All good points, but the weather bit surprises me actually.Originally Posted by Cavguy
I tend to view Aircraft and Arty as complementary, not competitive. Each has strengths and weaknesses - both inherent and situational.
Does it have a sound system?
All good points, but the weather bit surprises me actually.
I tend to view Aircraft and Arty as complementary, not competitive. Each has strengths and weaknesses - both inherent and situational.
Agreed. Aboive was not meant to reduce role/effect of airpower in the slightest. I was responding to Ron's question in specific about why Arty was still needed in the age of JDAMs.
Re: Bad weather. Had a number of occasions aircraft were off station due to sandstorms in Iraq. At least they were unwilling to support when the pilot couldn't see the target. Good example was the sandstorm a few days ago when the Green Zone got barraged because A/C weren't on station. Not that we could do arty counterfire in urban though.
I concur with WM
This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.
The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Agreed.
I've seen that argument used in other areas as well, not just in missions assigned, but in weapons development, organization and force structure - it's pernicious.
The things that the soldier has to face, the enemy, terrain, weather, supply problems, inaccurate intel (in spite of all that the US Army throws at intel), are often tough enough to overcome as it is, without having any additional difficulties piled on. As the general said "I don't want a fair fight, I want every possible advantage that I can get"...
The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders
As BCT commanders we have watched the deterioration of the Field Artillery Branch with growing alarm. We are former maneuver commanders who recognize the importance of having reliable, fast and accurate fire support and wish to provide our Army's leadership with a "customer's perspective" on this issue.........
Interesting paper. While I agree with the spirit, I take issue with some of the suggestions.
One thing that I find endlessly infuriating is the supposition that somehow you "need" battalion and brigade commands, and commanders, to get good training and good officers in a branch. The authors suggest that there need to be formed Artillery brigades, and any place where there are separate batteries now must instead be grouped under a battalion headquarters. Battalion and brigade headquarters are very expensive in terms of personnel, especially multiplied over the numbers that we are taking about in the Artillery - depending on how you do the math, it could equate to perhaps a entire brigade's worth of troops. Most of those additional personnel are *not* there to increase the institutional knowledge or training quality of the artillery. Personnel in the battalion and brigade S1, S2, S4, etc are not going to be focused on improving the quality of artillery training. The battalion/brigade commander and his XO will also probably spend plenty of time worrying about "command" issues like maintenance, discipline, the family support group, etc. Grouping batteries into a battalion also requires a forward support company and/or an HQ battery, which at the very least will require additional personnel to command these company(/ies), even if the rest of the support personnel are realigned from the current organization, the same can be said of grouping battalions into brigades. This is quite a few extra personnel, when the whole reason for it, in the white paper, is to get some additional, senior artillery experts - an inordinately high price to pay, when there are other, more direct ways to accomplish it.
I wouldn't be nearly as quick to dismiss the FSE section. In the 3rd ACR, this was a Field Artillery major (no real reason that the billet couldn't be an LTC), a captain, a chief warrant, a senior NCO and a couple of support troops. They could focus solely on the quality of training, and didn't have to worry about all of the other things that a commander, and his staff, do (and some officers are all too happy to focus purely on the training, and not have the headaches of command). The batteries certainly did have time to train, and in tests/arteps often outperformed their "standard" counterparts in the other FA battalions, and even the FA brigades at Sill, in mission that was measurable.
Heck, King Battery (1st How, 1/3 ACR) just set a new record for most rounds fired by a battery in Iraq, over 5,000 rounds safely delivered to their targets, which is much, much more than the average battery gets for training in a year. The FSE sections also picked up the role of the battalion or brigade FDC (battalion and brigade FDC's are not nearly as useful today as they were back in WWII, before the advent of computers and battle command software.)
Other branches (say, MI) have a career progression path that involves staff jobs at the higher levels, where being an S2 on a brigade level staff is a qualifying job, the same could be done with the Field Artillery. I also think that it misses the point that, grouping into brigades, they will simply be an easier target for the "bean counters" to cut. At least in the current scheme, there are still plenty of howitzer batteries out there. A few iterations of reorgs, and that would change if they were in artillery brigades. Finally, the opposition to the two-man crew of the N-LOS C is... misleading. Batteries today have an ammunition carrier (CAT) to resupply each gun, and some flavor of HEMTT to resupply each CAT. Both of those vehicles have Artillery MOS soldiers that are trained as gun crew. (Perhaps the FCS batteries do not have these - if so, then that IS a serious mistake.)
This also ignores the serious training problems that arise from "stovepiped" units. The officers and NCO's in the Cav Howitzer batteries KNOW what their maneuver counterparts need, and have (or at least, had) developed unique TTPs to accomplish their mission and support the line troops.
We simply don't have the personnel to stand up entire brigades, just to get an FA Colonel. If you really want to spend that kind of money, make the N-LOS C as good as, say, the PzH 2000, and highlight the independence and awesome responsibility of a howitzer battery, or even make a few maneuver brigade commands available to (gasp) artillery officers, and you will (continue to) get good officers and NCOs into the branch.
BDE oversight
I've served almost 4 years in a new "Fires" Brigade as a FA and MI officer, with over 1.5 years on BN staff. I agree that as far as FA training goes, aside from BDE 3, the BDE staff does not contribute. However, I would say this is the same for all Brigade level staffs. They do the thankless work that gets stuff done. Fires Brigades are also intended to be deployable and modular like BCTs, requiring them to have sufficient internal support.
As the paper states, FA is hurting. My BN has only 1 CCC grad in Command, the rest are first/second year captains, and after OIF convoy security, and a SECFOR deployment trainup, few have large amounts of FA experience. The BN CDR spent his company grade years doing FA, and his field grade doing non-standard missions, so he has the expertise to guide the young commanders. The creation of BCTs ended "DIVARTY" which served an oversight role for all fires units in a division. The only FA COL in position of authority on Bragg is the Fires Brigade commander. The BCT Fires BNs have to seek out non-FA commanders for experience and guidance. Maybe not a deal breaker, but FA requires enough technical knowledge that most non-FA officers probably don't know. Emplacing, crew-drills, and gunnery are probably out of their realm.One thing that I find endlessly infuriating is the supposition that somehow you "need" battalion and brigade commands, and commanders, to get good training and good officers in a branch. The authors suggest that there need to be formed Artillery brigades, and any place where there are separate batteries now must instead be grouped under a battalion headquarters.
BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else. The FSC is also a great enabler in the field, and has definately improved how we train and work day to day. It does take more personnel, but it allows sections and units to specialize.Grouping batteries into a battalion also requires a forward support company and/or an HQ battery, which at the very least will require additional personnel to command these company(/ies), even if the rest of the support personnel are realigned from the current organization, the same can be said of grouping battalions into brigades.
I agree that these structures shouldn't exist just to justify a senior billet, but they do serve a purpose. 18th Fires just reflagged under 82nd Airborne Division, so we have not seen how this will impact the BCT Fires BNs, but the consensus with most FA Officers I've talked to here is they think it is a good move.This is quite a few extra personnel, when the whole reason for it, in the white paper, is to get some additional, senior artillery experts - an inordinately high price to pay, when there are other, more direct ways to accomplish it.
The FSE does serve an important function, but with a MAJ or even LTC filling it, would he really have authority or real influence over a Fires BN Commander? I am a Captain on staff, and Captains are Captains, but a Captain in Command does not always listen to the staff. Would a LTC in command listen to a MAJ or another LTC giving suggestions? "I'm the commander."I wouldn't be nearly as quick to dismiss the FSE section. In the 3rd ACR, this was a Field Artillery major (no real reason that the billet couldn't be an LTC), a captain, a chief warrant, a senior NCO and a couple of support troops. They could focus solely on the quality of training, and didn't have to worry about all of the other things that a commander, and his staff, do (and some officers are all too happy to focus purely on the training, and not have the headaches of command).
Sadly, most FA batteries are not shooting, and some are not even pretending to train FA, instead focusing on their next OIF/OEF security or infantry mission. There are only a handful of batteries shooting at Bragg right now, just the reality addressed by the paper. That said, those that are shooting in Iraq or Afghanistan, are shooting a lot. One of our sister BN's has been living the Artilleryman's dreams and destroying Taliban with HE. Also, due to the lost FA skills, BN Level Master Gunner and FDC oversight have been essential in our unit safely returning to the FA mission.The batteries certainly did have time to train, and in tests/arteps often outperformed their "standard" counterparts in the other FA battalions, and even the FA brigades at Sill, in mission that was measurable.
Heck, King Battery (1st How, 1/3 ACR) just set a new record for most rounds fired by a battery in Iraq, over 5,000 rounds safely delivered to their targets, which is much, much more than the average battery gets for training in a year. The FSE sections also picked up the role of the battalion or brigade FDC (battalion and brigade FDC's are not nearly as useful today as they were back in WWII, before the advent of computers and battle command software.)
Making more staff jobs KD may help retain people, but truth be told, if you come in knowing you are only going to go so far and be stuck on staff, that does not appeal to everyone. MI, as you mention, is now non-command oriented, basically telling CPTs not all of you will command, and that is OK (though we all know that is false). That will likely be the deciding point for me a few years down the road. Being a BDE S2 is KD because there are only a handful of actual MI BNs left. MI is up there with FA having the biggest officer retention problems (CSRB). This is due to deployments and happiness with career.Other branches (say, MI) have a career progression path that involves staff jobs at the higher levels, where being an S2 on a brigade level staff is a qualifying job, the same could be done with the Field Artillery.
Agree with you here, coming from a General Support (GS) FA unit. They don't teach FA LTs what GS actually means in practice, where you will get more (aka all) your time in the FA battery, and no time with IN or AR or the like. This was not a huge issue for me because I got to do a convoy security mission as a PL and got my maneuver on, but not training in direct support of IN or AR impacts units. That said, you can get exposed to more Joint operations. It is also a reality though, that 155mm and rockets are meant to reach out and touch the enemy, so keeping them one mile from the front may not make sense (conventional Fulda Gap thinking here).This also ignores the serious training problems that arise from "stovepiped" units. The officers and NCO's in the Cav Howitzer batteries KNOW what their maneuver counterparts need, and have (or at least, had) developed unique TTPs to accomplish their mission and support the line troops.
Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems. Sill just released the draft FA Plan on AKO, its worth a read to see where branch is trying to go.We simply don't have the personnel to stand up entire brigades, just to get an FA Colonel. If you really want to spend that kind of money, make the N-LOS C as good as, say, the PzH 2000, and highlight the independence and awesome responsibility of a howitzer battery, or even make a few maneuver brigade commands available to (gasp) artillery officers, and you will (continue to) get good officers and NCOs into the branch.
Long Live the King!
I think I'll throw a hangrenade in the water and see what floats...
First, a caveat, not an Artillery type but have a fair amount of Infantry and Cavalry experience and observing Artillerists at work for fun an profit during the period 1948-1995; post '95, I have a little knowledge.
Second, I'm quoting Patmc not to pick on him but because he makes good cogent points in a logical sequence.In the 48-95 period, that was pretty much the norm -- unless the other BCs were First or even, rarely, Second LTs. The game at all Carreer Course was to ask how many had Co/By/Trp command before arrival and typically it was about 2/3. Thus, I'm not sure that is a problem.Which also changed about 85 years of excessively (?) centralized organization -- bound to be rumbles....The creation of BCTs ended "DIVARTY" which served an oversight role for all fires units in a division.Simple solution there is to upgrade By Cmd to Major....Maybe not a deal breaker, but FA requires enough technical knowledge that most non-FA officers probably don't know. Emplacing, crew-drills, and gunnery are probably out of their realm.Support is support and the ACRs make it work.BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else.Valid point. What if we did away with Branches? Yes, I'm totally serious.Making more staff jobs KD may help retain people, but truth be told, if you come in knowing you are only going to go so far and be stuck on staff, that does not appeal to everyone. MI, as you mention, is now non-command oriented, basically telling CPTs not all of you will command, and that is OK (though we all know that is false).Here's my Grenade:Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems. Sill just released the draft FA Plan on AKO, its worth a read to see where branch is trying to go.
Seen a lot of FA GOs and worked for several. All were good and smart guys but IMO none was a particularly successful maneuver unit commander because of a strong tendency to over centralize, lack of maneuver experience and an, again IMO, lack of trust of subordinates (Aviators suffer the same problems, gotta use that Checklist...). Thus, I again ask, why branches?
Even though I am a combined arms advocate and obviously the BCTs need organic arty, I do see the need for Fire Brigades. If you place enough arty in a BCT for major combat operations, you have a lot of dead weight when those operations end. Fire brigades make arty enchantment easy and "modular"
Also reduces work load on already over tasked BCT commander. Of course I like the idea of CSS Brigades too, as opposed to trying to shoe-horn everything into a BCT (similar thought here LINK
In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...) Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???
The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.
Many consider an ACR battery command pretty coveted, primarily because of the autonomy, but also the sheer size (personnel & equip) and capability. It's almost like a mini battalion itself. I would only be so lucky to command one.
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
I have to agree with Ken. However, I would point out that, as young Field Artillery officers "grow up" in the BCT's, they will be much more "in tune" with their maneuver counterparts, so that aspect of the situation should improve.Seen a lot of FA GOs and worked for several. All were good and smart guys but IMO none was a particularly successful maneuver unit commander because of a strong tendency to over centralize, lack of maneuver experience and an, again IMO, lack of trust of subordinates (Aviators suffer the same problems
In any case, soon the Battalion and Brigade FDC's will cease to be training assets, but another frustrating, and frustrated, disfunctional link in the FA/FS chain, that needs to sort itself out, as the personnel who rotate into those positions have been performing non-standard, non-artillery missions for the last X years.
To turn an argument on its head: instead of grouping all the batteries into Fires Brigades to improve artillery training, that only occasionally get to train with maneuver units, instead have mobile training teams, with the mission of bringing batteries that have been doing non-standard missions "back up to speed" for shooting the big guns? This is a much more efficient method, and should prove just as effective.
A more worisome aspect of the problem is that right now, the Army "buys off" on one howitzer battery per maneuver battalion (with another per, somewhere in "GS"). Grouping into Fires Brigades just leaves the artillery ripe for cutting, when some "beancounter" goes about preparing to fight the last war. The remaining batteries would probalby be well trained - that problem might be solved - but there simply wouldn't be many batteries left. This is an Army looking to cut and re-align - there simply isn't room for luxuries that add up to thousands of personnel, and the decisions aren't between "good" and "bad", but are between "bad" and "dead end".
Fires Battalion commanders would fall under a division FSE, with a full COL who had "been there, done that". In an Armored Cavalry Regiment, the FSE had a MAJ, who the CPT's commanding the howitzer batteries had to call "Sir". Upgrading that position to an LTC would result in it carrying even more weight with the Regimental Commander. Sure, the possibility exists for pi**ing contests with the maneuver battalion-level commanders who actually own those batteries, but they certainly didn't want to be seen denying training time to a battery that subsequently shot out, so they allowed ample time for the artillery community to do what it needed to do.
Last edited by Sabre; 10-08-2008 at 05:48 PM.
different strokes
I'm no longer a S4, so I've lost my instant access to MTOEs, but my understanding is the ACR's have recently switched to the BCT structure? Is this correct, or did they retain their unique CAV organization? If anyone can provide link or rollup, it would be appreciated.
If it works for you guys, go with it. We are an Airborne howitzer battalion. Before transforming, we had a large 150+ HHS that did all non-firing tasks and supported the smaller firing batteries. Under Fires Brigade, we added a robust FSC and cut the HHB in half, leaving the staff sections, BN TOC, medics, and a couple other sections in HHB and putting all the support in FSC. The Firing Batteries have firing platoons, ammo sections, FDCs, and HQ element.
For Drop Zone missions, one battery controls the DZ and aircraft, one - three jump and drop howitzers, HHB sends an assault CP and medics, and the FSC pre-positions ammo and equipment as needed, then recovers. Its controlled chaos, but it works. In the field, same deal, with the BN TOC leading the FDCs and movements, FSC supplying and fixing, and the Batteries shooting.
Could batteries do it all on their own? If you gave them the pax and equipment.
Should every Artillery Battery move to independent action? Why have a FA Battalion if Batteries can do it all? Its the way MI, MP, EN, etc are moving, would it work for FA?
I trust my parachute packing to someone else. I don't pack it. I trust the mechanics in the support company to fix trucks, I don't fix them. As a former battalion ammo officer, I know how much of a pain in the ass ammo is, but again, the support folks draw and transport it (which works better than the individual units each drawing ammo, learned the hard way at ASP). A FA battery exists to quickly and accurately put rounds on target. If an FSC eases that Commanders burden, why is that bad? Everyone in the Army relies on everyone else. There is nothing that is not important, and it all has to get done. If people are professionals, they do their job, and you can count on them.Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???
Here at Bragg, the BCT Artillery Battalions are mainly doing non-standard missions. FA is not their priority, as directed by the BCT commanders that want them for maneuver. This is an OIFism, but true.The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.
Agree on stovepiping, but again, you are talking Direct Support (DS) vs General Support (GS). In COIN, it may make sense to move big guns and rockets down to BCTs and BNs and companies in DS role, as we are largely doing in Afghanistan. In full on conventional fight though, are you going to place your deep-fighers up with the near fight, or let them focus on the enemy's rear and C2, as they do in GS? Fires Brigades originally formed out of the existing GS units. You could add a GS BN to each BCT, then another BTRY to each BN, but I think that would detract more than add, and limit the use of their capabilities
Agree in theory, as our BN learned the hard way after deployment, but someone has to set the standard and provide guidance. Our BN FDC took an officer and NCO that had shot during the deployment, and they created a plan to recert the unit. One BC had been an instructor at Sill, and he ran a FDC university for all FDC pax and all FA officers. All took Saftey tests and underwent a MTT from Sill, if memory serves me. Agree that MTT are valuable, but limited due to the numbers, logistics, and time involved.In any case, soon the Battalion and Brigade FDC's will cease to be training assets, but another frustrating, and frustrated, disfunctional link in the FA/FS chain, that needs to sort itself out, as the personnel who rotate into those positions have been performing non-standard, non-artillery missions for the last X years.
As far as actual warfighting, BN and BDE FDC's are limited because of the realities of COIN. We condcuted a Korean War 2 scenario during a BDE TOCEX, and believe me, a LT in a battery FDC needed the higher filters in that one. If we eliminate BN and BDE control, how do we bring it back? Can argue either way.
My understanding is that all Captains call MAJ's sir or mam, but besides point. My issue was with LTC to LTC which I see here on staff, when BDE level LTCs tell BN level LTC what to do. Human nature and Army nature.Fires Battalion commanders would fall under a division FSE, with a full COL who had "been there, done that". In an Armored Cavalry Regiment, the FSE had a MAJ, who the CPT's commanding the howitzer batteries had to call "Sir". Upgrading that position to an LTC would result in it carrying even more weight with the Regimental Commander. Sure, the possibility exists for pi**ing contests with the maneuver battalion-level commanders who actually own those batteries, but they certainly didn't want to be seen denying training time to a battery that subsequently shot out, so they allowed ample time for the artillery community to do what it needed to do.
How large would the DIV FSE be? Would there be BDE or BCT FSE? It could work, but in reality, it would drive some officers away or out, if there last chance of command is as a captain, and they have 10+ years staff ahead. With the lower manning requirements under this change, maybe it would not be an issue for branch.
As stated earlier, I think this all boils down to DS vs GS in the FA, and maybe FA needs to re-examine this distinction. For the COIN fight, where the entire AO is battlespace, pushing FA down to the lowest level makes sense. In a conventional fight with relative lines or fronts, it makes sense to keep assets focused beyond the front line. An enemy can't fight if his reserves, C2, fuel, ammo, radars, signal, etc are out of the fight. Fires Brigades took GS units and made them modular. Moving BCT fires Bns under them replaces the DIVARTY function whose elimation is considered a mistake by most of the field grades I've spoken with. The Army has specialized units for different roles and missions. DS units may be stovepiped into thinking that they are the only way as well.
Good discussion.
Great points.
In regards to training, there is one major issue for consideration: It's no secret that there is a degredation of FA-specific skills among junior NCOs and officers.
DS fires BNs now and will continue to train themselves in the current BCT footprint. Without a DIVARTY to mandate or validate training, it's plausible that we will critically lack the expertise to train ourselves.
That's why I think it would behoove Fort Sill to plan for this and anticipate creating and dispatching MTTs to travel to posts to assist the FA BNs and validate training in the near future.
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
A thought on that...
As a one time purveyor of of a mission and skill set alien to Infantry (and even most Armor) units; specifically Cavalry reconnaissance in all its permutations, it was my observation that the direct and general support by the major unit to, and the technical competence of, said Reconnaissance elements was exceptionally good.
What was far too often totally lacking was a knowledge of how to use the asset. Even that was a double edged sword; one could often set up and run one's own missions with minimal interference...
To answer your question, I believe that the 3rd ACR has not, and will not actually transition to the BCT org. I will have to double-check that one, though. That they were ever going to was perhaps the most dumb-founding part about the whole BCT-reorg, that the Army set out to so completely dismantle the capable and proven Cavalry organizations, in the name of modularity, of all things. Absurd!
If there are those who want a few more modular Fires Brigades, sure, go for it, just as long as the BCT's still own their artillery battalions - they can have some sort of habitual relationship to the "divisional" Fires Brigade, with its FDCs. The batteries in the ACR certainly did our share of high intensity exercises, and the FDC work was no easier or more difficult than usual - the FSE's did their job, and I never saw a reason for a battalion or higher FDC. But to take away the batteries from the Cav Squadrons and take away the Fires Battalion from the BCTs, now that would be a grave error. Any maneuver commander knows that the only support that you can count on, in "crunch time", is the support that you OWN.
A maneuver battalion facing a "high threat" combat situation (one that carries with it a reasonable chance for heavy casualties, to differentiate between COIN in OIF and COIN in say, Vietnam, where even the VC had formed battalions) can almost certainly make good use of an artillery battery, for the critical suppression and smoke missions, if nothing else. The battalion mortars, while quite useful in some scenarios, simply do not have the range, accuracy, and weight of fire (at least in the heavy/mech world). A GS Fires Brigade can work to affect the deep fight, but to commit all available artillery to that work courts disaster.
Which is, in a nutshell, also why I believe that howitzer batteries, at least in DS should have their own support organic to their organization. As units are cut, sliced, chopped, etc to other units in other AO's, usually "on the fly", that seems to be the best way to guarantee (as near as that is possible) that they will have the support that they need. (Heh, a good read on the aspect of things is any book about the tank battalions and div cav squadrons in Vietnam - those units were scattered to the winds, it seems, although I would defer to those who were there.)
I agree with Ken that one of the perennial problems with artillery (albeit perhaps not a common complaint at the moment) is that the maneuver community sometimes doesn't know how to use it. Having artillery organic to maneuver battalions and brigades certainly goes a long way towards correcting that deficiency. Indeed, were it not for the dearth of artillery training right now, I am guessing that would become a matter of more concern for the maneuver commanders. While the artillery is getting little or no training in artillery, and given a war that requires rather less artillery than many other conflicts did, I suppose that I shouldn't be terribly surprised that they want training improved, and may be willing to give up their artillery to do it (I find it quite interesting that the authors of the paper did NOT come out and say that, but stated that "we leave to a separate discussions whether there should be some sort of command relationship..."). In a different war, they would probably want some artillery that they OWNED, even if it meant that there was a training penalty to be paid to get it.
As it is, the paper advocated one Fires Brigade for every "division" of 4 BCT's, with one or two Fires Battalions organic to the brigade. Sure. I think that they will be an easy target for force realignment (as the branch already is).
However, I don't feel that goes very far towards answering the training, retention, and morale problems. What would the alternative be? If all artillery were grouped into Fires Brigades, and restricted only to performing artillery missions, how many would end up being deployed to OIF? Most would probably stay back at their home station, training, since the requirement for artillery is somewhat less in this particular war. How would the Officer and NCO corps feel about being "left out" of the big show? I think that is a Catch-22. The NLOS-C is due soon, but the US artillery has managed, once AGAIN, to have a sub-par SP howitzer - short range, and with even LESS on board ammunition stowage (at least we have an excuse this time: the chimera of deployability) - still, the artillery can be excited about a new cannon system, but it could have been better. (I have to admit the M777 is neat, in some ways.) Meanwhile, the future doesn't look as bright as it should for the artillery, as this war is seen as not requiring much artillery, and we all know that the one thing we are good at is preparing for the last war.
Last edited by Sabre; 10-11-2008 at 02:32 AM.
I had a nephew with the 11th Marine Regt. in the march up to Baghdad, and he spoke about them trying to stay as close to the grunt Regiments as possible to provide support. He was a Marine Cook who left his stoves in Kuwait and did multi-tasking as a Ammo truck driver, Fuel and water hauler, and Battery Security. When the 11th Marines rotated back to Pendelton, he and others from the artillery units volunteered to fill Infantry slots to replace combat losses. He made Cpl. E-4 with one of the Infantry Regts. and didn't cook a meal until he returned with them to Pendelton.
Has there been a comparison of the activities of the Marine Artillery in that maneuver warfare portion of the Iraq War and the US Field Artillery supporting the ID units in that fight.
Is there a difference in Marine Artillery and US Army Artillery application in that kind of warfare?
If this question is off subject, or will side track the thrust of this thread, don't bother to answer.
I work with some Marine Cannon-cockers. I'll have to ask that specific question.
The perenial problem of (US) artillery is keeping up with maneuver (both a function of the speed of mechanized forces and the relatively short range of the guns), which, as nephew said, means being as absolutely close to the front line trace as practical, since once a meeting engagement starts, you will probably have fire missions being called in non-stop, and as a consequence won't be able to move, even as the line units are continuing to push.
08 hoo rahs
I'm a Marine artillery officer, sorry it took so long to join the conversation.
Obviously, Marine artillery focuses more on providing fire support during amphibious operations and thus are set up as DS artillery units (by doctrine anyway). Judging by the comments above, the Army still has a focus on DS vs. GS roles that is just not present in the Corps. We've been doing the GS thing in Iraq, but only at the battery (-) level. (Full battery by personnel, but only utilizing two guns.) This is viewed as "not the way its supposed to be."
Having spoken to many people who were in 11th Marines or in C Battery 1/10 (attached to 11th Marines for the invasion), it seems like at times the grunts and the batteries were leapfrogging North. I've heard from multiple people that VT missions were fired in support of infantry companies directly across the highway from the firing battery. It doesn't seem like keeping up was a problem.
I'm seeing two large issues in the artillery community right now. (I'm sure Army Redlegs are dealing with the same)
1) Non-artillery missions have seriously degraded the competency level of the artillery community.
2) While artillerymen have been doing these non-artillery missions, the technology has changed drastically in the meantime.
Artillerymen are returning to the artillery trade to find a new weapon system, new methods of communication, and new skill sets. (M777 and all the digital communications that go with it, StrikeLink, and the M327 EFSS) What little they remember of the artillery trade is out of date. Most of these new systems are not being taught at MOS schools yet. So we have a training system that hasn't caught up with the current gear, and a lack of institutional knowledge to make up the difference with on-the-job training. (This problem is especially bad with digital comms and the StrikeLink system)
Both of these problems exacerbate the other one, and they are making today a very frustrating time to be in the FA community.
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"A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, 
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