Intelligence Collection and Sharing

[SWJED]

SWJ Blog - Intelligence Collection and Sharing by CPT Tim Hsia.

Years from now after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have ended; historians will pore over the operations and tactics of the U.S. Army during both campaigns. They will likely applaud the all-volunteer force and the courage of the individual soldier; just as likely, however, they will criticize the lack of information sharing and management between the militarily and civilian departments of the U.S. government. Specifically, they will note the military’s poor record in information management, accessibility of intelligence gathered, and the inability to apply years of accumulated intelligence to current battlefield operations. A way to patch the current intelligence gap within the U.S. government would be to adopt an information collection program that accumulates data similar to major internet stock market trackers. Market trackers absorb information continuously, rigorously track trends, and enable traders to formulate decisions based off the latest news combined with historical data. The ability of market trackers to store and quickly recall historical data should be mimicked by the U.S. government so that commanders and diplomats possess relevant records that enable them to make decisions which take into account the economic, historical, cultural, political, anthropological, and environmental aspects of the region they are operating within...

[Ron Humphrey]

I think we'll see this sooner rather than later but how soon the business communities are willing to share their secrets has yet to be determined.

[Jedburgh]

...A solution to the current intelligence blackhole would be to collect, store, and sift this data into a “geointel” site organized in a manner replicating stock market data....

I dislike the comparison and feel it is yet another false analogy based on misconceptions about intelligence. The piece shows little understanding of multidisciplinary all-source collection and how it affects the analytic effort at the tactical and operational levels.

However, tossing aside the market comparisons, the concept of organizing finished intel by geographic location in an all-encompassing user-friendly database that can support analysis at all levels is a good one. At its most fundamental, this resembles an old analysis tool that is very handy in the COIN environment - the incident map/coordinates register.

Unfortunately, the coordinates register gets short shrift in current doctrine. The most current version of FM 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis provides one short paragraph on this tool, with no real instructions on its use. It is treated the same way in ST 2-91.1 Intelligence Support to Stability Operations and Support Operations. FM 2-91.4 Intelligence Support to Urban Operations doesn't mention it all - and I personally have found it to be particularly effective as an analytic tool in the unconventional urban environment. There is also no discussion of it at all in the new FM 2-01.301 Specific TTPs for IPB, although the manual does briefly mention an "incident overlay" in an almost dismissive manner.

(A lot of what LE is doing today with GIS support to LE analysis is similar to what I learned in the old days with a stubby pencil, notebook and paper maps. However, LE cross-jurisdictional issues with information sharing in support of analysis makes the Army's problems as discussed in the CPT Hsia's piece look positively minor by comparison.)

My understanding of the intent of CPT Hsia's concept is that it takes the old coordinates register tool and upgrades it a couple of generations - and takes it from tactical to strategic applicability - with current technology. Looking at it from an analyst's perspective, in many operational environments it would be nice to be able to use current high-res overhead imagery of your target location (from country level down through province, city, district, block and even to single building) as a dashboard to pull up resources based on what you are looking at. i.e. for the single building it could provide every product that even tangentially mentions that building or an occupant as well as everything reported within a given distance of the building. (As an almost-aside, it would pretty much require dual monitors to use the capability effectively.)

The technology exists. Hell, we are able to do bits and pieces of that right now. But the overarching all-encompassing user-friendly database does not exist. To build it to the level that he states - with complete (and timely) joint service, interagency and private sector colloboration and input - is a tough row to hoe. If we could get something that works that well with just the military services, it would be a near miracle.

Of course, there's always the human factor. We will always have leaders who, despite having all the substantive information they need to support a specific course of action, instead permit their personal biases and perceptions to dismiss valid intelligence. On the other hand, we continue to have a few outstanding leaders (never enough though) who, despite the lack of substantive information, manage to make the right decisions, or to find innovative ways of turning tragedy into success. Technology won't replace character or instinct (or be a substitute for the lack of), although it can certainly be leveraged as a powerful tool in support of good leaders.

[selil]

Jedburgh it sounds like you are describing the google suite.

[Jedburgh]

Jedburgh it sounds like you are describing the google suite.

Then I guess I did a really lousy job of describing my thoughts. That's not what's in my mind's eye at all. Although there are aspects of Google's Advanced Search that are useful, Google Earth is but a pale reflection of the quality of overhead imagery available to the IC and the interface I was pondering was like nothing Google offers.

