Retooling the Artilleryman

[davidbfpo]

Been away a few days and have not read all this thread - just the last few comments.

The British Army had an extensive history of deploying non-infantry units to Northern Ireland during "The Troubles", mainly from Germany (where we were deployed to face the USSR etc). This even included specialist units, armour, engineer, air defence and nuclear missile. I am sure there are articles in the British Army publications (British Army Review notably) on this theme.

Infantry units also had to be re-trained, for six month tours and several units did longer three year tours.

At one point, for several years wayback in the 1970's, the Army had primacy in security and law enforcement, as the police, the RUC, effectively collapsed and had little credibilty (a very short explanation). Today the RUC offer their COIN expertise around the world - not always without criticism.

At that time the Army deployed two very large military police regiments, to do "ordinary" policing and provide support to deployed army units. There are several, now dated published books on this period.

After a very long time the Army had a system for adapting to this COIN / support the police environment. I suspect non-infantry and artillery unit deployments declined.

I'll leave the use of police in COIN to another time.

davidbfpo

[wm]

Seems to me that we may be tying up the wrong sorts of assets doing some of the missions in SWA. For example, convoy and rear area security are (or used to be) ARTEP common tasks and common soldier skills. It does not take a specialized unit to do them. In fact some CA/CS units, like FA, are (or were once upon a time) probably better at them than other CS/CSS units that have been traditionally associated with such missions. If we have MP units doing rear area security and convoy escort in theater, then that is a huge misuse of their other special expertise. I have no clear current knowledge of how such matters are being handled in theater, but before folks start talking about not having enough of the right kinds of assets, I think how units are currently being employed ought to be reviewed.

[Ken White]

can't say for sure but I've heard some anecdotal stuff that seems to imply some of that occurs. One MP did tell me that his Co occasionally escorted a convoy of civilian truckers which meant the total escort package, sometimes two platoons worth but that most frequently they only provided a couple of HMMWVs and two or three M1117s for C2 and heavier firepower for military convoys with the convoy vehicles expected to self defend.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Seems to me that we may be tying up the wrong sorts of assets doing some of the missions in SWA. For example, convoy and rear area security are (or used to be) ARTEP common tasks and common soldier skills. It does not take a specialized unit to do them.

True, but is does take specialized equipment. In the article at the lead of this thread it took 13 fully equiped M1113s (UA HMMWV) to "retool" a single atrillery battery for use outside the wire. This is more than just assigning people to a new mission. This really breaks into two issues: First what did you need that you didn't bring, and two, what did you bring that you no longer need. To bring everything you need you will need two complete sets of MTOE for FA/AR/ADA units to be able to perform these missions. Once they shift missions, for an armor unit, you still have a huge logistical train that is not needed because the M1s are really being utilized when you reorganize the Armor as infantry.

My engineer unit had to provide it's own security for road construction operations. We were trained to do it, as all Engineers have the task "Reorganize as Infantry" even if many do not train for it. The problem was the equipment required to do it, both in vehicles and in firepower. I ended up signing for equipment from anyone I could scavenge it from. We were using mothballed M-60D machine guns that most of my younger soldiers had never seen. These are not big issues, we managed fine. The issue is, when you see a problem, do you let it go until the next war when we have to find solutions for it all over again, or do you look for a solution that is viable across the spectrum of combat operations.

In fact some CA/CS units, like FA, are (or were once upon a time) probably better at them than other CS/CSS units that have been traditionally associated with such missions. If we have MP units doing rear area security and convoy escort in theater, then that is a huge misuse of their other special expertise. I have no clear current knowledge of how such matters are being handled in theater, but before folks start talking about not having enough of the right kinds of assets, I think how units are currently being employed ought to be reviewed.

