IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.Originally Posted by LawVol
It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.
Maybe my memory is off, but didn't Gen Dunlap make a very similar argument and get ripped here?
This might work in the next "Iraq," but we'd need something to clean up the mess. If we had the ability to go into an area in the immediate aftermath of an air attack and rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, get the power going, kids in school, etc. maybe we wouldn't have to buy off as much. It would require a larger force than simply SOF, but it would go a long way toward winning over the majority of the population.
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
I don't know if Dunlap did but General Wayne Downing did before he died. Colonel Warden did and still does believe this is a much better way to handle these types of wars. He is rather amazed that the Army has not put Special forces at the for front since UW, Special Warfare is what they are all about.
That's interesting, I've only ever seen that argument made by Air Force officers and maybe Colonel MacGregor. But wasn't Saddam's Army, Republican Guard, and Fedayeen a totally different beast than the Taliban, and, Kurdistan aside, with no credible domestic opposition? Seems to me like the truck-mounted Fedayeen, at the least, could have dodged our bombs as well as the Serbs did in Kosovo.
initial invasions
The initial invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq went off in masterful applications of force. Both operations were handled with superb directness of purpose. They were entirely different operations. In afghan the Northern Alliance provided the major ground forces which the SF-backed by airpower- could leverage against a fanatical but militarily weak Taliban. Further the small generally rural population of Afghanistan contributed to the success of SF. Nothing of the sort existed in Iraq. The all SF/airpower plan would have run aground in there. Believe me it was a very good thing to have a Comapany of M1A1 and a CAAT Platoon to defeat the dispersed units of t-55 an t-72's that were engaged in the cities and suburbs. The population of Iraq, the urban nature of this population and the lack of a solid indigenous support base would have left an all SF operation hanging in a very precarious position. Remember the invasion was highly successful and complete in just 3 weeks despite hard fighting and heavy resistance in certain areas.
Most of the confusion comes from the aftermath of the two invasions, the post invasion actions. The draw down of coalition forces, the realignment of local forces and the transition to COIN and stability-reconstruction operations. In both cases this transition was handled ineligantly. Mostly the reason for this was a lack of knowledge, lack of training,lack of coordination, lack of willingness and lack of vision by the administration, local forces and field commanders to accept these new missions.
-T
Is Afghanistan more akin to Columbia right now, in your mind Eden?1. That the greatest threat to Afghanistan is the Taliban. The Taliban is a spent strategic force. In a few localities they retain their traditional support, but they have lost whatever nationwide appeal they may have once had. In many cases, they have become mere criminals, selling protection or working for the local drug lord. No, the longer-term threat to nation-building are the narcotic kings, regional power brokers, and semi-criminal entrepreneurs who have traditionally run affairs in the area. The only reason they have not vigorously opposed the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan is due to the sheer ineffectiveness of some of our allies. Relatively heavy fighting is largely restricted to the southern and eastern portions of the country not because it is a hotbed of Taliban support, but because those are the only areas where the Brits, Canadians, and Americans are making life difficult for those Afghans pursuing their traditional livelihoods: smuggling, extortion, and pissing in the river upstream from your neighbor. Elsewhere, bad guys are happy to accept western largesse so long as NATO doesn't actually interfere with them.
Columbia East?
I think that there are some superficial resemblances to Columbia, in that you have a synergistic relationship between an insurgency and criminals - the one enabling the other, the other returning the favor. But I would say it is more like the Columbia of twenty years ago, when there was less blurring of the lines between insurgent and drug criminal.
The other difference is that the insurgents in Afghanistan (I am grossly oversimplifying here, but stay with me) have international support, and a steady stream of foreign volunteers, plus a secure sanctuary over the border in Pakistan. Hmmm, agains, it does sound like Columbia, but 20-30 years ago.
Light vs Heavy
When we attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is true that US forces consisted mainly of SF and airpower. However, they worked hand-in-hand with the Northern Alliance and several other like groupings. The indigenous forces provided the conventional troops required to force the Taliban to mass so that we could hammer them with airpower. Once the Taliban figured out that they were in a no-win situation, they rapidly collapsed. In Iraq, there were no indigenous armies on the ground to provide security for the SF and force the enemy to present himself as a target. We had to provide that army.
Even if we could have crushed the Iraqis with a slightly pumped up version of Afghanistan, you still need troops to occupy the country. Those who say we did not need to occupy the country miss the point of the war in the first place: not just to topple Saddam, but to create a democratic outpost in the Middle East. Furthermore, our failure to follow up our victory in Afghanistan - due to lack of resources and troops on the ground - foreshadowed our lack of vision in Iraq. It just took longer for those particular fowl to come home to roost.
Just proof that preparing for the last war is not the sole perogative of conventional thinkers.
