It is my understanding that the hold on CRC funding is more incidental than specific. Senator Coburn is holding up 30-40 bills, the CRC legislation, S 613, is just one of many.
It is my understanding that the hold on CRC funding is more incidental than specific. Senator Coburn is holding up 30-40 bills, the CRC legislation, S 613, is just one of many.
1. ARC - my question is what are they going to do specifically....the specific scope of work. As we know, civilian rapid response officers within OFDA (USAID office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) DART teams conduct rapid assessments and based on these draw up program designs that are later quickly competitively awarded via grants to NGOs. The enormity of the requirements require that implementing players are the "real" boots on the ground. 250 officers globally for ARC leads one to believe that the only way they can have impact is to similarly be mandated to jump start programming via assessment/program design/contract or grant awards/manage those awardees or contractors.
What is not stated is a) do they bring money b) if they do bring money, do they (ARC rapid responders) know how to develop scopes of work / grant agreements / contracts c) if they do not bring money, are they merely coordinators of existing embassy/usaid staff - another layer? what would they "do" - I would love to hear what the ARC staff members "did" actually in Darfur that was any different from USAID staff. If it is staff augmentation, why not just beef up USAID as USAID has YEARS of experience with the Federal Aquisition Regulations and also has been granted exclusions for OTI programming (allowing for nimble and quick in kind grants to local communities, ala QIP style, etc).....State Department is woefully unaware (as they are not trained to manage programs) of these time consuming and rather arcane regulations (not brain surgery for sure but experience allows for more expeditious programming)
It floors me that USG seems to be ignoring the experienced agency it has in hand and is missing the opportunity to refine/beef it up as the mandate resides with them (since 95) currently to address stabilization and reconstruction programs (in a unit called the Office of Transitional Initiatives - OTI). Sadly, instead of building upon a reservoir of knowledge and experienced professionals, cuts and hiring freezes have led to folks leaving USAID (and OTI) in droves. There are many (tens of thousands) civilians who are willing and have gone out to manage post conflict and what is now called stabilization programs (either former USAID OTI staffers, former USAID contractors, NGOs) but the funding for USAID to beef up this rapid response capability has never been there. As we know, USAID staffing levels - approx 2000 staffers globally - is a pittance. Frankly, I see this as boiling down to State's presumption that it "knows" how to "do" development better than USAID.. but as its first crack at it - OHRA and CPA in Iraq - demonstrates - State had no idea what it took to manage these programs. Development is a bit more than just handing out school books....
2. ARC - FACTS - Field Advance Civilian Teams - these are to be deployed if there is no Embassy to "implement R&S programs" at the provincial and local level - ala PRTs. Same questions for me - a) do they bring money b) do they know how to contract funds out
3. SRC and CRC - , my biggest concern is with the glaring ignorance about what it takes to implement successful development programs. The presumption that 2-3 weeks of training a year on "conflict mitigation or other conflict related courses" would even remotely prepare someone to enter into a crisis/war zone is preposterous and insulting to those of us who have dedicated our career to international development. Having the "skill set" (ie. a city manager, attorney, etc) has no bearing on whether one can be effective in a completely different culture and certainly has no bearing on whether the individual can perform under extreme duress in a different culture. Even the PEACE CORPS has its volunteers go through a 3 month training before full field deployment in STABLE countries (technical training on tech skill set aspects tailored to culture/realities, language, cultural/social customs, practices, medical, etc etc). Peace Corps at least recognizes plucking well intentioned people overseas is dangerous if they are not well trained.
It thoroughly frightens me that there is no serious mention of the likely INCREASE in conflict that this policy would bring to bear - sending well intentioned gung ho "get 'er done" US civilians with no experience into sensitive fragile conflict zones is a clear set up for inflaming anti American sentiment. The American will be ugly despite however well intentioned they are unless they undergo SERIOUS long term training and that clearly can not happen under a mirroring of a National Reserve construct.
A little clarification
BrownenM, good questions. Sorry for the delay in responding.
To start, remember the name of the office: Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The "C" is important. USAID isn't not shoved the side, but in fact does bring its years of experience to the table. But also bear in mind, as I understand you have some experience in this area, that USAID's mandate is not post-conflict (or nearly post-conflict) zones, but humanitarian aid. The mission of CRS excludes humanitarian missions.
Also bear in mind the ARC, as well as the SRC, as not CRS staffers, but other members of other agencies tasked to this role, including USAID. From the post:
There's a reason the top leadership of USAID is completely on board with this. (As well as USDA, Commerce, DoD...) It is likely USAID will be found doing the bulk of the heavy lifting (literally). Also, there are two deputy coordinators at CRS, one of which is detailed from USAID.The ARC would be composed of dedicated civil servants from across USG, mostly from the State Department, USAID, but also from the Justice Department, the Agricultural Department, and others.
