Culmination Point

[Rob Thornton]

you wind up reading 4 pages per thread of good arguments and trying to digest it all - and you might catch somebody changing your name to "he looked better with a cigar".

Rob,

Which do you really think he meant?

From FM 1-02:

Quote:
decisive point – (DOD) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack

culminating point – (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offensive or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible.

That was what originally struck me about the article - he steps right off from the current doctrinal definition when he states:

Culminating points are psychological, not physical, happenings.

Which ties into the examples John had brought up later about Grant's Overland Campaign - but even then Grant was still making moves in preparation of either Lee making a breakout and joining Johnston, or at least trying to. We'll never know how Lee really felt as he left no testimony.

This is where I liked General Scales interpretation of a doctrinal term from physical to psychological. What I see as physical may not be the same way my enemy see it (or my friends). The strength of will has allot to do with determining how much longer either I or my enemy will fight, and how they will fight. That is why its interesting and I think of value for people who go to war on precise calculations as if they will determine an outcome in a set amount of time - its not enough if you believe the enemy is beat, the enemy must believe either that he is beat, that the objective it too costly or that there is an alternative worth accepting at least for right now as opposed to getting nothing.

I think this might be useful for people deciding to use military means to achieve a political objective(s) - you can't go to war on a short term investment model (I mean one which postulates low cost/short term with high yield/long term benefits) because the enemy may decide to continue to fight long after your models and assumptions have ceased to be valid - no slam dunks, no dead enders, just a stubborn enemy who has decided that fighting is still an option he can pursue and one that offers better prospects then any other he understands, or can commit to - regardless of how we feel about it. That is why the decision to go to war should be the last option -it doesn't seem offer any kind of real finality unless the enemy is absolutely beaten and unconditionally surrenders - as in the Civil War and WWII - even then it can give rise to new problems. It seems the best it can offer - with heavy maintenance is the opportunity for less violent redress - but even then requires a commitment to keep the peace. The longer a state of war exists, the more it changes things and the more removed it is likely to become from its original aims in order to bring it to some kind of conclusion.

Having said all that - you can't do away with war either because somebody is going to see it as their best option and may use military force to impose their will on a neighbor to get what they cannot have otherwise. As long as you maintain a strong military and have the option of countering force with relative superior force, I think you can afford to be more patient in considering the outcome.

Changing gears a bit:

I don't think a friendly Decisive Point equals an enemy Culmination Point in that regard (or vice-versa) as most "marked advantages" still seem to be relative until its OBE - they are however both useful for assigning resources, priorities, synchronization, and other planning functions we used to get moving - but they change with the execution, and that is where CDRs and staffs should really be using their gray matter to understand what is going on vs. what the plan said would be going on. So while Scales definition does not conform to either the DP or CP from the DOD pubs - I think he may have outlined a more useful spirit of the term that is more useful in considering how the enemy decides when he's had enough.

One more thing John brought up with regards to the Overland Campaign - Grant thought Lee had "culminated" following the battle of North Anna and as a result got too anxious at Cold Harbor - he (Grant) said he basically mistook Lee's choosing not to take an opportunity to CATK the AoP's right flank at N. Anna and the subsequent evacuation of those Confederate positions as Lee's weaknesses in both physical and psychological/moral terms. For a number of reasons following that-political pressures, the strains of campaigning, his own desire to end it, and the belief that an opportunity existed - he committed to an attack that yielded no tactical or operational gains but cost him thousands of men in mere minutes. I think after that Grant realized how a wrong assumption about Lee's willingness to fight could prolong the war, and he vowed not to commit to such an assumption again.

Culmination Point is probably a more accurate term if confined to a self assessment used to communicate decisions to higher. However, we have to have some way of considering the enemy in order to take advantage of opportunities and that means accepting risk - I guess the important piece would be to ask "why" we think the enemy has culminated (or done whatever he has done) and then look for alternative explanations and better ways to test our conclusions (mitigate the risks we assume by taking advantage of opportunities).

Best Regards, Rob