Terrorist Finance (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Taken from the current Yemen thread and cited in part:

The biggest beneficiary of the war has been AQAP, which now controls some six hundred kilometers of the southern coastline—from just outside Aden to Mukalla, the fifth largest city in Yemen and the capital of Hadramaut province. When AQAP seized the Mukalla at the start of the war, they looted $100 million from its banks. They are now earning at least $2 million and perhaps as much as $5 million a day in smuggling oil. The group is stronger today than ever before.

Link:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/marka...ecurity-riedel

My interest was prompted by a "lurker" asking does the anti-money laundering legal structure work, when terrorist groups can be self-financing?

[davidbfpo]

A RUSI paper, 42 pgs (un-read yet) by a US author:

This paper offers an overview of the aims of US policy, an examination of the US experience in implementing Sections 314 and 311 of the PATRIOT Act, and a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the US approach. It also draws lessons from US experience and provides seven principles for policy-makers to consider when developing public–private information-sharing arrangements at the national or international level.

Link:https://rusi.org/publication/occasio...-us-experience

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a SWJ comment which linked to this book review of a 2015 book, which was missed:http://www.thewashingtonbookreview.c...cial-networks/

The book is Counterterrorism and Threat Finance Analysis during Wartime edited by David M. Blum and J. Edward Conway, Lexington Books (Rowman & Littlefield), US $85.00, Pp 212, February 2015, ISBN 978-0739180433.

The review states:

The editors have been members of either the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) or the Iraq Threat Finance Cell. Both Blum and Conway were deployed in wars.

[davidbfpo]

May 2016 CTC Sentinel article by Magnus Ranstrop, on ISIS micro-financing methods in Europe:https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/micro...opean-recruits

Abstract: Islamic State recruits from Europe are raising significant funds for the group through multiple microfinancing techniques within the European Union. Moneymaking schemes have included petty theft, fraudulent loan applications, social insurance fraud, and VAT fraud. A range of techniques are being employed by aspiring and active European Islamic State operatives to transfer money to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, including bringing money with them when they travel to join the group, withdrawing funds from money transfer businesses operating along the Turkey-Syria border, sending cash couriers, and using the hawala system. To shrink this funding pipeline, financial intelligence must be better integrated into EU counterterrorism efforts.

[davidbfpo]

Just spotted and not read a new RUSI report 'Making Information Flow: Instruments and Innovations for Enhancing Financial Intelligence':https://rusi.org/sites/default/files...ation_flow.pdf

[davidbfpo]

An Indian commentary asks whether a "cashless" society will reduce terrorism and found - to my surprise - this:

a “cashless economy” need not be “terror-free”. In November 2014, CNBC conducted a survey of the 10 top “cashless” societies. It found Belgium to be the world’s top cashless society with 93 per cent non-cash consumer payments and 83 per cent debit card use. France was second, then Canada, the UK, Sweden, Australia, Holland, the US, Germany and South Korea. Unfortunately, Belgium and France were also the worst victims of indigenous and trans-border terrorism.

Then citing FATF and US reports states:

Detecting terror financing through legal channels is an extremely onerous task, as the US Treasury and FATF reports would indicate.

Link:http://indianexpress.com/article/opi...ption-4390492/

[davidbfpo]

Another RUSI report on 'Lone-Actor and Small Cell Terrorist Attacks: A New Front in Counter-Terrorist Finance?' and in summary:

As the threat from lone-actor and small cell terrorism evolves, this paper examines the financing of both disrupted and successful plots since 2000 in Great Britain, France and Australia. These plots often require minimal amounts of funding, making proactive identification through financial means challenging. Nonetheless, this paper highlights a number of key themes that warrant further investigation, showing the potentially disruptive role that financial intelligence can play.

Link:https://rusi.org/publication/occasio...-front-counter

Now to starting reading it, so may be a comment later.