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Thread: What are the top 5 things we've learned from OIF

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default What are the top 5 things we've learned from OIF

    Below is the starter for this thread that came out of a response I put forward in the Counter-Insurgency for U.S. Policy Makers thread that Steve Metz started:

    How will OIF be remembered - from which parts will we draw lessons available? What was John Ford trying to tell us when Jimmy Stewart admits to not having killed Lee Marvin in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance?

    I have some concern that when OIF is reviewed we will pick and choose what we want to learn out of it. If we were doing a review right now what would we lay out as the top 5 or so takeaways and how would that effect change? I'm a bit concerned that as a military we might go for the low hanging fruit instead of really being introspective and looking forward with regards not only to our own war, but the other wars going on around us, and how potential adversaries might be eyeballing us and their neighbors.

    Do we simplify things through aggregation of events to get our arms around it -a kind of historical compression - where important bits get crushed in order to make the larger event fit the place we assign it? Do we linearize historical events to a point where they are seen only in relation to previous and subsequent events and as such lose important context, or are discarded as irrelevant? We have to be real careful not to do this.

    At certain points in OIF you'll find some serious fights where the nature of war became reasonably unbridled and pure for the combatants, even if outside of that it was more tethered to its political context. This not only happened during the invasion, but in Ramadi, Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and several other places between the invasion and up to 2007. We still consider there is a possibility of large scale fights that might happen as a result of JAM, folks lying low until we start to withdraw BCTs or if events exterior to OIF should occur - we have to in order to lessen the chance of being surprised. We should not write those fights off as anomalies - nor should we cite them as the norm. Maybe its just the way chance and probability are going to play out to scale given the stakes of interested parties. What appears of tactical consequence to us, might be perceived as strategic to somebody else - and their reaction might be as well.

    Consider what it takes to deploy and sustain a large military force of air, sea and ground components capable of doing what we did in the initial phase of OIF - too many times I think policy folks (and even ourselves) don't understand or forget the mechanisms involved in that task until we actually have to do it. As such we often lack an appreciation for the overhead required to adjust to the friction of doing these big muscle movements with all the supporting ones that make it possible.
    RA ad Ken asked me to consider putting up a thread that would offer an an opportunity to consider what we've learned from OIF thus far. I had to think about that for a moment because it meant pulling a response from one thread and potentially losing the context from which the response was given.

    I think that is OK though - and I think we must always ask questions about what we've learned - but I wanted to qualify what responses "might" consist of:

    - It could be about the pre-war to contemplating the post war.
    - It could be from the tactical to the strategic.
    - It could be from the domestic to the international.
    - It could be about the enemy or about ourselves.
    - It could be about Iraq or about Iraq's neighbors.
    - It could be about our strategic culture or our morals and values with regard to how war changes us
    - It could be about politics or how we wage war
    - It cold be about IO or expectations
    - It could be about .....

    In sum - the floor is wide open. You don't need to stay on a single topic - cover five different ones if you want - be brief or be explanatory. I think it would be helpful if you can rank order them and tell why - so we all understand why something is important.

    For those wondering about the Liberty Valance ref. - John Wayne actually shot Lee Marvin, but after an older Jimmy Stewart tells all at the end, the guy recording the story tears it up - truth would not play out as well as the legend of a shop keeper standing down the town bad guy - we have to try hard and prevent that if we stand a chance of learning the right lessons and preparing for future wars. From the first guys and gals who crossed the berm and went into Iraq (and the pilots who flew those first missions) our folks have overcome fog and friction found within the METT-TC conditions - there are all kinds of lesson we should be considering.

    Best Regards, Rob

    I'll eventually get around to putting up my 5 - but I want to think about them awhile.

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    Rob:

    I like the thrust of this thread. But i have to ask you for some clarification and not to nit-pic but to know what you are trying to get at with this question.

    Do you mean actually what we have "learned," or, what "lessons" we can draw so far from oif? I am not trying to quibble over semantics but when you say what we have "learned" it implies knowing how certain understandings or "lessons" from oif have been incorporated into our organizations. So the notion of "learning" might be a bit hard to know at this point in the war but "lessons" i think we can start to discern.

    thanks

    gian

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default A good point, and

    Do you mean actually what we have "learned," or, what "lessons" we can draw so far from oif? I am not trying to quibble over semantics but when you say what we have "learned" it implies knowing how certain understandings or "lessons" from oif have been incorporated into our organizations. So the notion of "learning" might be a bit hard to know at this point in the war but "lessons" i think we can start to discern.
    I should clarify. I don't think we should limit the discussion to those lessons that have been brought into our organizations - here is why.

