Our Future Combat Systems?

[SWJED]

Today's Washington Post provides an update on the U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems - The Army's $200 Billion Makeover by Alec Klein.

... In the Army's vision, the war of the future is increasingly combat by mouse clicks. It's as networked as the Internet, as mobile as a cellphone, as intuitive as a video game. The Army has a name for this vision: Future Combat Systems, or FCS. The project involves creating a family of 14 weapons, drones, robots, sensors and hybrid-electric combat vehicles connected by a wireless network. It has turned into the most ambitious modernization of the Army since World War II and the most expensive Army weapons program ever, military officials say.

It's also one of the most controversial. Even as some early versions of these weapons make their way onto the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, members of Congress, government investigators and military observers question whether the Defense Department has set the stage for one of its biggest and costliest failures. At risk, they say, are billions of taxpayer dollars spent on exotic technology that may never come to fruition, leaving the Army little time and few resources to prepare for new threats...

[Abu Suleyman]

This is a classic problem in military history. The rubbish bins of history are filled with nations that trusted in the "magic bullet" of technology rather than sound military practice. Technology is important. If it weren't there would probably still be a Zulu Nation. Nevertheless war is political above all else. Wars stop and end because of some political objective (I mean international political objective: One country wants another country to do or stop doing something, not a 'wag the dog' scenario). Technology is only a lubricant that helps war to run more smoothly.

If the FCS becomes reality it will make war so expensive that we cannot even afford to win! Right now if we were to suffer the kinds of losses that we suffered in victories in World War II the cost would overwhelm us. We must always maintain technology, but I ask how is having a PDA in the hands of every soldier going to help us achieve the objectives of war? It sure isn't communication. Aren't radios good enough? And it isn't survivability if we can believe the preliminary reports about FCS.

It is time to admit that the Army is not the Navy or Air Force. Soldiers are not platforms, they are soldiers, and they need training and equipment not systems.

[wm]

In a world where we have an apparent interest in keeping the number of people serving in uniform as small as possilbe, the easy alternative to being able to acomplish missions is to have machines do it instead. I suspect that part of the motivation for FCS was a way of coping with the "do more with less" attitiude that came with the "peace dividend." It is like the Edsel--the market wanted something else by the time the car hit the dealerships.

[Penta]

It's always struck me....Why do we never have simple "Technology Maturation" projects?

"Because that's DARPA's job", I'm going to hear, I suppose.

I always thought DARPA's job was the really far out research - then, once you have something that may actually have applications, it transitions to the services.

Yet there's no tolerance anywhere to say that "No, the <F-22/V-22/Pick-your-project> is probably not ready for primetime...And that's okay, because even if this project is a failure or has issues, we have knowledge that we can immediately pile into the "Son of" project and thereby get to a version that reduces the risks".

Yes, projects will fail. My dad worked for 33 years for US Army CECOM, so I know what the Acquisition picture is like - I grew up with it. I know that failures are seen as inevitably bad, inevitably the result of someone's malice or incompetence.

Which makes no sense to me. Projects will fail. That's life, and so long as the Project Manager has the courage to look at his project and recognize when that's the case (and actually call for the plug to be pulled) while a project is in SDD (rather than sending it inexorably to EMD and then fielding), why should they be given a black mark for it?

Is there no place for us to say "Okay, V-22 may not be combat-ready; But that's fine, it's meant to test the technologies in a semi-operational form. Now we move on to the next iteration, incorporating everything from V-22." (for example)? None at all?

(GAO beats on DOD, rightly, for moving forward with projects before the technologies involved are mature, and it's one of the big reasons they've found for why DOD acquisitions projects go haywire so often.)

[Cavguy]

We ought to get Kreker on here - he works with FCS.

My major problem on it is barely mentioned in the article - lack of powerful direct fire systems (based off the idea that future war was to be OTH), lack of armor to defeat 4GW threats, and a belief that "sensors" will detect everything. The UAV example was great, but the UAV can't see inside buildings or fly in bad weather.

