The U.S. embraces open-source warfare?

[Granite_State]

Our old friend John Robb has an interesting post on the failure of nation-building and the U.S. move to back militias, on the Anbar model, in Pakistan:

THE US EMBRACES OPEN SOURCE WARFARE?
The US military is on the slow path to the realization that nation-building -- from reconstruction to other forms of traditional COIN dogma that serve to return legitimacy to the government -- doesn't work. Politics and populations in our new global environment fragment faster than they can be assembled into cohesive entities. What does work to slow the spread of temporary autonomous zones and open source insurgencies are open source militias. While messy (and many times as bad as what they replace), these militias do work:

* Colombia. The AUC blunted the spread of the FARC and other revolutionary groups.
* Sao Paulo, Brazil. Neighborhood militias have purged neighborhoods of the PCC (a criminal drug gang).
* Iraq. Anbar awakening and other militias have radically diminished al Qaeda's operational sphere.
....
Final Note: The use of a plethora of militias to fight a global open source insurgency from Nigeria to Mexico to Iraq to Pakistan is effective within a grand strategy of delay (it holds disorder at bay while allowing globalization to work). Most beneficially, it eliminates the need for nation-building, massive conventional troop deployments, and other forms of excess. Some questions remain: can the US manage something this complex or this messy? Will the rest of the US military/contractors sit idle (and as a result fall victim to budget cuts) while light weight special operations forces (and their allied private military corporations) take center stage?

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/...-embraces.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/wa...gewanted=print

[Stan]

Sounds like John is merely taking a dig at the US Military without examining just who provides oversight for/and what FMF and FMS really boil down to. That said, even all the money on earth won't convert border guards into special operations and/or guerillas.

...rather than use the more than $7 billion in U.S. military aid to bolster its counter-terrorism capabilities, Pakistan has spent the bulk of it on heavy arms, aircraft and equipment that U.S. officials say are far more suited for conventional warfare with India, its regional rival.

That has left fighters with the paramilitary force, known as the Frontier Corps, equipped often with little more than "sandals and bolt-action rifles," said a senior Western military official in Islamabad, even as they face Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters equipped with assault rifles and grenade launchers.

The arms imbalance has contributed to Al Qaeda's ability to regroup in the border region, and reflects the competing priorities that were evident even before this weekend between two countries that are self-described allies in the "war on terrorism" but have sharply divergent national security interests.

U.S. officials have urged Pakistan to move more aggressively against militants and bolster the capabilities of the Frontier Corps, an indigenously recruited force of about 80,000 troops, half of them based in the tribal areas, that was formed under British rule and is traditionally used to guard the border and curb smuggling.

Even front-line units with upgraded weapons are woefully unschooled in counterinsurgency tactics, other officials said. Late last month, Islamic militants captured dozens of fighters and paraded them before Western journalists...

Plans to build up the Frontier Corps are not universally supported by U.S. military officials. Loyalties within the corps are thought by many observers to be divided. Members are recruited mainly from Pashtun tribes with long-standing mistrust of outsiders. Most reject militant ideology, and have suffered hundreds of casualties in the fighting. But many also are devoutly religious and feel some degree of sympathy for the Islamists' cause.

"There is a push-back among some that the Frontier Corps is not a reliable ally of the United States," said Seth Jones, a military expert at Rand Corp. "The concern is that you give them additional training and equipment, and they could end up helping militants rather than taking action against them."

[Global Scout]

This isn't met as a bash John Robb post, he is a smart guy with some great ideas, but I think he made several mistakes in this post. John was an Air Force pilot, and then a software technician. He also has a great interest modern war/conflict, and it is important to get outside the box thinkers who didn't get indoctrinated in formal military schools to weigh in. He has even successfully borrowed terminology from the software industry (such as open source) to describe unconventional warfare concepts in an increasingly Globalized (new term, I'll see if it catches) world. However, he errs when he assumes that if he gives it a new name it is a new concept and he is the expert who discovered it. To put it in perspective, self promotion is part of the business of selling books, so looking past that at the issue:

The issue at hand is developing militias to solve our problems, to include the situation in Iraq. As almost all readers of this forum know, we have been engaged with militias (and militia like) organizations since our forefathers first settled on the east coast of America, starting with the manipulation of various Indian tribes to fight one another. The Europeans have been doing it much longer, and it even happened during the rule of the Roman Empire. However, John's version of recent history and his assessment for military requirements seems a little off to me.

“The rapid emergence of these local militias in Anbar came as a surprise to both the Iraqi government and the US military”.

