What are the top 5 things we've learned from OIF

[Rob Thornton]

Below is the starter for this thread that came out of a response I put forward in the Counter-Insurgency for U.S. Policy Makers thread that Steve Metz started:

How will OIF be remembered - from which parts will we draw lessons available? What was John Ford trying to tell us when Jimmy Stewart admits to not having killed Lee Marvin in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance?

I have some concern that when OIF is reviewed we will pick and choose what we want to learn out of it. If we were doing a review right now what would we lay out as the top 5 or so takeaways and how would that effect change? I'm a bit concerned that as a military we might go for the low hanging fruit instead of really being introspective and looking forward with regards not only to our own war, but the other wars going on around us, and how potential adversaries might be eyeballing us and their neighbors.

Do we simplify things through aggregation of events to get our arms around it -a kind of historical compression - where important bits get crushed in order to make the larger event fit the place we assign it? Do we linearize historical events to a point where they are seen only in relation to previous and subsequent events and as such lose important context, or are discarded as irrelevant? We have to be real careful not to do this.

At certain points in OIF you'll find some serious fights where the nature of war became reasonably unbridled and pure for the combatants, even if outside of that it was more tethered to its political context. This not only happened during the invasion, but in Ramadi, Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and several other places between the invasion and up to 2007. We still consider there is a possibility of large scale fights that might happen as a result of JAM, folks lying low until we start to withdraw BCTs or if events exterior to OIF should occur - we have to in order to lessen the chance of being surprised. We should not write those fights off as anomalies - nor should we cite them as the norm. Maybe its just the way chance and probability are going to play out to scale given the stakes of interested parties. What appears of tactical consequence to us, might be perceived as strategic to somebody else - and their reaction might be as well.

Consider what it takes to deploy and sustain a large military force of air, sea and ground components capable of doing what we did in the initial phase of OIF - too many times I think policy folks (and even ourselves) don't understand or forget the mechanisms involved in that task until we actually have to do it. As such we often lack an appreciation for the overhead required to adjust to the friction of doing these big muscle movements with all the supporting ones that make it possible.

RA ad Ken asked me to consider putting up a thread that would offer an an opportunity to consider what we've learned from OIF thus far. I had to think about that for a moment because it meant pulling a response from one thread and potentially losing the context from which the response was given.

I think that is OK though - and I think we must always ask questions about what we've learned - but I wanted to qualify what responses "might" consist of:

- It could be about the pre-war to contemplating the post war.
- It could be from the tactical to the strategic.
- It could be from the domestic to the international.
- It could be about the enemy or about ourselves.
- It could be about Iraq or about Iraq's neighbors.
- It could be about our strategic culture or our morals and values with regard to how war changes us
- It could be about politics or how we wage war
- It cold be about IO or expectations
- It could be about .....

In sum - the floor is wide open. You don't need to stay on a single topic - cover five different ones if you want - be brief or be explanatory. I think it would be helpful if you can rank order them and tell why - so we all understand why something is important.

For those wondering about the Liberty Valance ref. - John Wayne actually shot Lee Marvin, but after an older Jimmy Stewart tells all at the end, the guy recording the story tears it up - truth would not play out as well as the legend of a shop keeper standing down the town bad guy - we have to try hard and prevent that if we stand a chance of learning the right lessons and preparing for future wars. From the first guys and gals who crossed the berm and went into Iraq (and the pilots who flew those first missions) our folks have overcome fog and friction found within the METT-TC conditions - there are all kinds of lesson we should be considering.

Best Regards, Rob

I'll eventually get around to putting up my 5 - but I want to think about them awhile.

[Gian P Gentile]

Rob:

I like the thrust of this thread. But i have to ask you for some clarification and not to nit-pic but to know what you are trying to get at with this question.

Do you mean actually what we have "learned," or, what "lessons" we can draw so far from oif? I am not trying to quibble over semantics but when you say what we have "learned" it implies knowing how certain understandings or "lessons" from oif have been incorporated into our organizations. So the notion of "learning" might be a bit hard to know at this point in the war but "lessons" i think we can start to discern.

thanks

gian

[Rob Thornton]

Do you mean actually what we have "learned," or, what "lessons" we can draw so far from oif? I am not trying to quibble over semantics but when you say what we have "learned" it implies knowing how certain understandings or "lessons" from oif have been incorporated into our organizations. So the notion of "learning" might be a bit hard to know at this point in the war but "lessons" i think we can start to discern.

I should clarify. I don't think we should limit the discussion to those lessons that have been brought into our organizations - here is why.

I've come to believe more in the idea of "lessons available" - and I've kind of blended that into the idea of what lessons we think we've learned. I am concerned that in the future we might draw the wrong things from OIF - either because we wish them to fit the context of the moment, or because they will be divorced from the context of where they occurred. As such, I left the category very broad because we have such a diverse council who offer diverse views and experiences, and can scrutinize and postulate on what lessons are there to be learned, if they are the right lessons, etc.

Last night I wondered if we should also expand the thread and offer the opportunity for council members to debate "lessons" offered up by others - then I figured that it would happen anyway because we are an argumentative bunch (in a good way)as well as seeking to understand each other's ideas.

