Fear as A Political Motivator

[Abu Suleyman]

Thomas Friedman wrote in an article about some of the fits and starts of peace that we have seen in the Middle East recently. In it he included this passage

Fear can be a potent motivator. Fear of Al Qaeda running their lives finally got the Sunni tribes of Iraq to rise up against the pro-Al Qaeda Sunnis, even to the point of siding with the Americans. Fear of Shiite thugs in the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army has prompted many more Shiites in Iraq to side with the pro-U.S. Iraqi government and army. Fear of a Hamas takeover has driven Fatah into a tighter working relationship with Israel. And fear of spreading Iranian influence has all the Arab states — particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan — working in even closer coordination with America and in tacit cooperation with Israel. Fear of Fatah collapsing, and of Israel inheriting responsibility for the West Bank’s Palestinian population forever, has brought Israel back to Washington’s negotiating table. Fear of isolation even brought Syria here.

But fear of predators can only take you so far. To build a durable peace, it takes a shared agenda, a willingness by moderates to work together to support one another and help each other beat back the extremists in each camp. It takes something that has been sorely lacking since the deaths of Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein: a certain moral courage to do something “surprising.”

I must respectfully disagree, and believe that especially in the Middle east we can capitalize on these very fears to improve it. To reference Political Science I essentially agree with Hobbes. In Leviathan, Hobbes argues that political sovereignty grew out of a fear of violent death (Hobbes 1651, 84). In essence, according to Mr. Friedman this is what is currently motivating the changes in the Middle East. No government to date can promise an avoidance of death altogether. Not even the most stout theocracies make the attempt. But with careful planning violent death can become a thing that is relatively rare, as it has in most of the Developed World.

However, while terrorist organizations claim to be able to provide a degree of salvation after death, and even a theoretical terrestrial paradise, they bring an awful lot of very violent death with them, and that death can be seemingly indiscriminate. This is what has motivated the changes in the Middle East right now.

That said, the limitations of this motivation are not the limitations fear of violent death, but instead the fact that instead of creating a sovereign to deal with the issue, there is instead a precarious balance between people that hate each other, (e.g. Sunni's and Shi'ite, Jews and Muslims, Arabs and Americans). Eventually the common enemy will go away. In the case of Iraq, the only problem is making sure that the redployment and the disappearance of the threat is not too far separated in time. But all the other animosities are still there, and neither the Shi'ites nor the Sunni's are picking up and leaving. Essentially, there is still plenty of fear to go around.

Therefore, it is still possible to employ fear to guarantee a stable government, and an environment. The first step is to develop a dialog, which is hopefully happening now. If not, fighting common enemy has a way of bringing things together. After that the combatant parties can develop a pattern of checks and balances, and finally upon implementing that pattern watch it carefully until it has been in force for so long that it becomes taken for granted. This is how all treaties are written and peace is made. It can work in the Middle East as well, witness the border between Israel and Egypt which is now primarily patrolled by European troops in shorts for sunbathing. It all starts with fear, but it cannot be misdirected fear, and it must be strong.

On the small wars front, this same strategy can be employed writ small, and is essentially what has been driving the success of the surge. The problem is that until fear is piqued enough there is no desire for either side to negotiate. In order to keep the success of the surge going, a long lasting solution must be arrived at, otherwise once the fear decreases, instead of falling into a long terms stable situation, it will degrade into more violence. Basically, while it need not be the pseudo-dictatorial sovereign of Thomas Hobbes, some sort of Sovereign needs to be created and allow peace to rest upon that.

[Tom Odom]

Thomas Friedman wrote in an article about some of the fits and starts of peace that we have seen in the Middle East recently. In it he included this passage



I must respectfully disagree, and believe that especially in the Middle east we can capitalize on these very fears to improve it. To reference Political Science I essentially agree with Hobbes. In Leviathan, Hobbes argues that political sovereignty grew out of a fear of violent death (Hobbes 1651, 84). In essence, according to Mr. Friedman this is what is currently motivating the changes in the Middle East. No government to date can promise an avoidance of death altogether. Not even the most stout theocracies make the attempt. But with careful planning violent death can become a thing that is relatively rare, as it has in most of the Developed World.

However, while terrorist organizations claim to be able to provide a degree of salvation after death, and even a theoretical terrestrial paradise, they bring an awful lot of very violent death with them, and that death can be seemingly indiscriminate. This is what has motivated the changes in the Middle East right now.

That said, the limitations of this motivation are not the limitations fear of violent death, but instead the fact that instead of creating a sovereign to deal with the issue, there is instead a precarious balance between people that hate each other, (e.g. Sunni's and Shi'ite, Jews and Muslims, Arabs and Americans). Eventually the common enemy will go away. In the case of Iraq, the only problem is making sure that the redployment and the disappearance of the threat is not too far separated in time. But all the other animosities are still there, and neither the Shi'ites nor the Sunni's are picking up and leaving. Essentially, there is still plenty of fear to go around.

Therefore, it is still possible to employ fear to guarantee a stable government, and an environment. The first step is to develop a dialog, which is hopefully happening now. If not, fighting common enemy has a way of bringing things together. After that the combatant parties can develop a pattern of checks and balances, and finally upon implementing that pattern watch it carefully until it has been in force for so long that it becomes taken for granted. This is how all treaties are written and peace is made. It can work in the Middle East as well, witness the border between Israel and Egypt which is now primarily patrolled by European troops in shorts for sunbathing. It all starts with fear, but it cannot be misdirected fear, and it must be strong.

On the small wars front, this same strategy can be employed writ small, and is essentially what has been driving the success of the surge. The problem is that until fear is piqued enough there is no desire for either side to negotiate. In order to keep the success of the surge going, a long lasting solution must be arrived at, otherwise once the fear decreases, instead of falling into a long terms stable situation, it will degrade into more violence. Basically, while it need not be the pseudo-dictatorial sovereign of Thomas Hobbes, some sort of Sovereign needs to be created and allow peace to rest upon that.

We had that in Iraq in 2003: his name was Saddam. And we took him down. The use of fear as a tool to build has its own set of effects and costs. To name one as an example, you have to use it or you lose it. Saddam used it.

Secondly, fear of AQ did not necessarily drive the shift. Rather encroachment on tribal perogatives promted key sheiks to shift alliances; that could be interpreted as "fear" but I would term it more as greed.

Best

Tom

[Abu Suleyman]

We had that in Iraq in 2003: his name was Saddam. And we took him down. The use of fear as a tool to build has its own set of effects and costs. To name one as an example, you have to use it or you lose it. Saddam used it.

While Saddam was excellent at instilling fear, that is not the only way to use fear. I am not advocating in the least the generation of fear. Quite to the contrary, I want peace, which among other things includes the absence of fear.

In this case I am saying that with a fear either of us, the enemy, general chaos or whatever is a condition already extant with which we have to deal. In fact what we really want to do is do away with fear. Counter intuitively, we have to use the conditions created by fear, or the motivation of the fear to generate something good.

I have to respectfully disagree that it was greed that motivated the move of the Shaykhs in Al Anbar, etc. While greed can indeed trump fear, if they were more motivated by greed than fear there were and are far more lucrative ways to take advantage ("Hey! Where did all that contract money go?"). It is no coincidence that the move by the shaykhs came at the same time as American pullout seemed most imminent. Also, we had to give them a viable option to the fear.
The point is that we need to present a viable option to put fear in check. Up until then the only options available were either Shi'ite Domination (and in their mind at least almost certain death) or AQIZ domination (and maybe death). The role that fear played into this is it was the motivator in both cases. Now by empowering the tribes, and hopefully in the future establishing either organizations or conventions that will prevent further 'fearful' situations we can institutionalize peace.

Let me reiterate I am NOT advocating creating fear. That is what Saddam did, and lord knows we don't need more of that. I am merely saying that fear exists aplenty. If we understand it we can harness it, and use it to create a better situation, and hopefully peace. If the fear just went away, that would be fine too, but I think is would be naive to believe that will happen.

[Ron Humphrey]

While Saddam was excellent at instilling fear, that is not the only way to use fear. I am not advocating in the least the generation of fear. Quite to the contrary, I want peace, which among other things includes the absence of fear.

In this case I am saying that with a fear either of us, the enemy, general chaos or whatever is a condition already extant with which we have to deal. In fact what we really want to do is do away with fear. Counter intuitively, we have to use the conditions created by fear, or the motivation of the fear to generate something good.

I have to respectfully disagree that it was greed that motivated the move of the Shaykhs in Al Anbar, etc. While greed can indeed trump fear, if they were more motivated by greed than fear there were and are far more lucrative ways to take advantage ("Hey! Where did all that contract money go?"). It is no coincidence that the move by the shaykhs came at the same time as American pullout seemed most imminent. Also, we had to give them a viable option to the fear.
The point is that we need to present a viable option to put fear in check. Up until then the only options available were either Shi'ite Domination (and in their mind at least almost certain death) or AQIZ domination (and maybe death). The role that fear played into this is it was the motivator in both cases. Now by empowering the tribes, and hopefully in the future establishing either organizations or conventions that will prevent further 'fearful' situations we can institutionalize peace.

Let me reiterate I am NOT advocating creating fear. That is what Saddam did, and lord knows we don't need more of that. I am merely saying that fear exists aplenty. If we understand it we can harness it, and use it to create a better situation, and hopefully peace. If the fear just went away, that would be fine too, but I think is would be naive to believe that will happen.

Fear is as you say something which exist without having to be encouraged and as such must definately be taken into account when making any determinations about how to approach a solution.

That said, we must never allow ourselves to allow manipulation of said factors in order to control, or direct the actions of a populous in general.

This is where the greatest fears for many in academia stem from when the collaborative efforts of anthropologists and military are referenced.

In direct competition with an enemy then any factors both human and otherwise can and should be considered and employed effectively.

There must be a line drawn however, and it would be somewhere around where long term leadership within these areas are concerned.

Anything else leads us down paths which history has shown us we don't want to follow.

[marct]

Hi Ron,

That said, we must never allow ourselves to allow manipulation of said factors in order to control, or direct the actions of a populous in general.

I think it is important to note something here about the use of fear in propaganda; namely that fear generates an anger response in many situations and this response is frequently used to manipulate entire populations. This is, after all, the desired goal of a lot of terrorist attacks. It is also, I should note, the guiding principle behind what's known in pragmatic politics as "waving a bloody shirt".

This is where the greatest fears for many in academia stem from when the collaborative efforts of anthropologists and military are referenced.

I'm not sure I agree with this, Ron. Could we (Anthropologists) help the military produce such a campaign based on fear tactics? Probably, although I suspect that it wouldn't be as good as that produced by a couple of good ole boys from the smoke filled back rooms. As to this being the source of much of the "fear" in academia, I really doubt that. My suspicion is that a lot of that fear is generated more from a concern that they "mysteries" of the discipline will be seen by "profane" hands, and that those same non-initiates will realize that a lot of the "mysteries" are Bravo Sierra.

In direct competition with an enemy then any factors both human and otherwise can and should be considered and employed effectively.

There must be a line drawn however, and it would be somewhere around where long term leadership within these areas are concerned.

Anything else leads us down paths which history has shown us we don't want to follow.

Again, I'm going to have to disagree with you, at least as far as the use of "any factors" is concerned. This marks a key difference between professionals and amateurs in many fields of endevour (including politics): professionals realize that todays opponent may be tomorrows ally, while amateurs often believe that an enemy is an enemy, period.

BTW, let me just make it clear that I'm not saying that as an insult. The observation behind it comes out of a lot of work done on studying how groups operate and how individuals operate in new fields. The short term gain mentality exhibited by amateurs in a field (regardless of their expertise in other fields) often leads to a degradation of that field for all involved. When the field degrades, it has a feedback effect on all people in the field (on the psychology behind this, check out Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi on the Flow experience), and I think this is what you are talking about when you talk about "drawing a line".

Marc

[Ron Humphrey]

Hi Ron,



I'm not sure I agree with this, Ron. Could we (Anthropologists) help the military produce such a campaign based on fear tactics? Probably, although I suspect that it wouldn't be as good as that produced by a couple of good ole boys from the smoke filled back rooms. As to this being the source of much of the "fear" in academia, I really doubt that. My suspicion is that a lot of that fear is generated more from a concern that they "mysteries" of the discipline will be seen by "profane" hands, and that those same non-initiates will realize that a lot of the "mysteries" are Bravo Sierra.

First thank you very much for the feedback, and secondly no offense taken.
However much I study I never consider myself to know all the answers and thus I partake in such ventures as this in efforts to discover those answers.

I did not mean to associate anthropologists soley with the art of manipulation by fear, nor to even place them within the realm of helping with directed fires (so to speak). I was however referring to the fact that as you say, perception by those on the outside of the community may lead to unnecessary and ill placed kickback against that which they do not understand and thus do not trust.

Again, I'm going to have to disagree with you, at least as far as the use of "any factors" is concerned. This marks a key difference between professionals and amateurs in many fields of endevour (including politics): professionals realize that todays opponent may be tomorrows ally, while amateurs often believe that an enemy is an enemy, period

On this I meant to focus on the fact that any social factors can and will affect the outcome and as such none should be without review.
There is a tie-in between the line drawn and which factors can and should actually be used in any efforts by the military/government.

BTW, let me just make it clear that I'm not saying that as an insult. The observation behind it comes out of a lot of work done on studying how groups operate and how individuals operate in new fields. The short term gain mentality exhibited by amateurs in a field (regardless of their expertise in other fields) often leads to a degradation of that field for all involved. When the field degrades, it has a feedback effect on all people in the field (on the psychology behind this, check out Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi on the Flow experience), and I think this is what you are talking about when you talk about "drawing a line". Marc

This is exactly on mark, I was trying to tie the long term changes ( todays enemies, tommorows allies) into determining which aspects of social existence should be actively pursued in operations.

I think for me the guiding premise might be my personal interpretation of sun tzu's know yourself. I think the key component here is not only should one know their own weaknesses and strengths but also know what their own social issues are. I think if we follow the guidance of Christ in his statement " Do unto others, as you would have them do unto you it helps delineate which factors are the right ones for action when dealing with others.

The measure of intent being good might be found in knowing what would be acceptable behaviour when relating to oneself, and treating others accordingly.

This is however just the thoughts of an Amateur Expert in Training

[Rank amateur]

professionals realize that todays opponent may be tomorrows ally, while amateurs often believe that an enemy is an enemy, period.

You need the word "most" in front of professionals. People who were getting paid a lot of money decided that "you're either with us or against us."

I think that Communism was one of the factors in the turnaround, but I also suspect that a major factor was that the American public was not as "scarred" by WWII as most other nations.

True story, unless I'm confused and it's not.

Before D-Day Churchill told de Gaulle that after the war Britain was going to align itself much more closely with America - and much less with France - than it had before the war. De Gaulle wasn’t worried, because he knew that France could align itself with Germany. Remember, this was before D-Day.

Science and Sanity, Alfred Korzybski coined the term "semantic reaction" to refer to this, and it is a manipulation of fear at the symbolic level. The manipulation of this type of fear is, IMO, one of the core strategies behind both successful COIN and Insurgency operations, although I haven't seen it actually discussed in this light.

Our predictions about the semantic reaction to "shock and awe" were way off.

The main reason that I think we shouldn't do "voluntary univited nation building" is that by invading a country we change the semantic reactions of the public to our best efforts.

Having said that, I think we did a suburb job of changing the German public's semantic reaction to Hitler. The military deserves a lot of the credit. Marc, can you think of any other good examples?

[Rex Brynen]

Friedman notes:

It takes something that has been sorely lacking since the deaths of Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein: a certain moral courage to do something “surprising.”

Now, I think King Hussein was a truly remarkable political leader. However, his survival amid the tumult of Jordanian and Arab politics stemmed more from his unwillingness to take major risks, than his willingness to do so: after all, Jordan didn't sign its peace treaty with Israel until after it had it had been given the political space to do so by the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords.

Hussein similarly joined the 1967 Arab-israeli war because he couldn't risk bucking domestic public opinion; cozied up to Nasirite Egypt and Ba'this Syria when he needed to; and refused to join the coalition during the 1990-91 Iraq war because he (again) didn't wish to buck domestic opinion.

Don't get me wrong: I think these were all very astute moves under the circumstances, and did much to both consolidate the monarchy and stabilize Jordan. But they weren't risk-taking in the Sadat mold (and I say that as no Sadat fan).

Interestingly, and for all the ebb and flow of domestic repression (sometimes substantial) in Jordan, this country has relied much less on "fear as a motivator" than most in the region. The monarchy has often shown remarkable ability to co-opt potential opponents, and while the iron fist is here it is usually kept very much inside a velvet glove.

Sorry for all the Jordan comments for what was intended to be a broader discussion, but I just happen to be here a few days for a meeting/conference, and it seemed appropriate!