“’Dishonest Doctrine:’ Or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Coin Doctrine”

[Ron Humphrey]

But Jill, Peters does point out the fact that FM 3-24 is hyper-reliant on two historical cases: the British in Malaya; and the French in Algeria specifically the writings of David Galula. In this regard his critique, I think, is valid. The manual turns A theory of Coin into a principle that has become law to the point of dogmatism. That is to say in any counterinsurgency operation the people must be the "center of gravity." Why does that, in theory and in practice, have to be so all of the time? When I attended the Coin Academy in Taji in December 2005 prior to assuming our battlespace we were told that very thing by the teachers of the course. When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy I was told that that is just the way it is.

I think one can envision a counterinsurgency fight where the people are not the center of gravity at all but the enemy force is. But because our Coin doctrine is so heavily focused on the Galula model it prescribes how we will understand any given Coin environment and then direct action accordingly in line with this principle; hence we become dogmatic and non-creative.

always good to be in touch with my old WP Seminarian friend.

no worries

gian

The problem with acceptance of people as the COG is something which one can become so easily sidetracked by the semantics of it and two I have never really understood.

If one is to look at the three main areas of interaction
-Tactical
-Operational
-Strategic

I think about tactical actions and how they involve movement or action in, around, with or against the populous.

At the Strategic level I think anyone has seen the damage which can be done by either strategic privates or one local with a camera, blog, or simply large family network.

Given that the Operational Level is generally in and out of both the other two Where are the People not the largest part of any long term COG.

I will agree that in any given situation or operation this may not be the case but I would think reasoning minds differentiate the when and who.

Please let me know what I'm missing in my thinking.
I am always eager to learn what I don't know

[Granite_State]

Takes a bit of a shot at you here Steve, the way I read what you wrote was that you were talking solely about utility, not morality.

As delightful as it is to see anybody deflate Ralph Peters (although Peters has trumpeted his “kill them all” tough guy rhetoric for so long that he’s become a parody of himself), it’s disturbing that as astute an observer as Steve Metz has forsworn counterinsurgency and is pining away for tactics based on mass killings and genocide (… that the Roman method is more effective).

Van Creveld makes a strong case in his latest book, The Changing Face of War, that this is true where local governments are fighting local insurgencies (which also covers Peters’ case of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya. Even there, however, the British were eventually forced out).

When it comes to suppressing insurgencies that are fighting foreign occupiers, however, nothing has worked very well since about the middle of the 20th century. The Belgians probably hold the modern record for use of the Roman method, killing by some estimates 50% of the local population in the Congo, but were still driven out. The Soviets didn’t hesitate to use it, and where is their empire? We killed several million people in Southeast Asia. Gen Hermann Balck told Boyd that shifting the Schwerpunkt towards Leningrad would probably have worked, but in the end, the excellence of the German Army couldn’t compensate for the fanatical opposition generated by Hitler’s racial policies (van C notes that forces available to Germany for long-term occupation would have amounted to less than 1% of the population of the planned Nazi empire).

As Gen Sir Rupert Smith writes in The Utility of Force, if you’re going to use coercion as your C/I tool, you can never, ever let up. The moral and financial toll this extracts eventually saps the moral foundation — in a democracy, popular support — for continuing the war. OK, it’s true that if you can kill 100% of the inhabitants, the job is easier, but somewhere along the line we have seriously degenerated into fantasy.

But I have a bigger bone to pick. American strategic culture is not “a terrible impediment.” It is our best counterinsurgency tool, perhaps our only effective one.

http://dni2.wordpress.com/2007/12/10/ave-caesar/

[Granite_State]

I have had the honor of spending a bit of time with Ralph over the years (hanging around Garmisch, for instance). I'm a huge fan. We agree on a lot but even when we disagree, I find him passionate, brilliant, and challenging. I just like people who are unabashedly what they are and make no bones about it. Heck, I like Cindy Lauper for that precise reason.

I'd like to agree with you, because at least Peters is unafraid to challenge the orthodox view, but I just don't see the brilliance. The piece of his that most stayed with me was the pie-in-the-sky one about reshaping all the borders of the Middle East, with a Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Mecca and Medina as a state, etc., an article that was a "creative destruction" neo-con's dream. But I've only read articles of his, mostly Parameters and opinion pieces. If you were going to recommend one of his books as being most worthwhile, which one would it be, his newest?

[SteveMetz]

Takes a bit of a shot at you here Steve, the way I read what you wrote was that you were talking solely about utility, not morality.



http://dni2.wordpress.com/2007/12/10/ave-caesar/

Well, actually I wasn't pining. Just pointing out that it works. Full scale thermonuclear war would be an effective method of counterinsurgency as well. But I don't advocate it. What I was trying to say is that we select strategies based not simply on effectiveness (which Ralph and Ed Luttwak seemed inclined to do), but also on acceptability.

[SteveMetz]

I'd like to agree with you, because at least Peters is unafraid to challenge the orthodox view, but I just don't see the brilliance. The piece of his that most stayed with me was the pie-in-the-sky one about reshaping all the borders of the Middle East, with a Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Mecca and Medina as a state, etc., an article that was a "creative destruction" neo-con's dream. But I've only read articles of his, mostly Parameters and opinion pieces. If you were going to recommend one of his books as being most worthwhile, which one would it be, his newest?

