Capture, Detain and COIN: merged thread

[MikeF]

In my last tour as a company commander, I had a 90% detention/retention rate meaning that if we sent someone away,then they stayed there for a long time (minimum of three months). That took a lot of me putting on the lawyer/DA hat to build the case and sending my boys to Baghdad to testify.

With that said, the majority of dudes stayed as guest in our patrol base for 72 hours. For innocents, they had to stay so that they were not killed. For the bad guys, we could not transport them away b/c the only accessible road had over 100 IEDs over a 1 mile stretch. This bought me time to make a decision to detain or let go before air could be scheduled.

I would estimate that 40% over the bad guys that we held and released provided us valuable intelligence. Most of them were kids (15-24 yrs old) that had been told that Americans would torture them. When we didn't, instead gave them 3 hot meals a day and a cot, smoke cigarettes, and bull#### with them about Michael Jordan, Guns and Roses, Britney Spears, and American porn, they started telling us everything that we needed to hear.

The intel captured allowed us to kill the primary bomb maker and 3 of the top 5 al Qaeda deputies in our area, force the main leader to flee, roll up about 15 caches, find 3 rigged houses, get early warning on two impending attacks, and 30 emplaced IEDs.

If we released someone, then they were tracked. Sometimes we would get to know their parents, some converted to double agents, and others went back to doing bad things. Those that went back to bad things were killed.

My only regret is that I let the primary executor of Shiites go. We captured him, did not know who he was, no locals would make a statement other than a verbal "he's a bad man," and we let him go free. I'm still frustated over that one. That dude was beheading his neighbors.

[Presley Cannady]

Or a bombmaker for that matter?

[MikeF]

How long does it take to replace an IED?

That's actually the first questions that I wanted answered in my PIR (Priority Intelligence Requirements). During the first three weeks, we'd watch from observation posts to get an idea of the enemy's TTP's. Typically, it was a 72 hour process. Day one, dig. Day two, emplace the IED. Day three, wire it and prepare to blow it.

After we understood the enemy's decision making cycle, in their OOODA loop as some would say, we started killing emplacers. I wanted to make it too costly for them to emplace IEDs. The bad guys turned to using young children. We didn't shoot them.

Or a bombmaker for that matter?

They didn't, and my IED problem went away fast. We went from taking 12 attacks a day to only one every three days. The enemy turned to assassination attempts on key local figures and harrasing attacks on regular folks.

[JMA]

In my last tour as a company commander, I had a 90% detention/retention rate meaning that if we sent someone away,then they stayed there for a long time (minimum of three months). That took a lot of me putting on the lawyer/DA hat to build the case and sending my boys to Baghdad to testify.

With that said, the majority of dudes stayed as guest in our patrol base for 72 hours. For innocents, they had to stay so that they were not killed. For the bad guys, we could not transport them away b/c the only accessible road had over 100 IEDs over a 1 mile stretch. This bought me time to make a decision to detain or let go before air could be scheduled.

I would estimate that 40% over the bad guys that we held and released provided us valuable intelligence. Most of them were kids (15-24 yrs old) that had been told that Americans would torture them. When we didn't, instead gave them 3 hot meals a day and a cot, smoke cigarettes, and bull#### with them about Michael Jordan, Guns and Roses, Britney Spears, and American porn, they started telling us everything that we needed to hear.

The intel captured allowed us to kill the primary bomb maker and 3 of the top 5 al Qaeda deputies in our area, force the main leader to flee, roll up about 15 caches, find 3 rigged houses, get early warning on two impending attacks, and 30 emplaced IEDs.

If we released someone, then they were tracked. Sometimes we would get to know their parents, some converted to double agents, and others went back to doing bad things. Those that went back to bad things were killed.

My only regret is that I let the primary executor of Shiites go. We captured him, did not know who he was, no locals would make a statement other than a verbal "he's a bad man," and we let him go free. I'm still frustated over that one. That dude was beheading his neighbors.

I can't follow what you are talking about here. Are these prisoners taken in combat or people picked up at road blocks for during sweeps/searches?

[MikeF]

I can't follow what you are talking about here. Are these prisoners taken in combat or people picked up at road blocks for during sweeps/searches?

This was in a village that I was seizing that served as Al Qaeda's headquarters for my area of operations. After we cleared it, I established a patrol base at the former AQ headquarters. We literally took down the Black AQ flaq and replaced it with an Iraqi one.

Most of the prisoners were picked up during patrols for doing something bad- shooting at us, trying to blow us up, etc. The only time that I did sweeps was to bring four guys in so that I could talk to one source without blowing his cover. We didn't really do checkpoints. Instead, we used blocking positions as part of our attempt to limit traffic in and out of the town. That, and some serious curfews until we could get the violence under control.

Bottom line, the tactical questioning of prisoners was very effective for us.

[Uboat509]

This doesn't make sense to me. Are you talking about releasing people taken in arms against us because they won't be kept long enough or provide enough intel? How would that be a good idea? Are you seriously trying to put forward the idea that we tell the troops, "Hey, you know the guy who just took a shot at you but you captured him instead of killing him? Well, take his gun and send him home."? Good luck with that.

[Ken White]

population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb...

[Uboat509]

population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb...

That is pretty much what I was thinking as well. There would not be outright executions, before someone hysterically suggests that. There would probably be a lot less enthusiasm to put one's self or one's subordinates in harms way to capture bad guys who will then be released. This would be incredibly bad policy and I can't see any government adopting it, least of all ours.

[Ken White]

prohibited and the ROE would be tightened to try and make it officially difficult. Officers and NCOs would be told to not allow it and most would try to do so. However, Joe tends to ignore Leaders, niceties and rules when his survival is at stake -- as he should when Leaders implement dumb rules...

[Presley Cannady]

population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb...

As you would expect, preferably with command sanction. My read of Shu Han's expedition to Nanzhong is that ROE was very loose; she burned thousands of insurgents and civilians alive when the fighting took the villages, but quickly turned the survivors loose with some sort of reparation for their hardship. I ask the question to find out to what extent detention and ROE restrictions mutually interact to advance or deter pacifying an insurgent populace. I also get the impression the COIN camp focuses on ROE at the expense of other means in which to assuage enmity within the host population. So, could a more liberal detention policy offset the impact of a more robust firefight?

[Ken White]

As you would expect, preferably with command sanction.

In this era, I doubt that, if by sanction you mean the Command encourages more killing and less detention. I believe the reverse would be the case and there would be a top loaded effort to ensure that Troops did not do the logical (to them at the time) thing regardless of 'rules.'

I ask the question to find out to what extent detention and ROE restrictions mutually interact to advance or deter pacifying an insurgent populace.

I believe that is quite complex issue and the answer is very much situation -- METT-TC / specific war and location -- dependent. I doubt there's one catch all answer.

I also get the impression the COIN camp focuses on ROE at the expense of other means in which to assuage enmity within the host population. So, could a more liberal detention policy offset the impact of a more robust firefight?

I concur with your impression but believe the answer to the question is subject to many variables.