When we changed to population centric COIN, did we reach a decision point and implement a new critical system/function or were we forced to a culminating point by insurgents?Originally Posted by RTK
Slap - after knowing you for about a year - I'd have to say our views are pretty close - Best, Rob
When we changed to population centric COIN, did we reach a decision point and implement a new critical system/function or were we forced to a culminating point by insurgents?
Great question RA. I would offer that the decision point towards "eyes on the population" COIN was always out there, keeping pace with other strategic ebbs and flows, but for whatever reason, not quite palatable or maybe not possible to pick due to troop strength, political capital issues, etc.
We did hit a culmination point of sorts, which made the decision point not so much more suitable to pick, but rather a case of "well, we've tried about everything else...what was that guy talking about the other day?"
Be careful on interchanging decisive point and decision point. I don't know if you intentionally did that.
First, COIN is always going to be population centric.decision point – (DOD) The point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of action. A decision point is usually associated with a specific target area of interest, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient lead time to engage the adversary in the target area of interest. Decision points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of ongoing operations. (Army/Marine Corps) An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision.
I think in the scenario you point out culminated the HIC phase, though the decision point was before the culmination point, that is, the decision to enter into a sequel plan that began the stability operations and support operations (remember - there were no insurgents in May 2003). The phase culmination point was reached, but I don't think anyone has reverse engineered the culmination point for the entire war, nor do I think it's possible at this time so long as elections, tribes, and another soveriegn nation's security force have a say in it.
Example is better than precept.
Being a chronic heretic, I kind of take issue with that. Or at least believe we need to revise what we mean by it.
I think the idea that counterinsurgency is population-centric reflects the logic of cold war insurgency: insurgents are wannabe states. Therefore they need to control territory. They need popular support to provide them resources, intelligence, and sanctuary. So counterinsurgents need to prevent the insurgents from controlling the population. This is all straight from Galula, Thompson, etc.
Contemporary insurgents exercise a different type of control than Cold War era ones. Rather than being physical, it is more psychological, reinforced by periodic acts of terrorism. And--this is important--they are routinely interspersed within the population rather than spending most of their time in some sanctuary and making occasional forays into areas they don't control.
So, the idea of the government providing 24/7, country-wide security against the insurgents is, I think, an impossibility. I'm not sure exactly where this leads us, but we need to rethink our old ideas about a population-centric approach.
Here's another idea: I'm at least half convinced that the idea that success in counterinsurgency comes from protecting the population was always a myth. When I look at the history of insurgencies, it seems to me that when counterinsurgents lost, it was ALWAYS because of a collapse of will on the part of the regime and the security forces, not an inability to protect the population. That's why I blogged that I believe that the Casey strategy in Iraq which focused on bolstering the Iraqi security forces was actually better than the Petreaus one which emphasizes security the population (forgive me John, Dave, H.R., Pete, etc. if you're reading this!) At least that's what history suggests to me.
I said population centric, not securing-the-populace centric.
Relationships breed trust which leads to intelligence. There's something incredibly human about that. I don't disagree with 85% of what you have above but I think bolstering security forces is a means to securing to the populace. At least that's what I gathered from COL McMaster in his commander's intent.
At the end of the day, I think the winner of the fight is going to be whoever the populace hates least.
Example is better than precept.
I think the winner (in those very rare instances where there is a discernible winner) is going to be whoever the population fears most.
I concur. I weighed phrasing it that way too. Somehow it seemed less barbaric the first time I typed it.
Example is better than precept.
Dr. Metz I'd disagree with the point that the insurgents are wannabe states too. Not all insurgencies are about creating or taking over a nation. Sometimes they are proxy conflicts having to do with issues other than nation state such as reprisal or ethnic rivarly.
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My bad. Mrs. RA was yelling at me to come watch Helio's dance.
I guess the questions was, were we forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents? If so, does that mean that we reached a culmination point? If so, can we say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial?
No, I think we've conducted SOSO concurrently to FID, IDAD, and COIN.My bad. Mrs. RA was yelling at me to come watch Helio's dance.
I guess the questions was, were we forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents? If so, does that mean that we reached a culmination point? If so, can we say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial?
Again, I think certain phases or subphases have reached culminating points but not the overall operation.
Example is better than precept.
No, no--I wasn't advocating that position. I was saying that the notion that counterinsurgency must be population-centric flows from it. And that it is codified in American thinking. Just look at the official Joint definition of insurgency.
Words are important but they sure do mean
different things to different people. The Armed Forces, like any profession, have a jargon -- a lot of it doesn't translate well into civilian idiom. When you couple that with the Politicians ability to toss words around in a meaningless fashion, things can really get confused...My bad. Mrs. RA was yelling at me to come watch Helio's dance.
