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Thread: What are the top 5 things we've learned from OIF

  1. #41
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    Quoting out of context, aren't we?

    Go back and read the rest of the quote.
    OK. I'll restate my point.


    Saying "Iraqis want what we want, safety and security for their families" is like saying "Democrats and Republicans want the same thing: a better America." Technically it's correct, but it hides more than it reveals. For example, saying "Iraqis want what we want, safety and security for their families" it implies that because we feel safe in an area that hasn't been ethical cleansed, Iraqis will too.

    It also implies that we'd never go to war unless our families and homes were threatened.
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 11-20-2007 at 03:02 AM.
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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    OK. I'll restate my point.


    Saying "Iraqis want what we want, safety and security for their families" is like saying "Democrats and Republicans want the same thing: a better America." Technically it's correct, but it hides more than it reveals. For example, saying "Iraqis want what we want, safety and security for their families" it implies that because we feel safe in an area that hasn't been ethical cleansed, Iraqis will too.

    It also implies that we'd never go to war unless our families and homes were threatened.

    If you took it that way, you read too far into what I was saying.

    I meant it in a Maslowian self-actualization way.

    See the picture.
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    Example is better than precept.

  3. #43
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    Rob

    I think you hit on something subconsciously that needs to be discussed in greater depth.

    Transformation began, in the Army, in 1999 when Shinseki was CSA. He pitched the Stryker BCT as being the beginning of "transformation" and warned us all that "if you don't like the way we're headed, you'll like being irrelevant even less." That's the start of the problem - there has been a ridiculous mantra chanted within the Beltway since that time that everyone needs to be "relevant."

    Since 99, Transformation has really been equipment centric (FCS/ABCS) and force structure centric (Modularity). At least the codified version of Transformation - which is really the crux of the problem with Transformation as dictated from the bully pulpit of the 5 sided funny farm. Real transformation occurs as a grassroots movement from the lowest levels. Everyone has seen how training, operations and tactics have evolved and been modified because of OIF and OEF. That has occured because of how the war has evolved, and the codified transformation has been left in the dust.

    Units aren't deploying off their MTOE's for the most part - they are deploying off DMD's and MEEL's. That's the first sign of the disconnect between the codified version of Transformation and the real transformation. The Army that has been built on paper looks nothing like the Army that is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    This is a real problem because a ridiculous amount of money has been thrown at both the codified version of transformation, and at the new armies that have been created out of necessity due to the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. I submit that no other country could perform this feat - and we really can't either, because we're borrowing money at a pace that will take generations to pay off.

    So I submit that the codified version of Transformation has been a complete failure, at least in the short term. In addition, it has not transformed what really needs to be reformed (a much better term) - the personnel and acquisition systems. The personnel system is completely shattered in terms of officers. The thread on Officer Retention is proof positive of that. The acquistion system cannot produce anything quickly (don't mention the Strykers - they were supposed to be an off the shelf acquistion...and the NBC Recon and MGS variants took 8 years+ to get into service) and much of what it produces is a direct result of the codified transformation (more digital C2, more radios, etc...)

    The point to all of this is that real transformation takes place when there is real intellectual freedom, the necessity to adapt and change, and when it is driven from the bottom up. Codified transformation has done little to nothing - except cost a lot of money that the country doesn't have or is unwilling to spend in the form of higher taxes - and one has to believie that we could have fought these wars with the force structure and equipment of 1998 without any real difference in the results we've seen to date in OIF and OEF. Real transformation (nee reform) means correcting known problems (personnel and acquistion systems) instead of some half baked RMA where some delusional 06 or higher believes that the fog of war can actually be disappated with a strong gust of technology.

