A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan.

[SWJED]

Gordon Lubold in today’s Christian Science Monitor - A ‘Surge’ for Afghanistan.

The top general of the Marine Corps is pushing hard to deploy marines to Afghanistan as he looks to draw down his forces in Iraq, but his proposal, which is under discussion at the Pentagon this week, faces deep resistance from other military leaders.

Commandant Gen. James Conway's plan, if approved, would deploy a large contingent of Marines to Afghanistan, perhaps as early as next year. The reinforcements would be used to fight the Taliban, which US officials concede is now defending its territory more effectively against allied and Afghan forces.

Within the Pentagon, General Conway's proposal has led to speculation about which, if any, American forces would be best suited to provide reinforcements for a mission that, most agree, has far more political appeal than the one in Iraq. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already recommended against the proposal, at least for now, a military official said Tuesday…

Conway says that Marines, who have been largely responsible for calming Anbar Province in Iraq, can either return home or "stay plugged into the fight" by essentially redeploying to Afghanistan...

Rick Rogers, San Diego Union-Tribune, on USMC current operations in Anbar, Iraq and implications for the Afghanistan mission - Marines' Duties go Well Beyond Combat.

... some Marine commanders and defense specialists question whether the Corps' expeditionary combat strengths are being wasted in Anbar. The Marines are revered for their offensive capabilities, said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Va.

“At some point, we are going to have to ask why are we sending a quick-strike force to do nation building. It really would make more sense to send them to Afghanistan to chase insurgents than to have them helping locals in Anbar province build schools,” Thompson said.

“If the mission becomes more reconstruction, then it is more of an Army job,” he added.

The proposal for handing Marines the lead combat role in Afghanistan has been espoused by senior commanders such as Lt. Gen. [General] James Mattis, Helland's immediate predecessor at Camp Pendleton...

[tequila]

Does anyone else find it troubling that GEN Conway apparently has the idea that the Marines need to get back to a more kinetic role, and that the place to do this is Afghanistan?

If any theater fits the classical COIN model, it may be Afghanistan more so than Iraq.

On a personal level, I'd much rather go to Afghanistan in six months than Iraq - I'm learning to enjoy humping in the cold. But I'm not sure if GEN Conway's idea is what's best strategically for the U.S.

[pcmfr]

Unfortunately, we are already too kinetic in Afghanistan. The EKIA count increases significantly every week, but then so does the overall population controlled by the Taliban. Meanwhile the real problems are being driven by actors across the borders to the West and East.

[Eden]

Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, sending more US Marines to this country would be throwing good money after bad. General Conway apparently shares several common but nevertheless mistaken apprehensions:

1. That the greatest threat to Afghanistan is the Taliban. The Taliban is a spent strategic force. In a few localities they retain their traditional support, but they have lost whatever nationwide appeal they may have once had. In many cases, they have become mere criminals, selling protection or working for the local drug lord. No, the longer-term threat to nation-building are the narcotic kings, regional power brokers, and semi-criminal entrepreneurs who have traditionally run affairs in the area. The only reason they have not vigorously opposed the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan is due to the sheer ineffectiveness of some of our allies. Relatively heavy fighting is largely restricted to the southern and eastern portions of the country not because it is a hotbed of Taliban support, but because those are the only areas where the Brits, Canadians, and Americans are making life difficult for those Afghans pursuing their traditional livelihoods: smuggling, extortion, and pissing in the river upstream from your neighbor. Elsewhere, bad guys are happy to accept western largesse so long as NATO doesn't actually interfere with them.

2. That more troops will make a difference. Well, a lot more troops might make a difference. But even thousands of Marines will not. I suspect we would do more of the same with them: Guard our own bases, fruitlessly chase bad guys over mountains, and pretend to secure the borders. Maybe if the thousands of troops were CA, medical, construction engineers, etc. But riflemen? They'd be wasted.

3. That we are making progress that should be reinforced. Afghanistan is better off than it was in 2002, but only because it started in the stone age. Economic growth rates of 10-13% a year are impressive until you realize the baseline was only slightly above zero, and I'm not sure even that measure of progress can be linked beyond anything we accomplished since running the Taliban out. Besides, few Afghans want a strong central government. Just as throughout most of their history, they prefer a weak central government that they can use as a prop against their neighbors.

Bottom line is that if our goal is to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland the reinforcements wouldn't be enough. If our goal is simply to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist-free, what we have their now is sufficient.

[DaveDoyle]

Bottom line is that if our goal is to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland the reinforcements wouldn't be enough. If our goal is simply to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist-free, what we have their now is sufficient.

I can't agree with this statement. What we have in the way of troop numbers (combat, combat support and combat service support) is NOT sufficient to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist free. The troops there now are fighting to buy time for the Afghans, but the terrorists are the ones accelerating the struggle.

