Retooling the Artilleryman

[Granite_State]

Can Army artillery units hit the side of a barn? Maybe not, according to a troubling internal memo sent this month to Army Chief of Staff George Casey by three former brigade commanders.

“The once-mighty ‘King of Battle’ ” is a “dead branch walking,” write the active-duty colonels in the five-page document obtained by National Journal. With “growing alarm,” they describe “deterioration” in artillery readiness to perform its most basic missions. In training, “firing incidents [occur] during every rotation”; “crew drills are very slow, and any type of [disorder] halts operations”; and, absent instructor intervention, “most” cannon platoons would have fired in unsafe conditions, the memo says.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have drawn experienced artillery troops into other jobs—like infantry and transportation—where soldiers are badly needed, the authors write. Ninety percent of fire-support personnel have been reassigned, leaving behind fewer than 10 percent certified for the mission.

“General Casey seeks out and appreciates receiving feedback [from] commanders and soldiers in the field,” said an Army spokesman, who declined to comment on the memo’s specifics.—Elaine Grossman

http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmag...65&story3=null

Anyone heard anything about the memo in question?

[Cavguy]

http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmag...65&story3=null

Anyone heard anything about the memo in question?

I've got it but can't forward it outside of DoD. Send me a PM if you have a .mil account and are current DoD.

It pretty much laments that the FA has done everything but arty since 2003, and the branch has problems. For example, LTC Yingling's FA BN is deploying - to do detainee ops at Bucca. Other FA units are doing infantry BN work, perimeter guard (particularly MLRS units), or convoy escort. It worked as a short fix in 2003-2004, but after 5 years is now beginning to threaten long term ability of the FA to do their assigned mission. I also think it was written by non-FA because if it came from FA branch it could/would be seen as whining - instead it's maneuver commanders bringing up the issue.

Other branches (tankers, engineers) are in a similar box, but both do most of their core skillsets downrange on a regular basis. Also slight miscalculations with 155mm have worse effects.

[patmc]

I have been in an airborne 155mm FA battalion for over 3 years now, and went from putting rounds down-range, to training and executing convoy security, to SECFOR training, to cancel SECFOR and relearn rounds down range.

Our BN is finally back into shooting and getting good, but it took a long time and a lot of hard work from every member of the battalion. It is serious business, and takes a lot longer than most people assume, since a lot of FA is perishable skills. Also, with fast promotions, we have Officers and NCOs that have little to no gun time. The constant switch to non-standard missions is having a serious impact on FA as a branch. From the officer side, most LTs and junior CPTs have little if any FA experience. Not necessarily all bad for leadership sake, but definately puts them at disadvantage as battery commander, who needs to know safety, gunnery, and crew drill. The high number of FA on MTT assignments is also hurting the branch, since a lot of CPTs are not staying in or attending the Captains Course. Guys who joined to shoot howitzers may not see one in their first 4-5 years.

[Granite_State]

I've got it but can't forward it outside of DoD. Send me a PM if you have a .mil account and are current DoD.

It pretty much laments that the FA has done everything but arty since 2003, and the branch has problems. For example, LTC Yingling's FA BN is deploying - to do detainee ops at Bucca. Other FA units are doing infantry BN work, perimeter guard (particularly MLRS units), or convoy escort. It worked as a short fix in 2003-2004, but after 5 years is now beginning to threaten long term ability of the FA to do their assigned mission. I also think it was written by non-FA because if it came from FA branch it could/would be seen as whining - instead it's maneuver commanders bringing up the issue.

Other branches (tankers, engineers) are in a similar box, but both do most of their core skillsets downrange on a regular basis. Also slight miscalculations with 155mm have worse effects.

No .mil, but thanks for the reply. Interesting that it's from maneuver commanders, I'd assumed it was artillery officers that wrote it.

[Maximus]

PATMC,

You mention it takes a long time to re-train artilley. Can you give a rough estimate? Would you be confident firing artillery in support of a maneuver unit in 2 weeks if necessary?

I ask this because there's been a bit of a stir of late suggesting that we're losing our "conventional" warfighting skills. Often with this line of thought comes, be careful or we might find ourselves facing similar problems to those the IDF recently experienced against Hezbollah.

While I think this argument overlooks a whole variety of reasons why Hezbollah posed such a problem for the IDF, I do think it's important nonetheless and something we very much need to keep in mind.

