Page 1 of 2 12 LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 33

Thread: A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan.

  1. #1
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan.

    Gordon Lubold in today’s Christian Science Monitor - A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan.

    The top general of the Marine Corps is pushing hard to deploy marines to Afghanistan as he looks to draw down his forces in Iraq, but his proposal, which is under discussion at the Pentagon this week, faces deep resistance from other military leaders.

    Commandant Gen. James Conway's plan, if approved, would deploy a large contingent of Marines to Afghanistan, perhaps as early as next year. The reinforcements would be used to fight the Taliban, which US officials concede is now defending its territory more effectively against allied and Afghan forces.

    Within the Pentagon, General Conway's proposal has led to speculation about which, if any, American forces would be best suited to provide reinforcements for a mission that, most agree, has far more political appeal than the one in Iraq. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already recommended against the proposal, at least for now, a military official said Tuesday…

    Conway says that Marines, who have been largely responsible for calming Anbar Province in Iraq, can either return home or "stay plugged into the fight" by essentially redeploying to Afghanistan...
    Rick Rogers, San Diego Union-Tribune, on USMC current operations in Anbar, Iraq and implications for the Afghanistan mission - Marines' Duties go Well Beyond Combat.

    ... some Marine commanders and defense specialists question whether the Corps' expeditionary combat strengths are being wasted in Anbar. The Marines are revered for their offensive capabilities, said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Va.

    “At some point, we are going to have to ask why are we sending a quick-strike force to do nation building. It really would make more sense to send them to Afghanistan to chase insurgents than to have them helping locals in Anbar province build schools,” Thompson said.

    “If the mission becomes more reconstruction, then it is more of an Army job,” he added.

    The proposal for handing Marines the lead combat role in Afghanistan has been espoused by senior commanders such as Lt. Gen. [General] James Mattis, Helland's immediate predecessor at Camp Pendleton...

  2. #2
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    New York, NY
    Posts
    1,665

    Default

    Does anyone else find it troubling that GEN Conway apparently has the idea that the Marines need to get back to a more kinetic role, and that the place to do this is Afghanistan?

    If any theater fits the classical COIN model, it may be Afghanistan more so than Iraq.

    On a personal level, I'd much rather go to Afghanistan in six months than Iraq - I'm learning to enjoy humping in the cold. But I'm not sure if GEN Conway's idea is what's best strategically for the U.S.

  3. #3
    Council Member pcmfr's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Posts
    62

    Default

    Unfortunately, we are already too kinetic in Afghanistan. The EKIA count increases significantly every week, but then so does the overall population controlled by the Taliban. Meanwhile the real problems are being driven by actors across the borders to the West and East.

  4. #4
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    223

    Default

    Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, sending more US Marines to this country would be throwing good money after bad. General Conway apparently shares several common but nevertheless mistaken apprehensions:

    1. That the greatest threat to Afghanistan is the Taliban. The Taliban is a spent strategic force. In a few localities they retain their traditional support, but they have lost whatever nationwide appeal they may have once had. In many cases, they have become mere criminals, selling protection or working for the local drug lord. No, the longer-term threat to nation-building are the narcotic kings, regional power brokers, and semi-criminal entrepreneurs who have traditionally run affairs in the area. The only reason they have not vigorously opposed the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan is due to the sheer ineffectiveness of some of our allies. Relatively heavy fighting is largely restricted to the southern and eastern portions of the country not because it is a hotbed of Taliban support, but because those are the only areas where the Brits, Canadians, and Americans are making life difficult for those Afghans pursuing their traditional livelihoods: smuggling, extortion, and pissing in the river upstream from your neighbor. Elsewhere, bad guys are happy to accept western largesse so long as NATO doesn't actually interfere with them.

    2. That more troops will make a difference. Well, a lot more troops might make a difference. But even thousands of Marines will not. I suspect we would do more of the same with them: Guard our own bases, fruitlessly chase bad guys over mountains, and pretend to secure the borders. Maybe if the thousands of troops were CA, medical, construction engineers, etc. But riflemen? They'd be wasted.

    3. That we are making progress that should be reinforced. Afghanistan is better off than it was in 2002, but only because it started in the stone age. Economic growth rates of 10-13% a year are impressive until you realize the baseline was only slightly above zero, and I'm not sure even that measure of progress can be linked beyond anything we accomplished since running the Taliban out. Besides, few Afghans want a strong central government. Just as throughout most of their history, they prefer a weak central government that they can use as a prop against their neighbors.

