“’Dishonest Doctrine:’ Or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Coin Doctrine”

[Gian P Gentile]

If you are a true believer in the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine then don’t read Ralph Peters’s critique of it in the most recent edition of Armed Forces Journal because your mind won’t be changed.

However, if you believe it is the duty of the intellectual, as Carl Becker once said, “to think otherwise,” then you should. In this piece Peters questions the underlying premises of the new doctrine by pointing out its hyper-reliance and very selective use of certain historical “lessons” while not considering others. Although he does not mention him explicitly, the pen of Peters implicitly lacerates LTC John Nagl and his role in the writing of the new doctrine. According to Peters, certain individuals have used their position as primary writers of the new doctrine to “validate” their own personal theories…at the expense of our men and women in uniform.” In his most strident remark Peters states that “doctrine should be written by successful battlefield commanders, not by doctors of philosophy playing soldier.”

I am not a true believer in the things that Ralph Peters writes. Some of his stuff is quite good but if you follow his writings there are huge inconsistencies and contradictions that he never comes close to trying to resolve. Although in this piece he makes a valiant try at it but he fails miserably. On the one hand he criticizes the American new Coin doctrine but on the other hand he lavishes praise on General Patraeus for moving beyond it and fighting the war in Iraq the way Peters thinks it should be fought. Arguably General Patraeus and his team have been following the new Coin doctrine to a “T.” As I see it Peters’s problem is that he really does believe there are serious problems with the new Coin doctrine but his political interests as a hard-line conservative who writes for a conservative New York City newspaper forces him to write about the successes of the Coin doctrine inspired Surge. You can judge but in my mind in this piece he did not come close to resolving this contradiction.

I am not a true believer in Peters or in FM 3-24 so if you too are not then I commend his article to you.

gentile

[SteveMetz]

If you are a true believer in the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine then don’t read Ralph Peters’s critique of it in the most recent edition of Armed Forces Journal because your mind won’t be changed.

However, if you believe it is the duty of the intellectual, as Carl Becker once said, “to think otherwise,” then you should. In this piece Peters questions the underlying premises of the new doctrine by pointing out its hyper-reliance and very selective use of certain historical “lessons” while not considering others. Although he does not mention him explicitly, the pen of Peters implicitly lacerates LTC John Nagl and his role in the writing of the new doctrine. According to Peters, certain individuals have used their position as primary writers of the new doctrine to “validate” their own personal theories…at the expense of our men and women in uniform.” In his most strident remark Peters states that “doctrine should be written by successful battlefield commanders, not by doctors of philosophy playing soldier.”

I am not a true believer in the things that Ralph Peters writes. Some of his stuff is quite good but if you follow his writings there are huge inconsistencies and contradictions that he never comes close to trying to resolve. Although in this piece he makes a valiant try at it but he fails miserably. On the one hand he criticizes the American new Coin doctrine but on the other hand he lavishes praise on General Patraeus for moving beyond it and fighting the war in Iraq the way Peters thinks it should be fought. Arguably General Patraeus and his team have been following the new Coin doctrine to a “T.” As I see it Peters’s problem is that he really does believe there are serious problems with the new Coin doctrine but his political interests as a hard-line conservative who writes for a conservative New York City newspaper forces him to write about the successes of the Coin doctrine inspired Surge. You can judge but in my mind in this piece he did not come close to resolving this contradiction.

I am not a true believer in Peters or in FM 3-24 so if you too are not then I commend his article to you.

gentile

As always, I'm green with envy over Ralph's way with words. But this hasn't shifted me from my long held position: in the broadest sense, there are two approaches to counterinsurgency. Treat it like war and either kill or cow those who oppose you (call it the "Roman" method). Or try and minimize the extent to which it is like war, stress the political and economic, and try and win support thereby undercutting the insurgency (call this the "British" method).

My feeling is that history suggests that the Roman method is more effective. The British method takes much longer and has a lower probability of success. But American strategic culture has simply taken the Roman method off the table for us. Where, I think, Ralph and I diverge is that I don't believe that even the most articulate national leadership can sell the American public on it. The British were able to deviate from their own method--South Africa and, to some degree, Kenya--specifically because their public was not as engaged in the course of colonial wars as our public is in small wars. American strategic culture may be a terrible impediment, but we cannot wish it away. So we're left with the British method even given all of its complications and shortcomings.

