Retooling the Artilleryman

[selil]

I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

Just use those cannon cockers and civilian kitchen staff.

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.


Egads I think I'm choking on my own sarcasm.

[Penta]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

[Norfolk]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

Very good point Penta! Why indeed should senior officers have to be up-or-out by 55 (at the latest), never mind junior officers that are automatically tossed if they don't make Major within 10 years? The present system was based on what was introduced to clear out the deadwood back in the early days of WWII, but is based on more of a corporate (ie. individual career track) rather than an institutional model.

Not surprisingly, that leads to many officers in general and many flag officers in particular not only developing along much the same lines as businessmen (and for many of the same sorts of reasons), but given that they're going to need a civvie job when they retire, they're already going to be looking ahead to that day when they take off the uniform and put on a business suit. If mandatory retirement (and FULL pension and benefits) were available at an age limit of say 60, there may be somewhat less incentive for senior officers to learn the often less useful traits of businessmen and subsequently to prepare their way for employment in business after their military career.

There really isn't so much of a military-industrial complex so much as there is a political-industrial complex; military spending is just grist for its mill, and military officers who go along with it in their careers become accomplices to it. Professionalism is necessary for the Army; careerism, it goes without saying, is seriously damaging to it. And of course the system as it exists is mostly about the latter, to the detriment of the former.

Now, to the topic of the thread at hand. Unless the Army is going to form Constabulary Regiments like it had two generations ago, and to do that it will have to come out of someone else's hide - principally the BCTs, then it's just going to have to keep doing what every other Army in the English-speaking world has been doing since the 1960's. And that is taking units of all the Combat Arms and re-rolling and -training them as infantry for low-intensity warfare. It is a huge disruption to unit (and parent Formation) training and readiness.

And to give just an example, several years ago, a Commonwealth Artillery Regiment being sent to Cyprus on UN duties not only was (obviously) re-rolled as infantry for the duration, but required a draft of troops from an Armour Regiment just to bring itself up to strength. And no, it's not practically possible to do both infantry training and operations [I]and/I] keep up one's parent Arms training and skills. Something will suffer. Ask the Brits or the Canadians, they've been doing this for over 40 years, and it never gets any easier.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think we're getting there with the ways we're restructure the ME (maneuver enhancement) BDEs and also the BTSB (Brigade Special Troops BN) - which some BCTs have made good use of - but they had to work it to fit their needs.

A CSB(ME) is exactly that, a support unit for Maneuver elements. The BSB is very maintenance heavy. It is not intended for this type of mission even though it is modular in concept. Besides, it falls under the Maneuver Division. A RASR would be a Corps asset. Ideally, it would have its own DIV HQ that would have a CMOC with an extended interagency capability.

[Ken White]

...
There is more than ego. There is no glamour in stability operations ... being a glorified policeman, a "peacekeeper". Without that glamour the leadership does not want to do it and Congress doesn't want to pay for it.

Agree -- but I suggest the glamor aspect is partly ego. In fairness, there was / is a true concern for the troops and the institution (not necessarily in that order in all cases); COIN is ugly, tedious work. Certainly best avoided -- but not to the point of trying to deny one will ever do that mission.

Congress doesn't want to pay for much of anything that won't benefit multiple districts. I've condemned them for that for over forty years. However, in fairness to them, the Army (and DoD) have gone along with that chicanery for that same forty years. It's a case of everyone remembering what their oath says and doing the right thing instead of the expedient thing. Ten years ago I despaired of that ever changing. Today, thanks to the internet and blogs like this, hope may be at hand.

I am not sure if you could really use the same units that kicked in the door to immediately shift to providing security in a way that does not alienate the population, in a manner that co-opts any potential insurgency rather than reinforces thier themes. For the Infantry I don't think this is feasible or wise. I want them on the top of thier game...

Done both as an Infantryman in two countries in different services, it's not at all hard to shift gears IF the troops are even reasonably well trained. We still do not train well, even though we're pretty much doing it better now than ever before.

