Originally Posted by
Jim Rodgers
This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.
Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.
Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.
This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both
-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level
is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.
There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.
But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.
That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.
IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.
And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of
-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things
IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either
-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard
Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.
) has penned here over time has led me to consider my own 22 years differently. Why do we seem to have to constantly relearn things? I'm beginning to think its more a condition then a problem. We're never going to be resourced in time, personnel, equipment, etc. to be prepared for all the military situations which might confront us - nor do I think we've ever been (although there have been time where by virtue of preparing for one thing, we were better prepared for another). As soon as you sink resources into the type of war you fought, or think you fought, or in this case are fighting, but want to conclude, somebody who has been watching you fight and who is concerned you are going to come to their neighborhood decides how to fight you differently enough to where you are not as prepared. Its the nature of an interactive, thinking enemy.
) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.
I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?
thats just non-sense IMO. They should have left PEMSI(I keep wanting to say Pepsi) as the 5 rings it has the same effect
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