The idea has been bothering me since I began reading COBRA II - then went back and looked how OIF has changed over the past years and thought about what our potential enemies are learning about us, and how they are thinking and preparing to defeat us, deny us, thwart us, make it too costly, etc. in order to achieve their own ends - be it regime survival, expansion, creation of a caliphate, the obtainment of nuclear weapons, etc.

How has OIF (and to a lesser degree OEF) changed our thinking and focus in both positive and negative ways about the use of military force to achieve a political end? Steve Metz had mentioned Colin Gray and Martin Van Crevald as having differing thoughts on the future of state on state vs. state on non-state. I think the future of who will wage war and how it will be waged important to consider - and I think we often postulate about the future by drawing on the past - the problem is we compress, linearize, and pick over history.

For me I'm more in line with Gray - in that I think it wise never to say never or you'll find yourself surprised in the worst way in the worst moment with the worst consequences at hand. My belief stems from both the idea that because the enemy is not always going to conform to our own standards of rationality given their perspective and desire of the object in view, and because they are living, thinking, learning and adapting - they will avail themselves of their strengths and our disadvantages; and because given the friction and fog of war - #### happens - that will further compound things - be they mistakes or advantages. When I finally get around to writing down 5 things - at least one of them will deal with the idea of "hybrid wars" that Hoffman, Terry Terriff an others have been thinking of - the idea that a state will be involved in some way and at some point within a war, and because non-states seem to have "state-like" ambitions - that is where I lean toward Gray more then Van Crevald.

Best regards, Rob

[goesh]

1.) Significant and vocal elements on the home front will never support any war under any circumstances, hence an increase in PR energy and expenditures by the military aimed at the home front is not justified.
2.) Concerns over immediate financial expenditures trump any and all strategic considerations and drive all time tables. The need for quality war products that saves lives and expedites mission completion mandates radical restructuring in logistical management/allocation.
3.) ROE can only be defined by the culture and terrain encountered
4.) All civilians and non-indigenous contractors must answer to a higher military authority, except the Diplomatic Corps, during combat and pacification operations.
5.) All combat personnel and those slotted for in-country supportive roles must undergo extensive, intensive cross cultural training and those failing must be kept stateside or discharged.

[Tom Odom]

Rob,

As a historian and a lessons learned type I would echo Gian Gentile's concerns and go a bit further. We have opportunities now to look at insights but I seriously doubt that "we" have "learned" anything. I say that because no one on SWJ can really define who "we" is at this stage; that definition is citical to what is even considered worthy of learning. As examples, I would several key senior leaders who judging from their books or their pronouncements never learned a damn thing: Tenet, Wolfowitz, and Bremer are examples. Finally I would say that as you consider what insights are worthy you must always keep in mind that OIF is not over; the fat lady is still chowing down and has no intention to sing in the near future.

With those cautions in mind, I would offer a few:

Quantity has a certain quality all its own when it comes to post-war stability.

Intelligence is often a question of user intelligence

Speed in shifting forces means you uncover stabilized areas faster

The host people chose their insurgents

Cultural ignorance is stupidity


Best

tom

[Stu-6]

1. Ends and means should be clearly laid out at the start. Bumper sticker slogans like we fight for freedom are a poor substitute for real stagey.

2.War can be started unilaterally but it can only be ended multilaterally. It aint over till both sides say it’s over.

3.Low tech stealth (i.e. car bombs, pretending to be innocent civilians, etc) can defeat high-tech weapons.

4.Don’t assume they want the same thing as you.

5. Your enemies are under no obligation to fight your kind of war.

I stress "should" because we should have learned some of these from Vietnam (or other places). I think this is what Col. David Hackworth was thinking of when he use to talk about CRS disease (Can't Remember ####)

[RTK]

no one on SWJ can really define who "we" is at this stage;

Concur,

Perhaps you breakdown "we" further into subcategories. Though this is not an all-encompassing list (I came up with this after five minutes of scribbling and mind dumping onto a piece of paper) I think each of the following groups has learned something different:

- Military (Tactical level)
- Maneuver, Fires and Effects
- CSS
- Intelligence
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- SOF
- Medical
- Aviation (fixed and rotary)
- Military (Operational level)
- Maneuver, Fires and Effects
- CSS
- Intelligence
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- SOF
- Medical
- Aviation (fixed and rotary)
- Military (Strategic level)
- Maneuver, Fires and Effects
- CSS
- Intelligence
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- SOF
- Medical
- Aviation (fixed and rotary)
- Political Appointees
- Political Electees
- Department of Defense
- Department of State
- Law Enforcement
- PRTs
- MiTTs/SPiTTs/BiTTs
- Logisticians
- Merchant Marine Transport
- Strategic Air Transport
- Procurment
- Acquisition
- FAO specialties
- Research Development
- Doctrine Development
- Linguists
- Academics
- Anthropologists
- Historians
- Economists
- Citizens

[SteveMetz]

Never get involved in a land war in Asia.

