Tom Barnett has a different take on this article.
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblo..._analysis.html
Tom Barnett has a different take on this article.
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblo..._analysis.html
...and manages to mention "I," "me" or "my work" nine times in one short blog post. Impressive.
(Although I do agree with him that the Wired piece establishes a bit of a false dichotomy between NCW and the importance of human systems analysis and capabilities.)
I didn't see Schachtman as presenting an "either....or" premise in the Wired piece. Rather, I read it as arguing that NCW had gone too far in one doctrinal direction and that the military is going through a correction to embrace the human element to a greater degree. At a couple of points in the article he quotes people who clearly state that both aspects are important. Although, at the end of the piece, he did place a caution about the danger of over-tech'ing (can I say that?) the anaysis of human interactions.
Barnett's blog entry comes off as a self-centered juvenile rant.
Geez, I wrote a much better description of this tension three years ago in BFA...
I worked with John at length in OFT....
Cebrowski pushed my work....
I briefed all of Rummy's senior aides...
BTW, didn't he write Cebrowski up as senior champion of my SysAdmin concepts....
And finally:
Shachtman interviewed me. I told him the thesis was sophomoric and that he needed to aim higher. And he ignored my advice.
He gets what he deserves for peddling such gross simplification: incomprehension and professional downgrading from anybody with a clue.
Thanks for the kind words, guys. i really appreciate it.
The second article I wouldn't characterize as a "rehash," though. I'd say it fills out some details - particularly about how hard it's been for the Human Terrain program to find qualified social scientists.
Speaking of characterizations... Barnett says, "Shachtman interviewed me. I told him the thesis was sophomoric and that he needed to aim higher. And he ignored my advice."
I think the e-mail chain of that "interview" pretty demonstrably proves that just ain't so.
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/1...forw.html#more
Anyway, I'll be hanging around the forums for the next few days. So feel free to shoot me any questions, barbs, etc.
nms
So then, perhaps it would be safe for us military reactionaries to say that we were at least half-right about NCW being in denial of traditional military views of the utterly crucial role of the Human Factor. And furthermore that NCW is just a tool, not a strategy.
Bingo. Exactly correct.
Net-Centric Warfare, from my perspective, is the domain of C4ISR and that makes it pre-eminently a technological tool which did not exist on any battlefield in the world prior to OEF/OIF.
Proof of concept was done in the various AWEs (Advanced Warfighting Experiments) and culminated in the desert of California at NTC Ft. Irwin in the "Millenium Challenge 2002" exercise which near-perfected the Army ABCS in virtual Middle Eastern battlefield conditions.
The real-world application of NCW against Saddam's army between March 20 and April 9 2003 was all the proof required that this tool worked beyond all expectations.
Last edited by Sean Osborne; 12-08-2007 at 03:40 PM.
Noah--I should add that my short comment on dichotomies really didn't indicate what a valuable piece I thought it was--although hopefully that was evident from the fact that I posted it here in the first place. Indeed, I'm a daily Danger Room reader.
Oh, and Ted--you missed one!
..as I describe in PNM, in the summer of 2002
The silliness continues...
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/11/more-barnett.html
Perhaps the "tension" underlying the Barnett - Schactman exchanges (Barnett responded to NMS on 11/29...more to come?) arises from NMS' sort of epiphany at Petraeus "love song" - COIN and NCW can be conducted by the same organization, at the same time, sometimes the same TAOR. KAT Missouri makes the point - the doctrines can be complementary and reenforcing, especially given the human and technical capacities of the MySpace generation. Of course, that really complicates PNM's mission and resource division, maybe even a dichotomy, between SysAdmin/DoEE and Leviathan/DoD. I see NMS/TPMB as emblematic of the coming resolutions of DoD centric vs. Interagency strategic points of view. Sort of how SWJ was needed as an alternative to the Big War Media's points of view?
So, where do I sign up?
On a more serious note, I read the preliminary assessment of the HTT in Afghanistan, and I certainly agree with you about some of the problems (and opportunities). One of the things that has bugged me is that large parts of the program training seemed to be out of whack, at least the early versions of it (I hope they adopt the recommendations in the assessment report).
Back to the recruiting issue for a minute, and one of my own pet peeves with how the recruitment is handled is the restrictions to US nationals. I honestly think that it should be expanded to anyone who holds a secret or TS clearance from a coalition country. Admittedly, that's still a tiny pool, but it is larger than just the US. As for the problems with getting the clearances based on past research activities, this is going to be an ongoing problem.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
I see in the Schachtman piece a narrative including perspective shifts in response to thought. I see in Tom's assessment some frustration that isn't supported in the piece he comments on. I won't speculate on his reason for writing it, but I'll say that I really cannot see his point of view.
Why is an interdisciplinary balance so unpalatable for some folks? Why not conceive of these approaches as intellectual tools that can be used in complement when the situation requires? Reminds me of the posts regarding COIN vs. MCO...
Well, for Noah - keeping making sense, and for Tom - have a nice day.
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