    In terms of the lack of planning in the beginning - quite frankly, if one is a war planner, one better have iron clad assumptions, and being willing to resign if political considerations are placed over military necessities if they cannot be resolved under the veils of secrecy. Clausewitz also stated that the military commander needed to inform the political authorities about the likeliness of those political considerations being acheived (or not). There has been plenty of discussion about what we really known about Iraq in 2002 - and let's face facts, we concentrated a great of time, effort, intelligence and resources to Iraq between 1990-2003, and I think Steve Metz stated in a thread that the potential fragmentation of the Iraqi state well known and wargamed to death in this time period, but simply ignored. The deaths of almost 4000 Americans and the wounds suffered by over 30,000 of our fellow servicemen (not to mention Coalition or Iraqi figures) are the direct results of poor assumptions, political considerations placed over geo-political, religious and ethnic realities, and military necessity. This still becomes a major lesson learned from OIF in my opinion - initial planning has to reflect political, religious, military, cultural and ethnic realities of any potential conflict, especially one against a weak nation-state. Failure to have the foresight and imagination required to develop these plans results in what we've seen over the last 5 years in Iraq. Yes, the enemy has a vote. And that's to be respected, and I vaguely remember something called a threat matrix from way back in the day. I wonder what the threat matrix for Iraq looked like in December 2002...and what it morphed into by 2004...

    Hope this adds a little clarity to my simple points.
    Last edited by Ski; 11-20-2007 at 12:14 PM.
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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ski View Post
    Transformation began, in the Army, in 1999 when Shinseki was CSA.
    I think it's more accurate to say that Sullivan began Army transformation with the Louisiana Maneuvers and Army After Next Project. He just didn't use the word "transformation." See this. If anyone is interested in it, PM me and I'll send the PDF.
    Last edited by SteveMetz; 11-20-2007 at 12:18 PM. Reason: Weasels ripped my flesh

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    Ski, I'm teaching a history course on transformation to ILE students on 2 December. Can I use that?

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    PM sent 120mm!
    "Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default Let Me Also Add...

    ...that I now have working drafts of two of the four chapters of my book that will deal with the Bush administration. The first covers September 11 and the beginning of the "war on terror"; the second the decision to intervene in Iraq and the conventional campaign. (The next two will cover the insurgency and the adjustment of the trajectory of defense transformation resulting from it).

    I've attached the first. The second is too long to upload. Would be happy to email it. Be forewarned though--they are big.

    I welcome comments on them as well.
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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    I think it's more accurate to say that Sullivan began Army transformation with the Louisiana Maneuvers and Army After Next Project. He just didn't use the word "transformation." See this. If anyone is interested in it, PM me and I'll send the PDF.
    True but we really have never stopped transforming; it has always been a question of degree--how large a transformation was underway?--and intent--where we doing it intentionally or were events forcing us to transform?

    Too often we have been event driven and that typically occurs in war. Sometimes we have been too theory driven and that regard I point to the original Lousiana Maneuvers and the theory (doctrine) behind Tank Destroyer development and fielding. Another of course was the modern heavy bomber (B17 and B24) which according to theory did not need fighter escort.


    From Ski: Since 99, Transformation has really been equipment centric (FCS/ABCS) and force structure centric (Modularity). At least the codified version of Transformation - which is really the crux of the problem with Transformation as dictated from the bully pulpit of the 5 sided funny farm.
    Yes in that it focused on FCS and ABCS as needed tools. No in that it (transformation as promulgated by Sir Donald) was/is driven by this idea that network-centric warfare could in its use of knowledge mangement substitute "electrons" for combat power. I make the distinction because I see it as critical; I fear we are back in the days of testing tank destroyers.

    Best

    Tom

  9. #49
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Hey Ski - your original points may have only come out in bullets - but I think your points have allot of depth. I wanted to highlight a couple of paragraphs from your follow on to discuss civil military relations.

