"U.K. Platoon Weapons and the Weight Capability Myth" by William F. Owen (from RUSI Defence Systems June, 2007, Vol. 10, No. 1):

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets...on_Weapons.pdf

Another intersting article by William F. Owen, this time concerning the weapons of the British Army Infantry Platoon. Owen is looking for ways to reduce the carried load of the British infantryman, but ends up proposing a new Infantry Section organization as well. Owen comes out rather strongly against providing infantrymen with weapons and training for employment beyond 200 m; he contends that beyond that range, infantrymen are typically unable to effectively target the enemy with carefully-aimed individual weapons. According to battle surveys taken over the past decade and a half or so from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 80% of all firefights occur within 200 m. Furthermore, that even determined training has failed to enable infantrymen to deal effectively with targets with individual, point-weapons beyond 200 m. He also notes that 5.56 mm ammo is more-or-less ineffective much past 200 m anyway, but interestingly, he does not consider this to be a problem at longer ranges; he points out that the man under fire doesn't care what the calibre of the bullets striking at and around him are, he's going to go to ground anyway.

Instead, he proposes that firefights at ranges of over 200 m be dealt with by machine guns, grenade launchers, rockets, and mortars. He takes the British Army to task (and I very much agree) for removing the 51 mm Light Mortar from the Infantry Platoon HQ (effective range 800 m) as it claims that the 40mm Underslung Grenade Launcher (range 350 m) can replace it in the indirect-fire role (obviously it can't). He does however, approving take notice of the M-32 40 mm Medium Grenade Launcher with its 800 m range. Eventually, Owen proposes an Infantry Section composition of 8 men split into a machine gun team and a medium grenade launcher team.

William F. Owen - Quote:

"It is section weapons and HE projectors that win firefights, not IWs.
Where the performance of IWs is critical is at short range."

-Unquote

Interesting, but I'm not sure that either team is suited for the assault itself, and sadly, discussion of the Infantry Platoon gets waylaid in the course of the article. Although the issue of weight does get fair treatment, I think, and that reducing the typical British infantryman's load from 42 kg (52 kg for Section Commanders due to radio and batteries) to 26 kg is partially faciliated by some of Owen's proposals for Platoon Weapons. He does not sound optimistic that a clear recognition that solutions to the weight problem are readily at hand will in fact occur.