    I've come to believe more in the idea of "lessons available" - and I've kind of blended that into the idea of what lessons we think we've learned. I am concerned that in the future we might draw the wrong things from OIF - either because we wish them to fit the context of the moment, or because they will be divorced from the context of where they occurred. As such, I left the category very broad because we have such a diverse council who offer diverse views and experiences, and can scrutinize and postulate on what lessons are there to be learned, if they are the right lessons, etc.

    Last night I wondered if we should also expand the thread and offer the opportunity for council members to debate "lessons" offered up by others - then I figured that it would happen anyway because we are an argumentative bunch (in a good way)as well as seeking to understand each other's ideas.

    The idea has been bothering me since I began reading COBRA II - then went back and looked how OIF has changed over the past years and thought about what our potential enemies are learning about us, and how they are thinking and preparing to defeat us, deny us, thwart us, make it too costly, etc. in order to achieve their own ends - be it regime survival, expansion, creation of a caliphate, the obtainment of nuclear weapons, etc.

    How has OIF (and to a lesser degree OEF) changed our thinking and focus in both positive and negative ways about the use of military force to achieve a political end? Steve Metz had mentioned Colin Gray and Martin Van Crevald as having differing thoughts on the future of state on state vs. state on non-state. I think the future of who will wage war and how it will be waged important to consider - and I think we often postulate about the future by drawing on the past - the problem is we compress, linearize, and pick over history.

    For me I'm more in line with Gray - in that I think it wise never to say never or you'll find yourself surprised in the worst way in the worst moment with the worst consequences at hand. My belief stems from both the idea that because the enemy is not always going to conform to our own standards of rationality given their perspective and desire of the object in view, and because they are living, thinking, learning and adapting - they will avail themselves of their strengths and our disadvantages; and because given the friction and fog of war - #### happens - that will further compound things - be they mistakes or advantages. When I finally get around to writing down 5 things - at least one of them will deal with the idea of "hybrid wars" that Hoffman, Terry Terriff an others have been thinking of - the idea that a state will be involved in some way and at some point within a war, and because non-states seem to have "state-like" ambitions - that is where I lean toward Gray more then Van Crevald.

    Best regards, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-15-2007 at 01:51 PM. Reason: clarification - see bolded point I had left out

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    Default What This Civilian Has Learned

    1.) Significant and vocal elements on the home front will never support any war under any circumstances, hence an increase in PR energy and expenditures by the military aimed at the home front is not justified.
    2.) Concerns over immediate financial expenditures trump any and all strategic considerations and drive all time tables. The need for quality war products that saves lives and expedites mission completion mandates radical restructuring in logistical management/allocation.
    3.) ROE can only be defined by the culture and terrain encountered
    4.) All civilians and non-indigenous contractors must answer to a higher military authority, except the Diplomatic Corps, during combat and pacification operations.
    5.) All combat personnel and those slotted for in-country supportive roles must undergo extensive, intensive cross cultural training and those failing must be kept stateside or discharged.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Rob,

    As a historian and a lessons learned type I would echo Gian Gentile's concerns and go a bit further. We have opportunities now to look at insights but I seriously doubt that "we" have "learned" anything. I say that because no one on SWJ can really define who "we" is at this stage; that definition is citical to what is even considered worthy of learning. As examples, I would several key senior leaders who judging from their books or their pronouncements never learned a damn thing: Tenet, Wolfowitz, and Bremer are examples. Finally I would say that as you consider what insights are worthy you must always keep in mind that OIF is not over; the fat lady is still chowing down and has no intention to sing in the near future.

    With those cautions in mind, I would offer a few:

    Quantity has a certain quality all its own when it comes to post-war stability.

    Intelligence is often a question of user intelligence

    Speed in shifting forces means you uncover stabilized areas faster

    The host people chose their insurgents

    Cultural ignorance is stupidity


    Best

    tom

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    Council Member Stu-6's Avatar
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    Default What we "SHOULD" Learn

    1. Ends and means should be clearly laid out at the start. Bumper sticker slogans like we fight for freedom are a poor substitute for real stagey.

