Right, I agree and to build on this statement Scales has used the word "culmination" as metaphor for things that defy his ability to express in clearer language. When I read the Scales piece it was like he was just substituting "culmination" for other metaphors like: "tipping point;" "turning point;" "we have the ball and the initiative;" "light at the end of the tunnel" sorts of things. And as PhilR points out it is almost binary-like in its conception. That there was this before, we are now here at the culminating point, and something wil happen next. An overly simplistic description of the complexity that defies simplification in the land from where PhilR writes.Originally Posted by PhilR
If this is the case, then what's the point? IF all the terminology hits terminal velocity above a certain level, maybe that's what wrong at the "Big Map, Small Hand" level. Bigger question is, should we be willing to accept this as truth?
We've talked about this before on this board. As a tactics instructor it makes absolutely no sense to me that doctrinal terminology is not relevant above a certain stage. I have a feeling many of you disagree with me on this.
Example is better than precept.
RTK,
I would assert that any use of terminology has relevance in a context. Sometimes the context sets the relevance automatically, sometimes the relevance must be explained. I thinlk that Scales' use of culminating point in his article falls into the latter class of usage. As PhilR noted, at tactical and operational levels, the terminology has a perfectly transparent usage in the definitions you provided from JP1-02. The usage by Scales is a much more opaque metaphor.
For example, I would not use 'culminating point' in a current operation except to describe to my higher that my force had reached such a point that it was unlikely to be of much further operational use until given a chance to rest, refit, and reset. (And I probably would say my unit had or was becoming combat ineffective instead.) I do not see Scales using it in that way. I am not clear to whose culminating point he is referring--could be Coalition forces, could be insurgents, could be a subset of either or both, could even be all forces across the entire AOR. As you pointed out indirectly, as a mimimum, we need to know what scale map he has in mind when he uses the term. It would also be helpful to know to which "color' of unit symbols he is referring.
This discussion recalls
many classes at CGSC where we tried to explain the term "culmination point" to eager young majors. It was part of the blocks on Operational Art and was always the most difficult of concepts. I came to think of the epitiome of a tactical culmination point as the second day at Gettysburg, the far left of the Union line at Little Round Top. Both Oates and Chamberlain had reached their culmination point when the latter ordered the bayonet charge that broke the Rebel attack. Oates' culmination point came moments before Chamberlain's but at the end of the charge neither force could continue doing what it had been doing.
Perhaps, a good example of an operational or theater strategic culmination point is the series of fights that Grant initiated in the Summer of 1864 and carried out through the siege of Petersburg when Lee, finally, could no longer continue what he was doing.
A national strategic culmination point was nearly reached that summer and fall when Union soldiers appeared to be dying needlessly in the battles in Virginia and Sherman showed no sign of taking Atlanta. The Democrats appeared likely to elect McClellan President with the result of a negotiated peace that would have sundered the Union. Had Sherman not taken Atlanta before the election the Union would, I think, have reached its national strategic culmination point because it no longer had the will to fight.
So, I suspect that the DOD definition of a culmination point is probably pretty good and can be addressed at all 3 levels of war. (Please note that I did not use Iraq or any other contemporary examples.I leave those applications to others, preferably after the turkey is finished.)
Cheers
JohnT
Somewhat applicable
Since the AQ threat is global I don't think defeating AQI (if we have) equates to a strategic culminating point for the long war (GWOT) or even the war in Iraq since it is multi-headed problem; however, we may be close to reaching a tactical or operational level culmination point against AQI.
I don't have strong feelings on this, but as food for thought, I think a culmination point for an insurgency or terrorist group/movement is generally more difficult to identify and/or define than it is a for a nation-state at war, especially without the benefit of hindsight. Insurgencies can ebb and flow, so any set back for the insurgents should probably best be viewed as temporary until the passage of time has proven otherwise, and it will take time (perhaps years) to see if this is truly a culmination point for AQI.