I'm currently reading Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
As I turn the pages I keep thinking about the issue of whether we are indeed losing our "conventional" capabilities and, if this is true, I'm trying to figure out the timeline to become proficient again (I'm a grunt so can't speak much, if at all to arty, tanks, engineers, etc.). The article mentions 6-12 months to become proficient in arty again. To be honest, this seems like an extremely long time considering the Inchon invasion. Early July 1950 the Commandant of the Marine Corps is asked if he can execute a division-sized amphibious invasion at Inchon in September. At the time the Marines are fighting for their very existent and barely have 1 functioning and decently trained regimental combat team in the Corps. Remnants of another exist at Camp Lejeune. Since 1945, the Marine Corps' conducted minimal amphibious training; same for the Navy. Little to no battalion or higher exercises. In fact, the main thing that the Marine Corps' been doing from 1945-1950 is becoming smaller, having the budget cut, and figuring out very creative ways to train with little to no funding.

When the Commandant gives the word "go" around 8 July the barely functional regiment is sent to the Pusan Perimeter, and two other regiments are formed by activating reservists and taking almost all other Marines from North Carolina, Hawaii and elsewhere and sending them to Camp Pendleton to join 1st and 7th Marines. Amphibious vehicles, mothballed at the time, are sent from Barstow, CA to San Diego. Marines that used the vehicles in 1945, 5 years earlier, re-familiarize themselves with them, the Marines get whatever gear they can find, jump on ships, and are off in early Aug for the Pacific. No training at the company level or higher. Ships on the way over are jam packed. This definitely doesn't facilitate training. Typhoons mess up the prep timeline. 5th Marines, which had been fighting in the Pusan (allegedly one of the best, if not the best unit holding the perimeter), is pulled back and sent to link-up w/ the rest of 1MARDIV. Old and barely functional landing craft staged in vicinity of Japan from 1945 onward, piloted in some cases by former Japanese naval officers, take the Marines ashore. No amphibious rehearsal. Almost all odds against the joint-force landing. But in the end, the operation, executed on 15 September 1950, is a resounding success. Heart. Determination. The Will to Win and Only to Win. These rule the day.

I can't help but to think about this when some say we're not ready to fight a "conventional" fight today. If you tell a Marine or Soldier to attack something today, in my heart-of-hearts I know they'd accomplish the mission just as the 1stMar Div (and 7th Infantry Division) did at Inchon and then into Seoul.

[Ken White]

Having been in the 1st Mar Bde at the time, I can testify that what you say is true and that the Bde and later the Div did everything it was supposed to do. I can also say it was not easy; it got done but it was tough and there were excess casualties due to all the factors you cite.

There were two differences then and now which may or may not be significant, only time will tell. The first is that the Officers and NCOs of the Div virtually all were combat experienced in WW II and a large number had prior 'Banana War' experience and all that experience was generally in their nominal field of expertise. The second is that there was a difference in general attitude with respect to acceptance of what the fates wrought then as opposed to now, I believe.

It is pretty well proven that COIN efforts enhance the skill of individual Infantrymen and are neutral to mildly detrimental to the skills of those in the other Combat Arms.

Given all three factors, I think that skill deterioration is a big concern -- but I agree with you that the Troops will make it work regardless under most circumstances.

[Maximus]

Ken,

Thanks for the post. Semper Fi brother!

How small a world it is. I served with 1st Mar in OIF-I. I am also reluctant to say outright that we're not ready to fight a "conventional" fight because my experiences in 2002-2003. I checked into 1st Mar in Nov '02. No platoon. The battalion's at roughly 30% strength. We're all called back from Christmas leave and told we're going to war. All the Lts present, we were still short quite a few Lts at the time, look at each other wondering where the Marines for the platoons are. Marines from the School of Infantry East and West are sent to 1st Mar, specifically, 1st Bn 4th Marines, at the cyclic rate. On 5 Jan 2003, I have a platoon of 30 Marines; my other squad is in Kuwait at the time and I won't link-up with them until 25 Feb, having never met any of the Marines. We get on ship on 17 Jan 2003, having never conducted a platoon, company or battalion live-fire and maneuver exercise. We did what we could on ship. We trained hard but as far as live-fire goes, there's only so much one can do on a "small" deck. We land in Kuwait 25 Feb. Link-up with the other squad. Train for about 3 weeks in the desert, almost exclusively at the platoon and limited rehearsals at the company level. We have no AAVs at the time. All rehearsals are conducted dismounted or using 7-ton trucks. 19 March we get AAVs; many of these AAVs are in a sorry state. All day and night long our AAV warriors, reservists from Texas, burn the midnight oil getting the vehicles up. We cross the LD 20Mar, towing one of my platoon's 3 AAVs.