...But some of the other units, like FA and ADA could make the shift. But I still have reservations on how to get the second, supplemental set of equipment into theater. It would also require the DIV HQ to be able to make that shift. But now I am just rambling.

The 'second' set should be part of the MTOE and should deploy with the unit to the staging area for short term hold than rapid movement forward.

I remember seeing what we used to call RACO, Rear Area Combat Operations, slowly fall by the wayside. All the Corps support assets transitioned into front line units...

The MPs picked up the mission and did it well (even though DA did not resource them well for the mission until 2004) -- if Rumsfeld hadn't screwed with the TPFDL, there'd have been a reinforced MP Bde right behind 3d ID --- instead, there was one Bn. Micromangement has its flaws...

We lost ASGs and the likes as more BCTs were built. Now we have the "Non-Contiguous Battlefield". To me, that just means that we have ceded control of sections of the battlefield to the enemy. I am wandering off down a rabbit hole but I feel that the two subjects are related. It seems to me that if we quit concentraing on lean and lethal we might make some progress toward a force that is capable of performing all the missions that we need to be able to handle.

I'm not sure it's as bad as you think. Lot of serving folks I talk too think there's still too much tail. In any event, the non-contiguous battlefield is reality, not a question of ceding territory, it's a question of available bayonets. Fortunately, the ISTAR assets cover the holes and the MQ1-C, Guided GMLRS, Excalibur and some other toys should make it mostly a non-problem.

[Ken White]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

Or, more accurately, the altitude. Oops -- attitude. While there are a few (very few) who an beat the odds, most folks past 40 do not function well in combat, they get overly cautious. The more combat they've had, the lower the age that caution becomes a detriment instead of a blessing.

While there are indeed those in their 70s -- even 90s -- out running, not too many of them are multiple tour ground combat veterans; that job is hard on the old bod, it gets beaten up a lot.

There's a reason for 20 year and 30 year marks for retirement. Only things that need to happen to the retirement system are to make it contributory and thus portable and give the whole package in cash and cut the benefits (I await multiple slings and arrows... ).

I guess the answer to your question is that the physical is only part of it, mental attitude, tolerance for risk and rapidity of thought are very important. So yes, a very, very few 70 year olds could hack it, most could not.

[Ken White]

Very good point Penta! Why indeed should senior officers have to be up-or-out by 55 (at the latest),

Mostly to avoid having 50 year old Captains with 20 years in grade who can't keep up mentally with their young charges...

...The present system was based on what was introduced to clear out the deadwood back in the early days of WWII, but is based on more of a corporate (ie. individual career track) rather than an institutional model.

The latter part is correct, the first is not; up or out was introduced in the late 60s informally and by the book in the 70s. All through WW II, the 50s and early 60s, 40 year old Captains commanding their third or fourth Company weren't all that rare.

Now, to the topic of the thread at hand. Unless the Army is going to form Constabulary Regiments like it had two generations ago, and to do that it will have to come out of someone else's hide - principally the BCTs, then it's just going to have to keep doing what every other Army in the English-speaking world has been doing since the 1960's. And that is taking units of all the Combat Arms and re-rolling and -training them as infantry for low-intensity warfare. It is a huge disruption to unit (and parent Formation) training and readiness.

Heaven forbid on the Constabulary Units. Why are you trying to terrify me???

Shifting to low intensity operations from high is not at all difficult. Shifting the training need not be though my observation is that about 50% of the units make it unnecessarily so. The key is not to shift but to do it as an integrated part of mission training; we aren't talking rocket science here. It's got to be integrated so it is presumed a part of the normal operational methodology; it thus is ingrained in Joe Tentpeg. Train him for two years to kill in a fraction of a second, then for 30-60 days to pass out bags of rice while armed and you're asking for trouble. Train him to switch gears for two years then he can do it -- and you don't need to waste 30-60 days in 're' training.