    2.War can be started unilaterally but it can only be ended multilaterally. It aint over till both sides say it’s over.

    3.Low tech stealth (i.e. car bombs, pretending to be innocent civilians, etc) can defeat high-tech weapons.

    4.Don’t assume they want the same thing as you.

    5. Your enemies are under no obligation to fight your kind of war.

    I stress "should" because we should have learned some of these from Vietnam (or other places). I think this is what Col. David Hackworth was thinking of when he use to talk about CRS disease (Can't Remember ####)
    Last edited by Stu-6; 11-15-2007 at 06:07 PM.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    no one on SWJ can really define who "we" is at this stage;
    Concur,

    Perhaps you breakdown "we" further into subcategories. Though this is not an all-encompassing list (I came up with this after five minutes of scribbling and mind dumping onto a piece of paper) I think each of the following groups has learned something different:

    - Military (Tactical level)
    - Maneuver, Fires and Effects
    - CSS
    - Intelligence
    - Civil Affairs
    - Psychological Operations
    - SOF
    - Medical
    - Aviation (fixed and rotary)
    - Military (Operational level)
    - Maneuver, Fires and Effects
    - CSS
    - Intelligence
    - Civil Affairs
    - Psychological Operations
    - SOF
    - Medical
    - Aviation (fixed and rotary)
    - Military (Strategic level)
    - Maneuver, Fires and Effects
    - CSS
    - Intelligence
    - Civil Affairs
    - Psychological Operations
    - SOF
    - Medical
    - Aviation (fixed and rotary)
    - Political Appointees
    - Political Electees
    - Department of Defense
    - Department of State
    - Law Enforcement
    - PRTs
    - MiTTs/SPiTTs/BiTTs
    - Logisticians
    - Merchant Marine Transport
    - Strategic Air Transport
    - Procurment
    - Acquisition
    - FAO specialties
    - Research Development
    - Doctrine Development
    - Linguists

    - Academics
    - Anthropologists
    - Historians
    - Economists
    - Citizens
    Example is better than precept.

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    I would also hazard a guess that the learning has occurred relatively quickly at some levels and not at all in others. The higher one goes, the less that really seems to be "learned," and also the further one gets into areas that do not have vested interests in the outcome in Iraq the less that is learned or retained.

    I guess that's where it ends up for me: how much of what we gather will actually be retained? We learned a great deal in Vietnam (the hard way), and much of it was dumped as soon as the shooting stopped (if not before). I agree with Tom in that the singing hasn't even started yet (in fact the ol' cow ain't even warming up yet). Goesh has a nice summary of many good points, and I could add more. But I still worry about how much of it will be retained.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Council Member kehenry1's Avatar
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    Default Third World = Ethnic/Sectarian Conflict

    From my perspective, looking over the battles in most third world nations, either the ones that we've been involved in to the ones that we just watched unfold, ethnic or sectarian tension or conflict seems inevitable. From the first Gulf War, where it was the Shia that rose up against Saddam, to the Balkans, to Rwanda, Somalia, etc, etc, etc, particularly wherever political repression and economic depression exist.

    We seemed to be blissfully unaware of or simply ignored the possibility or probability. Maybe it is "hindsight", but we should have anticipated both the Shia death squads and the Sunni insurgents. When one ethnicity or sect has been oppressed by the other, they are going to want "justice" or "revenge". If that isn't forth coming immediately by either the invading force or by the constituted "representative government", one side will take matters into their own hands and it likely will not be as controlled or limited as a government might be and the needs to reduce the possibility of all out civil war.

    In some regards, though I understood the need for the Iraq government (now Shia dominated) to appear "just" as a new kind of government, different from the old, and our own desire to collect intelligence, it might have been more prudent to move along trials of the top offenders and get that out of the way.

    At the time, we were operating under the assumption that the appearance of "justice" would stem the tide of the insurgency. In all honesty, it didn't. Instead, the length of the trials allowed such malcontents to use it as an excuse to take revenge and fueled the Sunni insurgency. Accepting, of course, that part of the problem was the Al Qaida presence and attacks being loosely associated with some Sunni local insurgents.