Of course, my own recommendation is that we not use EITHER method. But that's another story.

[slapout9]

Steve Metz, so lets here the rest of the story, what method would you use?

[SteveMetz]

Steve Metz, so lets here the rest of the story, what method would you use?

Being the pathologically lazy son of a firearm that I am, let me just answer by quoting myself:

If, in fact, insurgency is not simply a variant of war, if the real threat is the deleterious effects of sustained conflict, and if it is part of systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the conflict, the objective of counterinsurgency support should not be simply strengthening the government so that it can impose its will more effectively on the insurgents, but systemic reengineering. The most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be a neutral mediator and peacekeeper (even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents). If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances.

Outside of the historic American geographic area of concern (the Caribbean basin), the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition. Unless the world community is willing to form a neo-trusteeship such as in Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor in order to reconstruct the administration, security system, and civil society of a state in conflict, the best that can be done is ameliorating, as much as possible, the human suffering associated with the violence by creating internationally-protected “safe areas.” In most cases, American strategic resources are better spent attempting to prevent insurgency or containing it when it does occur. Clearly systemic reengineering is not a task for the United States acting alone. Nor is it a task for the U.S. military. When the United States is part of a stabilization coalition, the primary role for the U.S. military should be protecting civilians until other security forces, preferably local ones but possibly coalition units, can assume that task.

To summarize, then, American strategy for counterinsurgency should recognize three distinct insurgency settings, each demanding a different response:
•A functioning government with at least some degree of legitimacy can be rescued by Foreign Internal Defense.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government but a broad international and regional consensus supports the creation of a neo-trusteeship until systemic reengineering is completed. In such instances, the United States should provide military, economic, and political support as part of a multinational force operating under the authority of the UN.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government and no international or regional consensus for the formation of a neo-trusteeship. In these cases, the United States should pursue containment of the conflict by support to regional states and, in conjunction with partners, help create humanitarian “safe zones” within the conflictive state.

[wm]

As always, I'm green with envy over Ralph's way with words. But this hasn't shifted me from my long held position: in the broadest sense, there are two approaches to counterinsurgency. Treat it like war and either kill or cow those who oppose you (call it the "Roman" method). Or try and minimize the extent to which it is like war, stress the political and economic, and try and win support thereby undercutting the insurgency (call this the "British" method).

My feeling is that history suggests that the Roman method is more effective. The British method takes much longer and has a lower probability of success. But American strategic culture has simply taken the Roman method off the table for us. Where, I think, Ralph and I diverge is that I don't believe that even the most articulate national leadership can sell the American public on it. So we're left with the British method even given all of its complications and shortcomings.

Of course, my own recommendation is that we not use EITHER method. But that's another story.

Steve,
On another thread I argued that a third option exists, which I won't rehearse here. However, I thnk the following quotation from a 2002 piece by Michael McClintock is very instructive. (I know nothing else about him except what this web site tells me)

The British, like the French and the Portuguese, were fighting insurgencies on territories they claimed as their own and administered on their own authority. U.S. forces were nominally "guests" of counterinsurgency states, while pursing the same ends as their colonialist counterparts. Some of the contrasts—and similarities—of the counterinsurgency doctrines of the European powers and the new U.S. doctrine were, as a consequence, inescapable.

Context link is here. The title page/TOC of the whole work is found here

Your Roman model probably works when you are in a position like the British, French, and Portuguese--that is you "own the territory"--that's why the anti-Mau Mau campaign in Kenya that Peters cited worked, IMHO.
I think that your "British" method gets applied when you do not have the military resources (or political will) to be come a conqueror who can then use the Roman method. Other pieces for discriminating between the two iinclude issues of how much time one wants to devote to resolving the problem and how long the problem has be going on. We used to talk about Phase I, II, and III insurgencies, and we used to identify that different methids needed to be applied to those different phases--the more entrenched the insurgents were, the more force was needed.