And to give just an example, several years ago, a Commonwealth Artillery Regiment being sent to Cyprus on UN duties not only was (obviously) re-rolled as infantry for the duration, but required a draft of troops from an Armour Regiment just to bring itself up to strength. And no, it's not practically possible to do both infantry training and operations [I]and/I] keep up one's parent Arms training and skills. Something will suffer. Ask the Brits or the Canadians, they've been doing this for over 40 years, and it never gets any easier.

Ah. Re roling, not re training. Very different animal - and to be totally avoided UNLESS it's integrated at all times...

Re roling Artillery to Infantry isn't wise, 500 man Bn can't do a 700 man Bns jobs. Re role 'em to MPs; 500 to 500 -- that'll work. Acknowledging that sometimes one has no choice.

[Norfolk]

[...] Constabulary Units. Why are you trying to terrify me???

Ah. Re roling, not re training. Very different animal - and to be totally avoided UNLESS it's integrated at all times...

Re roling Artillery to Infantry isn't wise, 500 man Bn can't do a 700 man Bns jobs. Re role 'em to MPs; 500 to 500 -- that'll work. Acknowledging that sometimes one has no choice.

Wait a minute Ken, I really heard you say (well, actually saw you write) that something actually terrified you? Well, it terrifies me too, and if some keener of a Parliamentary staffer reads this and suggests it to his Minister (good thing Canadian politicos by and large have never even heard of the SWC), then after the next Federal election up here, the whole Canadian Army might find itself converted into "Constabulary" units - it came very close to that in the 90's, and only the events of 2001 stopped that from probably becoming a reality.

And Re-rolling is almost as bad. Not quite, but almost.

And about 50 year-old Captains, Ken (hehe): just imagine the circles you could have run around doddering Field Grades and positively geriatric Flag Officers in your DoD years? I mean, there are some advantages to such a system, given its inherent bureaucratic nature anyway.

[Jim Rodgers]

This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.

Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.

Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.

This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both

-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level

is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.

There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.

But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.

That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.

IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.

And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of

-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things

IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either

-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard

Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.

[Ken White]

Wait a minute Ken, I really heard you say (well, actually saw you write) that something actually terrified you?

"Constabulary," my Wife and Brussels Sprouts...

Yea, verily on re-roling. You folks did have a bad patch for a while there. The little guy from Shawinigan was almost as dangerous as was Gary. My son was an instructor at Ranger School back in those days and the one or two Canadians in most classes always came in near the top of the Class and frequently took Honor Grad. Benefit of solid training -- so the Army didn't slack off on what was important.

And about 50 year-old Captains, Ken (hehe): just imagine the circles you could have run around doddering Field Grades and positively geriatric Flag Officers in your DoD years? I mean, there are some advantages to such a system, given its inherent bureaucratic nature anyway.

True but that's no challenge; the excessively bright and annointed (in their opinion), energetic young are so much more fun to discombobulate...

[Jim Rodgers]

Re: the assigning of other METL tasks, arty as MPs etc.

I'll start by pointing out that many of you think of MPs as, apparently, an "easy", but still relevant MOS. As an Armor guy, in the process of converting to MPs, I don't think that's the case. When I moved over, I was shocked by how much was going on in an MP unit that I hadn't realized. Of course, if what you really want is gun trucks and dismounts, that's not that hard. That, alone, doesn't make an MP. If what you really want is troopers with an outstanding grasp of EOF criteria, intelligence integrated by doctrine, experience and assigned ASIs, trained prison guards, Army Law Enforcement personnel, etc etc, then you can't just slap a badge on some redlegs and expect them to perform the same way.

I don't think that's an ego or branch bias thing. But the branches that are largely soft skill focused have legitimate concerns of their own. I can't fly a Kiowa or calculate winds aloft, which wouldn't surprise an Aviator or Artilleryman. I don't see why we would think that they should have the same situational awareness as an experienced cop, just because it's a soft skill, instead of a hard one.

