Thanks. Our concern when getting a new commandant always is how they will adapt to being the leader of a college which is radically different than the vast majority of command slots. Issues like academic freedom, media relations, and dealing with eccentric but extraordinarily talents faculty members can be challenging.
To give one example, some of our past commandants have had a lot of trouble with faculty members writing or saying things critical of official Army positions or administration policies. But that's exactly what the faculty at an accredited, degree granting institution of higher learning is supposed to do.
Time will tell, I guess. Some commandants adjust, others don't.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
...They aren't already on it? From what I recall, AAUP basically clubs Catholic universities over the head for stuff which, for Catholic institutions, is either required by ecclesiastical authorities, or an understood part of the atmosphere. (Example: the requirement (only sometimes enforced) that Theology profs receive approval from the local Ordinary (Bishop/Archbishop) before teaching.)
that most of what appears in FM 3-24 is not only not new but said quitre well in the 60s - 80s. What I like about the manual is that, unlike the iterations of Army and Joint doctrine in the 90s, this one attempts to hark back to the USMC SWM with the inclusion of TTP. The attempt to put most of what is needed in a single manual is, I believe, useful to the soldier and Marine on the ground.
One problem with all of this is that people tend to forget that doctrine is not - and should not be - dogma. It is, at best, the doctrine writers' best sythesis of lessons and previous writing, both doctrinal and form other sources. (I used to love to say that doctrine is written by "slugs" like us! And the "slugs" were majors and LTCs just doing a job.) The good part is that this group of slugs had both experience and education. The bad part is that the FM is a doctrine manual (in other words, for the academic types, a textbook) with all the faults of both. The danger, as many here have poited out, is that not only will this FM become dogma but that it will be treated as dogma for the kinds of conflict for which it is not intended. My friend and colleague, Max Manwaring, (Steve's office mate) loves to point out this Clausewitz quote, "The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature."
Sometimes that dead European male was more than a little relevant to contemporary debates.
Cheers
JohnT
I thought it was ridiculous when we became accredited anyway. Over 80% of our Army students come in with a master's degree, so they leave with two (or more--one of my former office mates had three).
The Naval War College first became accredited simply because with their rotation schedule, it was more difficult for their officers to get a civilian advanced degree. Then since they did it, the Air Force had to. When the Air Force did, we did.
I think, though, if the AAUP became a problem, we'd give up accreditation before we'd bow to an organization that doesn't understand our special mission.
The CGSC is accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools isn't it? Could the AAUP and its ilk become a problem in the future for Service schools somehow anyway, basically tossing out members who teach at Service schools if said schools refuse to conform to AAUP demands? Wouldn't most, if not all Faculty members currently teaching at Service schools take the hit anyway (those that are AAUP members anyway) and remain with the schools? Or could Faculty find themselves caught anyways?
Last edited by Norfolk; 12-08-2007 at 05:52 PM.
John:
This is one of Clausewitz's greatest one-lines and one of my favorites too. And I agree with your point about the continuing relevance of the Prussian. Which is why I was very much bothered by FM 3-24 when its writers chose--chose--to leave Clausewitz off of the classics reading list. This was more than a simple omission but instead an intentional mechanism by the writers of the FM to "rewire" the thinking of soldiers and marines away from "conventional warfare" toward the light of Counterinsurgency operations. What else could explain the omission from an important doctrinal manual of war of one of the greatest theorists of war of all time?
gian
one liner:
One we too often forget..."Principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference."
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Current faculty might. But it puts enormous pressure on faculty considering recruitment to the schools, I'd imagine; most undergraduate and graduate-level instructors are members of AAUP, I'm given to understand (from chatting w/ my former prof).
Also, more critically, attacking the service schools could well put the accreditation of the service academies into question, as well. -Those- institutions absolutely need accreditation for their degrees.
Steve: Does anybody even -look- at the accreditation of a degree? I understand it's required for civilian schools that want federal funding, but how does accreditation even help NPS?
I think the 80s were more El Salvador. I once compared American capability to a phoenix that periodically dies a dramatic death and then is reborn out of the ashes.