[selil]

Google Pro has a lot better imagery. For Google Earth there is an API that you can do some pretty swift GIS data stuff with. I'm not familiar with what you're using at all but Space Imaging in Thornton, CO has some pretty cool tools (sort of civillian company).

One other thing about Google is that what you see with search tools are only part of the capability. With the Google appliance suite you can put your data up for searching and it (and the software) can start doing analysis and drawing relationships. That gets your easy to use database.

When you're dealing with content rather than images or geographic locations context aware searching is important. There is another similar technology to Google for context aware searching being modeled by a company called Hakia. It uses heurestic semantics and the more questions you ask the better it gets at searching.

Sorry I didn't understand.

[Watcher In The Middle]

If I might ask a few questions....

01 First off, from your posts, I've developed this vision of being able to look at visual imagery (almost like driving down a road, or a network of roads, only from above) and eventually focusing in on a specific location (whatever it may be).

02 Then based upon the location selected (with a number of different locator options), not just coordinates, because you may not have that specific piece of information), tell me everything I might want to know about that specific location, with additional search options (like a diameter search, or a "side of road" search, or "Persons associated with" search).

03 My main question is, who would be the primary consumer (user) of the system? I know that sounds like a stupid question, but from reading the original article vrs. your comments, I don't ever see one unified software system being able to reliably perform all the required functions for all the different parties involved (folks in the trenches vrs. folks in command, being outside the primary activity area).

For example, I noted all the "high security" requirements in the original article. Well, if it takes an extra 5+ seconds to get through all the security access crap out in the field, that can be several eternities if people are shooting at you. Result will be that people won't use the crap (software) because it's just too slow. They won't tell you that, they just won't use it.

Reason I'm so interested in this is because we do software work, but for local government units across a number of states, and GIS/attribute database integration is a giant issue, so am always on the lookout for new ideas and concepts.

04 You night want to check out Google Neighborhood. It's extremely new, I just very recently got clued into it, and just started looking at it. Could be the type of software (first steps) that you are looking for.

Can tell you that the perfect training for this type of work would be "Siamese Cat Herder".

[Tom Odom]

Can tell you that the perfect training for this type of work would be "Siamese Cat Herder".

Naw, calicos are way tougher.

Seriously, I see the problem with the whole article in that it confuses/conflates information/knowledge management with intelligence. The first can support or cripple the latter but it cannot replace reall intelligence--especially in the realm of intelligence analysis.

Tom

[tim]

Thanks for the feedback on the article. To clarify, the intent of the article was not to imply that raw information is the end all and be all. Additionally, thorough scrutiny and analysis of intelligence will always be necessary.

The problem I sought to highlight is the fact that there is simply no overarching information network collection and sharing for units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is oftentimes accused of fighting the last war, but in essence we are fighting the last battle because we aren't keeping information and properly passing it on to units that will operate in a region 2-3 years from now. Think about how many times we have fought the "battle of Baghdad, Mosul, Falluja, Baqubah, etc..." What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the feedback on the article. To clarify, the intent of the article was not to imply that raw information is the end all and be all. Additionally, thorough scrutiny and analysis of intelligence will always be necessary.

The problem I sought to highlight is the fact that there is simply no overarching information network collection and sharing for units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is oftentimes accused of fighting the last war, but in essence we are fighting the last battle because we aren't keeping information and properly passing it on to units that will operate in a region 2-3 years from now. Think about how many times we have fought the "battle of Baghdad, Mosul, Falluja, Baqubah, etc..." What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

Tim,

I have no doubt about that issue but it is tied to larger IM issues, exacerbated by the need for RIP/TOA. We work it here (JRTC) but I understand where you are coming from. That said, I would frame the discussion in terms that were more operations-centric (even though they support both intel and ops). In any case, your article is well worth the read.

In a larger sense, we always do this. I am in the business of lessons learned and as a history guy I will tell you that is often an oxymoron when it comes to the US Army.

Best

Tom

PS

Keep writing!

[Stan]

Hi Tim !

Thanks for the feedback on the article.

...All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

I'm surprised that both the Army and DIA have not in 3 or 4 years fixed this. Then again, Tom and I were looking at each other after hearing of 'intel folks' in the camp (thinking quietly that someone heard our requests for assistance finally)... "the Cav has arrived" ...only to find one of the most disinterested people on creation in the midst of 800,000 refugees.

