China's Emergence as a Superpower (till 2014)

[Dayuhan]

America's Permanent War Agenda

http://www.countercurrents.org/lendman010310.htm


I wonder how far will Americans agree with this?

That piece comes from the left fringe, which is just as loony as the right fringe.

When assessing opinions I tend to adopt the Olympic Diving method: assume the low and high scores are compromised, and discard them. Similarly, the far fringes of the ideological spectrum are something one perhaps needs to be aware of, but which have little value except as a curiosity.

During Bush' time when the war rhetoric was high, none felt that going to war was immoral and yet today, there appears to be a sizable group that are strong votaries of Peace.

Even in the Bush years there was substantial opposition to the wars, particularly the one in Iraq. Those who supported the wars pulled the malleable center with them, largely as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks. As people realized that much of the fighting had no connection to 9/11 and that the missions were creeping far beyond what they expected, support for the wars dwindled and opposition grew. I don't think there was anything irrational about that. People supported the idea of stomping the living $#!t out of the people who attacked us... a natural response. When that morphed into an unending and appallingly costly attempt at "nation-building", support dwindled. Again, I see nothing irrational or unexpected about that.

I would consider myself a votary of peace. I hope that everybody is. Not that war isn't occasionally necessary, but it is always to be avoided if possible and is something one uses as a last resort. I do not believe that advocating war is in any sense more inherently patriotic than advocating peace.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

I've been reading papers on Taiwan and Operation Change of Direction this weekend and, while I might be chasing phantoms, I started to see a lot of connections between the attributes Hezbollah exhibited in '06 and the traits that the ROC would need to embody in order to survive a hypothetical war in the straits.

Does anyone think that the ROC and other regional powers could effectively respond to conventional over-match by the PRC and a changing regional geopolitical calculus by adopting force structures and doctrines typified by Hezbollah and related hybrid actors?

[Ray]

Even in the Bush years there was substantial opposition to the wars, particularly the one in Iraq.

However, this from the US proves that maybe the actuals did not trickle down to where you are.

A Gallup poll made on behalf of CNN and USA Today concluded that 79% of Americans thought the Iraq War was justified, with or without conclusive evidence of illegal weapons. 19% thought weapons were needed to justify the war.

Milbank, Dana; VandeHei, Jim (2003-05-17). "Washington Post May 1, 2003 Gallup poll
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp...1155-2003May16

On Lapel Pins:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpwZFvPZbkg

In so far, as the countercurrent article is concerned, I found it disconcerting but then one was left wondering if would find a chord with those who are batting for China, a country which feels that the US is meddling in the South China Seas and muddying the waters leading to a belligerent condition.

Anti US article no doubt, but it has some facts to offer (which can be challenged and maybe disproved) unlike mere postulations of a High Priest as is seen.

[Dayuhan]

However, this from the US proves that maybe the actuals did not trickle down to where you are.

Those who opposed the Iraq war were certainly a minority, but they made plenty of noise and were fairly visible, though they were duly ignored. They came mainly from the left - the same crowd that produced the article you cited - and to a lesser extent the libertarian/isolationist fringe of the right. A few even came from the center... I personally thought the Iraq war was a bad idea from the start, and I don't identify with left or right. I'm sure I wasn't the only one. Overall I think you could fairly say that opposition to the war was more substantial among those who actively follow foreign policy issues than it was in the general population, though of course those who actively follow foreign policy issues constitute only a minimal minority of the general population.

Of course the broad support for the war evaporated quite quickly, as discussed above, which suggests that it was largely based on emotion and questionable information.

In so far, as the countercurrent article is concerned, I found it disconcerting but then one was left wondering if would find a chord with those who are batting for China, a country which feels that the US is meddling in the South China Seas and muddying the waters leading to a belligerent condition.

I don't know... you'd have to find someone who is "batting for China" and ask them. Haven't seen anyone doing that here.

[Ray]

Dayuhan could you reconcile these two statements of yours?

Even in the Bush years there was substantial opposition to the wars, particularly the one in Iraq.

and

Those who opposed the Iraq war were certainly a minority , but they made plenty of noise and were fairly visible, though they were duly ignored.

Now do you realise why I am bewildered by your statements?

How the Dickens can it be -
Bush years there was substantial opposition to the wars, particularly the one in Iraq

as also

Those who opposed the Iraq war were certainly a minority?

Substantial opposition in one post and in another, opposition was but a minority?

Does appear that you state for the sake of stating to win brownies and know not what you write except that it should suit the flavour of the moment even though it contradicts another 'wise' saying just a few posts earlier that you made.

[Dayuhan]

"Substantial" doesn't mean a majority, it just means enough to have substance. Substance can come from numbers, but it can also come from commitment or position. As many leaders have discovered to their chagrin, violent dissent from a quite small percentage of the populace can be very substantial indeed. In this case the dissent wasn't violent, but it was vocal, visible, and had a base among those familiar with foreign policy.

In the early days of opposition to the Vietnam war, the opposition came from a minority. It was still substantial, not least because it had traction: it rapidly gained adherents and came to represent a majority. Much the same could be said of the early opposition to the Iraq war.

In this case the substance came as much from who as from how many. For example, Colin Powell was initially not at all enamored of the idea of war in Iraq, though he eventually submitted to the will of the administration. When the Secretary of State opposes something, that has substance, and is thus substantial. There was also, as I said, substantial debate among the foreign policy elite (look back at old issues of Foreign Affairs, and you'll see it). Again, this doesn't mean that a majority opposed the war, just that there was an opposition of some substance.

If I'd referred to "overwhelming opposition" or "majority opposition" that would indeed be contradictory.

Mountains of molehills, once more...

[Ray]

"Substantial" doesn't mean a majority, it just means enough to have substance. Substance can come from numbers, but it can also come from commitment or position. As many leaders have discovered to their chagrin, violent dissent from a quite small percentage of the populace can be very substantial indeed. In this case the dissent wasn't violent, but it was vocal, visible, and had a base among those familiar with foreign policy.

In the early days of opposition to the Vietnam war, the opposition came from a minority. It was still substantial, not least because it had traction: it rapidly gained adherents and came to represent a majority. Much the same could be said of the early opposition to the Iraq war.

In this case the substance came as much from who as from how many. For example, Colin Powell was initially not at all enamored of the idea of war in Iraq, though he eventually submitted to the will of the administration. When the Secretary of State opposes something, that has substance, and is thus substantial. There was also, as I said, substantial debate among the foreign policy elite (look back at old issues of Foreign Affairs, and you'll see it). Again, this doesn't mean that a majority opposed the war, just that there was an opposition of some substance.

If I'd referred to "overwhelming opposition" or "majority opposition" that would indeed be contradictory.

Mountains of molehills, once more...

You stand exposed for what you are.

No use of acting like a video game - flitting from side to side.

You are not consistent with your claims. You are vague and you love to pull wool over the eyes!

We also understand English, if one is to believe you all about US education, then maybe even better than you!

Pray don't teach me English, the Cambridge University has passed me fit.

Cambridge here mean the real one and not any clones that you might find in the US.

[Dayuhan]

I see nothing in the definition of "substantial" that requires a majority, and I think you're picking nits to avoid addressing the point... which in any event has strayed well away from the emergence of China as a superpower.

[Ray]

I have addressed the points, but it is you who is deflecting the issue since your standard flip flop attitude has come to the fore being totally noticeable.

[carl]

I've been reading papers on Taiwan and Operation Change of Direction this weekend and, while I might be chasing phantoms, I started to see a lot of connections between the attributes Hezbollah exhibited in '06 and the traits that the ROC would need to embody in order to survive a hypothetical war in the straits.

Does anyone think that the ROC and other regional powers could effectively respond to conventional over-match by the PRC and a changing regional geopolitical calculus by adopting force structures and doctrines typified by Hezbollah and related hybrid actors?

The Red Chinese would perhaps be better served by just blockading the island and starving them into submission. That of course would entail defeating the USN but if they could pull that off nothing could stop them. The ChiComs wouldn't shrink from the ruthlessness needed to do that and if would save a lot of trouble.

[The Cuyahoga Kid]

The Red Chinese would perhaps be better served by just blockading the island and starving them into submission. That of course would entail defeating the USN but if they could pull that off nothing could stop them. The ChiComs wouldn't shrink from the ruthlessness needed to do that and if would save a lot of trouble.

Right, but if the ROC's AShM capability is structured in a way that mitigates the impact PLAAF/2nd Artillery Corp stand-off fires have on their operational effectiveness, then how can the PLAN maintain sea superiority?

More importantly, if stand-off fires couldn't meaningfully effect Taiwanese AShMs, then wouldn't the PLAN ultimately be faced with a fait accompli?

[carl]

All the PLAN would have to do is keep the merchant ships from coming or going. They could do that with submarines, or just with an announcement. The subs wouldn't have to sink anything. Long range aviation wouldn't have to sink anything. The merchantmen wouldn't try it.

I don't know if Taiwan is self sufficient in food but I don't think they are self sufficient in oil. It would only be a matter of time and they would have to surrender. Also, no merchantmen going out means no money coming in.

All of the above predicated on the USN being out of the picture.

[Dayuhan]

I don't know if Taiwan is self sufficient in food but I don't think they are self sufficient in oil. It would only be a matter of time and they would have to surrender. Also, no merchantmen going out means no money coming in.

All of the above predicated on the USN being out of the picture.

The Chinese are vulnerable to exactly the same strategy, which the USN could implement without going anywhere near Taiwan or the mainland.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

True. But you will note that in both my posts I said what I said depended upon the USN being out of the picture.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan:

True. But you will note that in both my posts I said what I said depended upon the USN being out of the picture.

The point I'm trying to make is that the USN can operate effectively against China without being physically close to China. Why would we fight them where they are strong when we can fight them where they are weak? That being the case, why must we assume that we need the capacity to fight close to the Chinese mainland?

[carl]

Point granted. However that was not the point under consideration, since I said, twice, what I was said depended upon the USN being out of the picture. Now I've said that 3 times.

[Dayuhan]

Instead of repeating it, why not tell us why you think it matters. I can't see that it does.

PS to clarify the above: I'm not sure what you mean by "in the picture" here. The USN does not need to be physically anywhere near Taiwan to be "in the picture" in such a case, if we define "in the picture" as "capable of inflicting unacceptable consequences". Too much of the discourse on US capabilities vs Chinese capabilities seems to assume a need to operate within the range of land-based aircraft and missiles. It seems to me legitimate to question whether this need actually exists, especially since maintaining such a capacity would be an extremely expensive venture.

[davidbfpo]

I know we have discussed the defence of the RoC / Taiwan before, which Carl has raised again, posing his question.

My first reaction to offensive action by PRC was how would the one million RoC citizens who have been reported to reside in PRC react? Even if outnumbered and there mainly pursuing business and with a good number of students.

On reflection I cannot recall any mention of Taiwan's non-military capabilities, notably financial to possibly disrupt the PRC.

Then's the evolving, if ephemeral feeling that "small is beautiful, leave them alone". It is not as if the larger states have an impeccable record, say in comparison to Switzerland. Imagine if buying Chinese products was frowned upon by a movement akin to Anti-Apartheid - Boycott the Bully. Yes I know many cite a US bank's decision on South African loans was the catalyst for change. The Chinese have historically paid great attention to 'face'.

Apologies for this non-American interlude.

[carl]

Sorry Dayuhan. The short exchange between me and the Cuyahoga Kid was pretty clear and plain. Nothing else I can do to clarify it.

[carl]

David:

If a bunch of Americans are deciding the fate of Asia I don't see why an Englishman can't join in.

My guess is any RoC people caught on the mainland in the event of trouble would lay very low and quiet. The secret police would not look upon obstreperous behavior with favor.

The anti-Apartheid stuff worked because it didn't cost much money. The feel good/financial pain balance was way over on the left. If people tried in on Red China it would shift way over to the right and it wouldn't be done.

The financial question is a good one and I have no clue.