Most of my data is anedotal also. I am currently at Ft Leavenworth attending CGSC and this tends to be the topic dejur. The infantry understand that they have to do this mission in COIN as well as in any Failed State situation like Bosnia or Haiti. The Armor and Artillery hate the idea, particularly in the current rotation cycle. If you have spent the last three years either training for infantry mission or conducting infantry missions in theater, it means you haven't fired a tank table in that long. At NTC most units do a COIN type rotaion. When a unit asks to do a force-on-force battle the controllers are not prepared. Many of the Majors I have spoken to feel pretty strongly about this.

As far as using the MPs for Area Security I think that is the perfect model (even though they can do more). When orgainzed and trained around a "community policing" model, the MPs become an interface with the population. The population comes to rely on them for security and access to required services. MPs, because of thier law enforcement training, have the tools to deal with a population better than the Infantry (I have to be careful here, because I believe the infantry has done a hell of a good job in places like Bosnia). This is particularly true if the MPs come to the fight with a pre-set legal apperatus to deal with criminals, which is often where most of the problems FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION come from. I see this as a "hearts and minds" method that will yeild benifits in HUMMINT and a general acceptance of the force by the population.

[SteveMetz]

Most of my data is anedotal also. I am currently at Ft Leavenworth attending CGSC and this tends to be the topic dejur. The infantry understand that they have to do this mission in COIN as well as in any Failed State situation like Bosnia or Haiti. The Armor and Artillery hate the idea, particularly in the current rotation cycle. If you have spent the last three years either training for infantry mission or conducting infantry missions in theater, it means you haven't fired a tank table in that long. At NTC most units do a COIN type rotaion. When a unit asks to do a force-on-force battle the controllers are not prepared. Many of the Majors I have spoken to feel pretty strongly about this.

I take the point but what potential opponent's armored formations are better prepared? This is kind of like Roger Clemens blowing off a week of spring training.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I would tend to agree with you. There is no near-peer competitor as far as a large force-on-force Army on the horizon.

Again, I can only speak to what I have heard from others. Thier concerns were based around the younger soldiers. The guys who came in three years ago, who are now young SGTs, who have never conducted large scale maneuvers as Armor or Artillery. I don't know if this problem is real, but I can see it becoming as issue as we continue in the current cycle and the FA and AR soldiers coming up through the ranks spend most of thier time outside thier primary MOS.

Remember too that the Army has pushed the promotion cycle for LTs up so that now they spend only about three years in that rank before they make Captain.

Normally I would disregard these concerns as "sour grapes". But as I got to know the officers who made these comments I learned that they were not whiners. They were career officers who were genuinely concerned for the long term health of the force.

[Tipy]

Lets see if I can word this right. A soldier, be it an Infantry, Artillery, Combat Arms, or Combat Service Support soldier can do what he is tasked to do if he is trained and led by competent leaders and given the time to train. A commander who violates the basic tenents of combat will get his soldiers killed and may lose the battle and lose the war.
Remember Roberts Ridge in early Afg.? Those guys were killed because the commanders didn't think they needed Artillery. They Air Assualted into those high altitude mtns. with nothing but the things they carried. Where were the Artillery Fire Support bases that could have delivered fire support day and night and in bad weather to those Rangers? The commander who made the decision to not bring or use Artillery should have been shot. A soldier will do as he is ordered, even though he may not like it. A commander who can't even do the basics will get his soldiers killed and in doing so lose the battle and then lose the war.
The thing that made me sick was all of the content of the stories about Roberts Ridge did not even mention the lack of Artillery, "they" just seemed to think it was no big deal to AA into a high altitude mtn. top without Artillery support because the Air Force would take care of the CAS. Never did hear anyone do an AAR about that action and never did hear anyone mention the lack of BASIC COMBINED ARMS tactics (Artillery). We killed those Rangers because we didn't do the basics. Has anyone made sure that that will never happen again? We really are doomed to continue to not learn the lessons of history. I'm not confident that the troops in Iraq will not be sucked into another Indian Revolt of the mid 1800's. Anyone ever even heard of the Indian revolt of the sepoys against the British?
Semper Fi,
Tipy

[davidbfpo]

Tipy,

Having just read 'Battle Company is Out There', the excellent NYT piece on an infantry company in the Kunar region, in a hostile valley, I noticed no references to artillery fire, just airpower. From an armchair I thought after reading your piece, where is the artillery? See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/ma...ef=todayspaper.