Prevailing against an uprising (I've chosen this term to get around the whole civil war/ insurgency /revolt/rebellion/revolution casuistry) is not a one (or two) size fits all proposition. Doctrine is similar. I was always taught that regulations are a guide for commander--they choose to obey them or not. I submit that doctrine is the same thing. Each of these bodies of knowledge gives leaders and their organizations a baseline from which to improvise as the situation dictates.

Ralph Peters may be right about the selective use of examples. However, I think he does military leaders a disservice by expecting that they will not see that for themselves and adapt the doctrine as required by their current suituation.

[SteveMetz]

Mike gave me a copy of his book a couple of months ago but I haven't read it, so am not positioned to comment on it.

My big points (using the term loosely) in this thread are:

1) Because the strategic context of counterinsurgency is so frustrating, Americans tend to devolve to the operational and tactical which we're pretty good at. But it doesn't work. Re: Vietnam.

2) Political leadership can change some things about the way Americans view the world but there also some immutable characteristics. One of these is that we aren't going to use the "mailed fist" approach to pacification particularly in today's post-racist, transparent, interconnected world.

[Ken White]

...
My big points (using the term loosely) in this thread are:

1) Because the strategic context of counterinsurgency is so frustrating, Americans tend to devolve to the operational and tactical which we're pretty good at. But it doesn't work. Re: Vietnam.

2) Political leadership can change some things about the way Americans view the world but there also some immutable characteristics. One of these is that we aren't going to use the "mailed fist" approach to pacification particularly in today's post-racist, transparent, interconnected world.

Agreed. This is appropriate, I think:

"In default of knowing how to do what they ought, they are led very naturally to do what they know"

Marshal Maurice Comte de Saxe; Mes Reveries, 1756

To the point, there's the old country song "Do what you do do well, Boy." We have strengths. As Steve said, we're better'n the average Bear at the operational and tactical. I cannot believe that we cannot shape things to use our strength and avoid catering to two of our national weaknesses, impatience and dislike of the tedious.

IMO, we do not do COIN that well on a large scale because that causes an over commitment of excessive rank into the theater and smart aggressive people want to do smart aggressive things -- and they are generally impatient, both undue aggressiveness and impatience are not good things in a COIN operation. Admittedly, that can be remedied with better professional education and training at all levels but the proclivity is unlikely to be eliminated. See de Saxe, above.

Add to that the kinder, gentler public persona, the sound bite mentality and instant gratification capability of US society today coupled with immediate mass communication, our bureaucracy versus their flexibility and a major COIN effort is an invitation to problems. As we have seen twice in the last 40 odd years...

Yet, there are those who adapt well to the COIN mentality and we are capable of producing units who can do it well -- the problem is that everyone does not adapt to that environment well. We should use those who do and not send those who do not. To me, that implies small low key and early commitments of dedicated and trained SOF and reliance on large quantities of MPF only in very rare and extreme cases -- which should be avoided if at all possible.

That is not to say that the MPF should not receive some COIN training, they should -- the key word being SOME. They particularly must know what to do in the immediate aftermath of a win in major combat and be able to do it right to forestall an insurgency getting started...

Thus, I think Gian is correct as well; full spectrum for the MPF with an emphasis on high intensity combat -- but there is always a need for some specialists to do special things...

Norfolk also has a point, we are bad about that pendulum bit, we tend to overreact to stimuli and go a step -- or a bridge -- too far. We are really old enough to temper that.

That means, post Iraq, that we must not throw COIN out the window -- nor should we adopt it as the new mantra; we need to be full spectrum and our skill and strength lie in the conventional realm; we should play to our strength. While I believe we need to avoid COIN efforts on a large scale (note that is, again, emphasized) for many reasons, mostly US political and societal but also for some very practical geo-political reasons, we need to have the capability to get some low key but fully (even excessively) funded expert COIN efforts going early on.

Where is Global Scout when we need him...

[Rank amateur]

I believe this statement from the article is flat out wrong:

"Given the responsibility of command, he recognized that, when all the frills are stripped away, counterinsurgency warfare is about killing those who need killing,"

I believe we are bribing, negotiating with and even training people who used to attacks us.

I also think "the only doctrine" statement is overblown. I don't want to speak for Cavguy, but I'm pretty sure that if he ran into a fleet of 50 enemy tanks he wouldn't try to negotiate with them.

[Surferbeetle]

To the point, there's the old country song "Do what you do do well, Boy." We have strengths. As Steve said, we're better'n the average Bear at the operational and tactical. I cannot believe that we cannot shape things to use our strength and avoid catering to two of our national weaknesses, impatience and dislike of the tedious.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
- Sun Tzu

Keeping in mind that 12-month combat tours are a marathon and 15-month combat tours are not wise, IMHO ‘Big Army’ would benefit from adopting the SOF model of regional specialization for both ‘small wars’ and large ones. By this I suggest that units, and key leaders in particular, return to the same AO again and again.

My boots on the ground view during 03’-04’ in Mosul was that the application of sufficient and carefully targeted security, respect, and resources led to the establishment of personal relationships with those inhabiting local power structures. Effective cultural and linguistic skills were key to this effort. Ongoing maintenance of these relationships led to relative stability. OIF 1 had time to ‘get up to speed’.

The rotation of all key US personnel during 04’ however, completely disrupted these relationships and this disruption was further compounded by the replacement of a Division sized force by a BCT sized force. The fragile equilibrium was shattered and key Iraqi’s began to leave or were killed. Local power structures crumbled and a downward spiral began: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2004) .

3-24 and COIN practice at JRTC, NTC, & Hohenfels take into account current conditions and are needed for our ‘full spectrum capabilities’ however, a balance needs to be found instead of an almost exclusive small or large war focus.

Strategically, effective teamwork skills are lacking and ‘those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.’ still applies. It’s a tough nut.

[Cavguy]

Although he does not mention him explicitly, the pen of Peters implicitly lacerates LTC John Nagl and his role in the writing of the new doctrine. According to Peters, certain individuals have used their position as primary writers of the new doctrine to “validate” their own personal theories…at the expense of our men and women in uniform.” In his most strident remark Peters states that “doctrine should be written by successful battlefield commanders, not by doctors of philosophy playing soldier.”

I guess this begs the question I haven't asked you yet - I have read your criticisms of 3-24 and enjoyed our private emails - but what is your alternative? I saw reference to the need to acknowledge the utility of lethal operations in COIN (to wit I agree, if done right), but no alternative doctrine/mindset that should be followed.

On its face, every publicized tactical/operational success we have had in Iraq was essentially based in the FM 3-24 doctrine/mindset. Short list - Tal Afar 05-06, Mosul 06 , Ramadi 06-07, Dialaya mid 07, Baghdad late 07. All employed FM 3-24 at the root of the pacification strategy, and all have seen success. For a "dishonest doctrine" that's a pretty good record.

Arguably General Patraeus and his team have been following the new Coin doctrine to a “T.” As I see it Peters’s problem is that he really does believe there are serious problems with the new Coin doctrine but his political interests as a hard-line conservative who writes for a conservative New York City newspaper forces him to write about the successes of the Coin doctrine inspired Surge.

That's what has been driving me nuts about Peters - a fan of the Roman approach who sings Petraeus who uses the British approach.

And let's be realistic - we could never wage COIN as we did in the Phillipines in today's media enviornment. It might sound nice and we may gnash our teeth at not being able to do street executions, burn villages, and terrorize populace - but we're not going to do that as the USA in the early 21st century. So again I ask, what is the alternative for operational/tactical doctrine?

[Steve Blair]

And let's be realistic - we could never wage COIN as we did in the Phillipines in today's media enviornment. It might sound nice and we may gnash our teeth at not being able to do street executions, burn villages, and terrorize populace - but we're not going to do that as the USA in the early 21st century. So again I ask, what is the alternative for operational/tactical doctrine?

And as a sort of follow-up to that: how do we craft workable doctrine that allows us to avoid the damned "either/or" mindset that does us so much damage? We seem set on having "either" a COIN force "or" one that can do high-intensity conflict, without examining the possibility that we may be able to configure doctrine and training that would allow for at least some capability in both areas with enough flexibility to come up to speed for COIN or major conflict when required. This is nothing new (the Army fought the entire Indian Wars period with tactics/doctrine modeled on Europe and intended to wage a war against a major power, and we saw it again in Vietnam for at least the first 2-3 years), and I think technology (and the US dependence on same) has accelerated the trend in many ways. And with a realistic view of the world indicating that we're likely to take part in more COIN situations and mid-intensity conflicts (not one or the other, unless we can manage to retreat totally into isolationism...something we've never quite managed to do), it's only wise to prepare for both eventualities and not the one we would most prefer.