To help rebuild the USG's damaged credibility military professionals should probably steer away from perhaps overly rosey assessments, and simply focus on the facts, which fortunately is good news. However, if the situation takes a turn for the worse the speaker or author will be requoted a thousand times in an attempt to make him look like a fool and destroy his/her credibility. Let the politicians do that, as they seem to relish in their delusions.
For those of you that teach culmination points, do you have any examples of culminating points for insurgencies that I could use as examples when I mentor officers and NCOs?
Culminating Point - El Salvador and...
In El Salvador, I would suggest that the FMLN reached its culmination point with the failure of the November 1989 offensive. the principla reason for this was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet decision to stop supporting Cuban foreign policy adventures which included support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to support the FMLN. The result was that the FMLN had the resources fro only one final offensive. When it failed, they headed to the negotiation table in earnest.
TET 68 was a strategic culminating point for the US in the Vietnam War because the interpretation of what happened by the American people was that this war would have no end and they were no longer willing to support it.
Note that I am using the DOD definition as supplied by RTK.
Hope this helps
Cheers
JohnT
I have monitored this forum and lurked since early 2006, pleased to be on receive but hesitant to transmit/post given the healthy, intelligent dialogue. All credit to the moderators and members for maintaining a great site. Congratulations!
Me thinks the problem must be identified prior to assigning culmination points. Perhaps this long war, GWOT, GSAVE etc. will go on for just as long as irational religious belief exists.
Hi John,
I've been reading this discussion with some interest and trying to get a handle on what the term actually means. PhilR's point about language actually struck me as very relevant, and shifted my understanding quite a bit.So, I suspect that the DOD definition of a culmination point is probably pretty good and can be addressed at all 3 levels of war. (Please note that I did not use Iraq or any other contemporary examples.
John, do both terms refer to shifts in organizational isomorphic vectors leading to a catastrophe point? This is what they seem to be referring to, but without that mathematical models. If that is the case, then it should be possible to map and plot them out.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
The dialogue has prompted me to further think on the subject. In my previous posting, I did not mean that the doctrinal definitions are not relevant as we move up the ladder from tactical to strategic, but that they lose their precise nature.
At the lower levels, we can look at the definition for "culminating point" and each piece is usually readily apparent and generally agreed upon--what the terms "offense," "defense," and "capability" mean within the context are vital to understanding the definition as a whole. As we move up the scale, these terms are not so clear. In Iraq, we can argue about who constitutes what forces--there are multiple threats; we can also argue about who is on the offensive and what it means to be on the offensive. Can an insurgent run out of military capability, but offset and continue to press with informational capability?
It is no longer enough to state "culminating point" and generate an agreed upon mental picture in everyone's head as to what that really is. However, as demonstrated here, it does provide a great foundation for discussion and investigation--that is where the doctrinal terms are really useful at the higher levels.
I don't think it helps in this case that MG Scales has chosen not to use the doctrinal defintion of culminating point, as others have pointed out. He has freighted the term with a certainty and finality that it does not contain (according to DoD). The term as defined by DoD is just a shift in the form of operations, not necessarily an irreversible slope towards victory for one side or another. Of course, he is writing for a wider audience and may not feel tied to the DoD definiton, preferring a different tack. While it may appeal to the wider audience, it inevitably causes the debates within the military community as we are doing here.
I agree with Gian about the danger of the binary nature of MG Scales employment of the term (either the enemy is or it isn't at culmination and thus we can deduce X,Y,Z from this). We are in danger if this becomes the single presumed lens within which to analyze the campaign at this point. However, as sort of a working hypothesis to be continually held up to scrutiny, it is valuable as a framework to use to evaluate events and try to divine some direction for future action (it just shouldn't be the only framework--sort of like differing threat courses of action, or using scenario based planning).