With that said, this isn't an attempt to keep the 5 MP METL tasks all to ourselves. Some sort of rollover\fallback METL tasks make a lot of sense, particularly for branches like arty. Formalizing it makes sense. You can't expect the redlegs to be full fledged MPs, but you could expect them to take over Interment and Resettlement Operations under conditions x or y, under the leadership of the Brigade Provost, or to support IO, or to do Civil Affairs project nominations, or whatever. Planning and training for that contingency makes sense, as you could plan for the inherent limitations. It makes a lot of sense in the MPF scenario that Rob and Ken talk about, because the commanders would have a road map given a certain set of conditions\guidance.

[Rob Thornton]

What about giving the BCT CDR the resources and authorities to contract skill sets and services back at Home Station to meet needs it anticipates as part of its multi-role mission set?

Ex. Allow BCTs to partner with local university on 1/2/3 year contracts to hire folks working toward their degrees in social sciences (anthropology/sociology/economists/etc.), earth sciences (geologists/climatologists/geographers/biologists/etc.), media and linguists to form something that sort of smells like a HTT but is more functional – and then integrate them into existing shell structure headed up by some uniformed folks. They could be with the BDE from MA to train up to deployment – possibly even several cycles.

This would be a long lasting partnership between the military and partner universities and strengthen CIV/MIL relations at a local / community level – more then just the folks at base are deployed – the community so to speak deploys in a stronger way then just the absent revenue (I’m not trying to slight local leaders – some are very good at integrating their military members). As a type of internship it would provide people going into those fields – a type of internship/field experience not available anywhere else. There would be some challenges, but I think we could overcome them.

The other thing I’d consider it the HSOC concept. This would be more permanent. It would involve contracting mostly retired/former military/law enforcement/social service workers/intelligence/contracting officers and like type services (with active clearances) to stand up and maintain a Home Station Operations Command for a BCT (I suppose not every BCT would need its own all the time – but ideally if the unit had a mission it’d have a dedicated one) where the command could build a relationship (you need trust!). This would provide the deployed BCT unparalleled reachback to assist in coordination with OGAs at the local/state and federal level to leverage other relationships. This would be very useful in places where the sustainment, communication and contractor architecture is not developed. I understand the COCOM or the JIATF may have some of those requirements – but I’m not sure you’d get the same type of services or response as the folks you have a relationship with and that are on your payroll – not to mention folks that are plugged into the community. An HSOC would also have the ability to do installation continuity – they could be tasked with getting the resources and sorting things out to giver the re-deploying unit a jump on getting back into the swing of things at the unit. If we were looking for economies - you might also roll up those functions currently under the Rear-Det - such as replacement training and flow - potentially even hire a couple of the spouses to compensate them for the increasing workloads undertaken in support of the FRG (Family Readiness Groups) - the key here is flexibility.

What I’m really talking about is ways to enable a BCT to better perform its multi-role mission from the time it receives that mission to it returns and gets plugged back into a rotation. If we are going to rely on the BCT structure to do this over a sustained high OPTEMPO couple of decades – they are going to need more enablers. While it probably looks expensive – I think this might be a case of where those services and funds reside. While some $$$ need to stay with the installation based on the services they provide to the tenant units – some operational type funds might be better leveraged toward effectiveness if given to the BCTs. Like I mentioned it has some very positive side benefits – but mostly what I think it does is place the flexibility in support of the deploying end of the spear.

Best Regards, Rob

[TheCurmudgeon]

Agree -- but I suggest the glamor aspect is partly ego. In fairness, there was / is a true concern for the troops and the institution (not necessarily in that order in all cases); COIN is ugly, tedious work. Certainly best avoided -- but not to the point of trying to deny one will ever do that mission..

I think that a military officer has to have an ego to begin with. I mean, to be a Platoon Leader you have to start with the idea that you can lead better than any of your 30 or so troopers. The trick is how do you restrain this. But that is another conversation on professionalism.

Done both as an Infantryman in two countries in different services, it's not at all hard to shift gears IF the troops are even reasonably well trained. We still do not train well, even though we're pretty much doing it better now than ever before.