    In terms of the lack of planning in the beginning - quite frankly, if one is a war planner, one better have iron clad assumptions, and being willing to resign if political considerations are placed over military necessities if they cannot be resolved under the veils of secrecy. Clausewitz also stated that the military commander needed to inform the political authorities about the I likeliness of those political considerations being achieved (or not).
    Failure to have the foresight and imagination required to develop these plans results in what we've seen over the last 5 years in Iraq. Yes, the enemy has a vote. And that's to be respected, and I vaguely remember something called a threat matrix from way back in the day. I wonder what the threat matrix for Iraq looked like in December 2002...and what it morphed into by 2004...
    I think at the tactical level your assumptions will be stronger - at the operational level less so - and at the strategic level even less because of the role policy plays - so I don't know that there are any iron clad assumptions at the level where policy and strategy mix - every time we make one at one level - the inflexibility of policy at a higher level may ignore it - I think it depends on the existing civil military relationship. What happens if the General resigns? and then the next guy, and the next guy? What if he speaks his mind, but is then fired or marginalized and a less capable guy comes in - one who is more malleable to the civilian leadership and will never tell the emperor he has no clothes? Its not an easy question looking backwards - let alone trying to gauge how things will look in the future.

    We have a planning system within the military at both the Army and Joint levels that lays out facts and assumptions, decisions and risks all with in a context that we understand (although it too can be ignored), but that system does not account for foreign policy decisions that are made in a vacuum - and which don't consider the potential long term domestic impacts at home - let alone those of the country or region we're trying to influence - consider our mixed bag policies toward Iran right now - and trying to sort out how that effects the rest of the region and beyond. You can lay out the facts and assumptions, but ultimately policy has to be able or willing to listen - so there is a policy ceiling I guess. Since politicians make policy - my guess is if there is a showdown in our system - policy will trump and as Sec Rumsfeld infamously once said - we'll go to war with the one we have (although I'm not sure he saw the irony in the statement).

    Certainly there were planners who saw the OIF numbers and recognized the consequences and risk involved and said "Holy-bat-guano - we're going to screw the pooch on the back end of this thing" - but it didn't matter - somebody in the food chain eventually told them to shut up and color. It was not until the political conditions changed enough to where military leadership was able to make a case of the obvious - and ask for and get the resources it needed to implement the ideas it wanted to. I'd be willing to bet somewhere in the future - we'll look back at OIF and forget how we got it wrong - we'll have to go learn it all over again -we'll just get it wrong again for whatever reasons, and we won't know it until it looks different - it doesn't mean there won't be successes in between, or that we won't succeed in the long run - just that we'll miss the right of it in the beginning.

    Ref the hardware, and organizational changes - I think those were needed - but for some reason we often think new stuff and rearranging furniture is the story - its got to be about people first. The tendency to put the stuff first probably has something to do with trying to apply business models to war by policy makers, and a fascination with technology over people - I guess its just easier to wrap arms around MTBF type stats, then putting faith into leadership if your trying to sell political risk.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-20-2007 at 07:47 PM.

  10. #50
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    These points are more in the nature of things to be kept in mind and they are aimed more at the American citizenry.

    1. You are going to war against human beings. They can be and probably
    will be just as brave, determined, intelligent, imaginative, ruthless and
    skilled as you are. The rectitude of their cause, or lack thereof isn't
    going to change this.

    2. You have to try-hard. Effort is how you overcome those things
    the foe brings to the fight. We all have to take part in the
    effort, not just hand it off the the military sub-division and say "come
    back when you've won and don't do anything that will look 'bad in the
    newspapers and upset civilians at their breakfast'".

    3. War will exact a price and their is no way of avoiding payment. The
    price will be treasure, death, time and effort. You reduce the death with
    treasure, time and effort; but you will never eliminate it. If you don't
    pay enough of these things you will pay by being defeated.

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    we are unable to bring our spiritual conceptions to bear in a fight in any formal, organized manner
    we have trouble distinguishing religious and combat leaders
    we cannot appreciate the impact on indigenous relationships female soldiers have when in a 3rd world Muslim environment their duties are perceived as a man's duty
    we aren't utilizing armor/light armor as a tool to build relationships/PR props/elements of cultural interaction

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