Intelligence Collection and Sharing

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the feedback on the article. To clarify, the intent of the article was not to imply that raw information is the end all and be all. Additionally, thorough scrutiny and analysis of intelligence will always be necessary.

The problem I sought to highlight is the fact that there is simply no overarching information network collection and sharing for units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is oftentimes accused of fighting the last war, but in essence we are fighting the last battle because we aren't keeping information and properly passing it on to units that will operate in a region 2-3 years from now. Think about how many times we have fought the "battle of Baghdad, Mosul, Falluja, Baqubah, etc..." What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

Tim,

I have no doubt about that issue but it is tied to larger IM issues, exacerbated by the need for RIP/TOA. We work it here (JRTC) but I understand where you are coming from. That said, I would frame the discussion in terms that were more operations-centric (even though they support both intel and ops). In any case, your article is well worth the read.

In a larger sense, we always do this. I am in the business of lessons learned and as a history guy I will tell you that is often an oxymoron when it comes to the US Army.

Best

Tom

PS

Keep writing!