After a good nights sleep I have to agree it can be done. I have spoken to a couple of Infantry Officers who have done it in both Bosnia and Iraq. Thier complaint was that the rest of the infrastructure to run a legal system was not there, so in essence, they ran a "catch and release" program. I think to make it effective you need to have a "court-in-a-can" capability that deploys with the lead element. Here is where the "trained" MPs and SJA come into play.

One other point that you may or may not agree with. Whether we like it or not, we need to act as the soveign for between 12-36 months (or longer) until the rest of the structure is there. Then we turn it over. The FIDD and MITT missions need to be complete, not in-progress.

I also think that the Stryker BCT could easily be retooled to perform this mission. Their equipment set provides the mobility needed and would require the least additional MTOE to make the transition.

I think the Marines have done this type of work in the past. Us Army types are used to having a big footprint. The Marines are used to doing more with less. I think we could learn a lot from them if we took the time.

The 'second' set should be part of the MTOE and should deploy with the unit to the staging area for short term hold than rapid movement forward..

See above on Strykers.

The MPs picked up the mission and did it well (even though DA did not resource them well for the mission until 2004) -- if Rumsfeld hadn't screwed with the TPFDL, there'd have been a reinforced MP Bde right behind 3d ID --- instead, there was one Bn. Micromangement has its flaws....

That may be true, but that is only an excuse for OIF 1 and 2. We never tried to transition over to MP type operations until recently in the Surge. Prior to that we relied on kenetic or lethal type operations to solve a problem better suited for the MPs who would get out and engage the population. For many this was a matter of risk adversion. I could go on about this but I think I will start a seperate string when I have my thoughts in order.

I'm not sure it's as bad as you think. Lot of serving folks I talk too think there's still too much tail. In any event, the non-contiguous battlefield is reality, not a question of ceding territory, it's a question of available bayonets. Fortunately, the ISTAR assets cover the holes and the MQ1-C, Guided GMLRS, Excalibur and some other toys should make it mostly a non-problem.

I disagree. If you look a little into where the IEDs are going off they are in the uncontroled seems between AOs. The non-contiguous battelfield is only a reality as long as we posture ourselves for the "NTC war": the quick battle that takes thirty days or less and then we go home. Again, I think we are relearning lessons from the past. If the battlefield is large enough that the BCT cannot control it, then we need to give the BCTs some help with thier Corps rear. I don't think that is as hard as it sounds and could be done with a minimal force if that force is trained and equiped poperly.

One other point I would like to add. In the old days we (the Army) used to be force-on-force oriented. We were going to fight a big battle against a near-peer nation-state. Today, because of GWOT, we are looking at operations in failed states or even ungoverned territories. Our doctrine really does not cover this. COIN is a start, but it is a response to a specific situation we are dealing with today. As was pointed out earlier, we need to be careful not to spend too much time designing a military that can ONLY do COIN.

[SteveMetz]

Just use those cannon cockers and civilian kitchen staff.

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.


Egads I think I'm choking on my own sarcasm.

Don't scoff. In Baghdad late April 2003 I came to a check point that was manned with a Paladin. The gun was lowered to the horizontal, direct fire position. I imagine one of those firing into your windshield from 20 meters would get your attention.

[selil]

Don't scoff. In Baghdad late April 2003 I came to a check point that was manned with a Paladin. The gun was lowered to the horizontal, direct fire position. I imagine one of those firing into your windshield from 20 meters would get your attention.

Can you imagine seeing that on Interstate 95 pointing up traffic with a RADAR sign that says "Your speed is....." above it? High impact policing I like it.

[Rex Brynen]

I think Jim and Selil have highlighted an important point here, that I hope we don't lose in the discussion: it may not be all that easy retooling into MPs, and especially not for the broad range of tasks that MPs may be called upon to perform in COIN and stability operations (checkpoints, escorts, detention, law enforcement, training assistance to local police forces, liaison, broader contributions to rule-of-law efforts, etc, etc.). As we saw at Abu Ghraib, poorly or inappropriately trained MPs may do far more harm than good.