I guess the questions was, were we forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents? If so, does that mean that we reached a culmination point? If so, can we say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial?
A lot of folks in uniform knew in May 2003 that a stability operation was likely to be required if we stayed. Originally, we (wrongly and shortsightedly) didn't plan on staying. By Jun '03 it was obvious we were going to be there a while. So we began. As RTK said;All along. The problem was that the Army had deliberately ignored all those methodologies for almost 30 years in an effort to not have to do those things because they are long term, tedious, dangerous, dirty and unpleasant -- plus they do bad things to highly honed big conventional war machines."I think we've conducted SOSO concurrently to FID, IDAD, and COIN."
A second problem is that our federal government is way too big and is governed by laws written by a well meaning but not good thinking Congress, thus that government and its Armed Forces are big, bureaucratic and very cumbersome.
It took the Army 18 months to realize that they were going to have to get serious about the SOSO, FID, IDAD and COIN things instead of just jacking around with them, much as they hated the idea. It took another 18 months to get the system to gear up to start doing that and 18 more months for that shift to really become effective.
Thus, IMO, the answer to your question is that we were not forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents, we've been doing them all along and it just took the big bureaucratic elephant over four years to shift gears and change direction. Again to RTK; we've been doing all those things all along, we just gradually shifted the emphasis, refined the tactical process and better trained the troops. The surge made little difference.
I don't think we've reached a culmination point -- and that's a bad word for Scales to be throwing around because it implies an end to something and we aren't near the end of anything. It's as bad as using 'victory' and 'win' in that those words imply something that is not what is likely to happen in any insurgency. Thus soldiers say one thing, the politicians another and the great American public gets confused because of jargon and jingoism.
We can say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial in some situations but not necessarily in all. Since we aren't at a culmination point in Iraq and since we have not changed strategy, merely tactical procedures, that doesn't apply to Iraq.
Agreed. And as you have said on related subjects many times, I don't expect this tension/confusion to end anytime soon. Bob Scales use of terms in offering false clarity really blurred reality.I don't think we've reached a culmination point -- and that's a bad word for Scales to be throwing around because it implies an end to something and we aren't near the end of anything. It's as bad as using 'victory' and 'win' in that those words imply something that is not what is likely to happen in any insurgency. Thus soldiers say one thing, the politicians another and the great American public gets confused because of jargon and jingoism.
Best
Tom
Amen
So rightdifferent things to different people. The Armed Forces, like any profession, have a jargon -- a lot of it doesn't translate well into civilian idiom. When you couple that with the Politicians ability to toss words around in a meaningless fashion, things can really get confused...
A lot of folks in uniform knew in May 2003 that a stability operation was likely to be required if we stayed. Originally, we (wrongly and shortsightedly) didn't plan on staying. By Jun '03 it was obvious we were going to be there a while. So we began. As RTK said; All along. The problem was that the Army had deliberately ignored all those methodologies for almost 30 years in an effort to not have to do those things because they are long term, tedious, dangerous, dirty and unpleasant -- plus they do bad things to highly honed big conventional war machines.
A second problem is that our federal government is way too big and is governed by laws written by a well meaning but not good thinking Congress, thus that government and its Armed Forces are big, bureaucratic and very cumbersome.
It took the Army 18 months to realize that they were going to have to get serious about the SOSO, FID, IDAD and COIN things instead of just jacking around with them, much as they hated the idea. It took another 18 months to get the system to gear up to start doing that and 18 more months for that shift to really become effective.
Thus, IMO, the answer to your question is that we were not forced to stop stability and support operations because of the insurgents, we've been doing them all along and it just took the big bureaucratic elephant over four years to shift gears and change direction. Again to RTK; we've been doing all those things all along, we just gradually shifted the emphasis, refined the tactical process and better trained the troops. The surge made little difference.
I don't think we've reached a culmination point -- and that's a bad word for Scales to be throwing around because it implies an end to something and we aren't near the end of anything. It's as bad as using 'victory' and 'win' in that those words imply something that is not what is likely to happen in any insurgency. Thus soldiers say one thing, the politicians another and the great American public gets confused because of jargon and jingoism.
We can say that changing strategies at a culmination point can be very beneficial in some situations but not necessarily in all. Since we aren't at a culmination point in Iraq and since we have not changed strategy, merely tactical procedures, that doesn't apply to Iraq.
You've convinced me. I looked up FM-23. It says COIN is a mixture of offensive and defensive operations, so I can see that we've been on the offensive the entire time.
Not completely. I think the term that is more appropriate is full spectrum operations:
FM 3-0 has more on this.FM 1-02
full spectrum operations – The range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.
Example is better than precept.
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