Page 2 of 2 FirstFirst 12
Results 21 to 37 of 37

Thread: Counterinsurgency, Denial, and Iraq

  1. #21
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    SOCAL
    Posts
    2,152

    Default

    As for the question on whether were fighting insurgents or doing some sort of quazi peace enforcement between multiple warring sides can be debated indefinitely, and everyone's argument would have a grain of truth, which is the essence of our challenge in Iraq, we don't even understand the nature of the problem, which means any strategy is at best an educated guess on how to best respond.
    Excellent point Global Scout. I've held the exact same view for too long. The problem is too complex, too multi-faceted to be totally grasped by 1 or 100, which make administration and execution of a strategy very hard. Let's just call them bad guys, kill them or make them realize their path is pointless, and negotiate with the non-so bad ones.

    I know in some cases were fighting a resistance and we're the occuppying foreign power. There is no other way to define it, no matter how unplatable this is to our American tastes. There is also an internal resistance against the Iraqi government from various Sunni groups, and perhaps some the Shi'a groups vying for power, so there is an insurgency. There is a war below the government level between Shi'a and Sunni, and always tension between Kurd and Arab, so there is civil conflict. Then there are foregin fighters on all sides, but AQI being the best known the most dangerous, who have the potential of changing the nature of the conflict into something else if we're not careful.
    This is another excellent point that I have tried to articulate here before, but failed I suppose. We need to stop getting hung up on definitions and terms, because nothing in Iraq or Afghanistan is black and white. There is too much gray area, either outside the FOB walls, after the patrol has left, etc., that we cannot see. Unfortunately, the inclination to package Iraq with a set box of terms hurts us all, especially the administration and it's advisors. We may know generally what is going on...and can analyze COIN metrics to make an assesment of what phase or stage we may have transitioned to, but it appears we get burned often because the situation shifts ever so subtly and we didn't catch it. Or things go kinetic very quickly, like the Samarra Mosque bombing, and we aren't in a position to affect much.

    To put some of what I'm trying to say in perspective, how much would the coalition be able to influence the situation on the ground in the following scenarios (because I believe unrestrained Sunni-Shi'a violence would ensue):

    -Sistani is assasinated. By which side does not matter, b/c the blame will always fall on the Sunni/AQ.

    -Sadr is somehow assasinated and that too points back to the Sunni.

    -Another shrine is attacked and destroyed.

    Sistani and/or Sadr represent the most dangerous situations methinks, but in all seriousness, what are we capable of doing if either of those two meet a nefarious demise?

  2. #22
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Some comments, GS

    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    I find it interesting that some of you made an argument that there is very little difference between what the ground pounders were doing in 2004 and what they are doing now in 2007. I think it is different for the following reasons:
    My perception is that what was being done on the ground varied a great deal from unit to unit. That's based on comments from my son, a friend in the Rgr Regt who got around a bit and two other folks who were there at the time.

    1. Strategically there was still denial in the U.S. that there was an insurgency in 2004, which prevented a coordinated interagency strategy, and Mr. Bremmer made one strategic error after another because he and his bosses did not understand the nature of the fight. The biggest error was disbanding the Iraqi Army, and we didn't even properly demobilize them. Arrogance was our strategy then, now we're trying to clean up those mistakes.
    Agreed on all counts -- and I should've said the three detractors I listed in general order switched places almost on a daily basis with respect to which was most problematical. I did say that those detractors were based on that one Brigade but from here in an air conditioned house in Florida, it looked to me like the CPA easily was the biggest cluster of the bunch...

    2. The operational strategy focused on find, fix, and finish, because the assumption was the insurgents/trouble makers were a relatively small group, and if we killed them all, the troubles would stop. Sort of a mailed fist approach, but executed very weakly and it was doomed to failure from the start. What I recall in 2004 was several cordon and search activities, but very little clear, hold and build. We were taking areas, then giving them back to the enemy.
    True but again, it seems to have varied from unit to unit. Everyone I've talked to who was there at the time is pretty scathing in their comment on two units who apparently epitomized what you say. That includes one then MAJ who was in one of those units and was not a happy camper.