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?

[slapout9]

For Jim Rodgers. I just realized you were tlaking about me in one of your post on EBO-D3A. There are a lot of Steve's around here I am at my day job and sure enough something reallygood comes up and I am having a busy monday morning. I will respond tonight, you bring up good points that I will try to address. I will try and drop in during the day and monitor what is going on but as I say I will respond tonight. Slap or Steve or what ever

[Tom Odom]

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?

Rex

From my perspective here I would say that active MP units have been among the most adaptative. That said, much of what you describe was already in their kit bag as relatively well practiced TTPs due to the Balkans. In the case of the AG MPs, that was a reserve unit. The real need has been all along not enough MP units to do MP tasks. And that has led to using a variety of units to perform MP tasks.

best

Tom

[TheCurmudgeon]

Just had a quick conversation with MY FA buddy. He reinforced his position that FA cannot be dual trained as MPs. His primary argument is that MPs are too diverse and complicated to be trained as a secondary MOS. In addition, the FA proficiency requires too much training time. They could be secondary as Infantry, but not MPs.

He also emphasized that as the equipment becomes more technically capable the personnel requirements to man the equipment drops. This means that you really don't have as many soldiers in a FA BN as you would in an MP BN. There is not parity in capabilties if you simply "switch" the FA BN in a BCT to an MP role.

[Ken White]

I think that a military officer has to have an ego to begin with. I mean, to be a Platoon Leader you have to start with the idea that you can lead better than any of your 30 or so troopers. The trick is how do you restrain this. But that is another conversation on professionalism.

Agree on all counts -- the problem is that all platoon leaders are not better leaders than all their troops; the key is to realize and accept that and still get the job tune. Egos just need tuning. So does ambition. another thread, another time...

After a good nights sleep I have to agree it can be done. I have spoken to a couple of Infantry Officers who have done it in both Bosnia and Iraq. Thier complaint was that the rest of the infrastructure to run a legal system was not there, so in essence, they ran a "catch and release" program. I think to make it effective you need to have a "court-in-a-can" capability that deploys with the lead element. Here is where the "trained" MPs and SJA come into play.

Good point in this day and age with mass communication; not a significant requirement in my pre-history time.

One other point that you may or may not agree with. Whether we like it or not, we need to act as the soveign for between 12-36 months (or longer) until the rest of the structure is there. Then we turn it over. The FIDD and MITT missions need to be complete, not in-progress.

I agree with the thought, adding the caveat that we may or may not achieve that sovereign state or retain it for a set period. In all our post WW II experience, we have not truly had that 'sovereign' status. I'd also add that the MITT msn may -- usually will -- last longer then 36 months.
...

I think the Marines have done this type of work in the past. Us Army types are used to having a big footprint. The Marines are used to doing more with less. I think we could learn a lot from them if we took the time.

Strongly agree. Egos again...

That may be true, but that is only an excuse for OIF 1 and 2. We never tried to transition over to MP type operations until recently in the Surge. Prior to that we relied on kenetic or lethal type operations to solve a problem better suited for the MPs who would get out and engage the population. For many this was a matter of risk adversion. I could go on about this but I think I will start a seperate string when I have my thoughts in order.

I didn't offer it as an excuse, merely pointed it out as a contributing factor to the onset of the insurgency. Your point on early operational techniques is totally true and was a result of almost 30 years of head in the sand ignoring COIN hoping it would go away. That and putting the wrong guy in the job as Commander -- he'd already erred sadly and badly in Kosovo thus his actions were predictable...

I disagree. If you look a little into where the IEDs are going off they are in the uncontroled seems between AOs. The non-contiguous battelfield is only a reality as long as we posture ourselves for the "NTC war": the quick battle that takes thirty days or less and then we go home. Again, I think we are relearning lessons from the past. If the battlefield is large enough that the BCT cannot control it, then we need to give the BCTs some help with thier Corps rear. I don't think that is as hard as it sounds and could be done with a minimal force if that force is trained and equiped poperly.