    Bottom line is that if our goal is to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland the reinforcements wouldn't be enough. If our goal is simply to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist-free, what we have their now is sufficient.

  5. #5
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default Surge Not Answer in Afghanistan

    Surge Not Answer in Afghanistan at SWJ Blog.

    Michael VIckers, the principal strategist for the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s and today the top Pentagon adviser on counterterrorism strategy (ASD SOLIC), says the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan is through “the indirect approach” - working “by, with and through” host-nation forces — rather than “surges” of U.S. troops according to an article in Army Times - Surge not answer in Afghanistan - by Sean Naylor.

  6. #6
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Hopefully, this and the next Administration

    will listen to Vickers and not to the squirrels AEI.

    It took us nine years in Viet Nam to realize that giving the South Viet Namese second hand stuff, little to no training help and short shrift so we could do it all was just really dumb. Surely we aren't going to go down that road again...

    Are we?

  7. #7
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Wink Not to mention

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    will listen to Vickers and not to the squirrels AEI.

    It took us nine years in Viet Nam to realize that giving the South Viet Namese second hand stuff, little to no training help and short shrift so we could do it all was just really dumb. Surely we aren't going to go down that road again...

    Are we?
    The possible flashbacks many Afghans might have if huge numbers of soldiers begin flowing in.

    The AQ and the Taliban have fought there in several different environments, it might not be the best idea to make what they are facing too familiar or to lead the populous to think the only way to beat them is with outside support.

    Short term hard hits, GREEAAT, Long term Training and support BETTER.

  8. #8
    Council Member LawVol's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2006
    Location
    Kabul
    Posts
    339

    Default

    In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light. It didn't work and we needed more troops in Iraq to acheive some form of success. The Afghan model didn't work in Iraq. Why would we think that the obverse would work now? It seems to me that the folks over at AEI are one-trick ponies.

    The lesson (or at least a lesson) here is that Afghanistan and Iraq are different. I would think some more creative thinking is in order. I'm no expert but it appears that Afghans are hyper-sensitive to the presence of foreign troops, even more so that Iraqis. Why would more foreign troops with weapons help the situation? Perhaps a coalition focus on human security issues, with US advised Afghan forces hunting down bad guys would be more workable. Am I way off here?
    -john bellflower

    Rule of Law in Afghanistan

    "You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)

  9. #9
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by LawVol View Post
    In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light...
    Ah, but did we go in light, really? Another question is, light or not, did we go in correctly and prepared for the probable consequences of our entry?
    ...It didn't work and we needed more troops in Iraq to acheive some form of success...
    Did we -- or was that success really on the way due to a revised TTP regimen and the arrival of more troops merely coincidental...
    ...The Afghan model didn't work in Iraq. Why would we think that the obverse would work now? It seems to me that the folks over at AEI are one-trick ponies.
    Well, I can agree with the last bit.
    The lesson (or at least a lesson) here is that Afghanistan and Iraq are different...Perhaps a coalition focus on human security issues, with US advised Afghan forces hunting down bad guys would be more workable. Am I way off here?
    Can't speak for others but I think you're right on the money...

  10. #10
    Council Member pcmfr's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Posts
    62

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by LawVol View Post
    In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light.
    IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

    It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.

  11. #11
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    If we leave the Afghan Army in charge, won't the Taliban bribe the generals with drug money and make them look the other way?
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  12. #12
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Post Although that might be tried

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    If we leave the Afghan Army in charge, won't the Taliban bribe the generals with drug money and make them look the other way?
    There would not likely be many who took the bribe expecting to have everything be honky dory once the Taliban took power again. They have not been out of power long enough for the Afghans to forget how they run things. Couple that with the fact that their return would equal the elimination of many, many who have helped fight against them and I don't think you find a peoples too terribly excited about a return regardless how they may feel at the moment.

  13. #13
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default No more than they would if we were in charge.

    A presence of westerners who do not do business in the south asian way deters a lot of that (but not all). The presence will be required for a long time, old habits fie hard...