    3. The current approach, where we have sufficient troops, is to clear, hold, and build and then transition the area to a competent (relative) Iraqi Security Force. The clear and hold involves leaving Soldiers in those areas 24/7, not simply doing a cordone and search, then run off after the next target, leaving the area just searched to insurgent control, and oh my the way a bunch of p.o'd Iraqis. There may have been individual units doing some version of clear and hold on their own, but without an interagency approach, the build phase had to be very limited, since it would have been restricted to the tactical/operational level. This was 2004.
    All true and, it seems, due mostly to MNFs concept of op and the CPAs inability to do much of anything right. As an aside, one guy involved in the initial ISF trainup attermpts under Eaton is still pretty livid over the flawed and half hearted approach at that time.

    ...The ISF is much better trained and equipped...
    . . .
    Unfortunately we don't have an occupying power doctrine, because it is politically incorrect, so when we find ourselves in the position of being an occupying power, we have to redefine the nature of conflict to make it platable politically, so we call it an insurgency (partially true), but is a our counterinsurgency doctrine effective, when we're not invited by the HN government?
    Good question. I'd add "or if we're invited but only half heartedly because we bullied or bribed the HN to 'invite' us."

    I think my real question is will a counterinsurgency strategy work for the multiple facet problem we're dealing with? Especially the so called British strategy? Killcullen addressed something along a similiar vein when he discribed the complex problem in Iraq as consisting of an insurgency, terroristism, and civil conflict (loosely paraphrased), and that the strategy for one often the made the other problem worse.
    I believe a series of techniques that will work can be found for this or any even more complex situation. All that's required is the time and fortitude to do that. The more important, even critical question IMO is will that time be allowed by US domestic political concerns?

    ...Are we currently winning in Iraq because the level of violence is down? Can anyone define winning first, then we can try to answer that.
    Can't win a COIN effort short of playing G. Khan, all you can do is achieve an acceptable outcome (and that's true of the over-touted and misused Malaya example). The level of violence is, I think, not a good indicator of the probability of that. Said acceptable outcome will vary in the eye of the beholder. I've long said there'll be decreasing (not an absence of) violence and a Troop drawdown five years after the start -- that means next summer; then a move by US units to the boonies and a few years of steadily declining and sporadic violence leading to a rule of (rough, ME type) law by the 2013-2018 time frame and a fully functional nation (in accordance with world, not western norms) by 2028-2033. Still looks possible even with all our screwups.

    Oh -- and the oil keeps flowing to China and India...

  3. #23
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Question

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    I suspect that AQI is more of an agent provacateur in the mold of the COMINTERN I mentioned above. I further suspect that a better role for the US would be to try to keep the agents provacateur out of the fracas as best we can while simultaneously doing what we can to allow the civil war to work itself out as non-violently as possible. I view this, by the way, as an alternative somewhere between Steve Metz' two choices. It is one that I think even Ed Luttwak might sanction. I say this because Luttwak has been known to say: "Just let them duke it out and to the winner goes the spoils" (my gisting, not his words).
    I couldn't agree more about the long -term. The duking it out is happening and always will but we are the one outside influencer which may have the possibility of reducing the amount of collateral damage once it's all said and done.

    This might be one reason for greater involvement of partner states being an important piece. The overall perceptions will always expand and contract to include/exclude anything which takes place in direct correlation with the perspective of the audience. Does this however really ever change the basic fact that in the end to the winner go the spoils.

    Is the question really about how to win it so much as who should win it, and in relation to that; who should/does decide the winner

  4. #24
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Posts
    106

    Default

    I also don't see civil war, insurgency, and terrorism as discrete phenomena. Every insurgency I know of is associated with a civil war of some type. Terrorism is an operational method or tactic.
    Steve, it will sound like I'm tripping over mouse turds debating this, but I think it is critically important to understand who the enemy (or elements hostile to our overall objectives) are exactly before we can develop a strategy that results in the desired outcomes, which by the way seem to be getting more realistic each passing day.