First I don’t recall the emergence of the local militias in Anbar or elsewhere being a surprise. Rather I recall various Iraqi leaders approaching us with the idea asking for permission to form these groups, and asking for our support. First no one in their right mind is going to form an overt militia in Iraq without coalition permission and support unless they're fighting the coalition. Why risk unnecessary blue on blue casualties, and just as importantly why not co-opt the coalition's firepower? The reality in many parts of Iraq is that a lightly armed militia will not be effective against a heavily armed and brutal insurgent force, so the only way they could be effective is with the help of the coalition, meaning a substantial number of conventional forces (in this situation) are still required. If the insurgents were then foolish enough to put together a large enough force to threaten the militia group, then the coalition could pounce on them. It was and is much more complicated than this, but the emergence of these groups was not a surprise, and it was a quite natural reaction to insurgent abuses.

Then he added,

“Most beneficially, it eliminates the need for nation-building, massive conventional troop deployments, and other forms of excess. Some questions remain: can the US manage something this complex or this messy”?

I’m not sure how this eliminates the requirement for nation building? In theory we’re looking for long term success, so we’re probably still looking at something along the lines of clear, hold, and build. The militias help us clear and hold, but the government still needs to build, and that will include some form of demobilization for the militias, all of which will require substantial resources from donor states in resources, to include military manpower. Militias are a temporary fix as he indicated. Can the U.S. manage something this messy? We have before, and one can argue it has probably backfired on us in the long term if you look at the Philippines, Burma, Balkans, Afghanistan, etc., where militias formed the nucleus of latter day insurgent groups or criminal groups, but in the short to mid term they were very effective.

I haven't seen much written on how to manage them more effectively so we don't unintentionally sabotage our long term objectives, but I have some ideas on that, as I'm sure most of you do.

[Stan]

Good Evening, Global Scout !

Seems we’ve had our differences already regarding FM. Although you have yet to introduce yourself (which would at the very least provide us with more than N/A for background info), I’ll continue this rant a smigin longer.

I’m not intentionally bashing John.

However, as you opined so well, without formal military schooling such as DISAM, it really wouldn’t matter what your previous occupation was, or how smart you were with present day.

The funds belong to State, DOD almost manages the distro, the logistics and finances belong to the Air Force, and not a soul on earth understands what happens at ground zero.

Foreign Military Sales and/or Foreign Military Financing is not acquired via the latest software products. I only have 14 years of experience, so I may not be an adequate source regarding FMF/FMS applications in hostile environments (such as Sub-Sahara or the former east bloc).

This I truly agree with:

I’m not sure how this eliminates the requirement for nation building? In theory we’re looking for long term success, so we’re probably still looking at something along the lines of clear, hold, and build.

Perhaps why we have so many diplomats around. Once the quagmires subside and the US Military is gone, someone still should concentrate on Nation Building.

That would be State.

[Rank amateur]

I’m not sure how this eliminates the requirement for nation building?

I think he means in order to be successful in the GWOT. (The assumption before was that "failed states" meant "safe haven" for AQ.) But now we can use lots of small militias to take away the safe haven. Nation building becomes a humanitarian exercise instead of a national security exercise.

At least, I think that's what he meant.

[Tom Odom]

THE US EMBRACES OPEN SOURCE WARFARE?
The US military is on the slow path to the realization that nation-building -- from reconstruction to other forms of traditional COIN dogma that serve to return legitimacy to the government -- doesn't work. Politics and populations in our new global environment fragment faster than they can be assembled into cohesive entities. What does work to slow the spread of temporary autonomous zones and open source insurgencies are open source militias.

This is not a bash John Robb thread either. Suffice it to say that John Robb does not feel compelled to speak English in a meaningful way beyond use of catchy phrases that mean something different to everyone who reads them. The above posits again a "new environment," which is a complete break from the past.

What is truly amzaing about this break with the past is that only Robb sees it. His statement that politics and populations in this new "global environment" fragment faster than they can be assembled into cohesive entities. Taken literally that means that all forms of social control are breaking down globally. Or perhaps that new alliances form (although he didn't say it) are replacing old alliances.

Neither is true. Centuries of ethnic and religious forces are at play in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The same holds true in Nigeria, the Congo (DRC), and I would hazard a guess elewhere. What did surprise the US in Anbar--taking Dave Kilcullen as a primary source--was the play of such pressures against an new element. The tribal rights to control women as vested in the chiefs was put at risk by AQI demands to intermarry. AQI lost. There is nothing new in this phenomenon and it has nothing to do with globalization.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

Have posted this several times before this is the basis of Robb's theory: Airpower,Chaos and Infrastructure. It is an adaption of Warden's Rings again nothing new here. Robb's defense theories that he proposes from his book are little more than a rehash of the US Civil Defense theories from the late 50's and 60's. Doesn't mean there is anything wrong with them, in fact they are very good, but they are not new.

I witnessed alot of this as a kid, so it is just old wine in new bottles to me but again he is not wrong except for the fact none of this is new. I have said this before the enemy does not practice 4GW it is EBW...Effects Based Warfare....I just invented that so that is new.

