Capture, Detain and COIN: merged thread

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 24 Jul 08: Iraq: Positive Change in the Detention System

In the spring of 2004, the Abu Ghraib scandal marred detainee operations in Iraq. The photographs of American mistreatment of Iraqi detainees tarnished the U.S. image, undermined Washington’s efforts in Iraq and enflamed the insurgency. Even today, one single common denominator is found among foreign insurgents captured by Coalition forces: each has seen a seven-minute al-Qaeda film showing U.S. servicemen and women committing acts of torture and abuse.

In an effort to reverse this legacy, Major General Douglas Stone, former deputy commanding officer for detainee operations from April 2007 to June 2008, undertook massive reforms of Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) detainment. Stone spoke at USIP on June 11, 2008, one week after his redeployment from Iraq. The following is a summary of his remarks.....

[AdamG]

US military: Iraq inmates imposed Islamic justice

By KIM GAMEL – 1 day ago

BAGHDAD (AP) — For years, extremist Iraqi detainees in U.S. custody held self-styled Islamic courts and tortured or killed inmates who refused to join them, military officials said, disclosing new details about the use of American prisons to recruit for the insurgency.

The problem became the main catalyst for a decision to separate moderate detainees from the extremists, part of a broader reform package aimed at correcting widespread U.S. prison abuses that sparked international criticism.

"We were having people who weren't insurgents who were being forced to be insurgents because of the power of these courts, the power of al-Qaida and other extremist groups," said Lt. Col. Kenneth Plowman, a spokesman for Task Force 134, which operates coalition detention facilities in Iraq.

He told The Associated Press Friday that the jailhouse Sharia courts were formed, despite the presence of U.S guards, to enforce an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. They were then used to convict moderate inmates, who were then tortured or killed, he said.

In comments published in the Sierra Vista Herald in Arizona, Brig. Gen. Rodney L. Johnson, commander of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, put the number of detainees tried by the courts in the double-digits. Neither he nor Plowman would give specific numbers.

The courts were eradicated and none has been detected in six months although some gang-related issues persist, Plowman said.

"We have a detainee population of about 21,000. You're gonna have extremists who will find a way to communicate and to form these kind of organizations," he added.

http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5h...ttSmgD925PU1O0

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 1st Qtr 09: Inside the Detention Camps: A New Campaign in Iraq

Summary of Key TF–134 Programs

- Transition Barracks In: Initially assesses motivation for joining the insurgency, criminal history, religious status, education/job skills

- Religious Discussion Program: Voluntary, but used to determine extent of religion in detainees’ lives and to develop a moderate view of Islam

- Dar al-Hikmah (Basic Education): Chance to get a minimum 5th-grade education

- Vocational Education: Job skills training

- Work Program: Compensated for voluntary work activities (for example, sewing center, mud brick facility, working parties)

- Individual Assessments: Occurs before their Multi-National Force Review
Committee hearing to consider mental health, religious ideology, education, work program performance, guard force input

- Family Advocacy and Outreach: Includes family in the rehabilitation process and grants greater access based on progress

- Lion’s Spirit: Continuing moderate religious education and training for those desiring to become an imam

- Transition Barracks Out: May spend up to a week in this program that includes courses on civics, public health, and reintegration into Iraqi society and with the family

[Jason Port]

It is my understanding that today the United States has prisoners in Iraq and elsewhere around the world, arrested for crimes committed during the Global War on Terror and for a variety of other criminal actions. (Please don't read this as sympathy, just a statement of facts written at 0100.)

Our US due process requirements would demand certain criteria be met in order to hold a trial and adjudicate the defendant appropriately, within a reasonable period. (Again, not an ACLU lawyer) It is further my understanding that these suspects/defendants/often zealot murderers are going beyond what the American citizen considers reasonable. My question to this group is - what is the cause of this and what steps are we as a force taking to expedite these hearings?

As a former attorney, I am surprised to hear that we are holding these prisoners for so long without complete processing, and I recognize that the postings on detention operations above are key for a successful counterinsurgency. (I would suggest that an expedited detention rapidly loses efficacy, if you hold prisoners without tangible evidence and without a trial.)

Recognizing that some of this information may be sensitive, please PM me if you are uncomfortable answering in the public forum.

[Schmedlap]

I have no uncommon or privileged information on this topic. It is just my hunch that we are delaying trials as a safeguard against the possibility that we are faced with the option of either an open trial or releasing the prisoners. Should that situation result, we will logically start with the people held the longest and work our way back. It is in our interest, in such a situation, for us to have the longest queue possible. That way, we have a time buffer between capture and trial for intelligence to become less timely and irrelevant to current operations.

Just my hunch.

[Jedburgh]

HRW, 14 Dec 08: The Quality of Justice: Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court

....Human Rights Watch monitored court proceedings and met with judges, defense attorneys, defendants, and others. We found that the majority of defendants endured lengthy pretrial detention without judicial review, that they had ineffectual legal counsel, and the court frequently relied on the testimony of secret informants and confessions likely to have been extracted under duress. Judges in many instances acknowledged these failings and dismissed some cases accordingly, particularly those involving alleged torture, but the numbers of cases where such allegations arise suggest that serious miscarriages of justice are frequent. Human Rights Watch also monitored a limited number of cases involving children, and found that the authorities failed to hold them separately from adult detainees, and that their access to counsel and prompt legal hearings was no better than that of adults.

Structural problems, due in part to political fractiousness and inefficiency among Iraqi institutions, play a role in undermining the CCCI’s proceedings. Iraq’s parliament approved a General Amnesty Law in February 2008, in part to reduce the detainee population and thus the burden on the justice system. Persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other offenses committed between July 1968 and May 2003 as outlined in the statute for Iraq’s Supreme Criminal Tribunal would not be eligible for amnesty. The amnesty as passed would benefit persons held for more than six months without an investigative hearing, or for more than a year without referral to a court. Implementation, however, has lagged very seriously. The continued high number of persons in detention facilities has put serious strain on the CCCI, where dozens of judges hear thousands of cases a month, and further delayed judicial review of detentions......

[Jason Port]

Thanks for the insights Jedburgh. The HRW stuff is helpful. I suspected much of what schmelap posted is on point from a rationale perspective. While most Americans sleep ignorant (intentionally or not) there is a nagging voice in my head that asks why can't we move this along, whether using Iraqi standards of justice our our own.