There was a similar article recently and that mentioned use of 120mm mortars and airpower.

No doubt someone on SWJ knows the answer!

davidbfpo

[Cavguy]

Tipy,

Having just read 'Battle Company is Out There', the excellent NYT piece on an infantry company in the Kunar region, in a hostile valley, I noticed no references to artillery fire, just airpower. From an armchair I thought after reading your piece, where is the artillery? See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/ma...ef=todayspaper.

There was a similar article recently and that mentioned use of 120mm mortars and airpower.

No doubt someone on SWJ knows the answer!

davidbfpo

I believe that they are so distributed the arty is out of range for most. I know some of the outposts have mortars in support. Also most artillerymen are acting as infantry.

Truly heartbreaking article. I choked up reading it. I really felt for that company commander - few know what that burden feels like, and he seemed to have a worse draw than most - he certainly has a harder leadership task than what I faced. And I know the frustration his guys felt at taking losses with no real result in sight. Not only that, Afghanistan is much much more isolated than Iraq, and they don't have much of an escape.

I also wondered about if their BN was rotating troops off the line - seemed like the situation was priming itself for a Haditha or similar due to the stress and constant casualties - It wouldn't take much for a SL or TL to snap and do something extreme. Having soldiers on Prozac didn't exactly seem like the best idea either.

I'm glad for articles like this - the majority of the American populace never knows what it truly demands of the soldiers in harm's way. God bless all those guys.

[slapout9]

Having soldiers on Prozac didn't exactly seem like the best idea either.

I almost fell out of my chair, I had to read that twice. It also said the commander thought things were so bad that he requested a Psychiatrist!! Those guys need a break.

[Tom Odom]

I believe that they are so distributed the arty is out of range for most. I know some of the outposts have mortars in support. Also most artillerymen are acting as infantry.

Truly heartbreaking article. I choked up reading it. I really felt for that company commander - few know what that burden feels like, and he seemed to have a worse draw than most - he certainly has a harder leadership task than what I faced. And I know the frustration his guys felt at taking losses with no real result in sight. Not only that, Afghanistan is much much more isolated than Iraq, and they don't have much of an escape.

I also wondered about if their BN was rotating troops off the line - seemed like the situation was priming itself for a Haditha or similar due to the stress and constant casualties - It wouldn't take much for a SL or TL to snap and do something extreme. Having soldiers on Prozac didn't exactly seem like the best idea either.

I'm glad for articles like this - the majority of the American populace never knows what it truly demands of the soldiers in harm's way. God bless all those guys.

I read it yesterday and passed it over to Slap via PMs.

The article reinforces some key issues and raises others like the Prozac.

A. Gets right to the issue of manpower, firepower, and COIN. A company is essentially trying to control a valley and in doing so turns to the firepower of aerial fires.

B. That all politics are local and good SU hinges on developing an accurate assessment of those political/tribal currents

C. The fundamental that the company--not the battalion and certainly not the brigade--either wins or loses this fight.

D. That the lack of a viable non-lethal effort with functional security is lethal.


Good piece about great Soldiers dealing with a tough situation

Tom

[Norfolk]

This company is just one really bad day away from another My Lai, and just like the Herd's immediate predecessors from the 10th Mountain Div - they're on the verge.

Western Armies have been coking troops to the gills on anti-depressants and the like, and then sending them back into the field since the Balkans in the 90's. If someone starts seeing stuff that's not there or just flashes back to some place or event that's long gone or is just plain losing control, and he goes to get some help for it, too often they just stick him on pills - and the bomb inside waiting to go off just ticks louder and longer instead. Even if the pills "work" and prevent a guy from losing it and taking out a lot of people in a war zone, what happens when he finally gets out of the military, goes off the pills, and has to deal with civvie life with all that stuff still festering inside him?