Does CRS bring money? To some extent, but again keep in mind the "C". The easiest funding is with 1207 money, or USAID, or supplementals, or ?? depending on the situation and the requirements.
Maybe thinking of CRS as a hub to channel skills from the various spokes of government would be a useful visual.
As far as OHRA or CPA being State ventures. Not quite... In fact, these are perfect examples of why a) State should do this and b) why a standing office needs to exist.
Regarding SRC, it is more like the ARC than the CRC in that it draws from existing USG personnel. The major difference between ARC and SRC is the slower call-up.
As far as the CRC, there would be an orientation training but at the start of the 'enlistment', but consider that the Peace Corps is not just preparing a person for the local culture but training them in the job they'll perform. For the CRC, these are already knowledgable professionals. Because of the nature of the deployments -- they don't know where they'll be deployed until called up by the President -- their orientation would focus on integration with military and other functional details. After they are called up they are given the mission specific training.
I hope that helps.
Matt
Not to nitpick but I think this statement is a significant error:
Certainly didn't jibe with my recollection of what I'd seen them doing in a number of countries over the years. I knew that they'd been chopped to State a few years ago -- a bad mistake, I thought -- so I went to their web site and checked. They still have all their old missions. (LINK) and I'd be willing to bet they're in the priority listed:"...that USAID's mandate is not post-conflict (or nearly post-conflict) zones, but humanitarian aid."
* economic growth, agriculture and trade;
* global health; and,
* democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance.
Nation building and post conflict work are related and every one of those tasks is a fit.
That's not to say that some in the agency would rather not do that mission....
Thanks Matt and Ken for your posts.
First a mea culpa....totally embarrassed about my referring ORHA/CPA as State Department venture. DoD of course created both and I had many buddies in ORHA working with the extremely talented and inspirational Jay Garner. My frustration lies along what James Dobbins stated
“Rather than use the structures that had done our nation-building for the last decade, we created a completely new structure. We transferred responsibilities from State and the Agency for International Development to the Department of Defense for things the Department of Defense had never been responsible for. That imposed another very substantial burden in terms of creating a whole new bureaucracy to do things for which there already existed bureaucracies.” Katherine McIntire Peters, “Blind Ambition,” GovernmentExecutive, July 1, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/features/0704-01/0704-01s3.htm (accessed July 14, 2006).
Regarding S/CRS, thanks for clarification and reminder that civil servants from other agencies (Commerce, Justice, Ag, etc) will be called up. I just cannot shake my strong belief that prior overseas experience working in development/stabilization is critical for senior leadership positions. Maybe that can be included in call up requirements within each of these agencies or at least some kind of overseas living experience.
I agree with you that a coordination mechanism is needed - no doubt. Just wish it had more folks who had post conflict reconstruction/stabilization/development field experience. I am familiar that S/CRS has a number of USAID folks ...and hats off to them for bringing in Larry Sampler as S/CRS Deputy Coordinator (from USAID) Larry Sampler - a real coup.
On CRC, I suppose I cannot shake the idea to more fully train CRC deployees. I was a peace corps volunteer and while I was a "joe generalist" 90% of my "technical" training was cultural contextualization of basic tenets of public health. I guess I look to the decision of the HTS program to train folks for 4 months - CRC may not need 4 months but I maintain it needs more than 2 weeks.
Thanks Ken for your post on USAID mandate. Just wanted to add some more on the specific post conflict mandate of the Office of Transitional Initiatives within USAID DCHA Bureau to give an idea of the depth of the work...
Some background on OTI
Since 1994, OTI, part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, has laid the foundation for long-term development in thirty-one conflict-prone countries by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting local economies, supporting nascent independent media, and fostering peace and democracy through innovative programming. In countries undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, violent conflict to peace, or pivotal political events, initiatives serve as catalysts for positive political change. OTI programs are short-term -- typically, two to three years in duration. OTI works closely with regional bureaus, missions and other counterparts to identify programs that complement other assistance efforts and lay a foundation for longer-term development. OTI programs often are initiated in fragile states that have not reached the stability needed to initiate longer-term development programs.
To determine where to devote its resources, OTI has developed key criteria for engagement:
Criteria 1. Is the country significant to U.S. national interests? While humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need alone, transition assistance is allocated with an eye to advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and priorities. Stable, democratic countries are better able to meet the needs of their own people, are more reliable trading partners, are less likely to engage in aggression against their neighbors, and are less inclined to provide support for terrorists. In consultation with the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security Council, and with the consent of Congress, OTI seeks to focus its resources where they will have the greatest impact on U.S diplomatic and security interests.