    Still, "justice" should have been done much sooner. This was not post WWII Germany where the population had been bombarded into glazed eyed acceptance of the end and could not mobilize to protest the long trials or the occupation.

    Had the Iraqis moved forward quickly with trials, even under a very imperfect system and with summary decisions of guilt (as if there was going to be any other...another complaint heard among Iraqis) and execution, the Shia may even have been mollified enough to allow the system to work, even a little more slowly on the rest. It might also had the Shia less concerned about high ranking Ba'athists coming back and allowed the rest of the reconciliation problem to move forward.

    As they say in the west, "No justice, no peace."

    Accepting that third world nations are likely to have such tensions or conflict, we should be much more cognizant of the layers of society and prepared to deal with them. Somehow, the idea that Iraqis were "educated" and had lived together for years without conflict, made us forget that the Ba'athist organization was largely Sunni and had oppressed the Shia violently, thus the probability of conflict.

    Further, that, most of the Sunni not being unutterable destroyed or decimated in battle, meant that they were less likely to see themselves as "totally defeated" and thus ready to accept the new paradigm of a Shia dominated government. It's the sociological idea that the abuser actually fears the return abuse that they may receive when they no longer have power.

    We should be looking for the divides and not pretend they don't exist. We should prepare for that divide and the desire for revenge.

    That is a good reason to have anthropologists and other cultural experts on board before we decide to go. And, we should be more willing to listen to them. Does it stop war? No. But it may keep a four year insurgency from occurring.
    Kat-Missouri

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    We seemed to be blissfully unaware of or simply ignored the possibility or probability. Maybe it is "hindsight", but we should have anticipated both the Shia death squads and the Sunni insurgents. When one ethnicity or sect has been oppressed by the other, they are going to want "justice" or "revenge". If that isn't forth coming immediately by either the invading force or by the constituted "representative government", one side will take matters into their own hands and it likely will not be as controlled or limited as a government might be and the needs to reduce the possibility of all out civil war.
    Kat,

    We were aware in 91 what was likely to happen in Iraq should we go north. I sat on the NIEs that examined the issues. That awareness was very much alive in 2002-2003; it was ignored because it was inconvenient to an established agenda.

    In Rwanda in 1994, the probability of genocide was ignored and downplayed, magain because it did not fit with established agendas. From 1994 thru 1996, we were again ignored when we warned that a larger, more dealy conflict was imminent, one that began in 1997.

    I don't disagree with any of your thoughts concerning anticipating such conflicts; I did that for a living, None of that, however, alters the reality that the decision makers must be willing to listen. If they don't, then the best analysis in the world is simply fuel for historical study when it comes to light.

    Best

    Tom

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    Default My .02, FWIW...

    01 Snipers. Use, availability, training, support, and that fact that for what appears to be the first time in a very long time, we didn't have to go back & re-learn all our previously hard won knowledge. It seems like in virtually every previous conflict, we basically relegated our sniper community to a back room, and forgot virtually everything we had learned. Did not appear to happen this time around.

    02 Widespread high speed Internet access. This has changed so many different aspects, and we still don't have our minds fully around all of the consequences. Everybody thinks of the AQI videos, but there's also the Mike Yons of the world, the milblogs, moveon.org, support organizations like Soldiers Angels and anysoldier.com, not to mention the impacts on the effects on MSM. Biggest Impact goes to SWJ, IMO. /shameless pandering

    03 Personal digital electronics. Back in GWI, some, but very limited. Nowdays, stuff is everywhere, and in every variety (cell phones, digital cameras, .MP3 players, iPods, DVD's and players, portable USB hard drives loaded with both music and movies, notebooks & tablets, etc., etc.). Appears to have a real impact on stress reduction, and behavior problems.

    04 Logistics. To me, this is one of the more interesting areas. Many non-military (civilian) logistics entities are always watching and studying how the US military runs their logistics, particularly in and out of hostile environments. There's a whole lot of respect out there for US military logistics operations.

    05 US Military Adaptability. This is actually pretty impressive, particularly as relating to operations in/around hostile environments. From an outsider vantage point, seeing the military strongly pursuing areas like HTTs and other similar things, and then attempting to rapidly integrate these wholesale changes into front line combat units in a hostile environment is very impressive. There are any number of very large multinational corporate entities which can only wish they were as adaptable as the US military has shown itself to be.