This is a very depressing read, so I'm not even going to get into that company's mission in that valley.

[Tipy]

Wash my laundry out in front of everyone.

I was USMC Vietnam late 68 to late 69, grunt with 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines and
4th Combined Action Group, from Dong Ha to Laos and in or on the DMZ, Purple Heart, thirty days on the USS Repose Hospital ship and another thirty days in Da Nang Naval Hospital with P. Falcip malaria. Went to school on GI bill and got an ROTC commission. Two years active 101st,1976-78,
2nd of the 327th. Thought I was maybe a little bit crazy, and did not have a good experience, lot of depression and Jimmy Carter was Cinc.. Didn't have any experience to fall back on. Got out and became a Cop. Kept my mouth shut and tried to do my job. You know how people in the morning say "how are you". I always replied "I'm fine". No one really knew. Depression, child support, three jobs, and "crazy maybe". Couldn't sleep through the night, wake up after three hours and couldn't get back to sleep. Obsessed with reading about Vietnam and military history. Started reading about PTSD and was in denial. Went to my HMO for my depression, that was very hard to do and I didn't tell anyone. Ride around with officers who would fly off the handle about not wanting to work with ofc. on anti-depressants(little did they know) especially an ofc. on anti depressants and carrying a gun.
I WOULD RATHER WORK WITH SOMEONE THAT WAS ON ANTI-DEPRESSANTS THAN SOMEONE WHO NEEDED THEM AND WAS NOT. Did a lot of reading and finally went to my dept. and said "hey I need some help". Another year and I'm convinced I would have been fired. By going in and asking for help that put the burden on my dept. and they couldn't fire me. Five sessions with the Police Psychologist and he gave me 100% police disability. (Forgot I also had a good shoot off duty in a convience store robbery in 1996 and then 911 was very interesting for me.) Hand carried my Police packet to the VA and got my 150%, 100 for PTSD, 20 for diabetes, 20 for parithial neuropathy(sp?) and 10 for my tinnitus. Guess what, the VA only pays 100% no matter how bad you are, unless you are in an ICU permanently.
My VA Psychiatrist (Full Colonel USAR and two tours in Iraq) convinced me that I wasn't crazy, just needed to know what was happening to me and get treatment. Didn't cure me but did put me on the road to not pulling my brain out through my nose. FOR GODS SAKE If YOU BREAK A LEG YOU GO TO THE ER. IF YOU HAVE PTSD YOU GO TO THE PSY.. No one seems to be able to get that little bit of info through their heads. No one is ever completely healed, but at least I'm living an almost good life now. If I hadn't been a reader and Vietnam history buff I would have never figured out what I had to do and I .... who knows. By the way a big part of PTSD is a physical change to your amygdula(sp?) gland in the brain, not a choice that anyone can make or control. If you (or someone) has horrindus combat you are going to have PTSD. Your chain of command has to help you and you can still function and perform as a soldier if you get early treatment and possibly take meds etc.. Group therapy was the biggest help to me because I could see that others were going through the same thing I was, and up till then (group t.) I thought I was the only crazy one suffering. The junior chain of command, Capt. through team leader, needs to know that this monster can be tackled and fixed if they take CARE OF THEIR TROOPS, the exact same thing they are taught to do for "normal" combat. By the way mine, I'm convinced, was bad because I was not treated till thirty some years later.
Apologize for taking up so much bandwidth. The above is only my opinion based on my experience's in the last 40 years of my 58 year life.
Semper Fi,
Tipy

[jcustis]

I agree that it is a great article, but damn does it seem out of character for NYT reporting. Is it part of an agenda? I mean, if the stuff on page three about Prozac and medications, and the soldier willing to kill an Afghani walking up to the firmbase sticks with us folk here, what is it saying to the general populace who read it?

And while I may not be a public affairs officer, what commanding officer puts that sort of stuff out there in front of a reporter, concerning any medical details about his troops?

It may just be me, but something rubbed me the wrong way about what Kearney either said or was misquoted to have said. The article painted this picture of a guy with a band of high-strung soldiers who (despite claiming to stand on the moral high ground) are being pushed to the brink of snapping. Maybe it was just the slant, but a lot of it rubbed me the wrong way. If the quotes are accurate, what speaks to me the loudest are the words LEADERSHIP CRISIS. But, I am not there and seeing this through a single lens, so I hope the ground truth is something different, more positive.

Irrespective of all that, for me the article highlighted an important truth in COIN and dismounted-centric operations. You have to retain the ability to fix and maneuver. Call it the influence of ROE, but if you can't ascertain whether there are noncombatants in a house you saw a suspected insurgent run to, you've got to retain the ability to put boots on the ground there and work the cordon. Shoot, even if you know you are going to go kinetic, you have to fix and maneuver - stick and move. I know of too many occasions when small elements (plt-sized) of my last TF would make contact with either an IED or SAF ambush, and all of the vehicles would just move to cover and begin engaging the first target called out, rather than maneuvering. Almost to a contact, the kinetic window was closed too quickly because they did not have the sense to maneuver (in some cases the BGs had done a great job of setting the kill zone on terrain that prevented maneuver) and close that gap.

[Ken White]

I agree that it is a great article, but damn does it seem out of character for NYT reporting. Is it part of an agenda? I mean, if the stuff on page three about Prozac and medications, and the soldier willing to kill an Afghani walking up to the firmbase sticks with us folk here, what is it saying to the general populace who read it?

Agenda possibly. Being charitable by inclination, I ascribed the general tone of the essentially good article as being an excess of reportorial empathy. Regardless, it is IMO notable for the quite possibly incorrect sense of futility it transmits.

And while I may not be a public affairs officer, what commanding officer puts that sort of stuff out there in front of a reporter, concerning any medical details about his troops?

Same thought by me; be totally honest but volunteer nothing; the media will almost always consciously or unconsciously leave something out, misquote or slant their verbiage, generally in a manner not envisioned -- and not desired....

It may just be me, but something rubbed me the wrong way about what Kearney either said or was misquoted to have said. The article painted this picture of a guy with a band of high-strung soldiers who (despite claiming to stand on the moral high ground) are being pushed to the brink of snapping. Maybe it was just the slant, but a lot of it rubbed me the wrong way. If the quotes are accurate, what speaks to me the loudest are the words LEADERSHIP CRISIS. But, I am not there and seeing this through a single lens, so I hope the ground truth is something different, more positive.

Agree. Though I suspect that, as Gav Guy noted, there's much more to the tactical picture than came through.

Irrespective of all that, for me the article highlighted an important truth in COIN and dismounted-centric operations. You have to retain the ability to fix and maneuver. Call it the influence of ROE, but if you can't ascertain whether there are noncombatants in a house you saw a suspected insurgent run to, you've got to retain the ability to put boots on the ground there and work the cordon. Shoot, even if you know you are going to go kinetic, you have to fix and maneuver - stick and move. I know of too many occasions when small elements (plt-sized) of my last TF would make contact with either an IED or SAF ambush, and all of the vehicles would just move to cover and begin engaging the first target called out, rather than maneuvering. Almost to a contact, the kinetic window was closed too quickly because they did not have the sense to maneuver (in some cases the BGs had done a great job of setting the kill zone on terrain that prevented maneuver) and close that gap.

Sigh. Seen that elsewhere, over and over...

Can I beat my "We do not train the basics well" drum here?

[jcustis]

Ken, that drum resonates well. What we (I actually picked up the direct observation from the TF Bn Cmdr) saw was that the simplest things aren't "simple" anymore.

And as I read a notation about Kearney again, I noticed that he is 26 years old. A 26-y/o captain leading a company across a 12-month running gunfight...hmmm...