  14. #14
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    A presence of westerners who do not do business in the south asian way deters a lot of that (but not all). The presence will be required for a long time, old habits fie hard...
    If we're needed for a long time, how do we determine the optimal number of troops? Doesn't doctrine say that COIN is very labor intensive?
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  15. #15
    Council Member LawVol's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2006
    Location
    Kabul
    Posts
    339

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by pcmfr View Post
    IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

    It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.
    Maybe my memory is off, but didn't Gen Dunlap make a very similar argument and get ripped here?

    This might work in the next "Iraq," but we'd need something to clean up the mess. If we had the ability to go into an area in the immediate aftermath of an air attack and rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, get the power going, kids in school, etc. maybe we wouldn't have to buy off as much. It would require a larger force than simply SOF, but it would go a long way toward winning over the majority of the population.
    -john bellflower

    Rule of Law in Afghanistan

    "You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)

  16. #16
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by LawVol View Post
    Maybe my memory is off, but didn't Gen Dunlap make a very similar argument and get ripped here?
    I don't know if Dunlap did but General Wayne Downing did before he died. Colonel Warden did and still does believe this is a much better way to handle these types of wars. He is rather amazed that the Army has not put Special forces at the for front since UW, Special Warfare is what they are all about.

  17. #17
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Doctrine does not say that, common wisdom

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    If we're needed for a long time, how do we determine the optimal number of troops? Doesn't doctrine say that COIN is very labor intensive?
    does, sort of; it postulates about 20 COIN personnel including police per 1,000 of population. The figure ranges from 18 to 35 depending on which version you wish to believe, that gives a median of 27, err on the side of caution and go with 20, any combination of either allies or host nation.

    They need to do it, we just need to help.

  18. #18
    Council Member TROUFION's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    212

    Default a temp surge is a good thing

    Face it a surge is simply a reinforcement in order to regain or recapture the momentum that was/is being lost to a "surge" re-SURGEnt opposing force. The ability for a commander in the field to call for and recieve local reinforcement is very improtant. The main issue will be the duration and the question that will linger-will more FORIEGN troops be needed. I believe the stated concept of the USMC reinforcement of the Afghan effort is clearly the right design. A MEU to reinfore the NATO combat effort and a BN reinforced to reinforce the training and assistance effort. These are smart moves. The timing is also right as it will reinforce prior to the warm weather and carry through the historically most dangerous months.

    The bottomline, the US and NATO need to hold the line long enough and push back the Taliban enough to allow Afghan forces to train and equip to stand on their own. How long and at what cost are still to be determined. BUT a reinforcement to regain momentum and get the effort through a danger zone is a smart thing to do.

    -T

  19. #19
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    The Green Mountains
    Posts
    356

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by pcmfr View Post
    IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

    It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.
    That's interesting, I've only ever seen that argument made by Air Force officers and maybe Colonel MacGregor. But wasn't Saddam's Army, Republican Guard, and Fedayeen a totally different beast than the Taliban, and, Kurdistan aside, with no credible domestic opposition? Seems to me like the truck-mounted Fedayeen, at the least, could have dodged our bombs as well as the Serbs did in Kosovo.

  20. #20
    Council Member TROUFION's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    212

    Default initial invasions

    The initial invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq went off in masterful applications of force. Both operations were handled with superb directness of purpose. They were entirely different operations. In afghan the Northern Alliance provided the major ground forces which the SF-backed by airpower- could leverage against a fanatical but militarily weak Taliban. Further the small generally rural population of Afghanistan contributed to the success of SF. Nothing of the sort existed in Iraq. The all SF/airpower plan would have run aground in there. Believe me it was a very good thing to have a Comapany of M1A1 and a CAAT Platoon to defeat the dispersed units of t-55 an t-72's that were engaged in the cities and suburbs. The population of Iraq, the urban nature of this population and the lack of a solid indigenous support base would have left an all SF operation hanging in a very precarious position. Remember the invasion was highly successful and complete in just 3 weeks despite hard fighting and heavy resistance in certain areas.

    Most of the confusion comes from the aftermath of the two invasions, the post invasion actions. The draw down of coalition forces, the realignment of local forces and the transition to COIN and stability-reconstruction operations. In both cases this transition was handled ineligantly. Mostly the reason for this was a lack of knowledge, lack of training,lack of coordination, lack of willingness and lack of vision by the administration, local forces and field commanders to accept these new missions.

    -T

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •