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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Culmination Point

    Retired Major-General Scales wrote a thoughtful piece on the use of the "Culmination Point" to describe AQIZ's current potential of challenging the outcome there. Generally we think about the culmination point as "the point in time and space where a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations" - that is out of the latest FM 3-0 DRAG - but general scales gives an explanation that I think is more in line with the AQ ability to foment insurgency vs. our counter-insurgency efforts. I also remember if you go back to some of the older incarnates of FM 101-5-1s you'll find more thoughtful definitions like his vs. the truncated one in the 3-0 DRAG. Doctrinal concepts such as the culmination point help to visualize the battlefield, communicate and determine when and how to make transitions.

    You can pick up the full article in the early bird - however I can't provide a link to the WSJ since it requires a subscription.

    Wall Street Journal
    November 21, 2007
    Pg. 18

    Petraeus's Iraq

    By Robert H. Scales

    BAGHDAD, IRAQ -- I've just returned from a week in Iraq with Gen. David Petraeus and his operational commanders. My intent was to look at events from an operational perspective and assess the surge. What I got was a soldier's sense of what's happening on the ground and, although the jury is still out on the surge, I came to the conclusion that we may now be reaching the "culminating point" in this war.

    The culminating point marks the shift in advantage from one side to the other, when the outcome becomes irreversible: The potential loser can inflict casualties, but has lost all chance of victory. The only issue is how much longer the war will last, and what the butcher's bill will be.

    Battles usually define the culminating point. In World War II, Midway was a turning point against the Japanese, El Alamein was a turning point against the Nazis and after Stalingrad, Germany no longer was able to stop the Russians from advancing on their eastern front. Wars usually culminate before either antagonist is aware of the event. Abraham Lincoln didn't realize Gettysburg had turned the tide of the American Civil War. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive proved that culminating points aren't always military victories.

    Culminating points are psychological, not physical, happenings. The commanders I spoke to in Iraq all said that there had been a remarkable change of mood in February when Gen. Petraeus announced that they were taking the fight to the enemy by taking Baghdad from al Qaeda. He pushed soldiers out of the big (and relatively safe) forward operating bases and scattered them among really bad neighborhoods. These joint security stations and combat outposts attracted locals and encouraged them to pass on intelligence about the enemy.
    Best, Rob

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    I respect Bob Scales and consider him a friend. He was very easy to work for in writing Certain Victory--not every general allows a major free voice of his opinions and actually listens to them.

    That said, I think this is classic misapplication of concepts to situations where they do not necessarily apply. I have made my opinions on the ethnic and religious map of "Iraq" known. To say this is a culmination point implies a verge in that the surge has brought the Iraq situation to the verge of success or the precipice of failure. I submit it is neither. It is rather a pause in the ongoing aftermath; what happens next is not clear and Scales is interpreting too much clarity into it by positing that anything as clear as a culmination point has emerged.

    In contrast, he could be correct if he interprets that culmination point as an Americam culmination point. The surge is being interpreted as a success in the run up to elections; who is doing the interpreting determines what that success means.

    best

    Tom

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    It depends what the mission is. AQI needs the support of the population and it looks like they're losing that. I've long thought that the mission should be limited to removing AQI from Iraq, but there are lots of people who believe that the objective should be more ambitious.

    We're a long way from a democratic, stable Iraq.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    That said, I think this is classic misapplication of concepts to situations where they do not necessarily apply. I have made my opinions on the ethnic and religious map of "Iraq" known. To say this is a culmination point implies a verge in that the surge has brought the Iraq situation to the verge of success or the precipice of failure. I submit it is neither. It is rather a pause in the ongoing aftermath; what happens next is not clear and Scales is interpreting too much clarity into it by positing that anything as clear as a culmination point has emerged.

    In contrast, he could be correct if he interprets that culmination point as an Americam culmination point. The surge is being interpreted as a success in the run up to elections; who is doing the interpreting determines what that success means.
    Mr Odom:

    This is a superbly written assessment of MG Scales's piece. It summarizes my thoughts exactly on it and i tried to write a posting for it but couldnt get it right. In my mind you do. Although i am probably not the one to be criticizing writers using historical analogies (because i did just that in my How To Stop IEDs oped) I think his use of Gettysburg and the American Civil War, in how he applies it to Iraq is deeply flawed. He makes it seem as you say a point of clarity that we have turned the corner. But a more nuanced analogy would have acknowledged that after G.Burg there were two more years of Civil War with many, many Americans dead. Is that what we have to look forward to in Iraq. I usually like the pieces that Gen Scales writes, but on this one i have lost my trust in him as an objective observer and consider him to be now on the "victory" bandwagon.

    gentile

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    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    Mr Odom:
    Although i am probably not the one to be criticizing writers using historical analogies (because i did just that in my How To Stop IEDs oped) I think his use of Gettysburg and the American Civil War, in how he applies it to Iraq is deeply flawed. He makes it seem as you say a point of clarity that we have turned the corner.

