Fear as A Political Motivator

[Ken White]

...It is the semantic reaction, that makes people reach for kinetic weapons.

somewhat differently than I. My observation has been that visceral reactions, not semantic ones, tend to lead to breaking the Broadswords out of the thatch...

[marct]

somewhat differently than I. My observation has been that visceral reactions, not semantic ones, tend to lead to breaking the Broadswords out of the thatch...

Actually, Ken, that's pretty much how Korzybski defined a semantic reaction .

[Ken White]

as opposed to a semantic reaction...

[wm]

My observation has been that visceral reactions, not semantic ones, tend to lead to breaking the Broadswords out of the thatch...

Ken,

I suspect the visceral, AKA emotional, reaction you describe is part and parcel of the sematic reaction. Every word has some emotional charge attached to it--comes with learning any language's vocabulary. For that reason, I doubt that, short of killing them, we ever truly change anyone else's fundamental semantic reaction. We may suppress it (Marc's point about it being a short term event), but it will return, often at the most inopportune moments.

[Ken White]

funny again.

Jeez. Can't even yank an occasional chain with a semantic quibble... :^)

[Ron Humphrey]

While I agree to a large extent with Norfolk's take on Hobes, I have some other issues about it and with MarcT's earlier post, quoted below. For those who want to cut to the chase here's my bottom line (which I justify eventually down further):
BLUF: Perhaps a Rousseau-like myth seems a better place to start in the Middle East. After all, through the insistence on using Shari'a as the basis of government and justice, the opponent is advocating for a "divine right" state of sorts .



I am somewhat confused by this post. What variant are you talking about? The usual application of the Prisoner's Dilemma is to show a fundamental inconsistency in acting egoistically. It purports to show that acting in what appears to be your unique self-interest results in an outcome that is least in your self interest. I'm not sure how that plays into the Hobbesian myth from Leviathan about how and why we form governments. Another use of the Prisoner's Dilemma is an attempt to show how Adam Smith's hidden hand makes for the best outcomes for all in a laissez faire market--another interesting myth, IMHO.

I view the Hobbesian position as fundamentally opposed to that of Locke--Hobbes' view of human nature is that we are basically bad while Locke thinks we are basically good. Hobbes also views our resources as constrained--there isn't enough to go around for everyone while Locke seems to think we have more than enough natural resources to turn into "property." For Hobbes, we need an outsider to keep us in line and make sure we share the limited resources. For Locke, we appoint a special agent to allow us to get on with enriching ourselves and keep those who would acquire property the easy way (by theft) from doing so. BTW for Hobbes revolution is not a right of the governed; it is a right in Locke's view, which probably explains why Jefferson and Co. look much more Lockean than Hobbesian in their efforts.

This all has little to do with the real world I think (except perhaps for the division of labor piece). BTW, I'm pretty sure most of the post-American Revolution uprisings/rebellions/ revolutions (and revolutionary writings, like Marx's and the modern Frankfort School folks, e.g.) are based, philosophically, on Rousseau, who is at odds with both Hobbes and Locke in important ways. Rousseau's hidden agenda/ interest is to justify getting rid of a government based on "divine right." (He didn't have a Henry VIII to break him from the Catholic guilt trip about obeying the duly annointed sovereign. Nor did he have a John Wesley to advocate for a missionary spirit vis-a-vis the urban poor, which kept England from undergoing the post-Congress of Vienna tumult that the Continental states experienced). Rousseau creates his social contract myth to explain why divine right is the wrong model for understanding how and why "man is born free yet is everywhere in chains."

Great discussion

While I am studying up on some of the theories you have all mentioned ,has anyone worked with what I believe was Cooley/Goffman looking-glass and would it also be related research for this type of discussion ?

[wm]

funny again.

Jeez. Can't even yank an occasional chain with a semantic quibble... :^)

But most of the best opportunities for learning and understanding start out as/with a joke

[marct]

Hi Ron,

While I am studying up on some of the theories you have all mentioned ,has anyone worked with what I believe was Cooley/Goffman looking-glass and would it also be related research for this type of discussion ?

I've used Goffman's Framing as a way of examining external environmental selection pressures in social settings. I find that it complements the work of Schutz and Luckmann (Structures of the Lifeworld, vol 1 & vol 2) while, at the same time, can easily go on top of neural networks. I read Cooley's work quite a while ago and, while I don't use it, I suspect some of it has stuck in my subconscious .

