A "Tet Offensive" in Iraq

[Shivan]

Read an interesting blurb, http://ace.mu.nu/archives/247147.php basically suggesting a Tet is on the way, just a matter of time. Further, with too many premature calls by U.S. commentators (blogs, media, etc.) of victory in Iraq, this will bring about disappointment among Americans, and would be a coup for AQI, with renewed calls in U.S. for withdrawal from Iraq.

Comments?

Salaam y'all,

Shivan

[invictus0972]

I think this is a great question. As others on here know better than I, there are a lot of differences between Vietnam and Iraq. In the Tet Offensive, there were a lot of traditional engagements between American and NVA forces, something the Iraqi insurgents cannot produce. On the otherhand, the VC filled their insurgent role during the operation, something the insurgents might be able to produce. As we all know, the major effect of Tet was a psychological and political defeat. In order to equal this kind of defeat in Iraq, there would have to be several attacks similar to the one on the Golden Mosque of Samarra within a relatively short period of time. Also, there would need to be a significant number of casualties. I suppose there could be these kinds of attacks, but I don't think it is likely. It seems that the insurgency there has lost a lot of steam. I read an article today in which the assertion was made that a lot of the money paid to past insurgents is no longer available. Furthermore, the ideology behind their tactics, as witnessed in al Anbar, has also diminished. If I had to make a prediction, I would say it is unlikely that a Tet Offensive type of opeation is not very likely. I am just glad that my predictions, unlike those of the real policymakers and troops on the ground, don't matter much!!!!

[Stu-6]

I don’t know if I would give much credence to this theory, but maybe we should be taking a look at what the missed indications and warning were of the Tet offensive. Obviously they wouldn’t be exactly the same but there might be some similarities. Does anyone know of a good study regarding missed intelligence before Tet? I would hope someone had taken a look at the subject.

[goesh]

I think the significant others in this fight are waiting to see who wins the White House - better to rest a bit and regroup then make a Tet like display of will and potential, or, move on to a different theater if the hoped for future occupant doesn't materialize. There's always Lebanon and allinaces to be made there and plenty of work to be done in Pakistan/Afghanistan.

[Stu-6]

While you maybe right abut the impact of US elections but I kind of doubt it. I think this view comes from the fact that we see others actions through our own perspective, i.e. the US elections are of major importance to us therefore we assume they are to others as well. However other actors have their own motivations and influences which are much more significant to them.

Add to that the fact that the differences between any of the likely presidential nominees are pretty small.

No doubt they watch the elections but I doubt it is a deciding factor.

[goesh]

Some of the recent Legislative attempts can give no other message but retreat to our foes and some from the Dem side have a platform built in part on this message. I for one am guilty of believing for far too long that our foes don't fully understand us. Iraq's economy is not robust, infrastructure growth is steady but on the slow side and the glue for political unity and a degree of solidarity is more akin to paper paste, far from substantial in its adhesion, England retains a toe hold at best andTurkey wants to come south to kill Kurds. I can't believe any senior commander in the camp of the enemy would be at this time launching any major offensives, not with just a year to a new American Administration and wounds to lick.

[relative autonomy]

I don’t know if I would give much credence to this theory, but maybe we should be taking a look at what the missed indications and warning were of the Tet offensive. Obviously they wouldn’t be exactly the same but there might be some similarities. Does anyone know of a good study regarding missed intelligence before Tet? I would hope someone had taken a look at the subject.

I think Robert "Blowtorch" Komer in Bureaucracy at War talks about this. Also the three books directly on Phoenix (Andrade's Ashes to Ashes, Moyar's Birds of Prey and Valetine's Phoenix Program) all take a position on the warnings or lack thereof preceding Tet.

[Shivan]

This article http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle2910440.ece indicates hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees are voting with their feet and coming home.

My concern re a "Tet" in Iraq is the media impact of a widespread and spectacular bombing campaign. Yes, AQ et al may lose this offensive, as the VC did, but win in the media and with refugees reversing course.

The AQ playbook understands well that the Western media and Congress are their best allies and best hope for a U.S. retreat, since they cannot quite win head to head with the Armed Forces, anymore than the VC did.

[Xenophon]

I agree that a Tet style offensive is unlikely. AQI just doesn't have the initiative or the resources right now. And AQ-proper is focusing on Pakistan, to great effect. The insurgency is too fractured to coordinate throughout the country.

[relative autonomy]

I would find this a lot more compelling if there was more than logical speculation about the current political moment. That said, the article does raise one important point: that the decline in attacks is a window that diplomatic efforst need to maximize upon. It seems to me that the surge performed and is preforming as well as anyone could have realistically hoped. This article is basically a warning that, if there isn't diplmatic improvement before another Iraq's Tet knocks out whatever wind is in Iraq gov's sails, its going to make it a lot harder, if not impossible, to open a window like this again.

I think the most imporantant thing to remember about Tet is that was a military defeat for the VC but a socio-political victory. Everything I've read says the Phoenix Program worked as it was designed to in Tet and "neutralized" a lot of the otherwise clandestine political cadres that surfaced during the attacks. The Provinisional Reconnassaince Units especially peformed remarkably well and earned their (in)famous rep as the best irregular force/the coldest mercs on the US advised side. As far as I understand, Tet finally persauded Theiu to sign on to Phoenix in earnest and actually make the GVN's Phung Hong a parallel structure to the CIA/MACV's Phoenix Program.

When the Tet attacks finally died down, there wasn't much VC activity becuase they rebuilding their ranks and structure that military defeat in Tet had decimated. In this climate, the GVN, through Phung Hong and especially the Special Branch Police, started, much to the displeasure of many US advisors, to target the loyal non-communist opposition, the Dai Viets, Viet Nam Dinh-Thu Duc, and the all rest. I think pursuing a dirty war against sects instead of reaching a political settlement prevented the emergence of a truly independent South Vietnam. Is this happening in Iraq?

I've seen pundits, military academics, and civilian academics argue for CORDs and/or Phoenix type arrangement to be set up in Iraq on the premise that those institutional arranagements and policies won the "intelligence war" or the small war and it was the NVA that finally won the war, not the VC.

Altogether, I think all this underscores the necessicity of a really concerted diplomatic effort in Iraq right now. Phoenix defeated the insurgency in Vietnam but couldn't win the socio-political war. I think the same goes holds true for the French in Algeria and if there isn't political progress in Iraq soon we might soon say the same about the US in Iraq.