Hey Marc
Isomorphic vectors, indeed!(I had to look isomorphic up - proved that a Phuddy Duddy can still use a dictionary
)
Are you referring toboth decisive points and culminating points? Or to culminating points at different levels of war? As Phil suggests, culmination does not always imply catastrophe although that is often how it is used. I guess that for me a culminating point is always not a good thing. If I reach it before my enemy does, I will not be able to accomplish my objective. If he reaches it before I do, he fails to achieve his objective.
That said, I don't think they are necessarily isomorphic vectors although they may be. By analogy: 2 marathoners are running side by side at the 20 mile mark. Obviously, they are on parallel vectors. One hits the wall and has to reduce pace; the other continues at pace and wins. the first hit his culminating point - the wall. Using the example of Chamberlain and Oates: The former was defending on a hill behind a wall. Oates was attacking up the hill but had more troops. Chamberlain was almost out of ammunition which was not Oates problem. Both had problems of fatigue. So, their vectors were hardly isomorphic but were quite different.
Much of this is psychological and much is physical. So, I find it hard to conceive how one might go about mapping.
Cheers
JohnT
Hi John...
LOLOL - I loved the concept of isomorphic vectors in social analysis when I came across it in the neo-institutionalists writings. It's so "clean".Isomorphic vectors, indeed!
More towards culminating points across levels, although I suspect that decisive points could be mapped, or at least predicted, as well. On "catastrophe", I was using that in the mathematical sense, i.e. multiple vectors converging and spinning out of control or collapsing in on themselves.
I see your point, John. If the vectors are parallel, then any isomorphism will appear in other areas - keeping with your marathon example, training, physical build, etc. In order to probabilistically pick the "winner", you would need information on those isomorphism. The same is true of the Chamberlain and Oates example, but the isomorphisms are somewhat more evident.
I'm mainly thinking of it's application where you have a fairly radical asymmetry between isomorphic groups, and the groups become non-isomorphic at the level of fine grained detail.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Well - if you go off on vacation around here
you wind up reading 4 pages per thread of good arguments and trying to digest it all - and you might catch somebody changing your name to "he looked better with a cigar".
That was what originally struck me about the article - he steps right off from the current doctrinal definition when he states:Rob,
Which do you really think he meant?
From FM 1-02:
Quote:
decisive point – (DOD) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack
culminating point – (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offensive or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible.
Which ties into the examples John had brought up later about Grant's Overland Campaign - but even then Grant was still making moves in preparation of either Lee making a breakout and joining Johnston, or at least trying to. We'll never know how Lee really felt as he left no testimony.Culminating points are psychological, not physical, happenings.
This is where I liked General Scales interpretation of a doctrinal term from physical to psychological. What I see as physical may not be the same way my enemy see it (or my friends). The strength of will has allot to do with determining how much longer either I or my enemy will fight, and how they will fight. That is why its interesting and I think of value for people who go to war on precise calculations as if they will determine an outcome in a set amount of time - its not enough if you believe the enemy is beat, the enemy must believe either that he is beat, that the objective it too costly or that there is an alternative worth accepting at least for right now as opposed to getting nothing.
I think this might be useful for people deciding to use military means to achieve a political objective(s) - you can't go to war on a short term investment model (I mean one which postulates low cost/short term with high yield/long term benefits) because the enemy may decide to continue to fight long after your models and assumptions have ceased to be valid - no slam dunks, no dead enders, just a stubborn enemy who has decided that fighting is still an option he can pursue and one that offers better prospects then any other he understands, or can commit to - regardless of how we feel about it. That is why the decision to go to war should be the last option -it doesn't seem offer any kind of real finality unless the enemy is absolutely beaten and unconditionally surrenders - as in the Civil War and WWII - even then it can give rise to new problems. It seems the best it can offer - with heavy maintenance is the opportunity for less violent redress - but even then requires a commitment to keep the peace. The longer a state of war exists, the more it changes things and the more removed it is likely to become from its original aims in order to bring it to some kind of conclusion.
