“’Dishonest Doctrine:’ Or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Coin Doctrine”

[wm]

As always, I'm green with envy over Ralph's way with words. But this hasn't shifted me from my long held position: in the broadest sense, there are two approaches to counterinsurgency. Treat it like war and either kill or cow those who oppose you (call it the "Roman" method). Or try and minimize the extent to which it is like war, stress the political and economic, and try and win support thereby undercutting the insurgency (call this the "British" method).

My feeling is that history suggests that the Roman method is more effective. The British method takes much longer and has a lower probability of success. But American strategic culture has simply taken the Roman method off the table for us. Where, I think, Ralph and I diverge is that I don't believe that even the most articulate national leadership can sell the American public on it. So we're left with the British method even given all of its complications and shortcomings.

Of course, my own recommendation is that we not use EITHER method. But that's another story.

Steve,
On another thread I argued that a third option exists, which I won't rehearse here. However, I thnk the following quotation from a 2002 piece by Michael McClintock is very instructive. (I know nothing else about him except what this web site tells me)

The British, like the French and the Portuguese, were fighting insurgencies on territories they claimed as their own and administered on their own authority. U.S. forces were nominally "guests" of counterinsurgency states, while pursing the same ends as their colonialist counterparts. Some of the contrasts—and similarities—of the counterinsurgency doctrines of the European powers and the new U.S. doctrine were, as a consequence, inescapable.

Context link is here. The title page/TOC of the whole work is found here

Your Roman model probably works when you are in a position like the British, French, and Portuguese--that is you "own the territory"--that's why the anti-Mau Mau campaign in Kenya that Peters cited worked, IMHO.
I think that your "British" method gets applied when you do not have the military resources (or political will) to be come a conqueror who can then use the Roman method. Other pieces for discriminating between the two iinclude issues of how much time one wants to devote to resolving the problem and how long the problem has be going on. We used to talk about Phase I, II, and III insurgencies, and we used to identify that different methids needed to be applied to those different phases--the more entrenched the insurgents were, the more force was needed.

Prevailing against an uprising (I've chosen this term to get around the whole civil war/ insurgency /revolt/rebellion/revolution casuistry) is not a one (or two) size fits all proposition. Doctrine is similar. I was always taught that regulations are a guide for commander--they choose to obey them or not. I submit that doctrine is the same thing. Each of these bodies of knowledge gives leaders and their organizations a baseline from which to improvise as the situation dictates.

Ralph Peters may be right about the selective use of examples. However, I think he does military leaders a disservice by expecting that they will not see that for themselves and adapt the doctrine as required by their current suituation.

[SteveMetz]

Mike gave me a copy of his book a couple of months ago but I haven't read it, so am not positioned to comment on it.

My big points (using the term loosely) in this thread are:

1) Because the strategic context of counterinsurgency is so frustrating, Americans tend to devolve to the operational and tactical which we're pretty good at. But it doesn't work. Re: Vietnam.

2) Political leadership can change some things about the way Americans view the world but there also some immutable characteristics. One of these is that we aren't going to use the "mailed fist" approach to pacification particularly in today's post-racist, transparent, interconnected world.

[Ken White]

...
My big points (using the term loosely) in this thread are:

1) Because the strategic context of counterinsurgency is so frustrating, Americans tend to devolve to the operational and tactical which we're pretty good at. But it doesn't work. Re: Vietnam.

2) Political leadership can change some things about the way Americans view the world but there also some immutable characteristics. One of these is that we aren't going to use the "mailed fist" approach to pacification particularly in today's post-racist, transparent, interconnected world.

Agreed. This is appropriate, I think:

"In default of knowing how to do what they ought, they are led very naturally to do what they know"

Marshal Maurice Comte de Saxe; Mes Reveries, 1756

To the point, there's the old country song "Do what you do do well, Boy." We have strengths. As Steve said, we're better'n the average Bear at the operational and tactical. I cannot believe that we cannot shape things to use our strength and avoid catering to two of our national weaknesses, impatience and dislike of the tedious.