    The terrorism piece is hard, and I agree that the vast majority of insurgent groups have used terrorism as a tactic to varying degrees to help achieve their political aims. The Shinnng Path being one non-Islamist example among many. However, the initial leadership of AQI was foreign (may still be), and their primary tactic was and remains horrendous acts of terror, that is not nested with insurgents and resistance fighters. 4th, 5th, or 13th Generation Warfare, I don't know, but this appears to be something new, and I'm not convinced that a British style COIN strategy will have much of an impact on it (probably need a much more robust N. Ireland approach) for AQI, while we do need a British COIN strategy for the former regime loyalists. Two different strategies, and that doesn't even address the Civil conflict between the Sunnis and Shi'a. That requires a deal between the two warring factions, more along the lines of traditional peace enforcement. You have your terms of reference and you go in an enforce them. You can't very well mobilize the Sunni's to mobilize to support the government, when the government is perceived to be leading the Shi'a death squads. So instead, we support the Sunni's from the bottom up, by forming militia groups.

    Each of these strategies tend to counteract the other, so if Ken has a plan to bring this all to bay, I would definitely like to hear it. At the same type our political will hour glass is running out of sand.

    I also think the definition between a resistance force and an insurgency is a useful definition. A resistance force is still an insurgency, but it is easier for them to maintain the moral high ground and mobilize the population to support them, such as the French Resistance fighting the Germans. A pure insurgency, such as in Greece in the early 50's, is more likely to fail, because their rallying call is normally limited to a few malcontents. A resistance defines the type of insurgency, and that nuance is important.


    Ken, if the oil keeps flowing to the global economy, then we won , or perhaps better stated, at least we didn't mess that up too.

  5. #25
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    Steve, it will sound like I'm tripping over mouse turds debating this, but I think it is critically important to understand who the enemy (or elements hostile to our overall objectives) are exactly before we can develop a strategy that results in the desired outcomes, which by the way seem to be getting more realistic each passing day.

    The terrorism piece is hard, and I agree that the vast majority of insurgent groups have used terrorism as a tactic to varying degrees to help achieve their political aims. The Shinnng Path being one non-Islamist example among many. However, the initial leadership of AQI was foreign (may still be), and their primary tactic was and remains horrendous acts of terror, that is not nested with insurgents and resistance fighters. 4th, 5th, or 13th Generation Warfare, I don't know, but this appears to be something new, and I'm not convinced that a British style COIN strategy will have much of an impact on it (probably need a much more robust N. Ireland approach) for AQI, while we do need a British COIN strategy for the former regime loyalists. Two different strategies, and that doesn't even address the Civil conflict between the Sunnis and Shi'a. That requires a deal between the two warring factions, more along the lines of traditional peace enforcement. You have your terms of reference and you go in an enforce them. You can't very well mobilize the Sunni's to mobilize to support the government, when the government is perceived to be leading the Shi'a death squads. So instead, we support the Sunni's from the bottom up, by forming militia groups.

    Each of these strategies tend to counteract the other, so if Ken has a plan to bring this all to bay, I would definitely like to hear it. At the same type our political will hour glass is running out of sand.

    I also think the definition between a resistance force and an insurgency is a useful definition. A resistance force is still an insurgency, but it is easier for them to maintain the moral high ground and mobilize the population to support them, such as the French Resistance fighting the Germans. A pure insurgency, such as in Greece in the early 50's, is more likely to fail, because their rallying call is normally limited to a few malcontents. A resistance defines the type of insurgency, and that nuance is important.


    Ken, if the oil keeps flowing to the global economy, then we won , or perhaps better stated, at least we didn't mess that up too.

    Most insurgencies throughout history have been a polyglot of groups, some with reasonable political demands, others so extreme that they simply have to be eradicated.

    The problem in Iraq is that the administration elected for a long time to just paint all of the insurgents as terrorists. This just made things worse.

    Sure its true that the perceived legitimacy of a group using insurgency matters. What I was suggesting is that you end up with an artificial typology if you draw rigid boxes, one terrorists, one resistance movement, one insurgency, and try and stick groups into it. To give a couple of examples, Mao's movement and Ho Chi Minh's were, simultaneously, resistance movements, ideological insurgencies, and civil wars which used terrorism.