While commanding in Tal Afar we were fielded a "TacMAV" UAV, which is essentially a model airplane with a camera and a laptop to receive the feed. It promptly crashed, and I got in trouble for losing an expensive "disposable" UAV. Also loss of a UAV at that time was reportable to Corps, so it was deluged with a "why were they doing that" RFI's from higher. Then our Air Officer reminded me that I needed to have done airspace deconfliction 24h out as well.

Great tech. Guess what I never used again. (BTW, I got the $20k+ UAV back by offering a $50 reward to anyone who returned it.)

[Penta]

We ought to get Kreker on here - he works with FCS.

In the PM office? For contractor?

[Norfolk]

We ought to get Kreker on here - he works with FCS.

My major problem on it is barely mentioned in the article - lack of powerful direct fire systems (based off the idea that future war was to be OTH), lack of armor to defeat 4GW threats, and a belief that "sensors" will detect everything. The UAV example was great, but the UAV can't see inside buildings or fly in bad weather.

It's funny, but just about every Army in the Western world that has engaged in COIN in the last 40 or so years has gone in thinking that they don't need tanks - Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq to name the bigger ones - and they all end up having to drag out the big boys to take care of business, cause the light stuff just doesn't work all the time. The Army had to restore the Tank Battalion to each of the Infantry Divisions in Vietnam (they deployed without them thinking they werren't needed), and the Australians sent a Tank Squadron (company) to reinforce their Task Force there as well. The US Army had to provide the Marines (didn't have their own on scene) with heavy armour in Fallujah, et al., and both the Canadians and the Danes have each sent a Tank Squadron (company) to support their Infantry Battalions in Afghanistan.

It seems that the myth of Armour not being suited for COIN has yet to die a hard, yet deserved, death.

And as for the FCS, well, the proposed replacement for the MBT part of it, even it was affordable, might give up too much protection for "deployability", at least as I understand it.

[Penta]

It seems that the myth of Armour not being suited for COIN has yet to die a hard, yet deserved, death.

Perhaps because it depends on which aspect of COIN one speaks of.

Building a rapport with the population? Intelligence gathering? There's such a thing as too much protection. Whether that protection is tank armor or hiding in FOBs and only going out in force. And tanks tend to make civilians feel repressed - that's before said tanks crush cars, either.

Urban combat? Tanks have a limited use, I'd imagine.

However, for when the other fellow is putting up a determined, stand-up fight, then tanks are really useful.

[Kreker]

We ought to get Kreker on here - he works with FCS.

Believe it or not I was just attending an AUSA sponsored Shaping the Force symposium in El Paso, where Army modernization was the main thrust, shapped around FCS. I would invite those council members that have commented to check out the FCS thread, where there is some good discussion.

The comments on this tread are good ones and valid from the perspectives given. But here are some questions to mull over: Without a major modernization effort (FCS) can the Army continue to afford upgrading the Abrams and Bradleys for the next 30-40 years, not to mention over systems, Paladin, SINCGARS, BCOTM, etc. There comes a point in a systems life-cycle where continued upgrades are not cost effective based on technology maturation (there is only so much you can 'hang' on an M1 before weight becomes an issue). Look at the weight increases that have come to the M1 thus far in it's life. FCS has a family of system (FoS) within a systems of sytems (SoS) tied to a common network. What would be the costs to the Army to develop the 14 systems separately?

UAVs are somewhat expensive, but have proven that they can save lives. So the question is would you rather spend the $s on a UAV that can detect an insurgent implacing an IED or have a Soldier find an IED by giving his life? Remember FCS BCTs are not totally replacing HBCTs. Current plans have only15 FBCTs out of a total of 76 MBCTs.

I look forward to additional dialogue on this subject, becaause we all need to be aware of how our Army is going to deal with Persistent Conflict in the coming years.