With Peters, we've had doctrine written by "successful battlefield commanders" discarded by other "successful battlefield commanders" who didn't agree with it. I think in his quest for absolutes he misses some important historical points.

[Gian P Gentile]

...So again I ask, what is the alternative for operational/tactical doctrine?

We dont need an alternative for Coin Doctrine because the new FM 3-24 as i stated up front in my "Eating Soup with a Spoon" piece is excellent doctrinal writing. As counterinsurgency doctrine it has its place. But the point i have been trying to make is that now its place in the Army is that it has become our FM 3-0, operational doctrine. And it has come to this without serious question or thought, which is why I have been making thread postings like this one. The American Army needs to acknowledge that we have become a counterinsurgency only force, and then we need to seriously debate this issue and where it is taking us in the future.

Moreover, because 3-24 has become our defacto operational doctrine without thought or serious questioning it has dogmatically determined our actions in Iraq. It also causes us to conclude that results in Iraq are directly due to the application of the Surge and our new doctrine. Your own quote in this thread attests to this:

On its face, every publicized tactical/operational success we have had in Iraq was essentially based in the FM 3-24 doctrine/mindset. Short list - Tal Afar 05-06, Mosul 06 , Ramadi 06-07, Dialaya mid 07, Baghdad late 07. All employed FM 3-24 at the root of the pacification strategy, and all have seen success.

The truth of the matter is that we really dont know what were the necessary causes for the recent lowering of violence. At a minimum it was brought about by a mix of many factors to include the Surge. In the extreme, as Macgregor argues, the Surge has had really nothing to due with the lowering of violence. Your statement, however, shows how Coin doctrine has moved beyond a general guide for action and has become prescriptive for action and it determines how we view the past.

Steve Metz sums things up very well in a previous posting on this thread with a quote that he takes from his excellent article on Coin:

To summarize, then, American strategy for counterinsurgency should recognize three distinct insurgency settings, each demanding a different response:
•A functioning government with at least some degree of legitimacy can be rescued by Foreign Internal Defense.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government but a broad international and regional consensus supports the creation of a neo-trusteeship until systemic reengineering is completed. In such instances, the United States should provide military, economic, and political support as part of a multinational force operating under the authority of the UN.
•There is no functioning and legitimate government and no international or regional consensus for the formation of a neo-trusteeship. In these cases, the United States should pursue containment of the conflict by support to regional states and, in conjunction with partners, help create humanitarian “safe zones” within the conflictive state.

The American Army's consumation with Coin precludes us from seeing the world as Steve describes and makes us think that with just enough competent units using FM 3-24 we can pulverize what are intractable problems that pose distinct limits to the use of American military power that Steve outlines above.

This is why I posted the Peters piece. To get us to start thinking about where we are at as an Army.

gentile

[SteveMetz]

The American Army's consumation with Coin precludes us from seeing the world as Steve describes and makes us think that with just enough competent units using FM 3-24 we can pulverize what are intractable problems that pose distinct limits to the use of American military power that Steve outlines above.

Excellent point. When I was a kid in Scottsdale, I was getting bullied (actually by Amanda Blake's kids--you old fogies will remember her). So my Dad gave me like two boxing lessons. That made me just confident enough that I managed to get myself beaten up. At this point the USG has had two boxing lessons.

[Norfolk]

We dont need an alternative for Coin Doctrine because the new FM 3-24 as i stated up front in my "Eating Soup with a Spoon" piece is excellent doctrinal writing. As counterinsurgency doctrine it has its place. But the point i have been trying to make is that now its place in the Army is that it has become our FM 3-0, operational doctrine. And it has come to this without serious question or thought, which is why I have been making thread postings like this one. The American Army needs to acknowledge that we have become a counterinsurgency only force, and then we need to seriously debate this issue and where it is taking us in the future.