I'm currently reading the newest one but it is a collection of previously published pieces. I really like the Parameters articles. When I was on the editorial board for it, we'd get manuscripts with identifying information removed but I could identify one of Ralph's within 4 or 5 sentences.

I'm also a huge fan of his Owen Parry novels.

[Rank amateur]

Again it goes back to the consequences and non-linearity that run rampant within war (they exist wherever there is complexity and interaction - but are perhaps at their highest in war due to the stakes in the outcome, and the degree of finality to which it is pursued).

I think the unpredictably and non linearity of war comes from the fact that warriors receive a tactical and strategic benefit from surprise. "All warfare is based upon deception." War won't go as planned, because the enemy will make sure that it won't go as planned. (And we'll make sure that their efforts don't go as planned.) Your political agenda is as likely to be ambushed as your troops.

Consider the view of the Vietnam War - we have an entry date and exit date that largely biases our view of that war. However, would the Vietnamese see it the same way? Would they see their rationale for commitment of military force as broader, and inclusive of the need to resist the Japanese, fight the French and then fight us? Would they also include their border wars with China?

If there's one thing I think our military needs to do better it's understanding why our opponents fight: not why we think they fight, what they believe to be the reasons for their actions. Your example is textbook. If we understood the Vietnamese point of view, we would've known that no matter what we said or did we'd be perceived as occupiers. We went to fight Communism. It turns out the best way to do that was letting the Vietnamese try it for a decade or two. The shoes I'm wearing now were made in Vietnam.

Where is our consummation with Coin taking the American Army in the future?

While I understand the problems caused by "fighting the last war," I really think that getting this one right is a higher priority than worrying about the next one.

When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy

Kilcullen explained that in a way I could understand. "Enemy centric" only works if you can kill them faster than they can recruit them. The enemy can ensure that doesn't happen by employing the tactic Monty Python calls "running away." I believe Killcullen referred to it as "the enemy controls their loss rate."

On the other hand, asymmetric tactics only work if the enemy can hide from our firepower. In the desert, the civilian population is the only place they can hide. Control the population, remove their hiding places, blast the $%#$ out of them.

And as Mr. Dilegge points out, if your beef is that you never get to kill the bad guys, you're misreading the doctrine. Once the population is controlled you can let er rip. If you can't control the population, you're inspecting every pile of #$%$ to see if it contains an IED.

shouldn't military experience be part of the "advanced degree leading to consulting the military" gig?

Personally, I think that the only requirement should be an Internet connection and a wife who doesn't care how much time you waste on line as long as you're not downloading porn.

[Ken White]

. . .
While I understand the problems caused by "fighting the last war," I really think that getting this one right is a higher priority than worrying about the next one.

Consider the fact that this one will work out okay. More importantly, consider that during and after the last one (Desert Storm) we did NOT worry about the next one and that's one of several reasons why we are where we are with this one...

[SteveMetz]

Consider the fact that this one will work out okay. More importantly, consider that during and after the last one (Desert Storm) we did NOT worry about the next one and that's one of several reasons why we are where we are with this one...

Ahhh, but this is the exact point of my book--after Desert Storm we spent a decade and untold amounts of money on "transforming" in order to throw Iraq out of Kuwait even better the next time.

It used to amaze me throughout the 1990s that EVERY war game I participated in (and there were a lot of them) had some scenario that entailed expelled a Soviet equipped, normally Muslim aggressor from a neighboring, oil producing state.

[Ken White]

Mostly because the Army would love to take RA's advice, finish this one and put it to bed and do little or nothing to think about the next one...

We have GOT to break that 'prepare for the last war' cycle...

[Norfolk]

Mostly because the Army would love to take RA's advice, finish this one and put it to bed and do little or nothing to think about the next one...

We have GOT to break that 'prepare for the last war' cycle...

Much agreed. Just when planners realize that "the next war" may be one fought on the dreaded Mainland of Asia (or at least directly adjacent to it), they may be less than enthusiastic to embrace it, and to seek "the next war" somewhere where it is perhaps less likely to occur. It would be all to easy to either revert back to a pre-2003 planning model (and retaining many of the asumptions that went with that), or to go the other way and embrace COIN (and related missions) to the detriment of planning and preparing for mainly (but not exclusively) conventional warfare.

It will be interesting to see what strategic course is set by the new Administration in Jan. 2009.

[Ken White]

. . .
It will be interesting to see what strategic course is set by the new Administration in Jan. 2009.

I foresee a 1.74 (that's one point seven four) degree course correction. If that much.

We aren't a Parliamentary Guvmint; the new Administration will little affect the course of the Ship of State. We operate on autopilot and that's why I could care less who gets elected -- it'll make little to no difference.

I've watched this monster from the inside for almost fifty years, off and on. Lived through the changes afterr WW II, after Korea, after Viet Nam, after Desert Storm -- and I expect little difference after OIF (which in any event I suspect will outlast the next two or three Administrations in point of troops there though I expect the combat to taper down pretty steadily).

