If we allow the HN to perform the HN role, we (The US) do not have to concern ourselves over proving anything. Not in our lane. As to oversight, I believe this is one function the UN could perform reasonably well to ensure that global sensitivities are not abused in the process, and it is best that this does not become an American operation.

One key to remember is that insurgents, by definition, are a part of the populace. Key to an enduring resolution to any insurgency is for the HN government involved in the insurgency to address their failures that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place, and to sort through those members of the populace that participated and adjudicate their disposition. Most should be returned to assist in being part of the larger solution. Some will indeed need to face harsh legal consequences for their actions, but again, this is not something that an outside nation, no matter how deeply they have embroiled themselves in the problem, needs to concern themselves over.

As to the larger question of why 40% of the foreign fighters in Iraq are Saudi Citizens, 20% Libyan, and 20% Algerian (per open source); these guys really need to be sent home, or perhaps granted asylum as many are probably insurgents at home.

I guess my point is, that if you have a confused understanding of the overall nature of the problem, then you are likely to come up with confused (ie, ineffective) ways for addressing it.

Fact is, that if Saudi insurgents believe that Phase 1 to a successful insurgency at home is to go abroad to attack the US in an effort to break the support of the US to keeping that Saudi government in power; you have to ask yourself if we have the right relationship / policies in place as to the US and the Kingdom.

To simply ascribe the GWOT to Bin Laden being some sort of Pied Piper with a magic ideological "flute" that makes otherwise satisfied Muslim citizens from a broad cross-section of the Middle East to mindlessly follow him is naive at best.

We can wrestle with the symptoms of this problem until we deplete our wealth, strength, and credibility as a nation. History is full of examples of how others have fallen into this trap (Greece, Rome, Great Britain, etc). Or, we can assess the situation with honesty and humility and change the focus of our engagement to addressing the causes. My vote is for the later.

This dilemma over what to do with detainees is rooted firmly in the former.