Say It Ain't So, Joe!

[Danny]

Wolfowitz, all will remember, is the one who bullied Shinseki out of the Army. Shinseki had the nerve to say to the Congress that it would take several hundred thousand more troops than we had going into Iraq to secure and maintain the peace.

I know that the mantra here at the SWJ is that more force is counterproductive, makes more insurgents, counter to the greatest and best COIN theory, and counter the notion of COIN as armed social science. I know that regardles of the OIF II and III difficulties, many here at this forum would still claim (and do still claim) that the small footprint model is the right one. Since I don't want to get into a long winded discussion about my views concerning force projection and how it is inversely related to the actual need to use that force in COIN, I will just say "notwithstanding the view of COIN as armed social science" (and my disagreement with it) and without getting into all of the things that Wolfowitz did wrong, I consider him to be an incompetent burden on society (American and international society). This man ignored the counsel of senior military leaders in favor of pet theories, threw well treaded military doctrine under the bus, bullied men out of the service, threw the U.S. armed forces into the middle of a conflict without the necessary foresight or planning or forces, and then got out unscathed.

I am disgusted by this man, and I consider him to be a dreadful human who - one day - will have much to answer for. I am sorry to see this administration continue to protect and promote him.

And in saying this, I am not really being completely forthright on exactly how I truly feel about this man because of the public nature of this forum. 'Nuff said.

[SteveMetz]

Wolfowitz, all will remember, is the one who bullied Shinseki out of the Army. Shinseki had the nerve to say to the Congress that it would take several hundred thousand more troops than we had going into Iraq to secure and maintain the peace.

Not true. Shinseki had already set his retirement date by the time of the exchange over Iraq troop numbers. If anything, it was the relationship with Rumsfeld that led Shinseki to retire.

[Danny]

I believe that Shinseki and the civilian leadership (both Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz) were at odds for quite some time over the force size, with Shinseki unwilling to go along. The problems between them didn't just surface with his congressional testimony. I was going to supply links (URLs), but there are so many I didn't know where to start and how many to give.

[SteveMetz]

I believe that Shinseki and the civilian leadership (both Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz) were at odds for quite some time over the force size, with Shinseki unwilling to go along. The problems between them didn't just surface with his congressional testimony. I was going to supply links (URLs), but there are so many I didn't know where to start and how many to give.

SECARMY White was fired after backing Shinseki. But again, this was just the straw that broke the camel's back. The myth that the congressional testimony got Shinkseki fired has been repeated by people like Nancy Pelosi and John Kerry (Pelosi on Comedy Central's "The Daily Show," November 30, 2005; Kerry, Press Conference, Tipton, IA, October 5, 2004).

Tom Ricks, Bob Woodward and Mike Gordon have covered the issue extensively. Also useful is David Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess," New York Times Magazine, November 2, 2003, and Jim Fallows, "Blind Into Bagdad," Atlantic, January/February 2004 touch on it.

[Global Scout]

I know that the mantra here at the SWJ is that more force is counterproductive, makes more insurgents, counter to the greatest and best COIN theory, and counter the notion of COIN as armed social science.

Danny, your statement above is not correct either. OIF I was not a counterinsurgency, it was all out war, state versus state, so we obviously didn't go into OIF I with a counterinsurgency force. It was an Air-Land battle approach with a little Boyd thrown in (run up the middle and get inside their OODA loop, destroy them before they can react).

I also think many participants in this council agree with GEN(R) Shinseki that more force was required. The planning assumption back then was that the Iraqi Army was going to switch sides and work with us, but when the Iraqi Army refused to act like the Italians during WWII, we had a huge problem on our hands, now we had to secure all of Iraq with our minimal forces, and we were still in denial that we were doing COIN for a few months. Then Wolfowitz II came in (Bremer) and simply demobilized the Iraqi Army with apparently little thought about the impact (resulting in several hundred dead Americans and a quagmire).

If the plan was simply to topple Saddam and leave (which many in the land forces thought it was), then Wolfowitz's force ratio was adequate, because it worked, we toppled the regime, but when our objectives starting changing under our feet, "hey good job, now I need you to develop a stable democracy.....", we obviously were not prepared. COIN requires a very large security presence, either host nation or other, and since we disbanded the host nation's military, we should have surged immediately in an attempt to secure the population and get Iraq's security forces stood up again.

Paul will go down in history as an idiot, but that does us little good, as the damage has already been done.

As for him pushing Shinseki out, I have to agree with Steve, because I recall Shinseki telling us in 2001 (prior to 9/11) that he would be fishing in JUL 03.

[120mm]

SECARMY White was fired after backing Shinseki. But again, this was just the straw that broke the camel's back. The myth that the congressional testimony got Shinkseki fired has been repeated by people like Nancy Pelosi and John Kerry (Pelosi on Comedy Central's "The Daily Show," November 30, 2005; Kerry, Press Conference, Tipton, IA, October 5, 2004).

Tom Ricks, Bob Woodward and Mike Gordon have covered the issue extensively. Also useful is David Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess," New York Times Magazine, November 2, 2003, and Jim Fallows, "Blind Into Bagdad," Atlantic, January/February 2004 touch on it.

Having worked for Shinseki, albeit indirectly, twice, I thought he was fired because there actually IS a God in the world.