Having said all that - you can't do away with war either because somebody is going to see it as their best option and may use military force to impose their will on a neighbor to get what they cannot have otherwise. As long as you maintain a strong military and have the option of countering force with relative superior force, I think you can afford to be more patient in considering the outcome.
Changing gears a bit:
I don't think a friendly Decisive Point equals an enemy Culmination Point in that regard (or vice-versa) as most "marked advantages" still seem to be relative until its OBE - they are however both useful for assigning resources, priorities, synchronization, and other planning functions we used to get moving - but they change with the execution, and that is where CDRs and staffs should really be using their gray matter to understand what is going on vs. what the plan said would be going on. So while Scales definition does not conform to either the DP or CP from the DOD pubs - I think he may have outlined a more useful spirit of the term that is more useful in considering how the enemy decides when he's had enough.
One more thing John brought up with regards to the Overland Campaign - Grant thought Lee had "culminated" following the battle of North Anna and as a result got too anxious at Cold Harbor - he (Grant) said he basically mistook Lee's choosing not to take an opportunity to CATK the AoP's right flank at N. Anna and the subsequent evacuation of those Confederate positions as Lee's weaknesses in both physical and psychological/moral terms. For a number of reasons following that-political pressures, the strains of campaigning, his own desire to end it, and the belief that an opportunity existed - he committed to an attack that yielded no tactical or operational gains but cost him thousands of men in mere minutes. I think after that Grant realized how a wrong assumption about Lee's willingness to fight could prolong the war, and he vowed not to commit to such an assumption again.
Culmination Point is probably a more accurate term if confined to a self assessment used to communicate decisions to higher. However, we have to have some way of considering the enemy in order to take advantage of opportunities and that means accepting risk - I guess the important piece would be to ask "why" we think the enemy has culminated (or done whatever he has done) and then look for alternative explanations and better ways to test our conclusions (mitigate the risks we assume by taking advantage of opportunities).
Best Regards, Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-26-2007 at 07:04 PM. Reason: changed the "business" metaphor to an "stock investment" one
The Other Surge
The collateral assumption here is a fractured, badly wounded and disorganized AQ/jihadist element in the equation, but the same parimeters that define culmination have made that determination. I think progress in the ability to govern and centralize power, to curtail religious fighting, to develope infrastructure and the economy is likewise no marker for the inability of insurgents to carry on the fight despite the current stand down on their part. I hope I'm wrong but its a year to a new White House and new strategies against jihadism and year is a long time to regroup, refund, rest and allow the opponent time to let down their guard.
Hey Goesh - I think your right -it does not provide a guarantee - its only an indicator that you'd have to qualify by asking the "so what" to why a HN might have been able to accomplish those functions/services. I think depending how you look at it, there are varying degrees of stability or instability in which an opposing group can operate in. As long as an enemy has the means and the will to resist they'll probably do so. Maybe the only thing that changes is their ability to influence a population that may not have one or both of those things (means or will), and a HN government that may have more of one or both of those things then the enemy. Those conditions can change based on the HN government's ability or inability to deliver.I think progress in the ability to govern and centralize power, to curtail religious fighting, to develop infrastructure and the economy is likewise no marker for the inability of insurgents to carry on the fight despite the current stand down on their part.
If a government (at whatever level) becomes better at governing and can provide security, and the populace "gets healthy" then the enemy has less freedom of movement and resources to draw upon - if it gets worse and can not provide security then the enemy may be provided with greater opportunities to achieve its own objectives.
