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  1. #1
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    Default STRATEGY TO COMBAT Transnational Crime

    http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defa..._July_2011.pdf

    In years past, TOC was largely regional in scope, hierarchically structured, and had only occasional links to terrorism. Today’s criminal networks are fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including cybercrime and providing support for terrorism. Virtually every transnational criminal organization and its enterprises are connected and enabled by information systems technologies, making cybercrime a substantially more important concern. TOC threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states or contested spaces; forging alliances with corrupt foreign government officials and some foreign intelligence services; destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states; undermining competition in world strategic markets; using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds; creating the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists; and expanding narcotrafficking and human and weapons smuggling networks. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support. TOC also threatens the interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems that move people and commerce throughout the global economy and across our borders.
    While researching documents to better understand the potential links between terrorism and transnational organized crime I came across our relatively new TOC National Strategy.

  2. #2
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    Fletcher Forum on World Affairs, Winter 2010: Tracking Narco-Terrorist Networks: The Money Trail
    Before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda funded and controlled operations from its base in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda provided funding for the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, and the 2001 World Trade Center attacks. Today, the terrorist threat is more decentralized, with the al-Qaeda core no longer funding other terrorist groups, cells, or operations as they did in the past. Local cells are being increasingly left to fund their own activities. While many fundraising techniques remain popular, including abuse of charities and otherwise legitimate businesses, terrorist cells increasingly engage in criminal activity to fund their actions. For example, Al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia, helped to finance the 2002 Bali bombings by robbing jewelry stores. Another example is the 2005 attacks in London, which were partially financed by credit card fraud.
    Break
    All things considered, the growing nexus between international terrorism and organized crime may actually be a positive development. For one, tracking terrorists for their illicit activities, rather than their terrorism-based endeavors, is less complicated. Also, while countries may adhere to dissimilar definitions of terrorism or hold divergent lists of designated terrorist organizations, there is more of a consensus on the need to fight crime.
    CRS, 24 May 07: Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress
    According to numerous terrorism scholars and analysts, there are indications
    that terrorists are increasingly relying on non-terroristic, precursor crimes to facilitate their terrorist attacks and/or further their terrorist campaign. Additionally, it appears that terrorist groups are diversifying and expanding the variety of crimes they commit. The cause for the increase in pre-attack criminal activity may be due to the following four factors:
    - the decline in state sponsorship;
    - the amateurization and decentralization of terror;
    - enhanced counterterrorism measures,
    - and changing terrorist demographics (i.e. shifts in ideology, strategy,
    and capabilities).
    According to the United Nations, there is a convergence of organized crime and ideologically driven terrorist groups. Antonio Maria Costa, a UN official with the Office on Drugs and Crime, reportedly believes the “world is seeing the birth of a new hybrid of organized-crime-terrorist organizations.” For example, media reports suggest that “Jihadists have penetrated as much as a third of the $12.5 billion Moroccan hashish trade.” According to the Brussels-based World Customs Organization, “counterfeiting is one of the fastest growing industries in the world with an estimated market worth more than [$]500 billion each year, or 7 percent of global trade!,” the illegal profits of which often go to fund terrorist organizations.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 11-30-2011 at 12:43 PM.

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    The Joint Staff J-7 published a first version of a Commander's Handbook for Counter Threat Finance on 13 Sep 11.
    This handbook provides an understanding of the processes and procedures being employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to plan, execute, and assess counter threat finance (CTF) activities and integrate them into their joint operation/campaign plans. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and considerations related to CTF that are being employed in the field and are evolving toward incorporation in joint doctrine.
    As an aside, I found it interesting, given the current push for putting damn near everything behind CAC access, that this FOUO pub is openly available to the broad 'net public on the Defense Technical Information Center site.

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    Default Kidnapping: Why AQ Needs Donations More Than Ransoms

    An article by Clint Watts (CWOT) which opens with:
    I discuss the trade offs and disadvantages for al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM that are dependent on illicit funding schemes, namely kidnapping, to sustain their operations. I conclude with the opinion that al Qaeda needs donations more than ransoms if they intend to orchestrate a comeback.

    (He ends)...Another detractor of illicit revenue generation for al Qaeda groups is the scrutiny brought on terrorists by law enforcement and the military when they conduct illegal activities like kidnapping and drug smuggling. An important point that I overlooked in the FPRI post.
    Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=975
    davidbfpo

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    As this is a wider than AQ thread I was puzzled to read Clint's comment and then minutes later on the BBC:
    A Newry man is believed to be the first person successfully prosecuted for terrorist fund-raising in Northern Ireland.
    Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21462050

    Yes, the first person successfully prosecuted! 'The Troubles' started in 1969 and much has been made in the UK of having terror finance laws and enforcement. The report has no details and a Google search found little else.
    davidbfpo

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    Default Pursuing terrorist finance: UK perspectives

    Within the linked document - written evidence given on 'Pursue', part of evidence presented to the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs (HASC) - are several contributions on terrorist finance and counter-action. It includes officials and others, including charities. On a quick read some "gems" lie within.

    Link alas no longer works:http://www.parliament.uk/documents/c...20Evidence.pdf
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-11-2016 at 12:41 PM.
    davidbfpo

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    Default A "blind eye" to supporting Syrian insurgents

    I recently heard an open source analyst comment that the Syrian insurgents were receiving financial support, up to US$600m, from rich families and others in the Gulf who move the cash to Kuwait ostensibly to donate to Kuwaiti charities. Kuwait and the Gulf states have legislation on countering terrorism finance, but being charitable donations prefer to "look the other way". Plus a Salafist faction is present in the Kuwaiti parliament, who would not support an official response.

    A partial support comes in this Kuwaiti newspaper report:http://alhayat.com/Details/568664 The Google translation is not perfect.
    davidbfpo

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