For example, OTI has worked in Kosovo, East Timor, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and currently is getting underway in FATA Pakistan
Thanks again Matt for your clarifications and I appreciate learning more and more as things unfold.
Best, Bronwen
Ken,
Are you suggesting they accidently left off "post-conflict"? Just forgot to mention a focus on transitioning societies from conflict? Also, USAID is developmental long-term, and not contigency dependent. S/CRS is a "Coordinating" office to bring the ground skills to bear.
Bronwen,
As far as Ambassador Dobbins' comments, to start, those were made in 2006. Just in 2007, CRS underwent change (maturation?) that weren't captured, for example, in the GAO report on Stabilization and Reconstruction (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0839.pdf) of Nov 2007. Included in the GAO report is a joint response by State, DoD, and USAID noting the shortcomings of the report mostly in the areas of recognizing the progress made in 2007. But more importantly, going back to his comments about transference to DoD, this is about returning R&S to a civilian-led operation.
I'm not entirely sure the 'nation-building' of the last decade has proven effect. I have Ambassador Dobbins books, seen his presentation on the subject, and have exchanged email with and as late as yesterday spoke to him on the phone about CRS. His comments in 2006 were of an entity shaping up then, not today. I won't speak for the Ambassador, but I don't think the comments of 2006 reflect his view, or concerns, of CRS today.
On the 'call-up', this isn't like what the SecStatewas about to do: force 'volunteers' for duty. The agencies would pre-designate who was a member of ARC and who was a member of SRC. This would not be an allotment to be distributed at call-up. Afterall, these people are going through training (constantly in ARC or periodically with SRC).
OTI would presumably be part of the S/CRS 'toolkit', as well as Commerce's and Agriculture's foreign offices, etc.
This discussion helps me with a follow post I'm doing. So I appreciate the questions.
Matt
Hardly. The guvmint is wondrous but they don't
do things like that 'accidentally'...
Not at all. My point was that 'humanitarian aid' NOT the US Aid mandate, it is merely one of them. Yes, it is a developmental long term operation -- with the goal of aiding US Foreign Policy (conditions not applied). Aid was quite busy in Viet Nam and supplied a lot of folks to the PRTs. It has done the same elsewhere both during and post conflict. that is part of its job.Originally Posted by MountainRunner
I understand what S/CRS is, just wanted to clarify that the US Aid mandate is a great deal more far reaching than was stated.
To me, this comes down to the issue of contractors. There is clearly a perception that contractors are outsiders who are not linked into USG realities, requirements and accountability measures. It even goes beyond that and the analogy that comes to mind is getting something done around the house. As a guy, I feel like it's my responsibility and skill set. When I can't get it done or I try to do something, like the plumbing and end up with a flooded basement, I hate to call in the contractor, pay him a sh*tload of money and then still don't know how to fix it.
Bronwen has a point about the fact that there are a ton of qualified and skilled people working on contracts or working for contractors who have this skill set. These are people who often have very specialized skill sets (water sanitation, rural electrification, etc) and who also often have language and country experience. A growing number have post-conflict experience. These skills and experience have been developed over decades of doing development work in challenging circumstances. It’s not something you can pick up easily or quickly and there are no real shortcuts. Believe me, I’ve put very competent professionals into places like Iraq and seen them get overwhelmed, or at worst, melt down completely.
The problem is that the Agency contracting mechanism and culture often doesn't put them in a position to be able to integrate and fit into the planning, coordination and management structures. You have a Scope of Work, a contract, budget and have to implement a project. This works fairly well when you only have one Agency, like USAID, and it can manage coordination among contractors. However, when there are multiple Agencies and actors, the Agency is supposed to represent the contractors with other agencies and to coordinate and plan as necessary. It doesn’t work so well in this type of situation as we found out in Iraq.
In terms of providing a solution, I think that the architects of these measures should not forget the contractors and what they can offer. Perhaps a solution is to resolve the contractual, systemic and cultural issues which prevent contractors from becoming full and effective partners in the ongoing process of R&S.
In other words, if you know you're going to have a lot of plumbing problems, find a good plumber, invite him into your home, get to know him and find a way that you can work with him so that your plumbing gets fixed. If the plumber is good, it'll be worth the money. And who knows, you might find out why so many of them have crack...
I could not agree more Beelzebubalicious. Given NGOs, (Interaction, or individual leading NGOs like CARE, Save the Children), think tanks (RAND, CSIS, etc), academia, traditional military contractors (Lockheed Martin, etc) are regularly included in USG supported R&S task forces or working groups on R&S process/policy....it seems logical to include the "other USG teammate" in the "chalk talk" - particularly given the co-captain "USAID implementing partner" role private sector development plays in the "boots on the ground" roll out of civilian side of stability operations - along side its other co-captains - non profit NGOs and reconstruction/engineering private firms.
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