    I have to jump on this bandwagon too.

    One thing I've hated since first going to Baghdad in 2003 was the number of times major leaders or influencers have stated we're at the "tipping point", "culmination", "last throes", "End of the beginning", "beginning of the end", "decisive point", etc. The problem is that if we really have reached that point no one will believe it because of the "cry Wolf" syndrome.

    It's almost as comical as the stock MNF-I answer to how large the insurgency is (from 2004-2006) - about 20,000. Never mind we detained over 90,000 in that period and killed over 10,000 AIF.

    There is little doubt that we have achieved at least temporary tactical and operational success, which has provided a window for larger strategic success. Strategic success depends on Iraqi political reconciliation, who as of this morning's paper Maliki was accusing the Sunni parliment bloc of being illegitimate. When the surge subsides that window will slowly begin to close if there is no progress on giving the Iraqis a flag/government to rally around, which seems as remote as ever.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Strategic success depends on Iraqi political reconciliation,
    I know you didn't set the strategy, so I'm sure you won't take this personally.

    I always thought it was dumb to make our strategic success dependent on others. There are lots of ways things could turn out "Not too bad." Stating that three stable countries would be a loss for us, makes it a lot tougher to win.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    I know you didn't set the strategy, so I'm sure you won't take this personally.

    I always thought it was dumb to make our strategic success dependent on others. There are lots of ways things could turn out "Not too bad." Stating that three stable countries would be a loss for us, makes it a lot tougher to win.
    I'm referring to the strategic objective as being our current national objective as stated in Iraq by the national leadership, not what I think it ought to be. We all have our opinion on that one - but my view (held since 2003 when I was in Baghdad), that Iraq really needed - a) a benevolent dictator to oversee the transition to democracy and lay off the nukes - kind of like Turkey or worst case Jordan, or needed to be partitioned into states. Worked as a solution in the Balkans - although it involved massive population displacement..

    We lost a lot of leverage to affect their political situation when we abruptly handed power off to an unprepared government in June 2004 when Bremer left. The problem with Iraqi sovereignty is that there is Iraqi sovereignty.....
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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    I guess its hard to get past the context of Iraq -since in this case its the context he uses to talk about culmination points, and because everything that is written now has political consequences - but what are the thoughts on culmination points with regard to the psychological vs. physical? What about why things happen without recognition of what they are? How do they effect transitions? The paragraph below is what stuck with me.

    Battles usually define the culminating point. In World War II, Midway was a turning point against the Japanese, El Alamein was a turning point against the Nazis and after Stalingrad, Germany no longer was able to stop the Russians from advancing on their eastern front. Wars usually culminate before either antagonist is aware of the event. Abraham Lincoln didn't realize Gettysburg had turned the tide of the American Civil War. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive proved that culminating points aren't always military victories.
    I mean it could go both ways couldn't it - you could culminate and not even know it. If we're talking about physical culmination - being out of Schlitz so to speak - even that could be subject to how you see yourself and the enemy. It just seems allot easier to look backwards and say - there was the culmination point where it was set in stone, then to say "here, is the culmination point". It may have just been the way I read it, and what interested me in the article - but I saw general Scales as pondering the possibilities and raising the questions of how culmination points come into being, how rivals see their selves, what does it mean in the broader perspective, what does that mean to policy, etc. I don't think Lee saw Gettysburg as a culmination point for his army - I'd argue he thought he had a shot right up to the end - he just needed the opportunity to make it happen. I'd argue that Grant did not see Lee as having culminated either until Lee had conceded by correspondence. Part of it has to do with those analogies - duels on larger scales, poker games, extreme sports, wrestlers etc - but with the highest stakes in the outcome.

    I think its worthwhile to think about because it gets to how we make military and political decisions in war. I mean the threads gotta go where the thread goes - but that is what interested me.