Welcome and please do continue to write !

Regards, Stan

[Jedburgh]

....What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

....tied to larger IM issues, exacerbated by the need for RIP/TOA.

It is a huge problem when units don't do a proper intel handover. Blame can go both ways: sometimes the departing unit hands over everything and the gaining unit files and forgets. Sometimes the departing unit is in such haste to unass the AO that they don't bother covering important details or transferring important data. Often it is a mix of both to varying degrees, with many other RIP/TOA issues impacting the intel handover. Then there are the instances in which there is no handover at all; one unit moves in after the other has departed with zero transfer of anything other than responsibility.

....I would frame the discussion in terms that were more operations-centric.

Tom, I agree 100%. When it comes to the handover affecting intel transfer it is really an operational issue, not an intel issue. Like damn near everything else, it comes down to a leadership issue. At what level that leadership issue comes to rest is dependent upon the situation at hand.

Certainly operational necessity can severely impact the ability of units to execute an effective hand-off, but in reality far less often than for which the excuse is made.

[Ron Humphrey]

One thing that has always bothered me when entering any new environment is that it is exactly that, an environment. Made up of all the social interactions, politics, etc which serve to make it unique.

There really should not be so much difficulty in at least maintaining the outline or shadow of that particular social enclave considering that travel companies have been putting together travel guides for such a long time.

A travel guide is not supposed to be able to tell you everything you need to know about an area but it sure enough gets you into the vicinity of understanding what and who to look for / to.

I know several individuals who have made a good effort in providing exactly this kind of thing and we can only hope that would continue.

Gathering and holding information isn't the problem, getting it where it is available to those who need it is where the answers can be found.

[Jedburgh]

One thing that has always bothered me when entering any new environment is that it is exactly that, an environment. Made up of all the social interactions, politics, etc which serve to make it unique.

There really should not be so much difficulty in at least maintaining the outline or shadow of that particular social enclave considering that travel companies have been putting together travel guides for such a long time.

A travel guide is not supposed to be able to tell you everything you need to know about an area but it sure enough gets you into the vicinity of understanding what and who to look for / to.

I know several individuals who have made a good effort in providing exactly this kind of thing and we can only hope that would continue.

Gathering and holding information isn't the problem, getting it where it is available to those who need it is where the answers can be found.

Ron, the living, breathing entity characterization is spot on.

Although the transfer of data is extremely important, in current ops relationships are truly critical. When an area is handed off between units, a poorly handled transfer (or no transfer at all) of HUMINT sources can be catastrophic to the new unit's initial collection efforts. By the time they rebuild the network, it is time to rotate home - and the cycle can start all over again. Even in the best of circumstances a transfer of sources has to be handled carefully.

Aside from HUMINT sources, the local relationships of sheikhs, mukhtars, imams, key civic leaders, local security/police commanders etc. with the US forces is absolutely critical. The handoff should include face-to-face meets with the most important of these living breathing represenations of the unit's area of operations. A "travel guide" type listing of local key leaders will not effectively replace a couple of days spent conducting a joint meet-and-greet with the locals by the necessary outgoing and incoming personnel. But on the other hand, its better than nothing.

[wm]

It is a huge problem when units don't do a proper intel handover. Blame can go both ways: sometimes the departing unit hands over everything and the gaining unit files and forgets. Sometimes the departing unit is in such haste to unass the AO that they don't bother covering important details or transferring important data. Often it is a mix of both to varying degrees, with many other RIP/TOA issues impacting the intel handover. Then there are the instances in which there is no handover at all; one unit moves in after the other has departed with zero transfer of anything other than responsibility.

Tom, I agree 100%. When it comes to the handover affecting intel transfer it is really an operational issue, not an intel issue. Like damn near everything else, it comes down to a leadership issue. At what level that leadership issue comes to rest is dependent upon the situation at hand.

Certainly operational necessity can severely impact the ability of units to execute an effective hand-off, but in reality far less often than for which the excuse is made.

One would think that after doing these handoffs for almost 5 years now that CENTCOM, CFLCC/3rd Army, MNF-I or some senior HQ would have developed an SOP with a complete checklist for RIP/TOA activities. It ought to be much like one's installatiuon clearance papers--you ain't leaving until you get all the boxes signed off--and an adequate data handoff ought to be one off the biggest boxes on the checklist.

[Penta]

But, wm, that would make sense. And we know that that cannot possibly be permitted.