In the end, the Marines fought like hell, fixed AAVs under ponchos while on the move at night, executing combined arms, tank/mech-infantry integration, and enduring the elements the whole time... nasty sand-storms, down to 1 MRE a day and very limited water, etc. (Please don't think that I'm even trying to compare this to the Chosin). We even executed a river crossing in the AAVs to get into Baghdad.

I say all this because, as you know, ultimately what we can do comes down to Heart, the Will to Win and Only to Win, Teamwork, Esprit, etc.

All this said, we must be aware of skills that are atrophying and find ways to alleviate this/these problems. I think, at least in the Marine Corps, we're doing this.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[patmc]

Personally, I would not want to be in a maneuver unit receiving danger close rounds from a FA unit with only 2 weeks training, but that being said, it could be done. The crew drills and basic Fire Direction could be done, at least. If you took infantryman or tankers, and gave them 2 weeks non-stop on a howitzer, they could probably emplace and shoot. Could they emplace, shoot low/high angle, out of traverse, march order, move, emplace, and repeat? Probably not. Also, who would train and lead them?

The biggest issue we have is experienced trainers and leaders. A healthy FA unit has NCOs with years of hands on experience. When a FA unit stops shooting for 2 years plus, and as people PCS, ETC, get promoted, etc... you lose your experience level. There is no one to train the trainers.

For the Fire Direction Centers, I do not think you would want to take non-13D's and create a FDC from scratch in two weeks. Soldiers, NCO's and Officers spend months learning gunnery. I don't think you could cut it down to two weeks. Again, you would also find few commanders willing to shoot their rank with that FDC.

For maintenance and support, it takes a U6, the howitzer maintenance expert, several weeks in school, plus months - years of hands-on experience to master their howitzer. The ammo sections also need training in drawing, handling, then preparing the rounds for fire missions.

Can you take a battalion of redlegs, put them in the field for 2 weeks and teach them basic infantry skills? Yes, we've done it. Could they move to an objective, clear it, and move out... yes. Was it pretty? No, but it worked.

PATMC,

You mention it takes a long time to re-train artilley. Can you give a rough estimate? Would you be confident firing artillery in support of a maneuver unit in 2 weeks if necessary?

[Ron Humphrey]

But can someone tell me what the likelihood of Full out and out Ground Arty component being a mainstay in the future. If the USAF gets the 22's and others then when comparing ground arty in relation to Air or Naval Arty which are the more likely to be used in largess. Isn't it a little harder for an enemy to take out supporting assets that are in the air or the ocean than on the ground.

Pound for pound what is the tradeoff between these and is it even something to be considered or can our forces not accomplish the missions without 155's on the ground.

[Cavguy]

But can someone tell me what the likelihood of Full out and out Ground Arty component being a mainstay in the future. If the USAF gets the 22's and others then when comparing ground arty in relation to Air or Naval Arty which are the more likely to be used in largess. Isn't it a little harder for an enemy to take out supporting assets that are in the air or the ocean than on the ground.

Pound for pound what is the tradeoff between these and is it even something to be considered or can our forces not accomplish the missions without 155's on the ground.

Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

[Jedburgh]

Anyone heard anything about the memo in question?

The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders

As BCT commanders we have watched the deterioration of the Field Artillery Branch with growing alarm. We are former maneuver commanders who recognize the importance of having reliable, fast and accurate fire support and wish to provide our Army's leadership with a "customer's perspective" on this issue.........

[Sabre]

The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders

Interesting paper. While I agree with the spirit, I take issue with some of the suggestions.

One thing that I find endlessly infuriating is the supposition that somehow you "need" battalion and brigade commands, and commanders, to get good training and good officers in a branch. The authors suggest that there need to be formed Artillery brigades, and any place where there are separate batteries now must instead be grouped under a battalion headquarters. Battalion and brigade headquarters are very expensive in terms of personnel, especially multiplied over the numbers that we are taking about in the Artillery - depending on how you do the math, it could equate to perhaps a entire brigade's worth of troops. Most of those additional personnel are *not* there to increase the institutional knowledge or training quality of the artillery. Personnel in the battalion and brigade S1, S2, S4, etc are not going to be focused on improving the quality of artillery training. The battalion/brigade commander and his XO will also probably spend plenty of time worrying about "command" issues like maintenance, discipline, the family support group, etc. Grouping batteries into a battalion also requires a forward support company and/or an HQ battery, which at the very least will require additional personnel to command these company(/ies), even if the rest of the support personnel are realigned from the current organization, the same can be said of grouping battalions into brigades. This is quite a few extra personnel, when the whole reason for it, in the white paper, is to get some additional, senior artillery experts - an inordinately high price to pay, when there are other, more direct ways to accomplish it.