    Best regards, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-21-2007 at 06:04 PM.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    Mr Odom:

    This is a superbly written assessment of MG Scales's piece. It summarizes my thoughts exactly on it and i tried to write a posting for it but couldnt get it right. In my mind you do. Although i am probably not the one to be criticizing writers using historical analogies (because i did just that in my How To Stop IEDs oped) I think his use of Gettysburg and the American Civil War, in how he applies it to Iraq is deeply flawed. He makes it seem as you say a point of clarity that we have turned the corner. But a more nuanced analogy would have acknowledged that after G.Burg there were two more years of Civil War with many, many Americans dead. Is that what we have to look forward to in Iraq. I usually like the pieces that Gen Scales writes, but on this one i have lost my trust in him as an objective observer and consider him to be now on the "victory" bandwagon.

    gentile
    Gian,

    Thanks for that. But please, Tom, suits just fine. Bob Scales has a tendency to reach for the dramatic sometimes and does so in this one; what is refreshing is that he will admit it, even when he is proved wrong. He said as much in revisiting the opening chapter of Certain Victory when he talked about a new way of war, something that made Terry Johnson and me cringe at the time.

    In this case, I take a longer view because Iraq is a region which seen countless armies come, declare victory, and leave, changing nothing but borders, which have little meaning beyond offering reason for future conflict. Personally I don't mind the victory declarations if the do what Bob Scales said--set the stage for political and diplomatic measures--and allow us to extract ourselves and preserve our precious military forces.

    best

    Tom

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Rob,

    Which do you really think he meant?


    From FM 1-02:

    decisive point – (DOD) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack

    culminating point – (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offensive or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Good post Ryan and to the point.

    I would sayhe using DP and calling it CP=or blending without explanation.

    Tom

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Good post Ryan and to the point.

    I would say he using DP and calling it CP=or blending without explanation.

    Tom

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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    From FM 1-02:
    decisive point – (DOD) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack.
    culminating point – (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations
    When we changed to population centric COIN, did we reach a decision point and implement a new critical system/function or were we forced to a culminating point by insurgents?
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

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    Great question RA. I would offer that the decision point towards "eyes on the population" COIN was always out there, keeping pace with other strategic ebbs and flows, but for whatever reason, not quite palatable or maybe not possible to pick due to troop strength, political capital issues, etc.

    We did hit a culmination point of sorts, which made the decision point not so much more suitable to pick, but rather a case of "well, we've tried about everything else...what was that guy talking about the other day?"

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    When we changed to population centric COIN, did we reach a decision point and implement a new critical system/function or were we forced to a culminating point by insurgents?
    Be careful on interchanging decisive point and decision point. I don't know if you intentionally did that.

    decision point – (DOD) The point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of action. A decision point is usually associated with a specific target area of interest, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient lead time to engage the adversary in the target area of interest. Decision points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of ongoing operations. (Army/Marine Corps) An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision.
    First, COIN is always going to be population centric.

    I think in the scenario you point out culminated the HIC phase, though the decision point was before the culmination point, that is, the decision to enter into a sequel plan that began the stability operations and support operations (remember - there were no insurgents in May 2003). The phase culmination point was reached, but I don't think anyone has reverse engineered the culmination point for the entire war, nor do I think it's possible at this time so long as elections, tribes, and another soveriegn nation's security force have a say in it.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    First, COIN is always going to be population centric.
    Being a chronic heretic, I kind of take issue with that. Or at least believe we need to revise what we mean by it.

    I think the idea that counterinsurgency is population-centric reflects the logic of cold war insurgency: insurgents are wannabe states. Therefore they need to control territory. They need popular support to provide them resources, intelligence, and sanctuary. So counterinsurgents need to prevent the insurgents from controlling the population. This is all straight from Galula, Thompson, etc.

    Contemporary insurgents exercise a different type of control than Cold War era ones. Rather than being physical, it is more psychological, reinforced by periodic acts of terrorism. And--this is important--they are routinely interspersed within the population rather than spending most of their time in some sanctuary and making occasional forays into areas they don't control.

    So, the idea of the government providing 24/7, country-wide security against the insurgents is, I think, an impossibility. I'm not sure exactly where this leads us, but we need to rethink our old ideas about a population-centric approach.

    Here's another idea: I'm at least half convinced that the idea that success in counterinsurgency comes from protecting the population was always a myth. When I look at the history of insurgencies, it seems to me that when counterinsurgents lost, it was ALWAYS because of a collapse of will on the part of the regime and the security forces, not an inability to protect the population. That's why I blogged that I believe that the Casey strategy in Iraq which focused on bolstering the Iraqi security forces was actually better than the Petreaus one which emphasizes security the population (forgive me John, Dave, H.R., Pete, etc. if you're reading this!) At least that's what history suggests to me.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Being a chronic heretic, I kind of take issue with that. Or at least believe we need to revise what we mean by it.