What you may wind up with if the insurgency lost its appeal because the government met the basic needs of the governed - but there still existed some core groups/members with the means and will to carry off smaller attacks, is something akin to ETA of the late 80s/early 90s. I mean in the terms of ETA's capabilities (not ideology or goals). A group with capabilities like that could keep the spark alive so to speak until an opportunity existed again to regain momentum in a broader insurgency. I think that is one reason why many European countries still retain para-military forces - using straight military forces may not allow for enough civil liberties, while straight police forces might not be able to maintain security. I thought about that some with regard to Iraq & wrote it up in SWJ VOL 8 on Building Indigenous Security Forces with Regard to METT-TC. SWJ member Karina Marzuk from Poland has recently written a book (no English translation yet - but I think Dave has an English out-take from it) on the subject that we might find useful. I think there is allot of grey between where we were in 2004/2005 and where we might be in 2009/2010 - and I think the outcome (from a variety of perspectives) is far from assured.
Iraq is in a bad neighborhood and even under the best conditions most can imagine is still going to be the subject to internal and external efforts to destabilize it for as far as anyone can imagine. An enduring challenge for Iraq will be how to maintain adequate security from the many threats it faces while providing levels of government that appeal enough to Iraqis so that they don't see insurgency as a better political alternative.
Best Regards, Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-26-2007 at 11:47 PM.
Good points Rob
The observation that culmination is as much psychological as physical is well taken. But it is not entirely psychological. Consider the tactical scenario on Little Round Top again. Chamberlain was almost literally out of ammunition. He had reached physical culmination so he ordered the bayonet charge. What if Oates, who was not out of ammo, had been able to regroup on the north slope of Big Round Top and lossed a volley just as the bayonet charge was coming apart?
I think that one can easily put too much emphasis on the psychological just as one can do the same on the physical. Your example of Grant's reading of North Anna strikes me as the latter as much as it was a misreading of the former. Still there is a point at which the physical cna outweigh the psychological.
Cheers
JohnT
BLUF: When a unit reaches culmination depends on at least three factors: physical, psychological, and logistical. A dynamic interplay among these three factors makes it extremely hard to specify when a unit is actually hors de combat , in the sense of being no longer able to continue its mission.
For a long time the French, as typified in the writing of du Picq, emphasized the "moral" factor in war. I suspect that what they were really emphasizing was the psychological factor, which was codified in the notion of the spirit of the offense preached by Joffre as the winning strategy early in WWI. (Check Bob Doughty's book, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War) It seems that the French found out the hard way that physical can outweigh the psychological--at least that is my take on the failure of French offensives through 1916 and the move by Petain to set up his rotations through Verdun. It is equally arguable that what happened was a loss of psychological motivation, which resulted in a physical debilitation of the forces. (The 1917 French Army mutiny points in this direction.) Tough call here. Either way, I suspect that there is an intimate interweaving of mind and matter associated with assessing if a force has reached its culmination point.
WRT to the example of Chamberlain at Round Top, I submit we are presented with another aspect of the assessment--logistics. The fact that the boys from Maine werer able to execute the bayonet charge indicates to me that they still had both psychological and physical means to contest the effort. They were prevented by a shortage of ammunition from maintaining a static defense. Chamberlain, therefore, modified his defense plan and chose a charge to sweep the attackers from the field. Remember "The best defense is a good offense"?
Perhaps a better example of the interplay of the physical, psychological, and logistical aspects is the effort during the D-Day landings at Omaha Beach. These landings teetered at the culminating point. But for the efforts of a few exceptional leaders (and, of course members of the 5th Rangers, "Ho-ah"), the forces of the 1st and 29th Divisions would have failed to achieve their goals on 6 June 1944.
Another example, in a humorous vein, is the Black Knight in his battle with Arthur in "Monty Python and the Holy Grail."
Thinking about it
Rob,
Excellent discussion and point's
As the symantic's can be such a slippery slope in effective communication
I will instead focus on something related to what you stated. This is a rough neighborhood we're talking about and do to familial, tribal, religious, and other factor's it is virtually impossible to seperate any long term results, from what happens around them.