The current debate, though, is different in some important ways. During those earlier manifestations, no one (or almost no one) argued that counterinsurgency, small wars, pacification, stabilization, low intensity conflict, operations other than war, irregular conflict, or whatever should be THE primary mission of the American military (or at least the ground forces). It was always seen as an additional added task. The debate was over what portion of the effort, funds, and personnel it required. But that portion was always small.
Now there is darned near a consensus that it should be THE focus of at least the ground forces. (And, if Charlie Dunlap has his way, the Air Force as well lest its budget and force be adjusted to better reflect its diminished role in American strategy).
You're closer to the Pentafont of all knowledge than I am -- if that thought is running around E-Ring, we'll be in trouble. We need to be able to do it, I don't question that -- but any 'focus' on less than full spectrum is not at all smart."Now there is darned near a consensus that it should be THE focus of at least the ground forces. (And, if Charlie Dunlap has his way, the Air Force as well lest its budget and force be adjusted to better reflect its diminished role in American strategy)."
As the overwhelming capabilities of any nations defense rely on its ability to defend but also to project its power to much realignment could very quickly translate into loss of some of the international momentum gained thus far.
Just as the point behind having overwhelming force is to encourage lack of a need for it, if it doesn't exist it is almost guaranteed to be needed
Gian--
I pulled the quote from Max and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which is a book about small wars of all kinds. We think that not only Clausewitz but Sun Tzu as well are as eminently relevant to small wars as they are to large ones.
I truly do not understand why the authors of FM 3-24 failed to mention Saint Carl as they should have. But, in the words of Hanford's Law, "Never attribute to malice what is adequately explained by stupidity." Not that I think the authors are/were stupid but rather, I suspect they just didn't think of it and nobody caught the omission. Perhaps, someone who was in on the vetting of the manual can offer a more profound explanation.
Cheers
JohnT
Last edited by SWJED; 12-09-2007 at 12:24 AM. Reason: Fix italics.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
- Sun Tzu
Keeping in mind that 12-month combat tours are a marathon and 15-month combat tours are not wise, IMHO ‘Big Army’ would benefit from adopting the SOF model of regional specialization for both ‘small wars’ and large ones. By this I suggest that units, and key leaders in particular, return to the same AO again and again.
My boots on the ground view during 03’-04’ in Mosul was that the application of sufficient and carefully targeted security, respect, and resources led to the establishment of personal relationships with those inhabiting local power structures. Effective cultural and linguistic skills were key to this effort. Ongoing maintenance of these relationships led to relative stability. OIF 1 had time to ‘get up to speed’.
The rotation of all key US personnel during 04’ however, completely disrupted these relationships and this disruption was further compounded by the replacement of a Division sized force by a BCT sized force. The fragile equilibrium was shattered and key Iraqi’s began to leave or were killed. Local power structures crumbled and a downward spiral began: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2004) .
3-24 and COIN practice at JRTC, NTC, & Hohenfels take into account current conditions and are needed for our ‘full spectrum capabilities’ however, a balance needs to be found instead of an almost exclusive small or large war focus.
Strategically, effective teamwork skills are lacking and ‘those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.’ still applies. It’s a tough nut.
I say this respectfully to you, Steve; but I believe that you are wrong. As soon as we develop theories and arguments to show that a "counterinsurgency war" like Iraq is not war that it is something else then that is what causes us to loose and not the other way around as you say. Would, say for example, Cavguy, or RTK, or former operator Tom Odom agree that counterinsurgency is not war, or even except your premise that even if it is then we need to adjust our thinking in how we view it and change it into something else so that we can mire ourselves in places like Iraq for generations?
And I don’t think you can parse things so neatly as to say well at the tactical level for the lieutenant or captain it is war but at the higher strategic and political level it is not. That sort of thinking is wrongheaded and attempts to place war into a neatly compartmentalized analytical box with no true meaning as to the inter-connected relationship of millions of variables that defines war in all of its levels and conditions.
gian
Bookmarks