Best--
Kreker

[Rob Thornton]

I read the article this morning, and I figured I might comment on it, particularly as someone who worked on FCS from 2004-2006 as the FCS BCT Experimental Element CAB (Combined Arms BN) Ops guy in Mobile Command Group 1 (that’s just the name for the Ops guy in the BN CDR’s track) and as the same for BDE CDR later on. Given, the tracks were mock ups in a high speed simulations bay, but we nugged out some hard tactical and to a lesser degree operational problems. We did so by a variety of experiments throughout the spectrum of operations, and in varying conditions. Basically the experimental element was a reduced BCT Staff, with very reduced HQs for the CABs and supporting BNs (such as NLOS – or the FA, the FSB, and the RSTA). We were to the point where we had operators/crews for various platforms and UMS (unmanned systems). It was a very ambitious program, and one where we as COL Roy Waggoner’s (an Infantryman who really has just about done it all & has the T-Shirt) thin green line to inject reality into it – we kept up with ongoing Army operations by bringing in guys from the SBCTs, modular forces, OIF, OEF and SOF, as well as some sharp contractors with Vietnam, ODS, Balkan, and Panama experiences. We also went out with DARPA and Industry as system leads to explain the TTP we were developing (mostly adopting from solid tactics) so the people making the “stuff” would not get “Buck Rogers” syndromes. I was the Unmanned Ground Vehicle guy – but I touched most everything else as we figured out how this stuff would work together and how to keep it focused on the soldier employing it. I’ll also say here before I forget that COL Schaill is the right guy to head the EBCT out at Bliss – he stood firm and gave the suits and the geeks the Heisman more then once while being my BN CDR out at 1-24 IN during the SBCT IOT&E – he and COL Bob Brown also underwrote the risks we took to really find out what the organization(s) could do – not the equipment – the unit as outfitted with the equipment! Both went to OIF in 04 (as the DCO and CDR of 1/25th SBCT) and brought back those experiences to shape the way they see the future.

What I thought might be good so that we don’t get wrapped around what the press says about FCS, or how Industry thinks they should sell it to politicians is ask a few questions about different systems within FCS – because these systems are going to make it out in the spiral – the end result will be units with real people with better stuff to do the tactical tasks they need to do – technology is at its most useful on the tactical end – regardless of if you are doing COIN or a conventional fight – or something in between:

Would it be good if you could emplace a sensor at a tier 1 IED site that you could leave unattended that would alert you and give you indicators of somebody trying to emplace and IED?

Would it be good if you could then put up a small UAV that could perch or hover with IR capability that could either target that activity with a BLOS round (beyond line of sight as targeted by the operator through the Class One UAV? Or follow that team out back to the house it came out of – the whole time being watched from within the PL or PSGs track – not as its viewed back in the TOC and then relayed to the patrol?

How about for a squad setting in a point ambush as part of a larger platoon area ambush in an urban environment and wants to do a quick R&S but can’t move – so they call up the PLT HQs and they do an R&S over the platoon area – then parks it on some piece of high terrain that overwatches where the 2 Opals and Bongo truck have been seen before?
How about the use of the crew of the MGV being able to track the movements of the squad after they dismount? Could this quicken the response for evacuation or for direct fire support? Could it lessen the chances of fratricide?

How about a UGV ARV-Light (Armed Robotic Vehicle) that can be programmed to recon a route through restrictive terrain – and actually think it’s the same size and weight as a the MGVs (manned ground vehicles) you are going to bring through there and send back updated info on the route and everything about it – how about the information goes directly into your BFT or EPLRS FBCB2 and all you do is notice the new options you’ve got?

How about that same robot carrying a modular mission payload (might be lethal or non-lethal- but we’ll say lethal) of a M240, or maybe something heavier with over 10,000 rounds – lets say it has articulated suspension that allows it to climb (it exists y the way – thanks to DARPA) and keep up with the dismounted patrol. Lets say it also carries better comms because it has a Power Amp that you can access from your own MBITR sized radio, and has powerful optics on it that you can use and see through something smaller then a lap top?

