Capture, Detain and COIN: merged thread

[JeffWolf]

Hi,

I came across this list on Amazon: PSEUDO-TERRORIST OPS: Deep Cover Military Sting Operations

Both this - How collusion was built into the system, and this - DOUBLE BLIND: The untold story of how British intelligence infiltrated and undermined the IRA, <Teague, Matthew, Atlantic Monthly Apr 06, Vol. 297, Issue 3> - deal with Northern Ireland.

This title sounds promising - From Coercion to Consent: Selective Amnesty and Reward Programs in COIN

Finally, I came across: Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2002. “‘Bribing the Reds to Give Up’: Rewards Policy in the Malayan Emergency.” 9 War in History 332.

Regards,
Jeff

[JeffWolf]

Hi,

I forgot to post this title:

The Dirty War: Covert Strategies and Tactics Used in Political Conflicts.

<http://www.amazon.com/Dirty-War-Strategies-Political-Conflicts/dp/041592281X/ref=si3_rdr_bb_product>

Regards
Jeff

[davidbfpo]

I'd recommend a closer look at the Northern Ireland situation, where it is commonly agreed jailing terrorists had a remarkable political impact and there was more pressure from prisoners on the political process than those outside exercised. Similar effect in South Africa. Indeed there is traffic in expertise between the two since peace.

Less well known here (in the UK) is the experience in Italy, with the Red Brigades and Spain, with ETA.

From a different angle the study of women suicide bombers held in Israeli jails has some lessons, best source I can readily find is:

http://www.labat.co.il/

Set up by an Israeli academic, Yoram Schweitzer.

davidbfpo

[Rank amateur]

From Mao's little red book. Pretty interesting, because he wasn't exactly a democrat. I read somewhere that it worked pretty well. His policies might be worth researching.

"Our policy towards prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who were coerced into joining the reactionary forces but who are more or less inclined towards the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their personal effects or try to exact recantations from them, but without exception should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the camp of reaction."

"On Policy" (December 25, 1940), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 446-47.*

[PhilR]

I appreciate everyone's response. It has provided some leads and additional material to look at. I think this is a relatively understudied point. For many tactical commanders, it seems like once the intel has been pulled out of a detainee, the attitude is that they are now out of the picture and that is a good thing (I know this is probably an unfair generalization).
However, the detainees still count in the minds of the populace. Unless they are considered bad actors by the general populace, detaining them is not percieved as an action to protect the populace. This all plays into long term reconciliation and amnesty considerations.

[gh_uk]

Two additional sources:

Fran Lisa Buntman, Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid. Cambridge University Press (2003)
http://www.amazon.com/Robben-Island-...28/ref=ed_oe_p

Kieran McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management, and Release, Oxford University Press, (2001)
http://www.amazon.com/Paramilitary-I...5717446&sr=1-2

The Buntman book is excellent and develops a theory of prisoner resistance (referred to as a 'continuum'); i.e. the different motivations and means by which 'political' prisoners exist in prison; it is also a useful account of how the ANC leadership prepared for its eventual move into government.

The McEvoy book is a slightly different book, not developing quite such a high level set of conclusions, but I don't think there is a single better detailed examination of PIRA's (and others) activities in prison.

[Rank amateur]

I appreciate everyone's response. It has provided some leads and additional material to look at. I think this is a relatively understudied point. For many tactical commanders, it seems like once the intel has been pulled out of a detainee, the attitude is that they are now out of the picture and that is a good thing (I know this is probably an unfair generalization).
However, the detainees still count in the minds of the populace. Unless they are considered bad actors by the general populace, detaining them is not percieved as an action to protect the populace. This all plays into long term reconciliation and amnesty considerations.

Good luck. Happy Thanksgiving. I know you're busy over there, but if you get a chance, let us what you've learned. (There's lots of very smart people here, thinking about their next deployment.)