Capture, Detain and COIN: merged thread

[Uboat509]

This doesn't make sense to me. Are you talking about releasing people taken in arms against us because they won't be kept long enough or provide enough intel? How would that be a good idea? Are you seriously trying to put forward the idea that we tell the troops, "Hey, you know the guy who just took a shot at you but you captured him instead of killing him? Well, take his gun and send him home."? Good luck with that.

[Ken White]

population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb...

[Uboat509]

population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb...

That is pretty much what I was thinking as well. There would not be outright executions, before someone hysterically suggests that. There would probably be a lot less enthusiasm to put one's self or one's subordinates in harms way to capture bad guys who will then be released. This would be incredibly bad policy and I can't see any government adopting it, least of all ours.

[Ken White]

prohibited and the ROE would be tightened to try and make it officially difficult. Officers and NCOs would be told to not allow it and most would try to do so. However, Joe tends to ignore Leaders, niceties and rules when his survival is at stake -- as he should when Leaders implement dumb rules...

[Presley Cannady]

population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb...

As you would expect, preferably with command sanction. My read of Shu Han's expedition to Nanzhong is that ROE was very loose; she burned thousands of insurgents and civilians alive when the fighting took the villages, but quickly turned the survivors loose with some sort of reparation for their hardship. I ask the question to find out to what extent detention and ROE restrictions mutually interact to advance or deter pacifying an insurgent populace. I also get the impression the COIN camp focuses on ROE at the expense of other means in which to assuage enmity within the host population. So, could a more liberal detention policy offset the impact of a more robust firefight?

[Ken White]

As you would expect, preferably with command sanction.

In this era, I doubt that, if by sanction you mean the Command encourages more killing and less detention. I believe the reverse would be the case and there would be a top loaded effort to ensure that Troops did not do the logical (to them at the time) thing regardless of 'rules.'

I ask the question to find out to what extent detention and ROE restrictions mutually interact to advance or deter pacifying an insurgent populace.

I believe that is quite complex issue and the answer is very much situation -- METT-TC / specific war and location -- dependent. I doubt there's one catch all answer.

I also get the impression the COIN camp focuses on ROE at the expense of other means in which to assuage enmity within the host population. So, could a more liberal detention policy offset the impact of a more robust firefight?

I concur with your impression but believe the answer to the question is subject to many variables.

[jmm99]

was a Rule of Law operation (treating detainees as criminal suspects to be eventually charged and tried under Iraqi domestic law), as Polarbear pointed out in post #18. In effect, our (US) forces acted as quasi-police officers.

Currently, US detainees under the Laws of War (all under Common Article 3, 1949 GCs) are those held at Gitmo and some held at Bagram. So, be careful about applying Laws of War to the Iraq situation - clearly, US Laws of War applied to members of the Iraqi armed forces detained in 2003 during the course of major combat operations (those being EPW under 1949 GC III).

The issue, of course, is whether Task Force 134, Camp Bucca, etc., were effective in at least neutralizing detainees who were released. The 2008 article re: Task Force 134 (cited by PC at post #17) was impressive in its apparent conversion of most all releasees.

But, in following up, I came on this Kings of War article from 1 Jun 2010, US detention ops: whatever happened to COIN ‘inside the wire’?:

Around two years ago, several articles and blog-posts appeared detailing the hard work of Gen. Douglas Stone, then the commander of Task Force 134 and in charge of detention operations in Iraq. The attention converged on the change of strategy within the Task Force, previously known mostly for its implication in various prisoner-abuse scandals. Under the command of Gen. Stone, the focus changed toward something more akin to the counterinsurgency principles of separating extremists from moderates, and of working with the latter to curb the influence of the former. To that end, each inmate was given an ‘initial assessment’ to determine his political orientation, religious beliefs and social concerns. The point was to engage with the prisoners’ motivation for violence, both within the prison and upon their release. It emerged that whereas some were hellbent on killing Americans, or other Iraqis for that matter, others were simply disillusioned, angry, acting out of revenge, or had no other prospect than to pick up a gun and become an insurgent.

Based on these assessments, Task Force 134 tailored a range of measures to deal with the inmates on the basis of their individual situation rather than as an undifferentiated whole. These measures included educational courses for those uneducated or of school age, vocational training for lower-risk inmates, religious courses (deradicalisation) for Islamist extremists, and psychological help for particularly traumatised inmates. The detention facilities held 140 reviews daily to assess inmates’ threat level. Those granted release were placed in front of an Iraqi judge to discuss their future and sign a binding pledge to renounce violence. While Gen. Stone said he did not envisage turning ‘radicals’ into ‘choir boys’, the Task Force apparently experienced a significantly reduced return rate (maybe 3-4%). Within the prisons, moderates had even launched a backlash against the extremist elements that had previously used the facilities as insurgency training grounds.

This astonishing work first gained my attention as part of some research I was doing on political reintegration in Iraq (the result of which will soon be released in paper-back). Since then, I admit to having lost the thread somewhat, so I was surprised and dismayed to read in The Guardian last week, that according to Iraqi Major General Ahmed Obeidi al-Saedi, a full ‘80% of prisoners released from US-run Camp Bucca have rejoined terrorists’ (H/T Jeff Michaels). Just a week earlier, another senior Iraq Army officer, Major General Qassim Atta, put forward a similar charge, noting that ‘the majority of the detainees who used to be inside US prisons went back to work in crimes and terrorism’ and that ‘many of them occupied leadership positions in Al-Qaeda’. (more in article, comments and links)

The two articles outlining the May 2010 Iraqi claims on ineffectiveness were:

Iraq prison system blamed for big rise in al-Qaida violence. "General claims 80% of prisoners released from US-run Camp Bucca have rejoined terrorists." (Featuring Major General Ahmed Obeidi al-Saedi).

Iraq says prisoners released by US rejoined Qaeda. (Featuring Major General Qassim Atta).

Now, I'm not saying that we should believe the Iraqi generals over our own. I am saying that it would pay here to make haste slowly in suggesting a scenario that is counter-intuitive to many of us.

Regards

Mike