Moreover, because 3-24 has become our defacto operational doctrine without thought or serious questioning it has dogmatically determined our actions in Iraq. It also causes us to conclude that results in Iraq are directly due to the application of the Surge and our new doctrine.[]

The truth of the matter is that we really dont know what were the necessary causes for the recent lowering of violence. At a minimum it was brought about by a mix of many factors to include the Surge. In the extreme, as Macgregor argues, the Surge has had really nothing to due with the lowering of violence. Your statement, however, shows how Coin doctrine has moved beyond a general guide for action and has become prescriptive for action and it determines how we view the past.[]

The American Army's consumation with Coin precludes us from seeing the world as Steve describes and makes us think that with just enough competent units using FM 3-24 we can pulverize what are intractable problems that pose distinct limits to the use of American military power that Steve outlines above.

This is why I posted the Peters piece. To get us to start thinking about where we are at as an Army.

gentile

It is the recurring problem, that Doctrine is reduced to prescription or even just "fashion" so to speak. Doctrine has long been treated as much less than a way of helping one to learn about a problem, than to simply condition one to accept a more-or-less generic "solution" to a more-or-less generic problem. And add the political pressure from above to this, and the result is, well, something perhaps more akin to a fad than to even a prescription. And when thinking becomes so proscribed, professional military judgement may become spotty, even blinkered.

As Col. Gentile points out, FM-3-24 has indeed effectively replaced FM 3-0 as the Army's (and maybe the Marines') capstone operational-level doctrine. The most troubling effect of this is not even how this affects judgements regarding how things are unfolding in Iraq, but how this will affect the professional perspective and judgement of the Army as a whole, across the entire range of military matters. If the Army found itself having to wage a conventional war in the not-so-distant future, it would be ill-equipped in its frame of mind (not to mention training, etc.) for such an event.

It seems the Army just can't break itself out of these mad pendulum swings from one extreme to the other and just be able to reform itself with a true flexible mindset, institutionally (there are plenty of clear, flexible thinkers inside the Army itself), when it comes to thinking in general and the role and application of doctrine in particular. FM 3-24 appears to be just fine for the more specific requirements of COIN, but it must be used as such within the general framework of FM 3-0, and the latter requires that the Army keep its mind fully open to the requirements of, and potential for, non-COIN roles and missions (and thus, requiring the Army to be a general-purpose force in mindset and function - admittedly, far easier said than done). That might help the Army to begin to find its "centre" so to speak. And that in turn might provide a better perspective for looking at and judging the situation in Iraq.

[Penta]

Stupid question: Why bother with "neo-" trusteeships?

Why not just resurrect the Trusteeship Council?

[SteveMetz]

Stupid question: Why bother with "neo-" trusteeships?

Why not just resurrect the Trusteeship Council?

Dunno. I just picked up the phrase from the current literature. I think it is to distinguish them from the first generation, post-colonial ones.

[Dr Jack]

We dont need an alternative for Coin Doctrine because the new FM 3-24 as i stated up front in my "Eating Soup with a Spoon" piece is excellent doctrinal writing. As counterinsurgency doctrine it has its place. But the point i have been trying to make is that now its place in the Army is that it has become our FM 3-0, operational doctrine. And it has come to this without serious question or thought, which is why I have been making thread postings like this one...

Moreover, because 3-24 has become our defacto operational doctrine without thought or serious questioning it has dogmatically determined our actions in Iraq.

One of the issues that impacts this directly is the status of FM 3-0 -- we are still in the "DRAG" (Doctrine Review and Approval Group) phase; this creates the condition where the current FM 3-0 is from 2001 and out of date.

[John T. Fishel]

Gian--

I pulled the quote from Max and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which is a book about small wars of all kinds. We think that not only Clausewitz but Sun Tzu as well are as eminently relevant to small wars as they are to large ones.

I truly do not understand why the authors of FM 3-24 failed to mention Saint Carl as they should have. But, in the words of Hanford's Law, "Never attribute to malice what is adequately explained by stupidity." Not that I think the authors are/were stupid but rather, I suspect they just didn't think of it and nobody caught the omission. Perhaps, someone who was in on the vetting of the manual can offer a more profound explanation.

Cheers

JohnT