I'm not saying the man is not capable, but by my calculations he probably has 4 years time in service. Is this an example of the Army promotion timings putting guys into command with fewer years of experience than in the past?

[Ken White]

Ken, that drum resonates well. What we (I actually picked up the direct observation from the TF Bn Cmdr) saw was that the simplest things aren't "simple" anymore.

What we do is shortchange the basics. That leads to problems doing the big things because the grounding is inadequate. We can cobble together things better than anyone else in the world but a lot of folks outdo us on the basics -- and, as they say, it's the little things that get you...

And as I read a notation about Kearney again, I noticed that he is 26 years old. A 26-y/o captain leading a company across a 12-month running gunfight...hmmm...

I'm not saying the man is not capable, but by my calculations he probably has 4 years time in service. Is this an example of the Army promotion timings putting guys into command with fewer years of experience than in the past?

Dunno, I'm long retarded -- but that was the case during the unpleasantness in SE Asia some years ago and that rapidity of promotion was a major problem in the day. Wars do that; most of 'em bumped up quickly cope very well and some are simply outstanding, all of them mature a little more rapidly but there is a cost in lack of experience, no question. There are also the few that do NOT cope so well...

Can I now bring out my DOPMA drum?

[Cavguy]

I'm not saying the man is not capable, but by my calculations he probably has 4 years time in service. Is this an example of the Army promotion timings putting guys into command with fewer years of experience than in the past?

Yes promotions are faster, but almost every combat arms commander I know is between 5-8 years of service, although most make CPT at 38 months. There's lag for captain's course, and the obligatory staff rowing time prior to command.

Me, I got command 7 years in and finished 9 years in, but I was behind a long command queue. Although I hated the wait, I got almost 2 years command and was much better prepared because of all the time spent on staff understanding how the sausage was made.

[Tipy]

Davidbfpo,
The NY Times is a defeatist paper, the most liberal, anti American, and anti war paper in the US. I would not trust anything they wrote.
I would love to hear what Cpt. Kearny has to say about this article.
Artillery would have been much more flexible and capable then the CAS(Close Air Support) in this article. It was mentioned that the unit's base was only 6 miles from a nearby American base. Why didn't they have artillery support from that nearby base? Mistakes on the writers part make me further doubt her writing. Calling a .556 caliber Saw a heavy machine gun makes me doubt the rest of the authors incompetent writing. I wasn't there so I sure wish Cpt. Kearny was available to comment on this article. Writer mentions that an American Platoon was wiped out, I very much doubt that.

Change the subject. Has anyone read John Masters biographies, "Bugles and a Tiger" and "Road Past Mandalay". He was a junior officer in the Gurka's about eight years before WWII started and then he ended the war as a Brigade commander of one of the Chindit Brigades. My favorite stories (biographical) I wonder what others think of these two volumes.
Semper Fi,
Tipy

[CR6]

Me, I got command 7 years in and finished 9 years in, but I was behind a long command queue.

Exactly my experience as well.

48 months to 03 started to fade about eight years ago, when the jump from 01 to 02 was shortened from 24 to 18 months. We've lost another 4 months of that since then. There's a ripple effect here with guys making 04 quicker as well, combined with accelerated promotion boards. I know of officers pinning oak leaves with less than a decade of officer experience. In and of itself that's not such a bad thing, but with record high promotion rates this could pose problems. Not everyone has demonstrated the potential for promotion at the nine year mark. Some guys never will. Field grade rank, in my mind, connotates some breadth of experience that should facilitate examing issues from more points of view than company/battalion level. The rapidity of promotion does not allow time for that experience to accumulate.

To nudge the post back on topic; CAV Guy, excellent post in the The Korengal Thread about how Battle Company may have drawn the short straw in order to shape the battlespace for success elsewhere. It would be interesting to learn what wasn't written in the article. On the whole, I found the tone sympathetic to the experience of the American solider without being hostile.