    Anyway, these are just some of the items noted from an outsider "looking in" viewpoint.

    One other point I might make is that many of you who are inside might in fact be "too close" to fully appreciate exactly how impressive some of these accomplishments appear from the outside.

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    Council Member kehenry1's Avatar
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    Default Hi Tech Surveillance

    02 Widespread high speed Internet access. This has changed so many different aspects, and we still don't have our minds fully around all of the consequences. Everybody thinks of the AQI videos, but there's also the Mike Yons of the world, the milblogs, moveon.org, support organizations like Soldiers Angels and anysoldier.com, not to mention the impacts on the effects on MSM. Biggest Impact goes to SWJ, IMO. /shameless pandering

    03 Personal digital electronics. Back in GWI, some, but very limited. Nowdays, stuff is everywhere, and in every variety (cell phones, digital cameras, .MP3 players, iPods, DVD's and players, portable USB hard drives loaded with both music and movies, notebooks & tablets, etc., etc.). Appears to have a real impact on stress reduction, and behavior problems.
    I would say not to forget that we were able to put video recorders, mp3 voice recorders, lap tops and cell phones into the hands of informants who were able to tape or otherwise provide information on the networks. Most reliable assets.
    Kat-Missouri

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    Council Member Ender's Avatar
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    Default Lessons as they relate...

    to multi-culturalization:
    1. Speak their language and understand their lingo, whoever they may be. Both literally and metaphorically which ties into...
    2. Ethnocentrism kills. Try to make anyone else look like us in our minds and we only waste time and lives, but if we just try to see the world from their eyes everything will click.
    to us:
    3. We are still our own worst enemy. No one hits us as hard as we do.
    4. We need to go back to basics, they are. Strategy has been left unchanged throughout the centuries but if stone age tech can still effect us we should go back to history and study the tactics of the ancients. I feel union between old and new perspectives will provide a proper foundation for future war fighting.
    to the enemy:
    5. They are playing for keeps, they want us dead and they are not going to stop unless someone forces them.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Default What I learned in two tours at the tactical level

    1. Iraqis want the same thing we want; safety and security for their families.
    2. Fundamentals are fundamentals are fundamentals. Whether its a tank on tank battle or a counterinsurgency, basic fundamentals of maneuver, fundamentals of offensive operations, fundamentals of defensive operations, fundamentals of security, and fundamentals of reconnaissance apply, it's just their application that changes.
    3. IF you try to learn the language and culture and make a concerted effort to communicate, no matter how bad you are, you'll make more money with the populace than if you play the "ugly American."
    4. You must live amongst the populace to influence the populace.
    5. Nothing you do is stealthy in a counterinsurgency. Someone is always watching you.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Some great thoughts in the previous posts - I'll try not to duplicate. Some of these would seem to be things we could have remembered from previous wars - as Ken might proffer - the more things change, the more they stay the same.

    1) The nature of a war can change before the first shot is fired, and the longer the war goes, the more likely change will occur. The leadership who can anticipate that change and adapt faster will retain the initiative. This is along the lines of seeing things as they are vs. how we'd prefer them to be.

    2) Technology, while it can be a fantastic enabler, is not as substitute for leadership, judgment and reason. War is a social occurrence involving people trying to kill each other - there are dangers in an over reliance on technology on all levels.

    3) War will consume resources far beyond those anticipated - the consequences it creates have impacts that go far into the future and create 2nd and 3rd order effects that often rival the original rational for going to war. As such trying to put a dollar amount up front can lead you to a false sense of security in the decision to go to war.

    4) The exact quality of a professional military at the onset of war is deceptive to people who have had no hand in its construction. Recruiting, training, sustaining and retaining the type of professionals present in the U.S. military in 2001 requires a great deal of resources (time, money and leadership) - it is not a simple task to replace or increase the quality while trying to sustain or increase quantity. If security matters and the use of military force is likely to be required, then pay the price for retaining a large professional force, so that when the course of the war out runs the projections,or when military options are needed elsewhere - you'll still have options.

    5) This has something to do with #4 - but given the climate - perhaps its worth giving its own bullet. Contracting does not automatically equate to commitment or competence on the scale required to attain the war's objectives. When war becomes a business venture, or seeks efficiencies over effectiveness it jeopardizes the legitimacy we seek in our national culture. Again - it means that a larger professional military force with leaders who have increasingly valuable attributes and skills will need to be retained - but in the long run we stand a better chance of attaining a political outcome we can live with.

