Quote Originally Posted by S2MSSI
...The more complex the churn is-- the more experienced the intel analyst must be. I'm still seeing weakness on the human side. I'm also still seeing push intel that does not related to the initial PIRs. Sad, but it is cooler to buy and play with more toys than fix an HR problem.
True to a certain degree. I've spoken on the board several times before regarding the quantity vs quality issue for the HUMINT side. But this applies to analysts a bit differently.

In the Army at least, the Intelligence Analyst MOS has always been the largest one in the MI field. The problem isn't numbers, its training. Like everyone else in the Big Army, training was always focused on conventional maneuver warfare. This has shifted significantly in the past couple of years, but the main weakness of training remains an over-reliance on systems and a failure to adequately focus on critical thinking skills. The new FM 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis actually goes into quite a bit of detail on critical thinking, the reasoning process and analytic pitfalls. But from what I've seen in the field, little of that is impressed into the heads of the cherry analysts at the schoolhouse and the focus is on using the spectrum of available tech tools instead. The smart ones with natural talent do rise to the occasion, but that is not an acceptable method for developing enough capable analysts to support current ops.

I'll never forget the time in Afghanistan, when I asked the NCOIC of the terrain team at Bagram for analytic products for certain key locations in-country I was in the process of assessing. He offered me some great overhead imagery, with key points clearly demarcated and a nice glossy unit logo on it. But when I pressed and asked again for an analytic terrain product, he just looked at me like I had something growing out of my forehead.