IMO, we do not do COIN that well on a large scale because that causes an over commitment of excessive rank into the theater and smart aggressive people want to do smart aggressive things -- and they are generally impatient, both undue aggressiveness and impatience are not good things in a COIN operation. Admittedly, that can be remedied with better professional education and training at all levels but the proclivity is unlikely to be eliminated. See de Saxe, above.

Add to that the kinder, gentler public persona, the sound bite mentality and instant gratification capability of US society today coupled with immediate mass communication, our bureaucracy versus their flexibility and a major COIN effort is an invitation to problems. As we have seen twice in the last 40 odd years...

Yet, there are those who adapt well to the COIN mentality and we are capable of producing units who can do it well -- the problem is that everyone does not adapt to that environment well. We should use those who do and not send those who do not. To me, that implies small low key and early commitments of dedicated and trained SOF and reliance on large quantities of MPF only in very rare and extreme cases -- which should be avoided if at all possible.

That is not to say that the MPF should not receive some COIN training, they should -- the key word being SOME. They particularly must know what to do in the immediate aftermath of a win in major combat and be able to do it right to forestall an insurgency getting started...

Thus, I think Gian is correct as well; full spectrum for the MPF with an emphasis on high intensity combat -- but there is always a need for some specialists to do special things...

Norfolk also has a point, we are bad about that pendulum bit, we tend to overreact to stimuli and go a step -- or a bridge -- too far. We are really old enough to temper that.

That means, post Iraq, that we must not throw COIN out the window -- nor should we adopt it as the new mantra; we need to be full spectrum and our skill and strength lie in the conventional realm; we should play to our strength. While I believe we need to avoid COIN efforts on a large scale (note that is, again, emphasized) for many reasons, mostly US political and societal but also for some very practical geo-political reasons, we need to have the capability to get some low key but fully (even excessively) funded expert COIN efforts going early on.

Where is Global Scout when we need him...

[Rank amateur]

I believe this statement from the article is flat out wrong:

"Given the responsibility of command, he recognized that, when all the frills are stripped away, counterinsurgency warfare is about killing those who need killing,"

I believe we are bribing, negotiating with and even training people who used to attacks us.

I also think "the only doctrine" statement is overblown. I don't want to speak for Cavguy, but I'm pretty sure that if he ran into a fleet of 50 enemy tanks he wouldn't try to negotiate with them.

[Ken White]

I believe this statement from the article is flat out wrong:

"Given the responsibility of command, he recognized that, when all the frills are stripped away, counterinsurgency warfare is about killing those who need killing,"

I believe we are bribing, negotiating with and even training people who used to attacks us.

We are doing both those things at the same time, the message is "You can get some bucks by chilling or you can be dead -- your choice." Works for me and sounds like a plan. The Byzantines developed it into an art form; the Brits do it well. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, not at all. In fact, they're all part of the effort. The object is to get them to stop attacking; whatever works. Google Chieu Hoi for just one example.

So Ralph is hyperbolic and can be annoying but he isn't wrong in that case.

[Rank amateur]

can be annoying but he isn't wrong in that case.

To me "killing those who need to be killed" doesn't imply, "unless they'd rather have a check," but I fully admit that I don't understand a lot of the technical military jargon.

If I needed to make a list of people who insisted that we keep repeating things that didn't work in Iraq, it would be a long list, but none of the COIN doctrine writers would be on it.

I do, however, think that it's not very productive to argue over tactics. Even I know that the best tactic is whatever works, the more tactics you master, the more likely that you'll be able to handle every situation, an unexpected tactic may work better than a more "textbook" response and repeating tactics makes you predictable and therefore defeatable. Like you said: if killing works great. If writing checks works great too.