Our troops are operating at increased risk based on the slim margins that are currently accepted as the norm in Afghanistan. Lack of aviation assets for direct action missions, logistics, and medevac operations put our operations regularly at higher level of risk. Even PRT missions, and "humanitarian" efforts have to deal with this critical constraint.

Factor that with the size of the operating environment that our troops deal with and you can see that more Marines would be a good thing. In many cases platoons at combat outposts have enough personnel to conduct their own force protection mission and only periodic engagement with the villages and rural areas surrounding them. That's no way to build a rapport or collect intelligence, or assist Afghan security efforts.

A coordinated plan with MORE troops will make a difference - maybe not a Switzerland, but some place less inclined to support and produce terrorists with a global reach.

[wm]

I can't agree with this statement. What we have in the way of troop numbers (combat, combat support and combat service support) is NOT sufficient to keep Afghanistan relatively terrorist free. The troops there now are fighting to buy time for the Afghans, but the terrorists are the ones accelerating the struggle.

Our troops are operating at increased risk based on the slim margins that are currently accepted as the norm in Afghanistan. Lack of aviation assets for direct action missions, logistics, and medevac operations put our operations regularly at higher level of risk. Even PRT missions, and "humanitarian" efforts have to deal with this critical constraint.

Factor that with the size of the operating environment that our troops deal with and you can see that more Marines would be a good thing. In many cases platoons at combat outposts have enough personnel to conduct their own force protection mission and only periodic engagement with the villages and rural areas surrounding them. That's no way to build a rapport or collect intelligence, or assist Afghan security efforts.

A coordinated plan with MORE troops will make a difference - maybe not a Switzerland, but some place less inclined to support and produce terrorists with a global reach.

Two posts almost 9 months apart--situations change. What may have been true in 11/07 may now be OBE. Or, it could be that we (to include ISAF) still have sufficient forces in the AOR and are just not using them in an optimal fashion to accomplish the assigned mission(s).

[SWJED]

Surge Not Answer in Afghanistan at SWJ Blog.

Michael VIckers, the principal strategist for the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s and today the top Pentagon adviser on counterterrorism strategy (ASD SOLIC), says the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan is through “the indirect approach” - working “by, with and through” host-nation forces — rather than “surges” of U.S. troops according to an article in Army Times - Surge not answer in Afghanistan - by Sean Naylor.

[Ken White]

will listen to Vickers and not to the squirrels AEI.

It took us nine years in Viet Nam to realize that giving the South Viet Namese second hand stuff, little to no training help and short shrift so we could do it all was just really dumb. Surely we aren't going to go down that road again...

Are we?

[Ron Humphrey]

will listen to Vickers and not to the squirrels AEI.

It took us nine years in Viet Nam to realize that giving the South Viet Namese second hand stuff, little to no training help and short shrift so we could do it all was just really dumb. Surely we aren't going to go down that road again...

Are we?

The possible flashbacks many Afghans might have if huge numbers of soldiers begin flowing in.

The AQ and the Taliban have fought there in several different environments, it might not be the best idea to make what they are facing too familiar or to lead the populous to think the only way to beat them is with outside support.

Short term hard hits, GREEAAT, Long term Training and support BETTER.

[LawVol]

In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light. It didn't work and we needed more troops in Iraq to acheive some form of success. The Afghan model didn't work in Iraq. Why would we think that the obverse would work now? It seems to me that the folks over at AEI are one-trick ponies.

The lesson (or at least a lesson) here is that Afghanistan and Iraq are different. I would think some more creative thinking is in order. I'm no expert but it appears that Afghans are hyper-sensitive to the presence of foreign troops, even more so that Iraqis. Why would more foreign troops with weapons help the situation? Perhaps a coalition focus on human security issues, with US advised Afghan forces hunting down bad guys would be more workable. Am I way off here?

[Ken White]

In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light...

Ah, but did we go in light, really? Another question is, light or not, did we go in correctly and prepared for the probable consequences of our entry?

...It didn't work and we needed more troops in Iraq to acheive some form of success...

Did we -- or was that success really on the way due to a revised TTP regimen and the arrival of more troops merely coincidental...

...The Afghan model didn't work in Iraq. Why would we think that the obverse would work now? It seems to me that the folks over at AEI are one-trick ponies.

Well, I can agree with the last bit.

The lesson (or at least a lesson) here is that Afghanistan and Iraq are different...Perhaps a coalition focus on human security issues, with US advised Afghan forces hunting down bad guys would be more workable. Am I way off here?

Can't speak for others but I think you're right on the money...

[pcmfr]

In 2001 we went into Afghanistan light and acheived success. In 2003, we tried to replicate this success in Iraq, a very different environment, by again going in light.

IMO, we went in way too heavy in Iraq. Had we gone in with SOF only, decimated the Iraqi Army with air power (much like in Afghanistan), and bought off the tribal leaders (as we are doing now), I'm not sure the insurgency would have picked up steam like it did.

It is because of folks like GEN Shenseki (not in spite of him) that we went in with too large of a conventional ground force for the job.