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  1. #1
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    Default Pres. Obama's Signing Statement on the NDAA

    Here is the text of Pres. Obama's statement, President’s Signing Statement on National Defense Authorization Act (text and brief comment by Marty Lederman; Opinio Juris, 31 Dec 2011) [from presidential statement as to key provisions in Secs. 1021 & 1022):

    Section 1021 affirms the executive branch’s authority to detain persons covered by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note). This section breaks no new ground and is unnecessary. The authority it describes was included in the 2001 AUMF, as recognized by the Supreme Court and confirmed through lower court decisions since then. Two critical limitations in section 1021 confirm that it solely codifies established authorities. First, under section 1021(d), the bill does not “limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.” Second, under section 1021(e), the bill may not be construed to affect any “existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States.” My Administration strongly supported the inclusion of these limitations in order to make clear beyond doubt that the legislation does nothing more than confirm authorities that the Federal courts have recognized as lawful under the 2001 AUMF. Moreover, I want to clarify that my Administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens. Indeed, I believe that doing so would break with our most important traditions and values as a Nation. My Administration will interpret section 1021 in a manner that ensures that any detention it authorizes complies with the Constitution, the laws of war, and all other applicable law.

    Section 1022 seeks to require military custody for a narrow category of non-citizen detainees who are “captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.” This section is ill-conceived and will do nothing to improve the security of the United States. The executive branch already has the authority to detain in military custody those members of al-Qa’ida who are captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the AUMF, and as Commander in Chief I have directed the military to do so where appropriate. I reject any approach that would mandate military custody where law enforcement provides the best method of incapacitating a terrorist threat. While section 1022 is unnecessary and has the potential to create uncertainty, I have signed the bill because I believe that this section can be interpreted and applied in a manner that avoids undue harm to our current operations.

    I have concluded that section 1022 provides the minimally acceptable amount of flexibility to protect national security. Specifically, I have signed this bill on the understanding that section 1022 provides the executive branch with broad authority to determine how best to implement it, and with the full and unencumbered ability to waive any military custody requirement, including the option of waiving appropriate categories of cases when doing so is in the national security interests of the United States. As my Administration has made clear, the only responsible way to combat the threat al-Qa’ida poses is to remain relentlessly practical, guided by the factual and legal complexities of each case and the relative strengths and weaknesses of each system. Otherwise, investigations could be compromised, our authorities to hold dangerous individuals could be jeopardized, and intelligence could be lost. I will not tolerate that result, and under no circumstances will my Administration accept or adhere to a rigid across-the-board requirement for military detention. I will therefore interpret and implement section 1022 in the manner that best preserves the same flexible approach that has served us so well for the past 3 years and that protects the ability of law enforcement professionals to obtain the evidence and cooperation they need to protect the Nation.
    It brought on a two-part comment (by folks who are centrists on the left side of that "section" of the political spectrum) - generally favorable to the Obama administration's detention policies, though with reservations if "some bad guy" gets into power.

    The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War–Part I (Marty Lederman and Steve Vladeck; Opinio Juris, 31 Dec 2011); and

    The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War–Part II (Marty Lederman and Steve Vladeck; Opinio Juris, 31 Dec 2011).

    In response, a position further left, Detention Under the NDAA and the Limits of Analogy (Kevin Jon Heller; Opinio Juris, 31 Dec 2011).

    Frankly, all three of these authors are based in the premise that there is a brooding, international omnipresence in the sky - call it the Laws of War (or the Law of Armed Conflict, or International Humanitarian Law). And that, that omnipresence controls all national laws on that subject. In some countries, their national "Basic Laws" do require that result (e.g., Israel and Germany); or that result is required by very broad treaties and other interstate compacts (e.g, as in the EU generally).

    In the US, the international "laws of war" become applicable only when they are adopted by the constitutionally empowered branch(es) of government, as in the following graphic:

    I Law Flow 01.jpg

    Given the unsettled state of international law with respect to detention (see OP in this thread) - especially in conflicts not of an international character (not between states), looking for a brooding omnipresence in the sky is a fool's mission.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default Presidential Policy - Sec. 1022 NDAA Waivers

    President Obama's Sec. 1022 Waivers of Military Detention yesterday.

