A "Tet Offensive" in Iraq

[Mike in Hilo]

Stu-6:

There was intel and allied forces did act on it--which helped render Tet a tactical disaster for the enemy. Lots of material on this, but I liked Bergerud's Red Thunder,Tropic Lightning, which highlights role of CG Third Regional Assistance Command and former CO of 25th ID, Gen Fred Weyand, in responding to the intel...Echoed in Sorely's A Better War, as well...

But more germane to COIN, for some time prior to the offensive, enemy logistical preparations involved putting in place men and materials in communities close to the urban targets, where they remained hidden with the collaboration of the populace...Must have been a matter of weeks. One such community which achieved notoriety as a "springboard" for the Tet assault--in this case on Bien Hoa--was nearby Ho Nai. Now, what is significant about Ho Nai is that this was virtually entirely a community composed of Roman Catholics of North Vietnamese refugee origin --a segment of society generally viewed as a bulwark against communism. In this tight-knit, tightly controlled, autocratically led (by the local Catholic hierarchy) community, these communist logistical preparations would have been impossible without the approval of the Bishop. Not a peep out of the populace, by the way, many of whom were USG employees at Bien Hoa Air Base and other installations...

Which illustrates the point that the population will support the side they believe is winning (especially if this will keep them from getting killed)--even when their "hearts" might dictate otherwise. A classic COIN precept (and Rand's Cost-Benefit principle of insurgency and COIN, cited in a number of earlier threads by moderator Ted). n.b.: Zero US posted in the village to protect the people, and the GVN security personnel (who would, anyway, have been drawn from the same community) would have been easily intimidated into silence. Strikes me we've got far better tentacles into the relevant populated areas in Iraq now, rendering this sort of thing out of the question--But those who are there will know better if I'm just whistling Dixie.

Cheers,
Mike---and a Happy Thanksgiving to all!

[tequila]

Strikes me we've got far better tentacles into the relevant populated areas in Iraq now, rendering this sort of thing out of the question--But those who are there will know better if I'm just whistling Dixie.

I'd submit that our tentacles in Iraq are far less fearsome than the GVN and American forces in RVN - rather the enemy is far less capable, organized, and centrally directed than the NLF/NVA. Indeed, its major constituent blocs are engaged principally in fighting each other at the moment rather than engaging the U.S.

[Mike in Hilo]

Tequila: Yeah, I need to remind myself of the incredible weight of the problem we faced in VN--numbers as well as quality. Terrific organization and leadership, unity of purpose, dedicated support of a nation-state....To the extent that comparisons of the two may be less than meaningful....

Cheers,
Mike.