I wouldn't be nearly as quick to dismiss the FSE section. In the 3rd ACR, this was a Field Artillery major (no real reason that the billet couldn't be an LTC), a captain, a chief warrant, a senior NCO and a couple of support troops. They could focus solely on the quality of training, and didn't have to worry about all of the other things that a commander, and his staff, do (and some officers are all too happy to focus purely on the training, and not have the headaches of command). The batteries certainly did have time to train, and in tests/arteps often outperformed their "standard" counterparts in the other FA battalions, and even the FA brigades at Sill, in mission that was measurable.

Heck, King Battery (1st How, 1/3 ACR) just set a new record for most rounds fired by a battery in Iraq, over 5,000 rounds safely delivered to their targets, which is much, much more than the average battery gets for training in a year. The FSE sections also picked up the role of the battalion or brigade FDC (battalion and brigade FDC's are not nearly as useful today as they were back in WWII, before the advent of computers and battle command software.)

Other branches (say, MI) have a career progression path that involves staff jobs at the higher levels, where being an S2 on a brigade level staff is a qualifying job, the same could be done with the Field Artillery. I also think that it misses the point that, grouping into brigades, they will simply be an easier target for the "bean counters" to cut. At least in the current scheme, there are still plenty of howitzer batteries out there. A few iterations of reorgs, and that would change if they were in artillery brigades. Finally, the opposition to the two-man crew of the N-LOS C is... misleading. Batteries today have an ammunition carrier (CAT) to resupply each gun, and some flavor of HEMTT to resupply each CAT. Both of those vehicles have Artillery MOS soldiers that are trained as gun crew. (Perhaps the FCS batteries do not have these - if so, then that IS a serious mistake.)

This also ignores the serious training problems that arise from "stovepiped" units. The officers and NCO's in the Cav Howitzer batteries KNOW what their maneuver counterparts need, and have (or at least, had) developed unique TTPs to accomplish their mission and support the line troops.

We simply don't have the personnel to stand up entire brigades, just to get an FA Colonel. If you really want to spend that kind of money, make the N-LOS C as good as, say, the PzH 2000, and highlight the independence and awesome responsibility of a howitzer battery, or even make a few maneuver brigade commands available to (gasp) artillery officers, and you will (continue to) get good officers and NCOs into the branch.

[patmc]

Battalion and brigade headquarters are very expensive in terms of personnel, especially multiplied over the numbers that we are taking about in the Artillery - depending on how you do the math, it could equate to perhaps a entire brigade's worth of troops. Most of those additional personnel are *not* there to increase the institutional knowledge or training quality of the artillery. Personnel in the battalion and brigade S1, S2, S4, etc are not going to be focused on improving the quality of artillery training.

I've served almost 4 years in a new "Fires" Brigade as a FA and MI officer, with over 1.5 years on BN staff. I agree that as far as FA training goes, aside from BDE 3, the BDE staff does not contribute. However, I would say this is the same for all Brigade level staffs. They do the thankless work that gets stuff done. Fires Brigades are also intended to be deployable and modular like BCTs, requiring them to have sufficient internal support.

One thing that I find endlessly infuriating is the supposition that somehow you "need" battalion and brigade commands, and commanders, to get good training and good officers in a branch. The authors suggest that there need to be formed Artillery brigades, and any place where there are separate batteries now must instead be grouped under a battalion headquarters.

As the paper states, FA is hurting. My BN has only 1 CCC grad in Command, the rest are first/second year captains, and after OIF convoy security, and a SECFOR deployment trainup, few have large amounts of FA experience. The BN CDR spent his company grade years doing FA, and his field grade doing non-standard missions, so he has the expertise to guide the young commanders. The creation of BCTs ended "DIVARTY" which served an oversight role for all fires units in a division. The only FA COL in position of authority on Bragg is the Fires Brigade commander. The BCT Fires BNs have to seek out non-FA commanders for experience and guidance. Maybe not a deal breaker, but FA requires enough technical knowledge that most non-FA officers probably don't know. Emplacing, crew-drills, and gunnery are probably out of their realm.

Grouping batteries into a battalion also requires a forward support company and/or an HQ battery, which at the very least will require additional personnel to command these company(/ies), even if the rest of the support personnel are realigned from the current organization, the same can be said of grouping battalions into brigades.

BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else. The FSC is also a great enabler in the field, and has definately improved how we train and work day to day. It does take more personnel, but it allows sections and units to specialize.

This is quite a few extra personnel, when the whole reason for it, in the white paper, is to get some additional, senior artillery experts - an inordinately high price to pay, when there are other, more direct ways to accomplish it.

I agree that these structures shouldn't exist just to justify a senior billet, but they do serve a purpose. 18th Fires just reflagged under 82nd Airborne Division, so we have not seen how this will impact the BCT Fires BNs, but the consensus with most FA Officers I've talked to here is they think it is a good move.

I wouldn't be nearly as quick to dismiss the FSE section. In the 3rd ACR, this was a Field Artillery major (no real reason that the billet couldn't be an LTC), a captain, a chief warrant, a senior NCO and a couple of support troops. They could focus solely on the quality of training, and didn't have to worry about all of the other things that a commander, and his staff, do (and some officers are all too happy to focus purely on the training, and not have the headaches of command).

The FSE does serve an important function, but with a MAJ or even LTC filling it, would he really have authority or real influence over a Fires BN Commander? I am a Captain on staff, and Captains are Captains, but a Captain in Command does not always listen to the staff. Would a LTC in command listen to a MAJ or another LTC giving suggestions? "I'm the commander."

The batteries certainly did have time to train, and in tests/arteps often outperformed their "standard" counterparts in the other FA battalions, and even the FA brigades at Sill, in mission that was measurable.

Heck, King Battery (1st How, 1/3 ACR) just set a new record for most rounds fired by a battery in Iraq, over 5,000 rounds safely delivered to their targets, which is much, much more than the average battery gets for training in a year. The FSE sections also picked up the role of the battalion or brigade FDC (battalion and brigade FDC's are not nearly as useful today as they were back in WWII, before the advent of computers and battle command software.)

Sadly, most FA batteries are not shooting, and some are not even pretending to train FA, instead focusing on their next OIF/OEF security or infantry mission. There are only a handful of batteries shooting at Bragg right now, just the reality addressed by the paper. That said, those that are shooting in Iraq or Afghanistan, are shooting a lot. One of our sister BN's has been living the Artilleryman's dreams and destroying Taliban with HE. Also, due to the lost FA skills, BN Level Master Gunner and FDC oversight have been essential in our unit safely returning to the FA mission.

Other branches (say, MI) have a career progression path that involves staff jobs at the higher levels, where being an S2 on a brigade level staff is a qualifying job, the same could be done with the Field Artillery.

Making more staff jobs KD may help retain people, but truth be told, if you come in knowing you are only going to go so far and be stuck on staff, that does not appeal to everyone. MI, as you mention, is now non-command oriented, basically telling CPTs not all of you will command, and that is OK (though we all know that is false). That will likely be the deciding point for me a few years down the road. Being a BDE S2 is KD because there are only a handful of actual MI BNs left. MI is up there with FA having the biggest officer retention problems (CSRB). This is due to deployments and happiness with career.

This also ignores the serious training problems that arise from "stovepiped" units. The officers and NCO's in the Cav Howitzer batteries KNOW what their maneuver counterparts need, and have (or at least, had) developed unique TTPs to accomplish their mission and support the line troops.

Agree with you here, coming from a General Support (GS) FA unit. They don't teach FA LTs what GS actually means in practice, where you will get more (aka all) your time in the FA battery, and no time with IN or AR or the like. This was not a huge issue for me because I got to do a convoy security mission as a PL and got my maneuver on, but not training in direct support of IN or AR impacts units. That said, you can get exposed to more Joint operations. It is also a reality though, that 155mm and rockets are meant to reach out and touch the enemy, so keeping them one mile from the front may not make sense (conventional Fulda Gap thinking here).

We simply don't have the personnel to stand up entire brigades, just to get an FA Colonel. If you really want to spend that kind of money, make the N-LOS C as good as, say, the PzH 2000, and highlight the independence and awesome responsibility of a howitzer battery, or even make a few maneuver brigade commands available to (gasp) artillery officers, and you will (continue to) get good officers and NCOs into the branch.

Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems. Sill just released the draft FA Plan on AKO, its worth a read to see where branch is trying to go.

Long Live the King!

[Ken White]

First, a caveat, not an Artillery type but have a fair amount of Infantry and Cavalry experience and observing Artillerists at work for fun an profit during the period 1948-1995; post '95, I have a little knowledge.

Second, I'm quoting Patmc not to pick on him but because he makes good cogent points in a logical sequence.

...As the paper states, FA is hurting. My BN has only 1 CCC grad in Command, the rest are first/second year captains...

In the 48-95 period, that was pretty much the norm -- unless the other BCs were First or even, rarely, Second LTs. The game at all Carreer Course was to ask how many had Co/By/Trp command before arrival and typically it was about 2/3. Thus, I'm not sure that is a problem.

...The creation of BCTs ended "DIVARTY" which served an oversight role for all fires units in a division.

Which also changed about 85 years of excessively (?) centralized organization -- bound to be rumbles.

...Maybe not a deal breaker, but FA requires enough technical knowledge that most non-FA officers probably don't know. Emplacing, crew-drills, and gunnery are probably out of their realm.

Simple solution there is to upgrade By Cmd to Major.

BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else.

Support is support and the ACRs make it work.

Making more staff jobs KD may help retain people, but truth be told, if you come in knowing you are only going to go so far and be stuck on staff, that does not appeal to everyone. MI, as you mention, is now non-command oriented, basically telling CPTs not all of you will command, and that is OK (though we all know that is false).

Valid point. What if we did away with Branches? Yes, I'm totally serious.

Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems. Sill just released the draft FA Plan on AKO, its worth a read to see where branch is trying to go.

Here's my Grenade:

Seen a lot of FA GOs and worked for several. All were good and smart guys but IMO none was a particularly successful maneuver unit commander because of a strong tendency to over centralize, lack of maneuver experience and an, again IMO, lack of trust of subordinates (Aviators suffer the same problems , gotta use that Checklist...). Thus, I again ask, why branches?

[reed11b]

Even though I am a combined arms advocate and obviously the BCTs need organic arty, I do see the need for Fire Brigades. If you place enough arty in a BCT for major combat operations, you have a lot of dead weight when those operations end. Fire brigades make arty enchantment easy and "modular"
Also reduces work load on already over tasked BCT commander. Of course I like the idea of CSS Brigades too, as opposed to trying to shoe-horn everything into a BCT (similar thought here LINK

[Sabre]

BN HHB and FSC do all the non-sexy jobs that allow the firing batteries to shoot. I was the HHS XO, and can tell you that if left to their own, admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, security, etc would overwhelm the batteries. The BCs already have too much on their plates to worry about everything else. The FSC is also a great enabler in the field, and has definately improved how we train and work day to day. It does take more personnel, but it allows sections and units to specialize.

In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...) Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???

The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.

[jkm_101_fso]

In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...) Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???

The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.

Many consider an ACR battery command pretty coveted, primarily because of the autonomy, but also the sheer size (personnel & equip) and capability. It's almost like a mini battalion itself. I would only be so lucky to command one.

[Sabre]

Agree that a position should not exist just to promote officers and SGMs, but there is a good case that Fires Brigade, or senior level FA billet is a force multiplier. Fires Brigades are deploying as FA and as non-standard, so they are serving a purpose. If we ever get to reset, the Army can better judge if they are worth their weight. I think only 1 FA officer is currently a BCT Commander, though I may be wrong. Where would we be if Napoleon had gotten stuck at BN command? (kidding) FA is facing serious organizational and manning problems.

Seen a lot of FA GOs and worked for several. All were good and smart guys but IMO none was a particularly successful maneuver unit commander because of a strong tendency to over centralize, lack of maneuver experience and an, again IMO, lack of trust of subordinates (Aviators suffer the same problems , gotta use that Checklist...). Thus, I again ask, why branches?

I have to agree with Ken. However, I would point out that, as young Field Artillery officers "grow up" in the BCT's, they will be much more "in tune" with their maneuver counterparts, so that aspect of the situation should improve.

In any case, soon the Battalion and Brigade FDC's will cease to be training assets, but another frustrating, and frustrated, disfunctional link in the FA/FS chain, that needs to sort itself out, as the personnel who rotate into those positions have been performing non-standard, non-artillery missions for the last X years.

To turn an argument on its head: instead of grouping all the batteries into Fires Brigades to improve artillery training, that only occasionally get to train with maneuver units, instead have mobile training teams, with the mission of bringing batteries that have been doing non-standard missions "back up to speed" for shooting the big guns? This is a much more efficient method, and should prove just as effective.

A more worisome aspect of the problem is that right now, the Army "buys off" on one howitzer battery per maneuver battalion (with another per, somewhere in "GS"). Grouping into Fires Brigades just leaves the artillery ripe for cutting, when some "beancounter" goes about preparing to fight the last war. The remaining batteries would probalby be well trained - that problem might be solved - but there simply wouldn't be many batteries left. This is an Army looking to cut and re-align - there simply isn't room for luxuries that add up to thousands of personnel, and the decisions aren't between "good" and "bad", but are between "bad" and "dead end".

The FSE does serve an important function, but with a MAJ or even LTC filling it, would he really have authority or real influence over a Fires BN Commander? I am a Captain on staff, and Captains are Captains, but a Captain in Command does not always listen to the staff. Would a LTC in command listen to a MAJ or another LTC giving suggestions?

Fires Battalion commanders would fall under a division FSE, with a full COL who had "been there, done that". In an Armored Cavalry Regiment, the FSE had a MAJ, who the CPT's commanding the howitzer batteries had to call "Sir". Upgrading that position to an LTC would result in it carrying even more weight with the Regimental Commander. Sure, the possibility exists for pi**ing contests with the maneuver battalion-level commanders who actually own those batteries, but they certainly didn't want to be seen denying training time to a battery that subsequently shot out, so they allowed ample time for the artillery community to do what it needed to do.

[patmc]

In the Cav, I ran admin, ammo, maintenance, fuel, etc for a battery. Worked perfectly - OC's from other (standard) units were quite jealous of the support that we had all to ourselves. If it overwhelms someone, then they are in the wrong line of work. Only attachment that I needed was medics and their associated track. Never had a problem, and if I did, it would have been my own stupid fault. It's an amazing feeling to know that you can go out and shoot, and not have to rely on ANYONE else (heh, with the exception of Range Control...)

I'm no longer a S4, so I've lost my instant access to MTOEs, but my understanding is the ACR's have recently switched to the BCT structure? Is this correct, or did they retain their unique CAV organization? If anyone can provide link or rollup, it would be appreciated.

If it works for you guys, go with it. We are an Airborne howitzer battalion. Before transforming, we had a large 150+ HHS that did all non-firing tasks and supported the smaller firing batteries. Under Fires Brigade, we added a robust FSC and cut the HHB in half, leaving the staff sections, BN TOC, medics, and a couple other sections in HHB and putting all the support in FSC. The Firing Batteries have firing platoons, ammo sections, FDCs, and HQ element.

For Drop Zone missions, one battery controls the DZ and aircraft, one - three jump and drop howitzers, HHB sends an assault CP and medics, and the FSC pre-positions ammo and equipment as needed, then recovers. Its controlled chaos, but it works. In the field, same deal, with the BN TOC leading the FDCs and movements, FSC supplying and fixing, and the Batteries shooting.
Could batteries do it all on their own? If you gave them the pax and equipment.

Should every Artillery Battery move to independent action? Why have a FA Battalion if Batteries can do it all? Its the way MI, MP, EN, etc are moving, would it work for FA?

Maintenance, ammo, etc are too important to entrust to someone else - why on earth would anyone want to leave that to someone else???

I trust my parachute packing to someone else. I don't pack it. I trust the mechanics in the support company to fix trucks, I don't fix them. As a former battalion ammo officer, I know how much of a pain in the ass ammo is, but again, the support folks draw and transport it (which works better than the individual units each drawing ammo, learned the hard way at ASP). A FA battery exists to quickly and accurately put rounds on target. If an FSC eases that Commanders burden, why is that bad? Everyone in the Army relies on everyone else. There is nothing that is not important, and it all has to get done. If people are professionals, they do their job, and you can count on them.

The leadership in the Cav was quite *professional* and were extremely careful to ensure that the Artillery had the time and resources to train - more than the batteries over in the regular FA battalion got, from what I gathered talking to my friends over there. Which is my other major point - put everything in a "stovepiped" unit, and you may, or may not, get better training - it is no guarantee. Put them in a mixed battalion, and you at least guarantee that they will know what their maneuver counterparts need, and be part of the team.

Here at Bragg, the BCT Artillery Battalions are mainly doing non-standard missions. FA is not their priority, as directed by the BCT commanders that want them for maneuver. This is an OIFism, but true.

Agree on stovepiping, but again, you are talking Direct Support (DS) vs General Support (GS). In COIN, it may make sense to move big guns and rockets down to BCTs and BNs and companies in DS role, as we are largely doing in Afghanistan. In full on conventional fight though, are you going to place your deep-fighers up with the near fight, or let them focus on the enemy's rear and C2, as they do in GS? Fires Brigades originally formed out of the existing GS units. You could add a GS BN to each BCT, then another BTRY to each BN, but I think that would detract more than add, and limit the use of their capabilities

In any case, soon the Battalion and Brigade FDC's will cease to be training assets, but another frustrating, and frustrated, disfunctional link in the FA/FS chain, that needs to sort itself out, as the personnel who rotate into those positions have been performing non-standard, non-artillery missions for the last X years.

Agree in theory, as our BN learned the hard way after deployment, but someone has to set the standard and provide guidance. Our BN FDC took an officer and NCO that had shot during the deployment, and they created a plan to recert the unit. One BC had been an instructor at Sill, and he ran a FDC university for all FDC pax and all FA officers. All took Saftey tests and underwent a MTT from Sill, if memory serves me. Agree that MTT are valuable, but limited due to the numbers, logistics, and time involved.

As far as actual warfighting, BN and BDE FDC's are limited because of the realities of COIN. We condcuted a Korean War 2 scenario during a BDE TOCEX, and believe me, a LT in a battery FDC needed the higher filters in that one. If we eliminate BN and BDE control, how do we bring it back? Can argue either way.

Fires Battalion commanders would fall under a division FSE, with a full COL who had "been there, done that". In an Armored Cavalry Regiment, the FSE had a MAJ, who the CPT's commanding the howitzer batteries had to call "Sir". Upgrading that position to an LTC would result in it carrying even more weight with the Regimental Commander. Sure, the possibility exists for pi**ing contests with the maneuver battalion-level commanders who actually own those batteries, but they certainly didn't want to be seen denying training time to a battery that subsequently shot out, so they allowed ample time for the artillery community to do what it needed to do.

My understanding is that all Captains call MAJ's sir or mam, but besides point. My issue was with LTC to LTC which I see here on staff, when BDE level LTCs tell BN level LTC what to do. Human nature and Army nature.

How large would the DIV FSE be? Would there be BDE or BCT FSE? It could work, but in reality, it would drive some officers away or out, if there last chance of command is as a captain, and they have 10+ years staff ahead. With the lower manning requirements under this change, maybe it would not be an issue for branch.



As stated earlier, I think this all boils down to DS vs GS in the FA, and maybe FA needs to re-examine this distinction. For the COIN fight, where the entire AO is battlespace, pushing FA down to the lowest level makes sense. In a conventional fight with relative lines or fronts, it makes sense to keep assets focused beyond the front line. An enemy can't fight if his reserves, C2, fuel, ammo, radars, signal, etc are out of the fight. Fires Brigades took GS units and made them modular. Moving BCT fires Bns under them replaces the DIVARTY function whose elimation is considered a mistake by most of the field grades I've spoken with. The Army has specialized units for different roles and missions. DS units may be stovepiped into thinking that they are the only way as well.

Good discussion.

[jkm_101_fso]

As stated earlier, I think this all boils down to DS vs GS in the FA, and maybe FA needs to re-examine this distinction. For the COIN fight, where the entire AO is battlespace, pushing FA down to the lowest level makes sense. In a conventional fight with relative lines or fronts, it makes sense to keep assets focused beyond the front line. An enemy can't fight if his reserves, C2, fuel, ammo, radars, signal, etc are out of the fight. Fires Brigades took GS units and made them modular. Moving BCT fires Bns under them replaces the DIVARTY function whose elimation is considered a mistake by most of the field grades I've spoken with. The Army has specialized units for different roles and missions. DS units may be stovepiped into thinking that they are the only way as well.

Great points.

In regards to training, there is one major issue for consideration: It's no secret that there is a degredation of FA-specific skills among junior NCOs and officers.

DS fires BNs now and will continue to train themselves in the current BCT footprint. Without a DIVARTY to mandate or validate training, it's plausible that we will critically lack the expertise to train ourselves.

That's why I think it would behoove Fort Sill to plan for this and anticipate creating and dispatching MTTs to travel to posts to assist the FA BNs and validate training in the near future.