We can disagree on that. Hard is not the issue, end strength and worst case tactical reality are the drivers.

One other point I would like to add. In the old days we (the Army) used to be force-on-force oriented. We were going to fight a big battle against a near-peer nation-state. Today, because of GWOT, we are looking at operations in failed states or even ungoverned territories. Our doctrine really does not cover this. COIN is a start, but it is a response to a specific situation we are dealing with today. As was pointed out earlier, we need to be careful not to spend too much time designing a military that can ONLY do COIN.

Agree.

Your later comment:

Just had a quick conversation with MY FA buddy. He reinforced his position that FA cannot be dual trained as MPs. His primary argument is that MPs are too diverse and complicated to be trained as a secondary MOS. In addition, the FA proficiency requires too much training time. They could be secondary as Infantry, but not MPs.

He also emphasized that as the equipment becomes more technically capable the personnel requirements to man the equipment drops. This means that you really don't have as many soldiers in a FA BN as you would in an MP BN. There is not parity in capabilties if you simply "switch" the FA BN in a BCT to an MP role.

Nor do you have as many soldiers in a FA Bn as you have in an Infantry Bn (which, last time I checked, was bigger than an MP Bn). It is noteworthy that a lot of re-roleing of FA to Inf has occurred in both Afhanistan and iraq. Seems to work okay in the latter but not so well in the former. METT-T.

On the training aspect, I disagree with him. The basic problem is we do not provide adequate full spectrum initial entry training; we send poorly trained kids to units and then they really get trained on the job. That shortfall is due to a number of impactors but I'm sure the biggest is cost -- and I'd bet that if you life cycled those costs, it would pay to double our IET training time. It takes about three years in peacetime to develop a fully trained Infantryman, still takes almost a year in combat (and even then there are gaps). That, too is for another thread...

And to address some other comments:

Rex Brynen said:

I think Jim and Selil have highlighted an important point here, that I hope we don't lose in the discussion: it may not be all that easy retooling into MPs, and especially not for the broad range of tasks that MPs may be called upon to perform in COIN and stability operations (checkpoints, escorts, detention, law enforcement, training assistance to local police forces, liaison, broader contributions to rule-of-law efforts, etc, etc.). As we saw at Abu Ghraib, poorly or inappropriately trained MPs may do far more harm than good.

Totally true -- thus a selective set of tasks and missions is a necessity. That's why we have a Deployment mission task list. As we also saw at Abu Gharaib, the wrong folks doing the wrong mission with no supervision can be problematic...

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?

My understanding is that in the last two-three years, considerable adaptation has occurred but I'm sure someone who's far more current than I am can address that.

Tom Odom said:

...The real need has been all along not enough MP units to do MP tasks. And that has led to using a variety of units to perform MP tasks.

Agreed -- and my understanding is that is being rectified.

Selil said:

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.

With two sons who are cops with about 35 years service between them, yeah, I understand the scope of the problem. I'm also easy, we can re-role the FA as Infantry -- after all that's a low skill job...

Jim Rodgers said:

I'll start by pointing out that many of you think of MPs as, apparently, an "easy", but still relevant MOS. As an Armor guy, in the process of converting to MPs, I don't think that's the case. When I moved over, I was shocked by how much was going on in an MP unit that I hadn't realized. Of course, if what you really want is gun trucks and dismounts, that's not that hard. That, alone, doesn't make an MP. If what you really want is troopers with an outstanding grasp of EOF criteria, intelligence integrated by doctrine, experience and assigned ASIs, trained prison guards, Army Law Enforcement personnel, etc etc, then you can't just slap a badge on some redlegs and expect them to perform the same way.

I give up, curmudgeon said:

One, we look at expanding training for artillery, armor, ADA, and any other pure combat force so that they can perform MP, not infantry, missions to allow them to be relevant in stability operations...

I agreed and still think that's a good idea. However, I'll bow to the consensus and to Norfolk and the FA can be re-roled as Constabulary.