I don't think there will be many volunteers for this duty
Full-time deployable specialists wise in the ways of managing faroff states in need (whether they requested it or not) of our administration. Hmmmm. Sounds alot like we're talking about creating our own version of the British Foreign Colonial Office.
As for American civilians' reluctance to sign up for this kind of duty, I am reminded of Captain Blackadder's lament:
“I did like it [soldiering] in the old days, back when the prerequisite of a British campaign was that the enemy should under no circumstances carry guns. Even spears made us think twice.... The kind of people we liked to fight were two feet tall and armed with dried grass.... No, when I joined up, I never imagined anything as awful as this war. I had 15 years of military experience, perfecting the art of ordering a pink gin and mastering the intricacies of propositioning local women in their native tongue, and then, suddenly, a half million Germans hove into view....”
-- Captain Edmund Blackadder MC, mired in a dugout on the Belgian Front during WWI, describing his days with the 19th/45th East African Rifles, while preparing to die pointlessly in a futile “Big Push” against the entrenched Germans.
Administering the natives just isn't much fun when they are shooting back. People don't want to sign up for this kind of thing, even when promised it'll only be for a few months, at most. They just don't believe that.
Americans, at heart, just aren't interested in shipping out to some remote dangerous hellhole to teach the natives democracy, or whatever. They want to live in America. They don't want to ship out to India, Afghanistan, Malaysia, or wherever for 20 years as a civil servant. Or at least not many do in Iraq- style conditions. We are a provincial people, for better or worse.
A telling fact is how few Americans actually have a passport. We aren't much interested in even visiting other countries, let alone living out the rest of our lives there in service of the U.S. government. Those that do are attracted to work like the State Dept.
No signature required, my handshake is good enough.
All true, unfortunately. Penalty of being
big enough and rich enough to offer a comfortable life -- and a really poor K-12 education system...
Not to mention a lack of leadership for over 100 years (and most certainly for the last 60) by our national government who could have easily fixed the latter problem.
To clarify, it is not my suggestion [posit: to propose as an explanation] but a statement from the source.Originally Posted by Penta
For more from the current legislation most likely to shape the organization, S.613:
This is insourcing the tools of national power. They corps is made up of USG employees or NG-like (but outside Soldier-Sailor Act as mentioned before) sent under the authorization of the President "to provide assistance to stabilize and rebuild a countryor region that is in, or emerging from, conflict or civil strife." The same laws that cover USAID and DoS would presumably apply. Why wouldn't they?S. 613 would authorize the President to provide assistance to stabilize and rebuild a countryor region that is in, or emerging from, conflict or civil strife. The bill would establish anOffice of Reconstruction and Stabilization within the Department of State to provide civilian management of stabilization and reconstruction efforts and would authorize the appropriationof $80 million a year for personnel, education and training, equipment, and travel costs. Thebill also would authorize the creation of a new emergency fund to be used to respond to international crises and would authorize an initial appropriation of $75 million in 2008 and such sums as may be necessary each year to replenish the fund.
...
Section 7 would authorize the establishment of a Response Readiness Corps with an activecomponent of up to 250 members for deployment on short notice, plus a standby componentof up to 2,000 personnel. In addition, the bill would authorize a civilian reserve of at least500 nonfederal personnel to support operations if needed. The corps and reserve personnelwould receive training on stabilization and reconstruction from the Foreign Service Institute,the National Defense University, and the United States Army War College...
Last edited by MountainRunner; 12-13-2007 at 05:57 AM. Reason: slight clarification
Mountainrunner, any update on your conversation with Herbst. I'm curious...
Target is next week. Also, it will likely coincide with an event TBA. I can't say more now, it's not my event and it's not confirmed.
Legislative Friction
The S/CRS and the Civilian Reserve Corps (in each of its components) makes sense from the "right person/right skills" standpoint and the "inter-agency lead" standpoint. With the State Dept slimming their positions on paper down to accurately reflect the composition of the Foreign Service, I am at a loss to the rationale behind the position described below (Sen Lugar and Sec Rice OpEd)- that the US Govt essentially "has it covered."
Understanding the difficulty of incorporating "commercial-off-the-shelf" human resources into joint and inter-agency operations abroad, 200 deployable experts seems better than zero. The challenges of recruiting, contracting (in the legal sense, not the fiscal sense), and training the Civilian Reserve seems worth it even if the worst expected outcome is some inter-agency processes for DoD and DoS at the tactical level.
We often concern ourselves with building indigenous capacity for governance throughout the spectrum of conflict (what the UN likes to call "peacebuilding" now) in foreign lands, but from here it looks much more like trying to figure out which horse to back in a race. Compromising on funding a Civilian Reserve is one thing, but disavowing a need for one altogether seems odd.
Washington Post
December 17, 2007
Pg. 21
A Civilian Partner For Our Troops
Why the U.S. Needs A Reconstruction Reserve
By Richard G. Lugar and Condoleezza Rice
"Congress has already appropriated $50 million for initial funding, and an authorization to expend these funds is required. The bill is widely supported on both sides of the aisle and could be adopted quickly.
Yet this legislation is being blocked on the faulty premise that the task can be accomplished with existing personnel and organization. In our view, that does not square with either recent experience or the judgment of our generals and commander in chief."
It is my understanding that the hold on CRC funding is more incidental than specific. Senator Coburn is holding up 30-40 bills, the CRC legislation, S 613, is just one of many.
1. ARC - my question is what are they going to do specifically....the specific scope of work. As we know, civilian rapid response officers within OFDA (USAID office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) DART teams conduct rapid assessments and based on these draw up program designs that are later quickly competitively awarded via grants to NGOs. The enormity of the requirements require that implementing players are the "real" boots on the ground. 250 officers globally for ARC leads one to believe that the only way they can have impact is to similarly be mandated to jump start programming via assessment/program design/contract or grant awards/manage those awardees or contractors.
What is not stated is a) do they bring money b) if they do bring money, do they (ARC rapid responders) know how to develop scopes of work / grant agreements / contracts c) if they do not bring money, are they merely coordinators of existing embassy/usaid staff - another layer? what would they "do" - I would love to hear what the ARC staff members "did" actually in Darfur that was any different from USAID staff. If it is staff augmentation, why not just beef up USAID as USAID has YEARS of experience with the Federal Aquisition Regulations and also has been granted exclusions for OTI programming (allowing for nimble and quick in kind grants to local communities, ala QIP style, etc).....State Department is woefully unaware (as they are not trained to manage programs) of these time consuming and rather arcane regulations (not brain surgery for sure but experience allows for more expeditious programming)
It floors me that USG seems to be ignoring the experienced agency it has in hand and is missing the opportunity to refine/beef it up as the mandate resides with them (since 95) currently to address stabilization and reconstruction programs (in a unit called the Office of Transitional Initiatives - OTI). Sadly, instead of building upon a reservoir of knowledge and experienced professionals, cuts and hiring freezes have led to folks leaving USAID (and OTI) in droves. There are many (tens of thousands) civilians who are willing and have gone out to manage post conflict and what is now called stabilization programs (either former USAID OTI staffers, former USAID contractors, NGOs) but the funding for USAID to beef up this rapid response capability has never been there. As we know, USAID staffing levels - approx 2000 staffers globally - is a pittance. Frankly, I see this as boiling down to State's presumption that it "knows" how to "do" development better than USAID.. but as its first crack at it - OHRA and CPA in Iraq - demonstrates - State had no idea what it took to manage these programs. Development is a bit more than just handing out school books....
2. ARC - FACTS - Field Advance Civilian Teams - these are to be deployed if there is no Embassy to "implement R&S programs" at the provincial and local level - ala PRTs. Same questions for me - a) do they bring money b) do they know how to contract funds out
3. SRC and CRC - , my biggest concern is with the glaring ignorance about what it takes to implement successful development programs. The presumption that 2-3 weeks of training a year on "conflict mitigation or other conflict related courses" would even remotely prepare someone to enter into a crisis/war zone is preposterous and insulting to those of us who have dedicated our career to international development. Having the "skill set" (ie. a city manager, attorney, etc) has no bearing on whether one can be effective in a completely different culture and certainly has no bearing on whether the individual can perform under extreme duress in a different culture. Even the PEACE CORPS has its volunteers go through a 3 month training before full field deployment in STABLE countries (technical training on tech skill set aspects tailored to culture/realities, language, cultural/social customs, practices, medical, etc etc). Peace Corps at least recognizes plucking well intentioned people overseas is dangerous if they are not well trained.
It thoroughly frightens me that there is no serious mention of the likely INCREASE in conflict that this policy would bring to bear - sending well intentioned gung ho "get 'er done" US civilians with no experience into sensitive fragile conflict zones is a clear set up for inflaming anti American sentiment. The American will be ugly despite however well intentioned they are unless they undergo SERIOUS long term training and that clearly can not happen under a mirroring of a National Reserve construct.
A little clarification
BrownenM, good questions. Sorry for the delay in responding.
To start, remember the name of the office: Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The "C" is important. USAID isn't not shoved the side, but in fact does bring its years of experience to the table. But also bear in mind, as I understand you have some experience in this area, that USAID's mandate is not post-conflict (or nearly post-conflict) zones, but humanitarian aid. The mission of CRS excludes humanitarian missions.
Also bear in mind the ARC, as well as the SRC, as not CRS staffers, but other members of other agencies tasked to this role, including USAID. From the post:
There's a reason the top leadership of USAID is completely on board with this. (As well as USDA, Commerce, DoD...) It is likely USAID will be found doing the bulk of the heavy lifting (literally). Also, there are two deputy coordinators at CRS, one of which is detailed from USAID.The ARC would be composed of dedicated civil servants from across USG, mostly from the State Department, USAID, but also from the Justice Department, the Agricultural Department, and others.
Does CRS bring money? To some extent, but again keep in mind the "C". The easiest funding is with 1207 money, or USAID, or supplementals, or ?? depending on the situation and the requirements.
Maybe thinking of CRS as a hub to channel skills from the various spokes of government would be a useful visual.
As far as OHRA or CPA being State ventures. Not quite... In fact, these are perfect examples of why a) State should do this and b) why a standing office needs to exist.
Regarding SRC, it is more like the ARC than the CRC in that it draws from existing USG personnel. The major difference between ARC and SRC is the slower call-up.
As far as the CRC, there would be an orientation training but at the start of the 'enlistment', but consider that the Peace Corps is not just preparing a person for the local culture but training them in the job they'll perform. For the CRC, these are already knowledgable professionals. Because of the nature of the deployments -- they don't know where they'll be deployed until called up by the President -- their orientation would focus on integration with military and other functional details. After they are called up they are given the mission specific training.
I hope that helps.
Matt
Not to nitpick but I think this statement is a significant error:
Certainly didn't jibe with my recollection of what I'd seen them doing in a number of countries over the years. I knew that they'd been chopped to State a few years ago -- a bad mistake, I thought -- so I went to their web site and checked. They still have all their old missions. (LINK) and I'd be willing to bet they're in the priority listed:"...that USAID's mandate is not post-conflict (or nearly post-conflict) zones, but humanitarian aid."
* economic growth, agriculture and trade;
* global health; and,
* democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance.
Nation building and post conflict work are related and every one of those tasks is a fit.
That's not to say that some in the agency would rather not do that mission....
Thanks Matt and Ken for your posts.
First a mea culpa....totally embarrassed about my referring ORHA/CPA as State Department venture. DoD of course created both and I had many buddies in ORHA working with the extremely talented and inspirational Jay Garner. My frustration lies along what James Dobbins stated
“Rather than use the structures that had done our nation-building for the last decade, we created a completely new structure. We transferred responsibilities from State and the Agency for International Development to the Department of Defense for things the Department of Defense had never been responsible for. That imposed another very substantial burden in terms of creating a whole new bureaucracy to do things for which there already existed bureaucracies.” Katherine McIntire Peters, “Blind Ambition,” GovernmentExecutive, July 1, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/features/0704-01/0704-01s3.htm (accessed July 14, 2006).
Regarding S/CRS, thanks for clarification and reminder that civil servants from other agencies (Commerce, Justice, Ag, etc) will be called up. I just cannot shake my strong belief that prior overseas experience working in development/stabilization is critical for senior leadership positions. Maybe that can be included in call up requirements within each of these agencies or at least some kind of overseas living experience.
I agree with you that a coordination mechanism is needed - no doubt. Just wish it had more folks who had post conflict reconstruction/stabilization/development field experience. I am familiar that S/CRS has a number of USAID folks ...and hats off to them for bringing in Larry Sampler as S/CRS Deputy Coordinator (from USAID) Larry Sampler - a real coup.
On CRC, I suppose I cannot shake the idea to more fully train CRC deployees. I was a peace corps volunteer and while I was a "joe generalist" 90% of my "technical" training was cultural contextualization of basic tenets of public health. I guess I look to the decision of the HTS program to train folks for 4 months - CRC may not need 4 months but I maintain it needs more than 2 weeks.
Thanks Ken for your post on USAID mandate. Just wanted to add some more on the specific post conflict mandate of the Office of Transitional Initiatives within USAID DCHA Bureau to give an idea of the depth of the work...
Some background on OTI
Since 1994, OTI, part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, has laid the foundation for long-term development in thirty-one conflict-prone countries by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting local economies, supporting nascent independent media, and fostering peace and democracy through innovative programming. In countries undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, violent conflict to peace, or pivotal political events, initiatives serve as catalysts for positive political change. OTI programs are short-term -- typically, two to three years in duration. OTI works closely with regional bureaus, missions and other counterparts to identify programs that complement other assistance efforts and lay a foundation for longer-term development. OTI programs often are initiated in fragile states that have not reached the stability needed to initiate longer-term development programs.
To determine where to devote its resources, OTI has developed key criteria for engagement:
Criteria 1. Is the country significant to U.S. national interests? While humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need alone, transition assistance is allocated with an eye to advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and priorities. Stable, democratic countries are better able to meet the needs of their own people, are more reliable trading partners, are less likely to engage in aggression against their neighbors, and are less inclined to provide support for terrorists. In consultation with the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security Council, and with the consent of Congress, OTI seeks to focus its resources where they will have the greatest impact on U.S diplomatic and security interests.
For example, OTI has worked in Kosovo, East Timor, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and currently is getting underway in FATA Pakistan
Thanks again Matt for your clarifications and I appreciate learning more and more as things unfold.
Best, Bronwen
Ken,
Are you suggesting they accidently left off "post-conflict"? Just forgot to mention a focus on transitioning societies from conflict? Also, USAID is developmental long-term, and not contigency dependent. S/CRS is a "Coordinating" office to bring the ground skills to bear.
Bronwen,
As far as Ambassador Dobbins' comments, to start, those were made in 2006. Just in 2007, CRS underwent change (maturation?) that weren't captured, for example, in the GAO report on Stabilization and Reconstruction (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0839.pdf) of Nov 2007. Included in the GAO report is a joint response by State, DoD, and USAID noting the shortcomings of the report mostly in the areas of recognizing the progress made in 2007. But more importantly, going back to his comments about transference to DoD, this is about returning R&S to a civilian-led operation.
I'm not entirely sure the 'nation-building' of the last decade has proven effect. I have Ambassador Dobbins books, seen his presentation on the subject, and have exchanged email with and as late as yesterday spoke to him on the phone about CRS. His comments in 2006 were of an entity shaping up then, not today. I won't speak for the Ambassador, but I don't think the comments of 2006 reflect his view, or concerns, of CRS today.
On the 'call-up', this isn't like what the SecStatewas about to do: force 'volunteers' for duty. The agencies would pre-designate who was a member of ARC and who was a member of SRC. This would not be an allotment to be distributed at call-up. Afterall, these people are going through training (constantly in ARC or periodically with SRC).
OTI would presumably be part of the S/CRS 'toolkit', as well as Commerce's and Agriculture's foreign offices, etc.
This discussion helps me with a follow post I'm doing. So I appreciate the questions.
Matt
To me, this comes down to the issue of contractors. There is clearly a perception that contractors are outsiders who are not linked into USG realities, requirements and accountability measures. It even goes beyond that and the analogy that comes to mind is getting something done around the house. As a guy, I feel like it's my responsibility and skill set. When I can't get it done or I try to do something, like the plumbing and end up with a flooded basement, I hate to call in the contractor, pay him a sh*tload of money and then still don't know how to fix it.
Bronwen has a point about the fact that there are a ton of qualified and skilled people working on contracts or working for contractors who have this skill set. These are people who often have very specialized skill sets (water sanitation, rural electrification, etc) and who also often have language and country experience. A growing number have post-conflict experience. These skills and experience have been developed over decades of doing development work in challenging circumstances. It’s not something you can pick up easily or quickly and there are no real shortcuts. Believe me, I’ve put very competent professionals into places like Iraq and seen them get overwhelmed, or at worst, melt down completely.
The problem is that the Agency contracting mechanism and culture often doesn't put them in a position to be able to integrate and fit into the planning, coordination and management structures. You have a Scope of Work, a contract, budget and have to implement a project. This works fairly well when you only have one Agency, like USAID, and it can manage coordination among contractors. However, when there are multiple Agencies and actors, the Agency is supposed to represent the contractors with other agencies and to coordinate and plan as necessary. It doesn’t work so well in this type of situation as we found out in Iraq.
In terms of providing a solution, I think that the architects of these measures should not forget the contractors and what they can offer. Perhaps a solution is to resolve the contractual, systemic and cultural issues which prevent contractors from becoming full and effective partners in the ongoing process of R&S.
In other words, if you know you're going to have a lot of plumbing problems, find a good plumber, invite him into your home, get to know him and find a way that you can work with him so that your plumbing gets fixed. If the plumber is good, it'll be worth the money. And who knows, you might find out why so many of them have crack...
Hardly. The guvmint is wondrous but they don't
do things like that 'accidentally'...
Not at all. My point was that 'humanitarian aid' NOT the US Aid mandate, it is merely one of them. Yes, it is a developmental long term operation -- with the goal of aiding US Foreign Policy (conditions not applied). Aid was quite busy in Viet Nam and supplied a lot of folks to the PRTs. It has done the same elsewhere both during and post conflict. that is part of its job.
I understand what S/CRS is, just wanted to clarify that the US Aid mandate is a great deal more far reaching than was stated.
A potentially helpful analog to the S/CRS role...
These comments represent ~ONLY~ the personal opinion of the author - a long-time fan of SWJ - and do not in any way reflect the actual policy of anyone. In fact, if you ask around, most people will tell you that the author has difficulty discerning fact from fiction and policy from pizza sauce. He's not all that bright, but he's certainly happy!
Among the USG agencies that are or might be drawn into S&R missions, the capabilities and anticipated responsibilities overlap considerably. The Venn diagram would have circles with more overlap than not (and would depend on who was doing the drawing, and for which S&R mission). This won't change unless/until funding streams change. When there's serious money, for example, to support the Ministry of Health in Pineland because it's a critical-priority-country, there are going to be multiple agencies competing for the work.
The role of coordination - as highlighted by MountainRunner - is truly fundamental to the office. Think about the interagency as an orchestra, and the Coordinator as the Conductor. The conductor doesn't select the music to be performed; that's done by the Board of Directors. S/he doesn't recruit the musicians, direct what brand of trumpet or violin is to be used. S/he doesn't even get to decide who plays in a particular performance. S/he doesn’t print programmes, market the performance, or collect the money.
The conductor works from a musical score that articulates all the various elements of the piece being performed, and assures that each section contributes their part at the proper time, at the appropriate pace and volume, and makes sure that the overall performance of the orchestra truly is greater than the sum of its parts.
If, in rehearsals, the conductor feels there needs to be a stronger presence of bassoons (analogous to DDR, perhaps), then the conductor doesn't hire bassoonists; s/he merely calls for more bassoons. The Board approves (ornot) and section leads sort out who they'll be, where they'll sit, etc.
I don't mean to over-simplify S&R missions by this analogy. But it's been helpful among the interagency in assuaging fears that S/CRS is going to pull an “Al Haig” the next time a true S&R crisis rolls around.
S/CRS is only relevant when the Secretary of State – as empowered in NSPD-44 – calls upon them to take a particular role in planning and/or coordinating the whole-of-government approach to a specific S&R engagement. In the meantime, work proceeds apace on the interagency management system that would support such an engagement, and the structures (as alluded to by other posts above) to provide a robust and capable civilian corps to execute such engagements.
De Opresso Library!
I could not agree more Beelzebubalicious. Given NGOs, (Interaction, or individual leading NGOs like CARE, Save the Children), think tanks (RAND, CSIS, etc), academia, traditional military contractors (Lockheed Martin, etc) are regularly included in USG supported R&S task forces or working groups on R&S process/policy....it seems logical to include the "other USG teammate" in the "chalk talk" - particularly given the co-captain "USAID implementing partner" role private sector development plays in the "boots on the ground" roll out of civilian side of stability operations - along side its other co-captains - non profit NGOs and reconstruction/engineering private firms.
Good point but...
Isn't this arguement a ~little~ specious? I mean, if you walk into the USAID building - any office or bureau - and ask for a show of hands from anyone who's there on a contract providing internal support at USAID, you'll feel the breeze of all the hands waving at you! If anything, some at USAID feel that we're already too cozy with contractors...
I've yet to work in a theatre where contractors weren't already involved in the chaulk talks, helping shape and take then execute decisions and policy, etc. To my mind, the only two red-lines with respect to contractors are (A) Clearance issues - they have to have them for some of the discussions, and (B) "Inherently governmental work," which is a fuzzy, non-sensible phrase, but does have some merit with respect to setting policy and engaging with other governments.
I'm a big fan of Doug and IPOA and what they're doing to create recognizable standards in the operations arena. I think that will only increase the comfort-level of government with using contractors in increasingly important and fungible work.
Oddly enough, looking back at this post, I realized that while I think of my self as a government policy geek and "operator" (in the non-kinetic sense of the term), in actuality, the vast majority of my work abroad has been as ... (wait for it)... a contractor!
Cheers all,
LS
I agree things are improving all around and efforts are being made and like cockroaches, contractors are not going any where (we'll be around after the mushroom clouds subside)....but I still don't understand why S/CRS would prefer to recruit people in domestic positions who don't have significant development or post-conflict experience rather than contract this out (to those who do)? The recruiting grounds have been well trodden and while there are definitely still good people out there, it's a difficult task.
I guess I'm not yet sold on this part of S/CRS' mission or perhaps I don't really understand it.
Saturday ruminations...
Local solutions to local problems are sustainable. Certain people can in fact act as a ‘sparkplug’ to ignite and facilitate change when it comes to reconstruction and stability work provided that they are able to work effectively both within the local system of the area of operations and within the system of their sponsor.
Whether or not the proposed DOS S/CRS system will work is an open question. My experience with reorganizations within government agencies is that they are often most effective at looking busy. USAID, Civil Affairs, the Marine CAG, and various NGO’s currently exist and have the requisite technocratic human capital however, they are often stove piped, hampered by anemic funding streams, and have leadership which has been unable to muscle its way forward and provide effective solutions on the ground in our two current hot-spots of Iraq and Afghanistan. The DOS is commendably trying to fill this void, but it appears they are not interested in integrating the existing structure into their efforts, which I think is a mistake.
A quick Internet drive-by of the recent historical record in the reconstruction and stability arena is of interest
As many of you are no doubt aware, over the long haul France did not do so well with Algeria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria...f_Independence ) France did however, do some interesting military sponsored reconstruction and stability work with their Arabic speaking kepis blues, or Special Administration Section/Section Administrative Spécialisée—SAS. They were able to field approximately 5000 personnel in about 800 locations across Algeria. Many of the kepis blues stuck with the Hearts and Minds campaign however some of them crossed over into the darker side of things. ( http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-343.html and http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section...9cialis%C3%A9e ).
Public Private Partnerships are the business community’s solution to the reconstruction and stability arena. PPP’s allow municipalities, or even neighborhoods, to partner with private companies as a way to manage the task of providing reliable electrical, water, wastewater, and other services to areas with aging or nonexistent infrastructure and growing populations. We see this concept presently enacted on the ground in Iraq with the neighborhood programs in which entrepreneurs purchase and maintain generators in order to sell electricity to the surrounding community. I feel there are potential parallels to the CLC’s (Concerned Local Citizens) for PPP’s in Iraq in that both are bottom up processes and that both can hopefully be joined to a larger ‘quilt’ of government services at some point in the 'future'. The World Bank has some experience in this arena ( http://info.worldbank.org/etools/PPP...I/sessions.htm ). My experience in Iraq was that Turkish businessmen and women live and breathe many of the for-profit aspects, and the Iraqi's and Iranians are right on their heels, they just need some more security...
The reconstruction and stability/development ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Development_economics ) arena has some critics ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naomi_Klein ) theorists ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Easterly ) and practitioner/theorists (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Sachs ), who, if nothing else, make for interesting reading.
My .02 cents,
Steve
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 01-12-2008 at 08:53 PM.
Sapere Aude
Saw a recent reference to a 2007 Annual report on Volunteers for Prosperity, the president's USA Freedom Corps initiative launched in 2003.They basically place volunteers in NGOs and companies in the U.S and around the world.VfP was established to encourage international voluntary service by highly skilled Americans supporting our Nation's agenda to promote health and prosperity around the world.
Some of their 2007 results (see below) are impressive and I was surprised the program was so large and that it was placing peope in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. Seems like they've figured out how to do it...
Fiscal year 2007 showed significant gains in key measures of volunteer participation:
• The pool of highly skilled American profes¬sionals available through VfP partners grew impressively from nearly 285,000 in FY 2006 to more than 355,000 in FY 2007.
• During FY 2007, VfP partners reported deploying more than 34,000 volunteers, over 60 percent more than the FY 2006 total of 21,000.
• Between FY 2006 and FY 2007, the number of volunteer opportunities reported by VfP partners rose from just over 30,000 to more than 34,000.
• The number of VfP partners for FY 2007 increasedmore than 10 percent over FY 2006, to 244.
Finally, grants to VfP partners during FY 2007 totaled $44 million, an increase of nearly 160 percent over the FY 2006 total of $17 million.
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