SF was suppsed to have been supported by the Iraqi Army similar to the Northern Alliance. Downing and Several people thought that many Iraqi generals could be convinced to turn and overthrow Saddam with SF/Airpower support. Which in hindsight sounds really good but at the time may have seemed very questionable. However just recently 60 minutes did and interview of the FBI agent incharge of Saddam's interrogation. He had apparently already given orders for the Iraqi Army to stall the invasion for 2 weeks and then convert to a guerrilla campaign. How believable Saddam was is subject to opinion but that is what the FBI recorded him as saying during their interview.
Saddam almost certainly planned to do just that.
He even told us so -- and we were all too dumb to pick up on it. He announced he was going to arm everyone, let all the prisoners out of the jails, many things. he told us what he was going to do and we in our stupid arrogance ignored him. He gave those two Russian Generals medals just before the invasion and I remember thinking "Boy, they didn't do you any favors, why a medal?" After a week I woke up and realized why -- they told him he'd never beat the US conventionally; let 'em in, go to ground and they'll leave. We got suckered (again).
I doubt that Downings plan would have worked, I think the fear was too pervasive and the bulk of the Iraqi Generals were loyal enough that none would have turned. Langley also espoused that idea and IIRC, there was really only one Div Cdr that flipped. Langley also thought they had a couple of insiders turned as agents. Apparently not.
Squaring the circle
There is no necessary contradiction between Mike Vickers' quite sensible long-term approach to Afghanistan - of course, a decisive outcome can only be achieved by the Afghans themselves - and the need for a short-term plus-up of forces in the south, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. The 2009 and 2010 (per the current calendar) elections in Afghanistan are important points of deflection. Current conditions would not allow those elections to be held safely in the south (remember that the polling must be verified by the UN to be seen as legitimate). The British and Canadian contingents who are doing all the hard fighting in the south would welcome additional capabilities and numbers they simply don't have; the government in Kabul also sees this as a crucial time and would welcome an additional US commitment (and there's not really any other force available and even a US "surge" would be limited by strains on the force).
While I now work at AEI, I was also once was the editor of Army Times (and was lucky enough to have hired Sean Naylor in the first place), so my suspicion is that Sean wrote the story to make the conflict seem greater than it probably really is. Remember, Vickers' speech did not mention the AEI work and sounds to me like the kind of approach that he's long advocated. I also think it's likely that Mike understands that in the course of "building partnership capacity" in Afghanistan there may be moments where a more direct helping hand is required; the need to conduct successful elections - and to begin to set the conditions for that now - seems like one of those moments.
The esteemed readers of this journal should have a more sophisticated understanding of the way Us policy is made and ought to be wary of conspiracy theories - it's the bureaucratic equivalent of Okham's Razor: never explain by conspiracy what you can explain as confusion or incompetence.
Tom Donnelly
Hi, Squirrel
Didn't say there was, my point was only that AEI, like most other tanks, has ideas that may or may not have merit. My perception of AEI is that they get some right and some wrong but that they generally have an agenda. That agenda may or may not coincide with that of the Prez -- or mine. It also may accord priorities in a different order than some. Is a sustained effort in Afghanistan going to be enhanced by a short term surge that will exacerbate the stretching of the force? AEI thinks yea, I think nay.
I can remember that the polling must be verified by the UN in the eyes of some to be seen as legitimate...The 2009 and 2010 (per the current calendar) elections in Afghanistan are important points of deflection. Current conditions would not allow those elections to be held safely in the south (remember that the polling must be verified by the UN to be seen as legitimate).Not all, most. I'm sure they would appreciate more help. Most commanders will ask for more troops at the slightest provocation -- or with no provocationThe British and Canadian contingents who are doing all the hard fighting in the south would welcome additional capabilities and numbers they simply don't haveYep. To both points.the government in Kabul also sees this as a crucial time and would welcome an additional US commitment (and there's not really any other force available and even a US "surge" would be limited by strains on the force).[And be assured, we won't hold that against you. We all have some things in pour past...While I now work at AEI, I was also once was the editor of Army Times (and was lucky enough to have hired Sean Naylor in the first place)...Probably true.Remember, Vickers' speech did not mention the AEI work and sounds to me like the kind of approach that he's long advocated. I also think it's likely that Mike understands that in the course of "building partnership capacity" in Afghanistan there may be moments where a more direct helping hand is required; the need to conduct successful elections - and to begin to set the conditions for that now - seems like one of those moments.I'm certainly not esteemed but I can assure you I discard conspiracy theories for the almost certain problems of incompetence or, more common, extreme bureaucratic stupidity.The esteemed readers of this journal should have a more sophisticated understanding of the way Us policy is made and ought to be wary of conspiracy theories - it's the bureaucratic equivalent of Okham's Razor: never explain by conspiracy what you can explain as confusion or incompetence.
I just think the surge idea(s) and 'more boots on the ground' mentality are incorrect. These things take time and overstretching the force will not appreciably speed them up, ergo, it's sort of wasted effort. Your 'surge' in Iraq may speed things up slightly but that's about all it'll do. Afghanistan, OTOH, is not amenable to a speed up. Different strokes, as they say.
The real problem is which boots are where and doing what, not how many there are.
It should be noted that, in some respects anyway, we're getting better and smarter about that everyday...
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