    WH 1022 Fact Sheet
    Presidential Policy

    From the Fact Sheet:

    Specifically, as certified in the procedures issued today, the President has determined it is in the national security interests of the United States to waive the military custody requirement of Section 1022 in the following circumstances:

    • When placing a foreign country’s nationals or residents in military custody will impede counterterrorism cooperation;

    • When a foreign government indicates that it will not extradite or transfer suspects to the United States if the suspects may be placed in military custody;

    • When an individual is a U.S. lawful permanent resident who is arrested in this country or arrested by a federal agency on the basis of conduct taking place in this country;

    • When an individual has been arrested by a federal agency in the United States on charges other than terrorism offenses (unless such individual is subsequently charged with one or more terrorism offenses and held in federal custody in connection with those offenses);

    • When an individual has been arrested by state or local law enforcement, pursuant to state or local authority, and is transferred to federal custody;

    • When transferring an individual to military custody could interfere with efforts to secure an individual’s cooperation or confession; or

    • When transferring an individual to military custody could interfere with efforts to conduct joint trials with co-defendants who are ineligible for military custody or as to whom a determination has already been made to proceed with a prosecution in a federal or state court.
    Depending on how and how often these waivers are used, they could marginalize military detention and military commission trials of AQ members.

  3. #3
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    Default Two Astan MOUs

    for your consideration:

    Memorandum of Understanding between Afghanistan and the United States on Afghanization of Special Operations on Afghan Soil.

    Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan.

    Lest we forget:



    First Lieutenant Ben Hall, MTU Class of 2005 and former Cadet Battalion Commander, was killed in action on 31 July 2007 in Afghanistan while fighting with the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, against Taliban forces on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default

    Mike,

    Thanks for posting these. This is so long over due. To this point we have held Afghan Sovereignty in complete disregard, demonstrating through our actions the hollowness of our own words when we toss about terms like "Legitmacy" "Sovereignty" "Justice" and "Respect."

    Any government elevated into power by an external nation or other source of power is presumptively illegitmate, regardless of any holdings of any offical legal bodies to the contrary. Legality and legitimacy are not the same thing. In our pursuit of effective and efficient defeat of the Revolutionary and Resistance insurgencies in Afghanistan we have to this point placed the very perceptions of the non-Northern Alliance populaces of Afghanistan that are critical for stability far behind what we saw as reasonably necessary authorities and activities to defeat the insurgent threat.

    This is what happens when one comes to see their intervention as being "COIN." The host nation, as sovereign, conducts COIN. The intervening party assisting such a government is conducting FID, and fundamental to FID is the subjugation of ones actions to the sovereignty of that host nation. To do other wise is to make a joke of the very government one seeks to support. It places what one needs to be tactically successful secondary to what one needs in order to be strategically successful.

    If this were an American colony and all we needed to do was suppress the insurgent fighters so that our puppet government could get on with serving our interests over those of the nation they run for us, then suppression of this nature is good enough. Though that is what the bulk of our COIN doctrine is based upon, that is not our mission in Afghanistan, and that is not "good enough." This is a big step toward getting right with the people of Afghanistan. GIRoA may well fall, but if they fall it will be because they did not deserve to stand. Either way, Afghanistan is finally on a path toward earning true sovereignty and legitimacy in the eyes of not only their own populace, but the entire world,

    Now, I do not know if a Northern Alliance judge issuing a warrant in a Kabul court is going to mean F-all to a Pashtun living in the mountains of Uruzgan Province, or the suburbs of Kandahar. We may be applying an American solution to solve an American problem. I suspect a more recognized forum would be a local shura with village, tribal and religious leaders, who then go as a body to the home in question and ask for the offending citizen of their community, backed by appropriate Afghan security forces. One won't likely find very many guys still at home in such an approach, but that in of itself is a metric of how powerful the insurgency to the current government is in much of the country.

    We must learn that it is far better to achieve horrible results doing things right than it is to achieve tremendous results doing things wrong. This is a big step in the right direction, but we are losing control of the situation and effectiveness is out the window. Perfect. For those who are thinking, "we may as well pack up and go home," you are not far wrong.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Hi Bob:

    My primary foci in this "capture-detain" thread and in its sibling "kill" thread have been on US-owned Title 10 - Title 50 direct actions against HVTs (AQ officers being the type cases). We shall see whether the two 2012 MOUs will impact those particular DAs - e.g., a DA against an AQ officer at a target location in Astan, or a DA launched from Astan soil against an AQ officer located in Pakistan.