    Plus, there's another problem--even though a large number of Iraqi insurgents were motivated by "resistance" factors (they either just wanted us out or wanted to avenge a family or tribe member who we had "dishonored), it's hard to sell that to the American public. The administration has had to overemphasize the role of foreign jihadists. (It also downplayed the roll of what I called "commercial" insurgents. See this. I distinguished commercial, spiritual, and resistant insurgents. Iraq showed that all three can be intermixed. A number of people like Bard O'Neil have used that.)

  6. #26
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Heh. Do I start from Apr 2003 or today?

    Quote Originally Posted by Global Scout View Post
    ...
    ... So instead, we support the Sunni's from the bottom up, by forming militia groups.
    And, I betcha, support for some Shia groups is provided by elements of 'we' as well.

    Each of these strategies tend to counteract the other, so if Ken has a plan to bring this all to bay, I would definitely like to hear it. At the same type our political will hour glass is running out of sand.
    You're obviously correct in all that and, given my firm belief most of that did not have to happen, I asked the question re: when do I start...

    Reality intrudes; starting today, huh? Sigh.

    For AQI -- your prescription, Belfast x2 -- seems to me we're doing that with a mix of ISF, regular units and SOF. The FRLs -- your prescription again, placatory COIN. Seems to me we're also doing that right now. For the Sunni-Shia divide; repeat after me. "Our Father who art..."

    I joke. For that divide, we go Byzantine and bribe heavily while striving to convince the farthest out elements on each side that we do have and will use a hammer if necessary (our daily improving intel and zapping a leader or two sporadically aids in this, we need to keep doing that and also scuff up an Irani occasionally to keep them a little honest). It appears from here we may be doing that as well, can't tell for sure. That particular problem is literally older than we are and while we exacerbated it, it will never disappear completely; and anyone who thinks it will is, I believe, deluded. It can only be contained and in the ME, bribery and death most always keep somewhat of a lid on things while appeals to reason (in the western sense) rarely do...

    Gaurantees? None. Probability? ~ 60-75%. Close enough for Guvmint work. Never yet seen a 100% solution in warfare...

    Edited to add: Check the LINK

    I also think the definition between a resistance force and an insurgency is a useful definition. A resistance force is still an insurgency, but it is easier for them to maintain the moral high ground and mobilize the population to support them, such as the French Resistance fighting the Germans. A pure insurgency, such as in Greece in the early 50's, is more likely to fail, because their rallying call is normally limited to a few malcontents. A resistance defines the type of insurgency, and that nuance is important.
    Yes there is a difference and it is important. The interesting thing is that the Sunni-Shia divide element in Iraq allows either side to claim they are a resistance movement and their opponent to claim "Nay, not so -- they are insurgents" and thus both suffer from the advantages and disadvantages you cite. Still, if one does the math...

    Ken, if the oil keeps flowing to the global economy, then we won , or perhaps better stated, at least we didn't mess that up too.
    Yet.

    Prob'ly will keep flowing, too many derive an advantage if it does so. There'll be the random nut case who'll try to disrupt it but I doubt they'll be successful.

    We have messed up a bunch, all really IMO understandable (though not necessarily excusable) and most contributed to by too many players with competing agendas here in the US and our overweening bureaucracy which severely hinders flexibility. Democracies are like that, goes with the territory, I'm afraid. Neat thing is we cobble stuff together better'n most.
    Last edited by Ken White; 12-03-2007 at 01:03 AM. Reason: Link added

  7. #27
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey View Post
    Is the question really about how to win it so much as who should win it, and in relation to that; who should/does decide the winner
    Who should win is one thing that we may comment on, but, as outsiders, we really do not get to have a vote. The populace of the country gets to make that call. As I said before, perhaps not too clearly, we might play a role in trying to make sure that whatever choice they make is not coerced; this however, is only morally permissible, not morally required. Morally, we may not direct what choice they decide to make; they need to use their own free will. Nation states are not children; paternalism has no place here.

    What we choose to do for pragmatic reasons may very well be different from what we ought to do for moral reasons. The thing about making today's pragmatic right choice is that it often ends up being the wrong choice in the long term--this is the moral of the Prisoner's Dilemma, which was touched on in discussions on this thread.

  8. #28
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    Who should win is one thing that we may comment on, but, as outsiders, we really do not get to have a vote. The populace of the country gets to make that call. As I said before, perhaps not too clearly, we might play a role in trying to make sure that whatever choice they make is not coerced; this however, is only morally permissible, not morally required. Morally, we may not direct what choice they decide to make; they need to use their own free will. Nation states are not children; paternalism has no place here.

    What we choose to do for pragmatic reasons may very well be different from what we ought to do for moral reasons. The thing about making today's pragmatic right choice is that it often ends up being the wrong choice in the long term--this is the moral of the Prisoner's Dilemma, which was touched on in discussions on this thread.
    And, of course, my contention is that we need to get over the idea that we have to "win." We need to seek the quickest and most sustainable end to the conflict even if that does not constitute a clear "win." We need to think of counterinsurgency as more like peacekeeping than like warfighting.

    The huge problem with that, I realize, is convincing Congress and the families who sacrifice their sons and daughters that an outcome that is something less than a clear, unambiguous win (which is, after all, the American way) is in everyone's interest.

  9. #29
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    And, of course, my contention is that we need to get over the idea that we have to "win." We need to seek the quickest and most sustainable end to the conflict even if that does not constitute a clear "win." We need to think of counterinsurgency as more like peacekeeping than like warfighting.

    The huge problem with that, I realize, is convincing Congress and the families who sacrifice their sons and daughters that an outcome that is something less than a clear, unambiguous win (which is, after all, the American way) is in everyone's interest.
    It isn't a question of our winning. It is a question of, in the current cases, the Afghan and Iraqi people winning. To use a soccer, lacrosse, or hockey metaphor--they score the game winning goal, we may get an assist. (Or perhaps we are just the spectators who get to go home satisfied after watching a well played contest. Insert the "God I hope so" emoticon here.)

  10. #30
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default An interesting link

    HERE

    I added it to my excessive verbiage above but it got lost in the tangle of words...

  11. #31
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Most insurgencies throughout history have been a polyglot of groups, some with reasonable political demands, others so extreme that they simply have to be eradicated.

    The problem in Iraq is that the administration elected for a long time to just paint all of the insurgents as terrorists. This just made things worse.

    Sure its true that the perceived legitimacy of a group using insurgency matters. What I was suggesting is that you end up with an artificial typology if you draw rigid boxes, one terrorists, one resistance movement, one insurgency, and try and stick groups into it. To give a couple of examples, Mao's movement and Ho Chi Minh's were, simultaneously, resistance movements, ideological insurgencies, and civil wars which used terrorism.

    Plus, there's another problem--even though a large number of Iraqi insurgents were motivated by "resistance" factors (they either just wanted us out or wanted to avenge a family or tribe member who we had "dishonored), it's hard to sell that to the American public. The administration has had to overemphasize the role of foreign jihadists. (It also downplayed the roll of what I called "commercial" insurgents. See this. I distinguished commercial, spiritual, and resistant insurgents. Iraq showed that all three can be intermixed. A number of people like Bard O'Neil have used that.)
    Are you suggesting that we're either all in or all out, that we need to control the entire population and suppress all violence or leave, that we can't chose middle ground: keep the foreigners out while allowing domestic "politics by other means?"

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    We need to seek the quickest and most sustainable end to the conflict even if that does not constitute a clear "win."
    I think that's a civil war. Would you agree or disagree?
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 12-03-2007 at 02:02 AM.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  12. #32
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Hi Wayne,

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    Who should win is one thing that we may comment on, but, as outsiders, we really do not get to have a vote. The populace of the country gets to make that call. As I said before, perhaps not too clearly, we might play a role in trying to make sure that whatever choice they make is not coerced; this however, is only morally permissible, not morally required. Morally, we may not direct what choice they decide to make; they need to use their own free will. Nation states are not children; paternalism has no place here.
    Let me respond to this in the words of that great, latter day Jewish prophet, Tom Lehrer:
    What do we do? We send the Marines!
    For might makes right,
    And till they've seen the light,
    They've got to be protected,
    All their rights respected,
    'Till somebody we like can be elected.
    (full text here)

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    What we choose to do for pragmatic reasons may very well be different from what we ought to do for moral reasons. The thing about making today's pragmatic right choice is that it often ends up being the wrong choice in the long term--this is the moral of the Prisoner's Dilemma, which was touched on in discussions on this thread.
    Totally agree, although I do have to wonder what the pragmatic reasons for the Invasion of Iraq were (no, I really don't want to open that issue up again ). More importantly, what are the current, pragmatic, issues and what is the moral (in your term, ethical in mine) action that should be taken.

    Are you suggesting that we're either all in or all out, that we need to control the entire population and suppress all violence or leave, that we can't chose middle ground: keep the foreigners out while allowing domestic "politics by other means?"
    RA makes what find to be an intriguing point, especially in the "keep the foreigners out" part. Does that include coalition troops? I think it is more profitable, from a pragmatic viewpoint, to ask a somewhat different series of questions such as
    1. What is the moral (ethical) justification for staying in Iraq?
    2. How is this justification operationalzed?
    3. What are the long term policy implications of this justification?
    4. What are the long term institutional implications of this justification?
    This really does get beyond the somewhat neo-Thomistic wrangling over terms such as "insurgency" and "civil war" .
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  13. #33
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    It isn't a question of our winning. It is a question of, in the current cases, the Afghan and Iraqi people winning. To use a soccer, lacrosse, or hockey metaphor--they score the game winning goal, we may get an assist. (Or perhaps we are just the spectators who get to go home satisfied after watching a well played contest. Insert the "God I hope so" emoticon here.)
    My feeling is that by conceptualizing armed conflict as a sport, Americans squeeze themselves into strategically untenable boxes. I'm not contesting whether it is us or an ally that technically "gets the win," but whether pursuing a win in general is a good idea.

    My reading of recent conflicts is that it is the conflict itself that generates problems and threats (terrorism, crime, humanitarian disasters, economic problems). By holding out for a "win," we help sustain conflicts. Hence I favor a peacekeeping rather than a warfighting model.

  14. #34
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Are you suggesting that we're either all in or all out, that we need to control the entire population and suppress all violence or leave, that we can't chose middle ground: keep the foreigners out while allowing domestic "politics by other means?"



    I think that's a civil war. Would you agree or disagree?
    Naw, didn't mean to suggest what you said in the beginning. I think that almost every armed conflict in the contemporary security environment is a civil war.

  15. #35
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    I think it is more profitable, from a pragmatic viewpoint, to ask a somewhat different series of questions such as

    *What is the moral (ethical) justification for staying in Iraq?
    Same reason you "curb your dog" on a walk or pick up after it with a bag when it dumps on the neighbor's front yard.
    *How is this justification operationalized?
    By cleaning up the mess you and your dog have made.
    *What are the long term policy implications of this justification?
    Remember that your pets have impacts on others too. If you aren't prepared to clean up after those pets, then don't own them and find some other ways to exercise your need to control other, "less fortunate" critters.
    *What are the long term institutional implications of this justification?
    Maybe we will find out that our institutional framework ought to be much less Occidental consumerist-centric, that "testosterone-induced" urges to flex the leadsership's will are the wrong ones to follow, and that a policy framework that treats the rest of the world as our dumping ground is not such a great idea.


    This really does get beyond the somewhat neo-Thomistic wrangling over terms such as "insurgency" and "civil war" .
    Thanks for that summation, Marc. I really didn't want to start on the "that depends on what you mean by 'is' " diatribe again. "Casuistry is so pre-19th Century, " he said in his best Valley-girl nasal whine.

  16. #36
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    My feeling is that by conceptualizing armed conflict as a sport, Americans squeeze themselves into strategically untenable boxes. I'm not contesting whether it is us or an ally that technically "gets the win," but whether pursuing a win in general is a good idea.
    I agree. I had a long internal debate about using a sports metaphor for exactly the reasons you note.

    I lost out to the evil voices in my head, but at least got to water it down by indicating we might just be spectators in the big game (and hadn't bet against the spread, by the way)

  17. #37
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    Thanks for that summation, Marc. I really didn't want to start on the "that depends on what you mean by 'is' " diatribe again. "Casuistry is so pre-19th Century, " he said in his best Valley-girl nasal whine.
    Always glad to "help" . Actually, I love the analogy but, tell me, who walks whom?????? On second thought, let's forget that one....
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •