China's Emergence as a Superpower (till 2014)

[William F. Owen]

is that we (the "West") look at China through Western eyes, and concepts. That's our filter, it what we've grown up with, so it's understandable. Problem is, we miss stuff as a result. Here's a great example of something missed:

There's a huge difference between something you don't know and something you don't understand.

The idea that "Westerners" don't understand China (or the Middle East) is, IMO, simplistic, misleading and basically not true. There is, however a lot about China, we don't know.

The Chinese are very pretty easy to understand, and what it more there is a whole raft of westerners, who read and speak Chinese, who are good at understanding them. It is simply a matter of values, and assembling them in the right order.

The idea that the Chinese are complexity and arcane is an out growth of "China Watchers" wanting to make themselves more skilled than they actually are. What has emerged is a perception that doing the blindingly obvious is somehow clever.

A friend of mine sat through a very uncomfortable dinner in Singapore where a Washington based "China Expert" was lecturing a Thai Air Force officer on the Chinese threat to Thailand. After about 20 mins, the RTAF guy held up his hand and asked "Do you speak Cantonese?" The Expert said he spoke a little. The RTAF guy then suggested, "perhaps if we speak Cantonese, you will improve." No one laughed. If they had, they would have lost face.

[Ken White]

Have to again agree with Wilf. The Chinese and most Asians are really pretty straightforward. They are just far more patient than westerners and they talk less than -- or do not think out loud like -- westerners. Compared the the absolute duplicity, legerdemain and flat out lies in the ME (all in western terms, not those of the ME), Asians are an open book.

Saving face is quite far from an Asian-only activity...

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 17 Sep 08: The "People" in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China's Military

This volume represents the latest in the series published by the Strategic Studies Institute and describes the advances and reforms the PLA has made in its recruitment, officer and NCO training and education, and mobilization. As part of its larger reform effort to modernize and transform its military into a technologically sophisticated force, the PLA has implemented a number of measures aimed at training up a “new-type” officer for its modernized forces—one capable of operating effectively in a technologically advanced “informationalized” environment. This volume sheds light on such important questions as how the PLA’s personnel system is adapting to fulfill the requirements of a military force capable of “winning local wars under informationalized conditions” and how the PLA is cultivating a new generation of officers and what capabilities these new officers will likely possess.

Complete 401-page document at the link.

[Jedburgh]

ASPI, 28 Apr 10: China's Maritime Strategic Agenda

This Policy Analysis makes the following arguments about China’s maritime strategic agenda:

1. China has legitimate and growing maritime interests, and increasingly will plan to safeguard those interests independently.

2. The PLA Navy aspires to the ability to undertake operations far from home, but bluewater capabilities are not the main focus for China’s naval development.

3. China’s maritime strategic focus remains on the semi-enclosed and other narrow seas of East Asia.

4. China’s East Asian maritime preoccupations, not its occasional bluewater forays, are of greatest strategic significance. They pose direct challenges to the US sea‑based alliance system and the regional order that the system underpins.

[GI Zhou]

Thre biggest issue on many of these papers is a lack of referencing. There is a serious lack of translation of open source Chinese defence material so most of these reports tend to rehash the same material. The US Navy War College being the exception.

[AdamG]

To quote the immortal Scooby : rut-ro.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a97c53a-6...44feab49a.html

The commander of US forces in the Pacific has warned that China’s military is more aggressively asserting its territorial claims in regional waters.

Admiral Robert Willard told the Financial Times: “There has been an assertiveness that has been growing over time, particularly in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea.”

He said China’s extensive claims to islands and waters in the region were “generating increasing concern broadly across the region and require address”.

[selil]

I'm in Suzhou China writing this. I took the bullet train from Shanghai to Suzhou for about $6 traveling flat smooth at 200KPH. On my morning runs (I'm here for a little over three weeks) my only gripe on the manicured running paths is I have to dodge an enormous amount of construction. I'm teaching at a major university in a town filled with over a dozen universities with over 50K students at each. I don't know Chinese (or any other languages except English), but the 75 students in my class all speak multiple languages. China is on the move in ways people simply do not understand. The number of construction cranes is beyond anything I've ever seen.

[Tukhachevskii]

This book, Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India, was required reading at my old uni. There was a shorter version published as an article but I do not recall where. Chapter One: The Myths Floating around the Giants is here.

On a different note China has leased the DPRK/North Korean port of Rajin;

Who uses Rajin's Ports?

&

China leases Rason port for 10 years

The Rajin facility will give Chinese importers and exporters direct access to the Sea of Japan for the first time. "It is the country's first access to the maritime space in its northeast since it was blocked over a century ago", the Global Times reported

both via North Korean Economy Watch

[davidbfpo]

From IISS:

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has in 2010 taken part in numerous exercises, experimented with long-range force projection and represented China abroad in a number of diplomatic visits. This heightened level of activity results from an ambitious naval strategy which seeks to secure China's access to energy resources and to give it more diplomatic leverage in territorial disputes with its neighbours.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...aval-strategy/

I have added a link to the comments on their role in the Gulf of Aden on the Somali piracy thread too.

[AdamG]

China is preparing for conflict 'in every direction', the defence minister said on Wednesday in remarks that threaten to overshadow a visit to Beijing by his US counterpart next month.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...direction.html

[Cliff]

NY times and several other sources ran stories yesterday on the first flight of the new Chinese "5th Gen" fighter. The J-20's first test flight was publicized by the PLA military in a very unusual fashion, allowing pictures and video to be taken and posted on the internet. The timing was rather odd as well, as it coincided with SECDEF Gates visiting to try and establish mil-to-mil dialog.

The most interesting part of the story is that Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly didn't know about the test and lost some face as a result.

According to the Times, the official Chinese media is trying to walk the story back today. The Chinese People's Daily Global Times website (their English edition) points the finger at the US, saying that the US shouldn't fear China challenging its dominance in their own back yard.

The Chinese official version mirrors the rationale for Chinese military expansion that Thomas P.M. Barnett has been talking about lately. The analogy is that we wouldn't like China conducting exercises with Cuba in the Gulf of Mexico. Barnett has drafted a "grand strategy terms sheet" with John Milligan-Whyte and Dai Min of the Centre for America-China Partnership, which is a think tank that seeks to better US-China relations on rational terms. Their terms sheet seeks to come to a strategic understanding based on shared economic interests, while defusing security issues like Taiwan to prevent an arms race. The proposal was developed in consultation with numerous former Chinese government officials, and presented to the China's State Council and to the US ambassador. (See here for Dr. Barnett discussing it). The terms sheet was delivered at the end of December.

So, we have multiple attempts to reduce tensions and begin dialog, combined with an unprecedented amount of publicity for a major weapons system's initial tests. The interesting question is, was this:

1. An intentional play by the PLA to embarrass Hu Jintao and/or derail talks?
2. An intentional signal by the PLA to complement the discussions - as in "we are speaking softly, but our stick is getting more deadly by the day"?
3. Just a big coincidence?

No matter which is true, it definitely shows China's increasing self confidence. The question is what they will do about it.

Interested to hear your learned opinions.

V/R,

Cliff

[carl]

Here is an opinion in a blog by Bill Bishop that seems astute.

http://www.sinocism.com/archives/1539

Check out his conclusion 4. It says in so many words that the Chinese gov is running a game on us. Hu is well aware of the J-20 program's status, though he may not have been aware of the exact date of the test flight. That date may have been weather dependent.

I trust not at all the ability of senior, or junior, American officials to judge the reactions and state of mind of Chinese officials and politicians. That is like little leaguers up against pro ballplayers. I also think it highly unlikely that the Party has lost control of the military. They did to a small degree at Tiannemen (sic) Square and I've read they have worked to make sure it won't happen again.

It is futile to think we are going to talk the Chinese out of building up their military. They are doing this for their own purposes, not because a carrier sails about off Korea once in a while.

[Cliff]

Check out his conclusion 4. It says in so many words that the Chinese gov is running a game on us. Hu is well aware of the J-20 program's status, though he may not have been aware of the exact date of the test flight. That date may have been weather dependent.

I trust not at all the ability of senior, or junior, American officials to judge the reactions and state of mind of Chinese officials and politicians. That is like little leaguers up against pro ballplayers. I also think it highly unlikely that the Party has lost control of the military. They did to a small degree at Tiannemen (sic) Square and I've read they have worked to make sure it won't happen again.

It is futile to think we are going to talk the Chinese out of building up their military. They are doing this for their own purposes, not because a carrier sails about off Korea once in a while.

Carl-

Good find on the article.

I have to agree, I think Hu knew the test would happen but not when. Probably a coincidence on timing but not on the release.

If you look at it from the Chinese perspective, it makes perfect sense to build up their military to protect their resource flows and commerce. I think we need to work some kind of understanding, though, before we both waste a lot of money on an arms race or some kind of mistake occurs.

The big problem I see in China is that there really isn't one person who is in charge. Since things are run by consensus (which is not obtained in an opaque manner) you have many interests being advanced and it is difficult to tell who is doing what and why.

Do you think a strategic understanding with the Chinese is possible? Is it wise?

V/R,

Cliff

[carl]

I read a long time ago that China can be roughly compared to Imperial Germany of the early 20th century (or even Imperial Japan). It is a state that is just starting to get to get big an powerful. The problem will be to manage its integration into the world. Imperial Germany had some strange ideas and needlessly challenged the British in particular. Their integration into the world wasn't well controlled and a lot of bad things happened.

If that thesis is true, and I think it has merit, it will be very very difficult to come to an understanding with China and avoid a big complicated competition. I don't think it makes sense for them to build up their military to insure resource flows. There hasn't been any threat or constriction to their imports or exports since I don't know when. It does make sense for them to build up if they want to have their way with Taiwan and other bits of disputed territory.

Donald Kagan wrote (I think) that emotions are an important part of what makes wars come. I think that is true. The Chinese (a completely uneducated guess on my part) may be feeling quite agrieved (sic) about all they have had to take over the last 170 years and now want some back. Reasoned talk about common interests isn't likely to fix that.

I found that article through the Information Dissemination blog. Those Navy guys talk a lot about China.

[Dayuhan]

Imperial Germany "rose" at the peak of the colonial era, where the only way to acquire resources was to conquer them. That's not true for China: all they have to do is pay the market price, which they can afford to do.

Much is made of expanding Chinese influence in Africa, but I personally suspect that there's likely to be a real backlash there, and that it may prove difficult for China to manage. The open and blatant racism of many Chinese expatriates, the Chinese habit of importing labor, increasing acquisition of agricultural land, extensive bribery and close relationships with vulnerable dictators all point toward friction that could easily become violent. There's already talk of new colonialism and of Chinese invasion... as long as the net capital flow is inbound it may be controllable, but when the capital starts flowing out things could get ugly fast.

Not long ago a Chinese manager was confronted by disgruntled workers at a coal mine in Zambia; he opened up on them with a shotgun and put 11 in the hospital. This sort of thing does not win hearts and minds.

[Backwards Observer]

There is probably much to be said for the China threat; most powerful nations behave in ways that are threatening or may be perceived as such at some time or another. Perhaps it is fair to say in this last respect, that the US has been generally more reasonable than most. Perhaps not.

Unfortunately, most of what passes for current analysis of the China threat seems to run the range from hypocrisy to borderline mental illness, and is notable for the bizarre high-school level of discourse. One might expect this of ignorant commies, but perhaps not from those who count themselves as exceptional. Just my opinion.

[Bill Moore]

China’s president, Hu Jintao, is about to make a state visit to Washington, hard on the heels of a statement by Liang -Guanglie, his defense minister, that “in the next five years our military will push forward preparations for military conflicts in every strategic direction.” Not quite Nikita Khrushchev’s “We will bury you,” but close enough to give President Obama good reason to reset our overall policy towards the Chinese regime, including abandoning the outdated notion that trade is only about economics. President Hu knows better: Trade, overseas investment, currency manipulation​—​all, war by other means; all, about the place of nations in the world, a key part of the “strategic direction” in which he is taking his country.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/articl...cy_526878.html

Author's bio (note, not simply a HS graduate)

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/he...bio/221858.htm

[Backwards Observer]

But there is good news, news that trumps all of these problems. Democratic governments are intrinsically more flexible than despotic ones. China’s rulers are not infallible, any more than are ours. But they are less likely to hear, much less respond to, criticism and therefore more likely to overreach and less likely to change even a mistaken course of action in the absence of serious external pressure. (from the Weekly Standard Article, "Our Broken China Policy", bold added)

Clearly there is nothing to worry about then.

[Backwards Observer]

Also in doubt is whether the new regime in Bishkek will want to pursue Washington's military assistance, especially the setting up of a counter-terrorism center in the southern city of Batken near the Ferghana Valley. This includes the stationing of American military advisors on Kyrgyz soil, not far from the Chinese border.

Clearly, the US pressed ahead too rashly with its diplomacy. On the one hand, it came down from its high pedestal of championing the cause of democracy, rule of law and good governance by backing Bakiyev, whose rule lately had become notorious for corruption, cronyism and authoritarian practices, as well as serious economic mismanagement. (It will look cynical indeed if Washington once again tries to paint itself as a champion of democratic values in the Central Asian region.)

On the other hand, US diplomacy has seriously destabilized Kyrgyzstan. From its position as a relatively stable country in the region as of 2005, when the "Tulip" revolution erupted, it has now sunk to the bottom of the table for political stability, dropping below Tajikistan. An entire arc stretching from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has now become highly volatile.

US Reaps Bitter Harvest From 'Tulip' Revolution - Asia Times

M K Bhadrakumar has parlayed a distinguished career in the Indian Foreign Service, with postings in Moscow, Seoul, Colombo, Bonn, Islamabad, Tashkent and Ankara into his current eminence as one of the country’s foremost thinkers on foreign affairs …

M K Bhadrakumar - World People's Blog

The preference for the opinions of ideologues over those of individuals with regional experience is understandable but hardly exceptional.

[Entropy]

From the "more things change the more they stay the same" Deparment:

WASHINGTON'S official Japan-bashing season has begun. In Congress, complaints about Japan's "perfidious" trading practices are reaching the stentorian levels one hears in Washington during an election year. The complaints are not new. What is new is the 1988 Trade Act. It allows the United States to retaliate against unfair Japanese trade practices.

The Bush Administration should soon have in its hands a tentative report on Japan's compliance (or lack of compliance) with the act. If it is warranted, "retaliation" -- restrictions on Japanese imports -- could take place as early as July.

This course of action should be entertained only as a last resort, not as an opportunistic policy to arouse voters in an election year. Retaliation is an act of trade war. And a focus on Japanese trading practices should not be used as a defense mechanism to suppress hard examination of America's chronic problems of huge deficits and low personal savings. This low rate shrinks the pool of investment capital for industrial innovation and enhances U.S. dependence on foreign investment, including Japan's, to finance the deficits.

For the most part, the present version of Japan-bashing is neither helpful nor illuminating. Brandishing a protectionist stick over Japan's new government may not go very far in persuading Tokyo to modify some of its policies. Indeed, the United States has some barriers of its own to lift. According to London's Economist magazine, except for food, Japan has fewer trade barriers than the United States.

- Excerpt from the US Miami Herald, March 14, 1990.