How about a vehicle that has the capability to tell you when something important might break – and alert the maintenance contact team – or at least tell the Maint Contact team what is broke and what to bring out.

What if you and all the vehicles in your element could rehearse a mission on the digital terrain that except for the friction of real life was almost exactly as it was going to look when you actually drove it? Kind of like a mission fly through – hell just getting people into the right spots and down the right roads is pain in the butt – would if you could make it just a little better?

What if before you took your informant on the raid to nab a tier 1 personality that you’d been tracking for weeks, you as the PL or CO CDR could have him look through the robots sensors (optics) and tell you “yes, that is the house” in real time as opposed to hitting the wrong house a block away because the informant pointed to the wrong house picked off the overflight photo of the OH-58D? How about just prior to the assault as the outer cordon went in the 1 or more small UAVs and perched them on various roof tops or high ground overwatching the most likely exfil routes and then you could have somebody move in and either kill them or pick them up – vs. finding an empty hole?

What if you could use a SUGV (Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle to go in a cave or crawl space and check for trip wires or other hazards – and it let you control the tempo better?

What if you could access a HN, OGA or International Data base on the biometrics of a guy at a TCP and then you found out this guy was the no #### baddest MF on the planet – and by nabbing him you just put a major crimp in international terrorist group as well as shutting off support for the local group that has moved into your AO?
How about accessing all the known demographic and infrastructure of a new area for a host of missions? How about the name of a doctor working at a local hospital?

If you like any of that – its all FCS like stuff. FCS, although most often identified with the now 27 ton MGV, is really about stuff that lets us, the soldier – do tasks better and seize faster, then retain initiative longer to let us do unto them before they do unto us.

I’ve also included a link from an article I wrote back in 2005 called The Case for Robots in the SBCT Now. It’s a little dated – but it gives you the basics of UMS. What is changed is I’ve thought allot about how robotics might have been useful to me in Iraq. I also know that the tech has actually matured allot – Spinner (the DARPA project Mike Perschbacher headed is now Crusher – and it rocks) – BTW anyone having an opportunity to work with DARPA should jump on it – those guys are not afraid to break stuff right in front of you, and they listen better then any Industry guys when you tell them how you are or would tactically employ something.

I had my heartburn with some of the Industry folks as well - but I trust leaders like COL Schaill to provide push back to anyone who'd try to sell us down the river. The important things as I see them are to provide the soldiers the best tools and tech available - we'll put it to good use, we will not be constrained by how the marketing campaign said it'd be used; the second thing is focus on stuff that will help us do the same tasks better - don't try and replace us - people are the decision makers and in the fog, friction and chance of war - good leaders are what make the difference - in other words - focus on effectivness, not efficiency. If FCS continues to do those two things (and I think with leaders like COL Schaill it will) then we'll continue to be the best equipped Army on the battlefied.


ref. the M1 - I think it was not too long ago that the Armor Chief said it would be around until like 2050 - so plenty of time to recognize and evaluate - its a good piece of equipment - and it makes you feel good when it shows up on your side.
Best, Rob

[Presley Cannady]

It's always struck me....Why do we never have simple "Technology Maturation" projects?

You do, it just becomes less robust as the sticker price goes up. It's one thing to bang away at code through a test suite, dump manure into rifle or crash test a Hummer, it's another to fire live shots at an airborne F-22 or blow up a Stryker. At some point your testing focus becomes chiefly unitary over cheaply produced components rather holistic over the final system.

"Because that's DARPA's job", I'm going to hear, I suppose.

I always thought DARPA's job was the really far out research - then, once you have something that may actually have applications, it transitions to the services.

As far as I know, DARPA's job isn't even proof of concept, but more along the lines of basic research done in universities in the new drug discovery chain.