    Best Regards, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-16-2007 at 03:11 PM.

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    My five:

    1. On supplying war: Just in time inventory management does not work when you have no prior data on consumption of the “sinews” of war.

    2. On paying for war: When there are limited sources of production and
    competing demands for the products produced , do not expect the military to get a “sweet” pricing deal.

    3. On waging war: Technology alone is not going to win too many battles.

    4. On informed decisions: Just because decision makers have been given all the best information available to make good decisions, one cannot be sure that the decision makers will a.) use it and b.) not make a bad decision anyway.

    5. On full spectrum operations: The day of the linear battlefield is dead.

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    And now my bits, from an outsider's POV (well, mostly; my dad retired 4-5 yrs ago (in Jan 04, then left consulting in Jun 04) after 33 yrs as a DAC - an Engineer and Project Leader w/ US Army CECOM):

    1. The US military's logistics system is among the world's best, no question. However, it seems a common yet unspoken issue that we have singularly failed to invest in strategic lift - be that airlift or sealift.

    2. The populace may not like to hear that war will leave people dead, will cost money, and will take sacrifices from domestic programs - but we need to bite the bullet and tell them that, anyway. Goesh, I think, emblemizes a viewpoint that, well...scares me. "The civilians will never agree with us, so screw them." No, actually. Perhaps not any time soon, but in most circumstances, you can convince the American people to support military actions. But you need to be honest with them and play it straight. It may not be easy to skip the "fight for freedom" or "make the world safe for democracy" soundbites, but nobody believes those. The American people are not morons, and *can* digest mildly complex strategic rationales like "knocking out the government of Saddam Hussein will remove a symbol of 'anti-Western resistance'" or so forth. It was kind of insulting to hear Bush and the Admin speak of WMDs and democracy - no, morons, sorry. I can tell that's not why you're doing this, because if it was WMDs, you wouldn't wait. And democracy is so freaking overused as an answer it's obviously a lie. Would a more complex rationale be less amenable to soundbites, and maybe less of a feel-good? Yeah. But it'd be better for the country if we were to up our debate by a good bit.

    3. The acquisition system is broken. It's a pathetic joke by this point, and needs severe reform from the root levels. We have got to find a way to untangle ourselves from the massive prime contractors we're dealing with. The services need in-house acquisition and contract management ability to a much greater extent - honestly, we should probably plan on needing to have engineering and design capabilities the equal of contractors, so that we can perform oversight. Relatedly: The thought comes to mind, in regards to supply shortages: We have the Defense Production Act. Why not use it, to force the manufacturers to work 24/7/366, for eample?

    4. Languages. The old thing where a kid can go into the military at age 18 and come out at 21-22, maybe have gone overseas, and still speak only English fluently...Must die a rapid death. Whether it means issuing every new enlistee and ROTC cadet a copy of Rosetta Stone or expanding on-base language training (or, my preference, putting our tech-obsession towards improving language training by a massive extent) or whatever: Every soldier, by end of their first tour of duty, should be conversationally fluent in at least one language besides English - Fluent being defined as "No, I don't need a translator to talk to a native speaker of said language".

    5. On contractors: If OIF has not made us allergic of contractors on the battlefield, we're hopeless. I must admit a liking of the British system, where all contractor personnel in the war zone are actually members of the reserves, under military orders and subject to military discipline while they're on contract. At the very least, every contractor that supports deployed forces, or is otherwise acting for the USG within an area where deployed forces are operating, should be under the UCMJ and under military command.
    Last edited by Penta; 11-18-2007 at 06:17 PM. Reason: Um, that was more than 5. Ooops.:)

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Never get involved in a land war in Asia.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Never get involved in a land war in Asia.
    "Fool!" cried the hunchback. "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders. The most famous is 'Never get involved in a land war in Asia,' but only slightly less well known is this: 'Never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line.'"
    Example is better than precept.

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    "Fool!" cried the hunchback. "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders. The most famous is 'Never get involved in a land war in Asia,' but only slightly less well known is this: 'Never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line.'"
    I'm not sure which is worse--that you're quoting the Princess Bride or that I recognize that you're quoting the Princess Bride.

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