    What I may not have mentioned here or elsewhere is that Afghanistan has acceded (10 Nov 2009) to the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (link and link). In short, that placed Astan on the same legal playing field as ISAF (UN, EU, NATO), but on a footing different from that of the US (non-accession to APs I & II). AP II is fully cited in Section 1.4 (page 2) of the Special Operations MOU; and in Section 1.2 (page 1) of the Detention Facilities MOU.

    The language used (in Section 5 of the Special Operations MOU - .pdf snip attached) seems very exclusive of direct US participation in, say, "house clearings". These two MOUs remind me of the 2008 Iraq "SOFA"; and, if so, the consequences will probably be similar.

    I don't get what you mean by this:

    from BW
    We must learn that it is far better to achieve horrible results doing things right than it is to achieve tremendous results doing things wrong. This is a big step in the right direction, but we are losing control of the situation and effectiveness is out the window. Perfect. For those who are thinking, "we may as well pack up and go home," you are not far wrong.
    - the usual "What we have here is a failure to communicate" - a mutual problem, it would seem.

    Regards

    Mike
    Attached Files Attached Files

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    Default The Emerging Law of Detention

    When it first came out a year ago, I mentioned The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, by Ben Wittes and Bobby Chesney, as a useful (free) resource. At least two of the chapters have been updated since then. You can download the full monograph (1.35MB, 179pp), or individual chapters.

    The introduction (link above) summarizes the monograph's methodology and scope:

    This report proceeds in several parts. In the first section, we briefly describe the legal background that gave rise to these habeas corpus cases: the Supreme Courts decisions recognizing federal-court jurisdiction over Guantnamo and addressing to a limited extent the contours of a legal process for detainees adequate to satisfy constitutional concerns. We highlight in particular the extent to which the court left the key questions open, a move that in the absence of further congressional action effectively delegated the writing of the rules to the judiciary.

    In the sections that follow, we examine the law as it is developing with respect to several of the most important questions concerning the governance of non-criminal, law-of-war-based detentions. In particular, we look at the judges approaches to the following questions:

    the burden of proof;

    the substantive scope of the governments detention power;

    the question of whether a detainees relationship with an enemy organization, once established, is permanent or whether it can be vitiated by time or events;

    whether the government is entitled to presumptions in favor of either the accuracy or authenticity of its evidence;

    the use of hearsay evidence;

    the use of evidence alleged to result from coercion; and

    the governments use of a mosaic theory of evidentiary interpretation.
    This term of SCOTUS, eight detainee cases have sought review. So far, review has been denied in two cases.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default Detention Act Unconstitutional

    So held, Judge Katherine Forrest (SDNY, 16 May 2012), in a 68-page opinion, as reported by the Courthouse News Service:

    MANHATTAN (CN) - A federal judge granted a preliminary injunction late Wednesday to block provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act that would allow the military to indefinitely detain anyone it accuses of knowingly or unknowingly supporting terrorism.

    Signed by President Barack Obama on New Year's Eve, the 565-page NDAA contains a short paragraph, in statute 1021, letting the military detain anyone it suspects "substantially supported" al-Qaida, the Taliban or "associated forces." The indefinite detention would supposedly last until "the end of hostilities."
    ...
    Weeks after Obama signed the law, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Chris Hedges filed a lawsuit against its so-called "Homeland Battlefield" provisions.

    Several prominent activists, scholars and politicians subsequently joined the suit, including Pentagon Papers whistle-blower Daniel Ellsberg; Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Noam Chomsky; Icelandic parliamentarian Birgitta Jonsdottir; Kai Wargalla, an organizer from Occupy London; and Alexa O'Brien, an organizer for the New York-based activist group U.S. Day of Rage.

    They call themselves the Freedom Seven.
    This decision is contrary to the logic of the DC Circuit cases interpreting the AUMF; but Judge Forrest is in the 2nd Circuit and is not bound by DC Circuit precedents.

    Regards

    Mike

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