As Will Durant says in Hero's in History
That being said if one were to accept that AQ and other forces have perhaps been brought to a point where their actions and capabilities within Iraq are becoming prohibitive due to lack of support, then does this really still equate to either a culminating or decisive point. Outside factors have an effect, but even more so internally the Iraqi people will ultimately show whether or not they will choose to allow for return to former establishments or not.The price of Freedom is security
This more than anything else is probably the best argument for continued US presence long term albeit at much lower levels.
There will not be a complete termination of attacks or political complications until such time as other entities choose to discontinue their undermining of every step possible.
It may be that one good thing about bottom up militia related interactions towards peace that they are still that. If anyone is likely to cause problems after the fact it would be them. This being the case if they are not drawn into being part of the solution so that their supporters (the people) hold them responsible for continued prosperity and movement toward peace, then they would inevitably continue on past paths of conflict.
(more to come)
Cont.
This is true, but I think you will find that this may work to our advantage just as easily as it might work to theirs. If we sometimes find ourselves holding our breath in anticipation of what will come, it can be no less difficult let alone dangerous for an opponent to move ahead on assumptions which may or may not be the case when it's all said and done.
Keep em guessing, and while your at it kill as many as possible
John - good example about Little Round Top - I wonder with regard to assessing physical culmination if its more likely to be anticipated or acted upon as an opportunity at the tactical level? Only "more likely" not "limited to" - I say that because of the disconnects (impaired situational understanding) & time delays (windows of opportunity) that occur as what is happening on the ground is communicated higher?
I'd once had it put to me that for the ground services technology has a larger impact on the tactical whereas art has a larger impact on the strategic because the preponderence of technology is used toward tactical ends - whereas the higher the echelon the command the greater the reliance on art (intuition, experience, judgement, courage, candor, etc.) to make decisions. Again - both technology and art are present at all levels - but are more influential at certain levels based on the nature of their responsibilities/authorities & missions and tasks.
Last night I received a draft of TRADOC PAM 525-FW-X, The USA's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design Handbook (CACD) & and a supporting info brief. So far I like it allot - the emphasis is on how CDR's at various levels frame the problem. On one of the sildes there is a problem model that illustrates the difference between "more inter-active / more structurally complex" problems at one end of the spetrum and "less inter-active / less structurally complex" problems at the other end. Above the two ends is a digram depicting the level of corresponding effort between a "design" approach to framing the problem vs. an "engineering" approach toward framing the problem. The level of effort in the design approach corresponds with the "more inter-active / more structurally complex" problems that also fall toward the operational /campaign design end where the level of effort in the engineering approach more closely corresponds with the less inter-active / less structurally complex" problems in the tactical engagement end. Again both design and engineering are present in both, and inter-action and complexity exist in both ends - but the effects of non-linearity (disproportional outputs) are magnified the higher you go.
I mention it becuse of Wayne's statement:
Which get to how we make decisions and how the elements of the physical and psychological/moral/mental weigh in making those decisions. If you are interested in the draft CACD shoot me a PM - to big to hang here. Its an excellent piece of work that I hope makes it ito formal doctrine. The CACD offers the type of "descriptive" doctrine that I find most useful in harnessing talent toward "thinking". Even with some of the EBO language - it still puts the emphasis on people making decisions interacting with enemies and populations who are also making decisions. Some people are probably not going to like it though - because it: doesn't make any promises about easy wins, doesn't offer prescriptive formulas, clearly states there are no fire and forget solutions, clearly says the best we can do is adapt - and perhaps get it more right then wrong faster then the enemy can adapt. Its full ofEither way, I suspect that there is an intimate interweaving of mind and matter associated with assessing if a force has reached its culmination point.
unpleasant truths that require us to be engaged beyond the issuing of the plan. For some folks it will be too much to take on. I hope it gets acceptance in the community - it could be a very important piece of doctrine - Imagine, if we accept that we must think our way through somethings in their entirety.
Best Regards, Rob
That 's mean Rob
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