Roundtable on Proposed Civilian Reserve Corps

[Norfolk]

Edit: Oh, yeah. How do they fall under the Geneva Conventions?

Now that could be very interesting, and a real problem in the event of their capture. This is not an entirely workable proposition, at least not as it is presently composed. And the political and diplomatic fallout that would follow from CRC types being captured, and that in turn being used against the US Government (and American public) might range from damaging to devastating.

[Ron Humphrey]

Now that could be very interesting, and a real problem in the event of their capture. This is not an entirely workable proposition, at least not as it is presently composed. And the political and diplomatic fallout that would follow from CRC types being captured, and that in turn being used against the US Government (and American public) might range from damaging to devastating.

I asked several attendees at the recent COIN conf what they thought about the possibility of Reserve and NG being given the opportunity to be government employees civilian side as their fulltime jobs, thus allowing them to be deployed for mil service but also to go as civilians in the off time.

On the benefit side you would be able to maintain longer term consistency in ops awareness, and they would still be accruing time towards fed retirement.

There would be the problem of pay differential though and I guess along those lines is where we would find most the issues with something like that.

Most of those I talked to didn't think it would fly.

[smift]

The S/CRS and the Civilian Reserve Corps (in each of its components) makes sense from the "right person/right skills" standpoint and the "inter-agency lead" standpoint. With the State Dept slimming their positions on paper down to accurately reflect the composition of the Foreign Service, I am at a loss to the rationale behind the position described below (Sen Lugar and Sec Rice OpEd)- that the US Govt essentially "has it covered."
Understanding the difficulty of incorporating "commercial-off-the-shelf" human resources into joint and inter-agency operations abroad, 200 deployable experts seems better than zero. The challenges of recruiting, contracting (in the legal sense, not the fiscal sense), and training the Civilian Reserve seems worth it even if the worst expected outcome is some inter-agency processes for DoD and DoS at the tactical level.
We often concern ourselves with building indigenous capacity for governance throughout the spectrum of conflict (what the UN likes to call "peacebuilding" now) in foreign lands, but from here it looks much more like trying to figure out which horse to back in a race. Compromising on funding a Civilian Reserve is one thing, but disavowing a need for one altogether seems odd.

Washington Post
December 17, 2007
Pg. 21

A Civilian Partner For Our Troops
Why the U.S. Needs A Reconstruction Reserve
By Richard G. Lugar and Condoleezza Rice
"Congress has already appropriated $50 million for initial funding, and an authorization to expend these funds is required. The bill is widely supported on both sides of the aisle and could be adopted quickly.

Yet this legislation is being blocked on the faulty premise that the task can be accomplished with existing personnel and organization. In our view, that does not square with either recent experience or the judgment of our generals and commander in chief."

[MountainRunner]

It is my understanding that the hold on CRC funding is more incidental than specific. Senator Coburn is holding up 30-40 bills, the CRC legislation, S 613, is just one of many.

[BronwenM]

1. ARC - my question is what are they going to do specifically....the specific scope of work. As we know, civilian rapid response officers within OFDA (USAID office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) DART teams conduct rapid assessments and based on these draw up program designs that are later quickly competitively awarded via grants to NGOs. The enormity of the requirements require that implementing players are the "real" boots on the ground. 250 officers globally for ARC leads one to believe that the only way they can have impact is to similarly be mandated to jump start programming via assessment/program design/contract or grant awards/manage those awardees or contractors.

What is not stated is a) do they bring money b) if they do bring money, do they (ARC rapid responders) know how to develop scopes of work / grant agreements / contracts c) if they do not bring money, are they merely coordinators of existing embassy/usaid staff - another layer? what would they "do" - I would love to hear what the ARC staff members "did" actually in Darfur that was any different from USAID staff. If it is staff augmentation, why not just beef up USAID as USAID has YEARS of experience with the Federal Aquisition Regulations and also has been granted exclusions for OTI programming (allowing for nimble and quick in kind grants to local communities, ala QIP style, etc).....State Department is woefully unaware (as they are not trained to manage programs) of these time consuming and rather arcane regulations (not brain surgery for sure but experience allows for more expeditious programming)

It floors me that USG seems to be ignoring the experienced agency it has in hand and is missing the opportunity to refine/beef it up as the mandate resides with them (since 95) currently to address stabilization and reconstruction programs (in a unit called the Office of Transitional Initiatives - OTI). Sadly, instead of building upon a reservoir of knowledge and experienced professionals, cuts and hiring freezes have led to folks leaving USAID (and OTI) in droves. There are many (tens of thousands) civilians who are willing and have gone out to manage post conflict and what is now called stabilization programs (either former USAID OTI staffers, former USAID contractors, NGOs) but the funding for USAID to beef up this rapid response capability has never been there. As we know, USAID staffing levels - approx 2000 staffers globally - is a pittance. Frankly, I see this as boiling down to State's presumption that it "knows" how to "do" development better than USAID.. but as its first crack at it - OHRA and CPA in Iraq - demonstrates - State had no idea what it took to manage these programs. Development is a bit more than just handing out school books....

2. ARC - FACTS - Field Advance Civilian Teams - these are to be deployed if there is no Embassy to "implement R&S programs" at the provincial and local level - ala PRTs. Same questions for me - a) do they bring money b) do they know how to contract funds out

3. SRC and CRC - , my biggest concern is with the glaring ignorance about what it takes to implement successful development programs. The presumption that 2-3 weeks of training a year on "conflict mitigation or other conflict related courses" would even remotely prepare someone to enter into a crisis/war zone is preposterous and insulting to those of us who have dedicated our career to international development. Having the "skill set" (ie. a city manager, attorney, etc) has no bearing on whether one can be effective in a completely different culture and certainly has no bearing on whether the individual can perform under extreme duress in a different culture. Even the PEACE CORPS has its volunteers go through a 3 month training before full field deployment in STABLE countries (technical training on tech skill set aspects tailored to culture/realities, language, cultural/social customs, practices, medical, etc etc). Peace Corps at least recognizes plucking well intentioned people overseas is dangerous if they are not well trained.

It thoroughly frightens me that there is no serious mention of the likely INCREASE in conflict that this policy would bring to bear - sending well intentioned gung ho "get 'er done" US civilians with no experience into sensitive fragile conflict zones is a clear set up for inflaming anti American sentiment. The American will be ugly despite however well intentioned they are unless they undergo SERIOUS long term training and that clearly can not happen under a mirroring of a National Reserve construct.

[MountainRunner]

BrownenM, good questions. Sorry for the delay in responding.

To start, remember the name of the office: Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The "C" is important. USAID isn't not shoved the side, but in fact does bring its years of experience to the table. But also bear in mind, as I understand you have some experience in this area, that USAID's mandate is not post-conflict (or nearly post-conflict) zones, but humanitarian aid. The mission of CRS excludes humanitarian missions.

Also bear in mind the ARC, as well as the SRC, as not CRS staffers, but other members of other agencies tasked to this role, including USAID. From the post:

The ARC would be composed of dedicated civil servants from across USG, mostly from the State Department, USAID, but also from the Justice Department, the Agricultural Department, and others.

There's a reason the top leadership of USAID is completely on board with this. (As well as USDA, Commerce, DoD...) It is likely USAID will be found doing the bulk of the heavy lifting (literally). Also, there are two deputy coordinators at CRS, one of which is detailed from USAID.

Does CRS bring money? To some extent, but again keep in mind the "C". The easiest funding is with 1207 money, or USAID, or supplementals, or ?? depending on the situation and the requirements.

Maybe thinking of CRS as a hub to channel skills from the various spokes of government would be a useful visual.

As far as OHRA or CPA being State ventures. Not quite... In fact, these are perfect examples of why a) State should do this and b) why a standing office needs to exist.

Regarding SRC, it is more like the ARC than the CRC in that it draws from existing USG personnel. The major difference between ARC and SRC is the slower call-up.

As far as the CRC, there would be an orientation training but at the start of the 'enlistment', but consider that the Peace Corps is not just preparing a person for the local culture but training them in the job they'll perform. For the CRC, these are already knowledgable professionals. Because of the nature of the deployments -- they don't know where they'll be deployed until called up by the President -- their orientation would focus on integration with military and other functional details. After they are called up they are given the mission specific training.

I hope that helps.

Matt

[Ken White]

"...that USAID's mandate is not post-conflict (or nearly post-conflict) zones, but humanitarian aid."

Certainly didn't jibe with my recollection of what I'd seen them doing in a number of countries over the years. I knew that they'd been chopped to State a few years ago -- a bad mistake, I thought -- so I went to their web site and checked. They still have all their old missions. (LINK) and I'd be willing to bet they're in the priority listed:

* economic growth, agriculture and trade;
* global health; and,
* democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance.

Nation building and post conflict work are related and every one of those tasks is a fit.

That's not to say that some in the agency would rather not do that mission... .