Intelligence Collection and Sharing

[Stan]

Hmmm you can always point to Brazza 93-95 and just say, none.

Damn ! That was my trump card
I don't suppose it would then be blatantly obvious where that 'none' got him

[Tom Odom]

Damn ! That was my trump card
I don't suppose it would then be blatantly obvious where that 'none' got him

Hmmm promoted to full Colonel as Al Gore's advisor on Africa, n'est pas? After of course, I relieved him in Goma at the request of the JTF-A Commander and demand of the French...

[tim]

Thanks for the feedback on the article. To clarify, the intent of the article was not to imply that raw information is the end all and be all. Additionally, thorough scrutiny and analysis of intelligence will always be necessary.

The problem I sought to highlight is the fact that there is simply no overarching information network collection and sharing for units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is oftentimes accused of fighting the last war, but in essence we are fighting the last battle because we aren't keeping information and properly passing it on to units that will operate in a region 2-3 years from now. Think about how many times we have fought the "battle of Baghdad, Mosul, Falluja, Baqubah, etc..." What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the feedback on the article. To clarify, the intent of the article was not to imply that raw information is the end all and be all. Additionally, thorough scrutiny and analysis of intelligence will always be necessary.

The problem I sought to highlight is the fact that there is simply no overarching information network collection and sharing for units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is oftentimes accused of fighting the last war, but in essence we are fighting the last battle because we aren't keeping information and properly passing it on to units that will operate in a region 2-3 years from now. Think about how many times we have fought the "battle of Baghdad, Mosul, Falluja, Baqubah, etc..." What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

Tim,

I have no doubt about that issue but it is tied to larger IM issues, exacerbated by the need for RIP/TOA. We work it here (JRTC) but I understand where you are coming from. That said, I would frame the discussion in terms that were more operations-centric (even though they support both intel and ops). In any case, your article is well worth the read.

In a larger sense, we always do this. I am in the business of lessons learned and as a history guy I will tell you that is often an oxymoron when it comes to the US Army.

Best

Tom

PS

Keep writing!

[Stan]

Hmmm promoted to full Colonel as Al Gore's advisor on Africa, n'est pas? After of course, I relieved him in Goma at the request of the JTF-A Commander and demand of the French...

Vraiment...pas une petite merde
I was probably more relieved with your decision than all the French in Bukavu and Goma combined

[Stan]

Hi Tim !

Thanks for the feedback on the article.

...All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

I'm surprised that both the Army and DIA have not in 3 or 4 years fixed this. Then again, Tom and I were looking at each other after hearing of 'intel folks' in the camp (thinking quietly that someone heard our requests for assistance finally)... "the Cav has arrived" ...only to find one of the most disinterested people on creation in the midst of 800,000 refugees.

Welcome and please do continue to write !

Regards, Stan

[Jedburgh]

....What is happening, is units redeploy back home and all their information is lost and irretrievable to units who operate in that very same region 6-12 months down the road. This is compounded when units are being shifted continuously. All of that intelligence from the mundane (terrain, trafficability, key terrain, census info) to key data (important sheikhs, imams, cell network) has to all be researched and mapped out again.

....tied to larger IM issues, exacerbated by the need for RIP/TOA.

It is a huge problem when units don't do a proper intel handover. Blame can go both ways: sometimes the departing unit hands over everything and the gaining unit files and forgets. Sometimes the departing unit is in such haste to unass the AO that they don't bother covering important details or transferring important data. Often it is a mix of both to varying degrees, with many other RIP/TOA issues impacting the intel handover. Then there are the instances in which there is no handover at all; one unit moves in after the other has departed with zero transfer of anything other than responsibility.

....I would frame the discussion in terms that were more operations-centric.

Tom, I agree 100%. When it comes to the handover affecting intel transfer it is really an operational issue, not an intel issue. Like damn near everything else, it comes down to a leadership issue. At what level that leadership issue comes to rest is dependent upon the situation at hand.

Certainly operational necessity can severely impact the ability of units to execute an effective hand-off, but in reality far less often than for which the excuse is made.

[Ron Humphrey]

One thing that has always bothered me when entering any new environment is that it is exactly that, an environment. Made up of all the social interactions, politics, etc which serve to make it unique.

There really should not be so much difficulty in at least maintaining the outline or shadow of that particular social enclave considering that travel companies have been putting together travel guides for such a long time.

A travel guide is not supposed to be able to tell you everything you need to know about an area but it sure enough gets you into the vicinity of understanding what and who to look for / to.

I know several individuals who have made a good effort in providing exactly this kind of thing and we can only hope that would continue.

Gathering and holding information isn't the problem, getting it where it is available to those who need it is where the answers can be found.

[Jedburgh]

One thing that has always bothered me when entering any new environment is that it is exactly that, an environment. Made up of all the social interactions, politics, etc which serve to make it unique.

There really should not be so much difficulty in at least maintaining the outline or shadow of that particular social enclave considering that travel companies have been putting together travel guides for such a long time.

A travel guide is not supposed to be able to tell you everything you need to know about an area but it sure enough gets you into the vicinity of understanding what and who to look for / to.

I know several individuals who have made a good effort in providing exactly this kind of thing and we can only hope that would continue.

Gathering and holding information isn't the problem, getting it where it is available to those who need it is where the answers can be found.

Ron, the living, breathing entity characterization is spot on.

Although the transfer of data is extremely important, in current ops relationships are truly critical. When an area is handed off between units, a poorly handled transfer (or no transfer at all) of HUMINT sources can be catastrophic to the new unit's initial collection efforts. By the time they rebuild the network, it is time to rotate home - and the cycle can start all over again. Even in the best of circumstances a transfer of sources has to be handled carefully.

Aside from HUMINT sources, the local relationships of sheikhs, mukhtars, imams, key civic leaders, local security/police commanders etc. with the US forces is absolutely critical. The handoff should include face-to-face meets with the most important of these living breathing represenations of the unit's area of operations. A "travel guide" type listing of local key leaders will not effectively replace a couple of days spent conducting a joint meet-and-greet with the locals by the necessary outgoing and incoming personnel. But on the other hand, its better than nothing.

[wm]

It is a huge problem when units don't do a proper intel handover. Blame can go both ways: sometimes the departing unit hands over everything and the gaining unit files and forgets. Sometimes the departing unit is in such haste to unass the AO that they don't bother covering important details or transferring important data. Often it is a mix of both to varying degrees, with many other RIP/TOA issues impacting the intel handover. Then there are the instances in which there is no handover at all; one unit moves in after the other has departed with zero transfer of anything other than responsibility.

Tom, I agree 100%. When it comes to the handover affecting intel transfer it is really an operational issue, not an intel issue. Like damn near everything else, it comes down to a leadership issue. At what level that leadership issue comes to rest is dependent upon the situation at hand.

Certainly operational necessity can severely impact the ability of units to execute an effective hand-off, but in reality far less often than for which the excuse is made.

One would think that after doing these handoffs for almost 5 years now that CENTCOM, CFLCC/3rd Army, MNF-I or some senior HQ would have developed an SOP with a complete checklist for RIP/TOA activities. It ought to be much like one's installatiuon clearance papers--you ain't leaving until you get all the boxes signed off--and an adequate data handoff ought to be one off the biggest boxes on the checklist.

[Penta]

But, wm, that would make sense. And we know that that cannot possibly be permitted.