    I think the idea that counterinsurgency is population-centric reflects the logic of cold war insurgency: insurgents are wannabe states. Therefore they need to control territory. They need popular support to provide them resources, intelligence, and sanctuary. So counterinsurgents need to prevent the insurgents from controlling the population. This is all straight from Galula, Thompson, etc.

    Contemporary insurgents exercise a different type of control than Cold War era ones. Rather than being physical, it is more psychological, reinforced by periodic acts of terrorism. And--this is important--they are routinely interspersed within the population rather than spending most of their time in some sanctuary and making occasional forays into areas they don't control.

    So, the idea of the government providing 24/7, country-wide security against the insurgents is, I think, an impossibility. I'm not sure exactly where this leads us, but we need to rethink our old ideas about a population-centric approach.

    Here's another idea: I'm at least half convinced that the idea that success in counterinsurgency comes from protecting the population was always a myth. When I look at the history of insurgencies, it seems to me that when counterinsurgents lost, it was ALWAYS because of a collapse of will on the part of the regime and the security forces, not an inability to protect the population. That's why I blogged that I believe that the Casey strategy in Iraq which focused on bolstering the Iraqi security forces was actually better than the Petreaus one which emphasizes security the population (forgive me John, Dave, H.R., Pete, etc. if you're reading this!) At least that's what history suggests to me.
    I said population centric, not securing-the-populace centric.

    Relationships breed trust which leads to intelligence. There's something incredibly human about that. I don't disagree with 85% of what you have above but I think bolstering security forces is a means to securing to the populace. At least that's what I gathered from COL McMaster in his commander's intent.

    At the end of the day, I think the winner of the fight is going to be whoever the populace hates least.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    Be careful on interchanging decisive point and decision point. I don't know if you intentionally did that.
    My bad. Mrs. RA was yelling at me to come watch Helio's dance.

    I guess the questions was, were we forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents? If so, does that mean that we reached a culmination point? If so, can we say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial?
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    My bad. Mrs. RA was yelling at me to come watch Helio's dance.

    I guess the questions was, were we forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents? If so, does that mean that we reached a culmination point? If so, can we say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial?
    No, I think we've conducted SOSO concurrently to FID, IDAD, and COIN.

    Again, I think certain phases or subphases have reached culminating points but not the overall operation.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    My bad. Mrs. RA was yelling at me to come watch Helio's dance.

    I guess the questions was, were we forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents? If so, does that mean that we reached a culmination point? If so, can we say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial?
    different things to different people. The Armed Forces, like any profession, have a jargon -- a lot of it doesn't translate well into civilian idiom. When you couple that with the Politicians ability to toss words around in a meaningless fashion, things can really get confused...

    A lot of folks in uniform knew in May 2003 that a stability operation was likely to be required if we stayed. Originally, we (wrongly and shortsightedly) didn't plan on staying. By Jun '03 it was obvious we were going to be there a while. So we began. As RTK said;
    "I think we've conducted SOSO concurrently to FID, IDAD, and COIN."
    All along. The problem was that the Army had deliberately ignored all those methodologies for almost 30 years in an effort to not have to do those things because they are long term, tedious, dangerous, dirty and unpleasant -- plus they do bad things to highly honed big conventional war machines.

    A second problem is that our federal government is way too big and is governed by laws written by a well meaning but not good thinking Congress, thus that government and its Armed Forces are big, bureaucratic and very cumbersome.

    It took the Army 18 months to realize that they were going to have to get serious about the SOSO, FID, IDAD and COIN things instead of just jacking around with them, much as they hated the idea. It took another 18 months to get the system to gear up to start doing that and 18 more months for that shift to really become effective.

    Thus, IMO, the answer to your question is that we were not forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents, we've been doing them all along and it just took the big bureaucratic elephant over four years to shift gears and change direction. Again to RTK; we've been doing all those things all along, we just gradually shifted the emphasis, refined the tactical process and better trained the troops. The surge made little difference.

    I don't think we've reached a culmination point -- and that's a bad word for Scales to be throwing around because it implies an end to something and we aren't near the end of anything. It's as bad as using 'victory' and 'win' in that those words imply something that is not what is likely to happen in any insurgency. Thus soldiers say one thing, the politicians another and the great American public gets confused because of jargon and jingoism.

    We can say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial in some situations but not necessarily in all. Since we aren't at a culmination point in Iraq and since we have not changed strategy, merely tactical procedures, that doesn't apply to Iraq.

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