[Ken White]

To me "killing those who need to be killed" doesn't imply, "unless they'd rather have a check," but I fully admit that I don't understand a lot of the technical military jargon.

killed." Everyone, particularly in Iraq, who shoots at us is not a die hard enemy (who does need to be killed); if those of light conviction can be turned, everyone is better off. It makes no sense to kill people just because they shot at you -- particularly when, after all, you shot at them. Just nail the ones who aren't willing to quit shooting while turning the others...

If I needed to make a list of people who insisted that we keep repeating things that didn't work in Iraq, it would be a long list, but none of the COIN doctrine writers would be on it.

Actually, there aren't that many people who insisted we keep repeating things that didn't work, less than a half dozen who mattered and could actually make what they wanted happen. You also need to wrestle with the military problem of 'command prerogative' -- he who is in command gets to decide how he (or she) will operate and the system gives them latitude to do that. Thus, Franks (later Abizaid) would not get too dictatorial with Sanchez (later Casey) nor would the CJCS get too rigid with either Franks or Abizaid. While that creates some occasional problems, it is sensible and shouldn't be changed.

What does need to be changed is dumping the foolish idea that all Commanders are equal; they are not. Congress has tied the hands of every Administration since 1980 by making Generals virtually untouchable by the Civilian leadership and by insisting that everyone take their turn at jobs. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) was an effort to correct some ills and to be fair -- as is usual for products of inside the Beltway kneejerk experts, they overdid it. DOPMA makes it difficult to put the right senior person in the right job; DOPMA and some systemic over caution.

I'd also suggest the COIN doctrine writers are not error free; FM 3-24 is far from being the best FM I've seen. They produced a philosophy, not a manual -- and that philosophy had essentially been created in the early 60s -- it just got buried and forgotten in the interim. They just regurgitated most of it...

I do, however, think that it's not very productive to argue over tactics. Even I know that the best tactic is whatever works, the more tactics you master, the more likely that you'll be able to handle every situation, an unexpected tactic may work better than a more "textbook" response and repeating tactics makes you predictable and therefore defeatable. Like you said: if killing works great. If writing checks works great too.

Arguing may not be all that productive but discussion can be informative.

Textbook responses should always be avoided at all costs, Doctrine can be a strait jacket that way -- that's why Gian is worried (as are some others of us) that we will go overboard on the COIN mantra to the detriment of our ability to do other things. That really needs to be avoided...

[Surferbeetle]

To the point, there's the old country song "Do what you do do well, Boy." We have strengths. As Steve said, we're better'n the average Bear at the operational and tactical. I cannot believe that we cannot shape things to use our strength and avoid catering to two of our national weaknesses, impatience and dislike of the tedious.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
- Sun Tzu

Keeping in mind that 12-month combat tours are a marathon and 15-month combat tours are not wise, IMHO ‘Big Army’ would benefit from adopting the SOF model of regional specialization for both ‘small wars’ and large ones. By this I suggest that units, and key leaders in particular, return to the same AO again and again.

My boots on the ground view during 03’-04’ in Mosul was that the application of sufficient and carefully targeted security, respect, and resources led to the establishment of personal relationships with those inhabiting local power structures. Effective cultural and linguistic skills were key to this effort. Ongoing maintenance of these relationships led to relative stability. OIF 1 had time to ‘get up to speed’.

The rotation of all key US personnel during 04’ however, completely disrupted these relationships and this disruption was further compounded by the replacement of a Division sized force by a BCT sized force. The fragile equilibrium was shattered and key Iraqi’s began to leave or were killed. Local power structures crumbled and a downward spiral began: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2004) .

3-24 and COIN practice at JRTC, NTC, & Hohenfels take into account current conditions and are needed for our ‘full spectrum capabilities’ however, a balance needs to be found instead of an almost exclusive small or large war focus.

Strategically, effective teamwork skills are lacking and ‘those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.’ still applies. It’s a tough nut.