[RTK]

Never get involved in a land war in Asia.

"Fool!" cried the hunchback. "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders. The most famous is 'Never get involved in a land war in Asia,' but only slightly less well known is this: 'Never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line.'"

[SteveMetz]

"Fool!" cried the hunchback. "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders. The most famous is 'Never get involved in a land war in Asia,' but only slightly less well known is this: 'Never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line.'"

I'm not sure which is worse--that you're quoting the Princess Bride or that I recognize that you're quoting the Princess Bride.

[wm]

I'm not sure which is worse--that you're quoting the Princess Bride or that I recognize that you're quoting the Princess Bride.

I think we have a lot of leaders who took lessons at the same schools as Vizzini (the bald Sicilian) and Prince Humperdinck.

[Vizzini has just cut the rope The Dread Pirate Roberts is climbing up]
Vizzini: HE DIDN'T FALL? INCONCEIVABLE.
Inigo Montoya: You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means

I further think The Princess Bride ought to be mandatory viewing in every senior service academy, along with Dr. Strangelove and Forrest Gump or Being There.

So that's another lesson learned--many senior leaders do not seem to have a real clue.

[jcustis]

I think Dave summed up all the ones I was thinking, and a lot more. A few to add though are these:

-Sometimes it's okay to bring in an outsider to offer some commonsense insight into what is being done wrong and what could be done better (Kilcullen).

-An "oh ####" (Haditha) will negate just about every attaboy if it's bad enough.

-Layering warriors with all the pillows of force protection ignores the basic premise that sometimes we have to assume some occupational hazards to accomplish the mission (the IED fight). Doing so may actually hurt the troops.

[SWJED]

1. There is no such thing as a “slam dunk”, regardless. Even if issued from the 7th floor in a building located off a certain exit off the George Washington Parkway.

2. When the Commander-in-Chief challenges terrorists and insurgents to “bring it on” – duck. Even "dead-enders" have a certain sense of pride.

3. Mission accomplished has no direct relationship to war accomplished, excepting the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions.

4. Regime change is not an end-state.

5. In a formation, and as part of a unit conducting COIN, look to your right and then to your left. One of you ‘gets it’, one of you is trying to ‘get it’ and the other has a tool box filled with hammers. Be wary of the later – he will get you and your guys killed and be subject to a 60’ Minutes exposé – with pictures and / or video on FaceBook or YouTube.

6. The ‘Peter Principle’ is accelerated – where military commanders and civilian leaders are promoted to his or her level of incompetence more rapidly than during peacetime. When things go south they bow out or are forced on (not fired), go to the private sector and awarded the Medal of Freedom.

7. Lessons learned are more often than not lessons chronicled and will appear once again several years down the road as yet another ‘new insight’.

8. Strategic thought should not be attempted by tactical generals or political ideologues.

9. Campaign planning should not be attempted by tactical generals.

10. It ain’t over till it’s over.

11. Always heed the words of General Anthony Zinni, General David Petraeus and General James Mattis.

12. Read what the generals mentioned at # 11 read.

13. Part-timers are just that, God bless them. Move all critical skill sets / capabilities into the active component.

14. There is no such thing as an expeditionary interagency capability. You have to build it, they may come, or not.

15. Don't believe those who say they support the troops but don't support the mission. They haven't been there and haven't done it. Extreme paint-ball does not count. More often than not they are condescending SOBs and wouldn’t give you the time of day ‘on the street’.

[SteveMetz]

[Norfolk]

I think that there a little more than just 5 or even 5+ lessons learned or offered in your modest tome Steve.

[120mm]

1. Don't play soccer with PKT mines.
2. Put on your Pro Mask BEFORE running an M256 kit.
3. If you find a bunch of soda cans painted light yellow or light green, do NOT attempt to juggle them (WTF is BLU-97B soda, anyway???).
4. If that newly dug earth in front of your hooch has a bit too much "give" to it, or smells bad, it's best to call graves registration right away, versus later.
5. You shouldn't shoot at cylinders giving off red "smoke" during the heat of the day.

There. That's my list.

Honorable mention: If you're going to help you buddy up into the back of a 5 ton, don't use your loaded, off-safe M16, and don't extend it muzzle first, with your finger on the trigger.

[SteveMetz]

1. Don't play soccer with PKT mines.
2. Put on your Pro Mask BEFORE running an M256 kit.
3. If you find a bunch of soda cans painted light yellow or light green, do NOT attempt to juggle them (WTF is BLU-97B soda, anyway???).
4. If that newly dug earth in front of your hooch has a bit too much "give" to it, or smells bad, it's best to call graves registration right away, versus later.
5. You shouldn't shoot at cylinders giving off red "smoke" during the heat of the day.

There. That's my list.

Honorable mention: If you're going to help you buddy up into the back of a 5 ton, don't use your loaded, off-safe M16, and don't extend it muzzle first, with your finger on the trigger.

6. It takes a lot of kerosene to make MRE poop burn.

[goesh]

Steve, is this going to be the cover pic for the next book - A Line of Smoke in the Air: Conventional Applications in Iraq......?