For the past, oh, 12 years or so, I've been trying to formalize the concept of "cultural schemas" at different levels: neurological, cultural and sociability. I'm still not happy with the models I've produced, but I think they are a decent start that would fit into this area.

[Ron Humphrey]

Hi Ron,




For the past, oh, 12 years or so, I've been trying to formalize the concept of "cultural schemas" at different levels: neurological, cultural and sociability. I'm still not happy with the models I've produced, but I think they are a decent start that would fit into this area.

I would appreciate any suggestions you might have on more directed studies realted to this type of process. Aside from the analytical side I have also started playing around with possibilities towards simulated abstractions based on real interactions, thus hopefully allowing for slightly more realistic fiction.


So To Speak

I realize this is so far beyond me it's not funny , but one must have goals.

[marct]

hI rON,

I would appreciate any suggestions you might have on more directed studies realted to this type of process. Aside from the analytical side I have also started playing around with possibilities towards simulated abstractions based on real interactions, thus hopefully allowing for slightly more realistic fiction.

lol - Life is fiction; at least in the sense of improvisational acting . The reference I have been tossing out recently is "This is your brain on music" by Daniel J. Levitin (book and web site). Rally good as a primer on both music and neurology, although not really getting heavily into the other aspects of cultural schemas except at a surface level.

Another good place for some basics is the Evolutionary Psychology Primer, by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, which lays out some of the model of the social effects of neural evolution. Then it starts getting tricky...

I realize this is so far beyond me it's not funny , but one must have goals.

Who says it's beyond you?!? Go for it and have fun . BTW, I use some of this (without the references) in my Market Research consulting.

Marc

[Ron Humphrey]

hI rON,



lol - Life is fiction; at least in the sense of improvisational acting . The reference I have been tossing out recently is "This is your brain on music" by Daniel J. Levitin (book and web site). Rally good as a primer on both music and neurology, although not really getting heavily into the other aspects of cultural schemas except at a surface level.

Another good place for some basics is the Evolutionary Psychology Primer, by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, which lays out some of the model of the social effects of neural evolution. Then it starts getting tricky...



Who says it's beyond you?!? Go for it and have fun . BTW, I use some of this (without the references) in my Market Research consulting.

Marc

Thank You
I will stay fairly busy digging into what you've given me so far.


On quick review I couldn't agree more with this premise:

It was (and is) common to think that other animals are ruled by "instinct" whereas humans lost their instincts and are ruled by "reason", and that this is why we are so much more flexibly intelligent than other animals. William James took the opposite view. He argued that human behavior is more flexibly intelligent than that of other animals because we have more instincts than they do, not fewer. We tend to be blind to the existence of these instincts, however, precisely because they work so well -- because they process information so effortlessly and automatically. They structure our thought so powerfully, he argued, that it can be difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise. As a result, we take "normal" behavior for granted. We do not realize that "normal" behavior needs to be explained at all. This "instinct blindness" makes the study of psychology difficult. To get past this problem, James suggested that we try to make the "natural seem strange":

[marct]

My favorite is still "Our modern skulls house a stone age mind" .

[Tom OC]

I couldn't keep from jumping in, as fear is one of my favorite emotions to discuss. Perhaps I could best contribute in a sociological vein (although my field is criminology). I think the previous discussion has been spot on regarding Hobbes, Rousseau, etc., and while I'd love to delve into the sociology of Cooley on fear (I think he forshadowed the whole symbolic interactionist notion of expectation or anticipation on that, as well as emphasized the social group - reference group - prerequisite for fear), I'm much more comfortable discussing Weber and/or Parsons on fear. It is the consensus of most sociologists that both of these thinkers downplayed the role of fear; Weber, in jumping from the centrality he gives it in Ancient Judaism to making it a residual ideal-type in Protestant Ethic; and Parsons, in attempting to give some play to "affective action" but falling back upon a dualistic interplay with "affective neutrality." Yet, there is insight to be salvaged from Weber and Parsons, particularly in the charismatic authority concept, which in large part, relies upon the manipulation of fear. This is looked down upon by much of modern sociology, but criminology accepts much of it (as well as the Hobbesean roots) while psychology has its concept of attitude. As a trans-historical phenomena that rests on no other legitimacy than its own strength, charisma plays an important role in heterogeneous societies. It manifests itself in local contexts, to be sure, but Parsons (and Shils) toy with the idea that charismatic fear (not punitive fear or magical charisma) provides societies with ways to identify their "danger spots" and hence draw together to face a common challenge. Turner's Charisma Reconsidered is a good essay on this.