As Tom mentioned he has probably seen more open source warfare than most folks around....maybe it is time we start listening instead of trying to claim credit for inventing some new form of warfare.

link to PDF on Airpower,Chaos,and Infrastructure.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/.../Text/mp14.pdf

[Global Scout]

I think he means in order to be successful in the GWOT. (The assumption before was that "failed states" meant "safe haven" for AQ.) But now we can use lots of small militias to take away the safe haven. Nation building becomes a humanitarian exercise instead of a national security exercise.

Rank amateur

Rank amateur I don't think Robb really has a clue what he means after further reflexing on it, and he'll probably come up short trying to defend his argument if he tries to debate it. As Tom stated, Robb frequently writes in a way that is wide open to interpretation, and I would add frequently has little substance. I think his popularity is based on his ability to put his thoughts into cool sound bytes, which is want the majority of the world wants.

As for point on using militias to interfere with safe havens, the reality is if an area is truely a safe haven for a particular group, then most likely a militia without State backing will not have the strength to dislodge or significantly disrupt the insurgents. I'll review my books and dusty memory banks, but I can't recall one case where a militia without sustantial State backing was able to throw an insurgent element out of their safe area. Even the militias in Dafar are State supported. Also unless the insurgency is in its incipient phase or final death throes, these types of attacks will accomplish little.

Robb said the alleged plan for Pakistan is wrong because there are no anti-AQ/Taliban militias in the region. First off I doubt if he knows that, and second militias simply don't emerge out of the dust either. The question is are there people willing to do it, but need some help and top cover to get started? As we have done so many times in the past we provide incentives for those people to form militias if the potential is there. Will it work? Who knows, and I assure John Robb doesn't know either. As Tom stated there are enduring and complex problems that are hundreds of years old in these areas. This isn't something that globalization created, and globalization probably won't solve it.

Stan, I posted a bio of sorts on the link you posted, thank you. Monies and authorities have always been an issue, but the world is changing and DoD has relatively recently received new authorities that supports DoD funding their own activities along these lines. It isn't enough, and DoS and others can still be substantial obstacles, but it is a step in the right direction. If we ever truely form a functional interagency process then it shouldn't really matter who controls the purse strings, since we would all be rowing together.

[Ron Humphrey]

The thing I find amazing about such presentations as this is simply what seems like a complete lack of relation to our system in general.

Change will happen regardless in any society, and there will be forces representative of differing directions for that change. The key to involvement with these local entities is as with anything else, simply an effort to help guide or persuade the direction which will be taken.

For many of these tribal leaders the underlying premise is regardless what happens in the political/national scene they will still maintain control of their
areas. The Taliban have past experience with worming their way into the standing infrastructures of the tribes in order to assure their continued capability to influence and direct actions of said groups.

The only effective way of changing this is exactly as happened in Anbar and other areas which is to say that the "real" community leaders; those who have grownup in the areas and honestly feel the pain of their circumstance must choose a different path.

This is where the government working with these leaders in order to facilitate this becomes the impetus for lasting change.

Long and short , we all know what we know , until we learn more.
People live the life their environment allows and unless you can help them see anything different to look for , they won't look for it.

It's not the freedom and democracy of America that people yearn for its the idea of freedom and a better life for themselves, and they look to their local leaders to tell them which is which.

Just a thought...

[JeffC]

This isn't met as a bash John Robb post, he is a smart guy with some great ideas, but I think he made several mistakes in this post. John was an Air Force pilot, and then a software technician. He also has a great interest modern war/conflict, and it is important to get outside the box thinkers who didn't get indoctrinated in formal military schools to weigh in. He has even successfully borrowed terminology from the software industry (such as open source) to describe unconventional warfare concepts in an increasingly Globalized (new term, I'll see if it catches) world. However, he errs when he assumes that if he gives it a new name it is a new concept and he is the expert who discovered it. To put it in perspective, self promotion is part of the business of selling books,

When I read this I had to laugh. About six months ago, I sent John an email asking why he thought applying software terms to Guerilla warfare tactics was an innovation? I also suggested that he include a glossary on his site, rather than requiring readers to buy his book if they didn't understand his terminology. In his response to me, John explained how many important people (and named them) have told him that his work was QUITE innovative. Needless to say, he didn't dig my glossary idea either.

[Rank amateur]

I don't think Robb really has a clue what he means after further reflexing on it

Quite possibly.

As for point on using militias to interfere with safe havens, the reality is if an area is truely a safe haven for a particular group, then most likely a militia without State backing will not have the strength to dislodge or significantly disrupt the insurgents. I'll review my books and dusty memory banks, but I can't recall one case where a militia without sustantial State backing was able to throw an insurgent element out of their safe area.

True, but the idea that our state can support local militias is new in Iraq. The theory for four years was that we needed to build up police and military supported by the Iraqi state.

As Tom pointed out, none of this may be new, but there are lots of things we should've learned from Tom, but didn't.