The Candidates talk a lot of trash, then they get elected and in November and December, get all the Classified briefings. Thus they generally spend January through June explaining why they've changed their minds about matters strategic...

That's why I say the Army and DoD have to do this; the bureaucracy has to shift.

[Norfolk]

I foresee a 1.74 (that's one point seven four) degree course correction. If that much.

We aren't a Parliamentary Guvmint; the new Administration will little affect the course of the Ship of State. We operate on autopilot and that's why I could care less who gets elected -- it'll make little to no difference.

I've watched this monster from the inside for almost fifty years, off and on. Lived through the changes afterr WW II, after Korea, after Viet Nam, after Desert Storm -- and I expect little difference after OIF (which in any event I suspect will outlast the next two or three Administrations in point of troops there though I expect the combat to taper down pretty steadily).

You're a hard man, Ken.

[Rank amateur]

Mostly because the Army would love to take RA's advice, finish this one and put it to bed and do little or nothing to think about the next one...

We have GOT to break that 'prepare for the last war' cycle...

A) One thing you never need to worry about is anyone taking my advice.

B) Isn't fighting this one by definition different from preparing for the last one?

[slapout9]

I wrote this some time ago about how Police work relates to COIN operations. Which is how I tend to view everything in COIN operations. If you read all the great masters like Galula they always talk about Police operations. Try reading about this Police model and the concepts of COG and Saint Clausewitz Holy Trinity.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...angle#post4647

[Ken White]

. . .
B) Isn't fighting this one by definition different from preparing for the last one?

After the last one, we prepared to fight this one. That seemed to be fine -- for about a month. Then, because we had not thought it through and prepared for a war that was like the last one, we got caught with our shorts down when this one turned out to be different from that last one.

It then took us 18 month to figure out we were fighting the wrong war, another 18 months to figure out what we needed to do and then 18 more months to turn this big bureaucratic monster around -- so we are only now, four and a half years later, getting our act together. That is not good.

Fortunately, as wars go, this one is relatively low key and low violence. Had it been a big, bad one, we would have been in a world of trouble. We cannot predict what the next one will be like; we've got to be full spectrum capable and prepared for anything.

Those who think he next one (or few) will be a COIN effort may be right. They also may be wrong. Don't know about you but I've got a kid in there and I'd prefer better all round competence than a focus on just the last war...

Wasn't picking on you, BTW, you did say we should worry about this one and not the next (in so many words), I'm merely pointing out that the Army would love to do that, they certainly don't want to have to think too hard -- besides, change is such a drag...

They'll try to sluff it if their feet aren't held to the fire. Whoops, that's unfair -- SOME will try that, most will work for the right thing; the problem is in a bureaucracy, inertia gets rewarded all to often...

[Sargent]

But Jill, Peters does point out the fact that FM 3-24 is hyper-reliant on two historical cases: the British in Malaya; and the French in Algeria specifically the writings of David Galula. In this regard his critique, I think, is valid. The manual turns A theory of Coin into a principle that has become law to the point of dogmatism. That is to say in any counterinsurgency operation the people must be the "center of gravity." Why does that, in theory and in practice, have to be so all of the time? When I attended the Coin Academy in Taji in December 2005 prior to assuming our battlespace we were told that very thing by the teachers of the course. When I raised my hand and asked why the people are always the center of gravity and not the enemy I was told that that is just the way it is.

I think one can envision a counterinsurgency fight where the people are not the center of gravity at all but the enemy force is. But because our Coin doctrine is so heavily focused on the Galula model it prescribes how we will understand any given Coin environment and then direct action accordingly in line with this principle; hence we become dogmatic and non-creative.

I am not well-versed enough in the manual to spar with you on Peters' critique of the content. I simply bristle at his description of the "process." Unless there is some brilliant argument in support, on principle I don't see the wisdom of relying up only one school of thought on a subject. (Interestingly, academic review of the work would tend to reveal such weaknesses.)

Ultimately, the singular focus on "the people" is neo-Maoist. Call it that often enough and I bet it would lose it's cache.

Interestingly, I think they are right in identifying the people as the COG in Iraq -- for the American side in the Iraqi conflict, that is. If we can't keep the Iraqi people in support, the mission is untenable. And because we are a large foreign presence in Iraq, the already difficult situation of having simultaneously to develop it as a strength and defend it as a weakness is compounded by the normal friction between locals and foreign troops. Furthermore, the people in Iraq are key to the ultimate American policy of establishing a government there that is relatively compliant to American needs.

This does not even consider the strategic implications of the American people and the necessity of their support as part of that COG in its larger sense. Nor does it consider how American policy put the effort half a bubble off plumb from the get go by alienating large segments of the international people with the manner in which the operation kicked off in '03.

Considering all three levels of "the people" as they relate to the situation in Iraq, I'm not certain whether American strategic objectives are served with an OPTEMPO driven by an aggressive effort to get the bad guys. The collateral damage issues alone argue against it.

On a lighter note, will you be working the Seminar this year? I get a little misty-eyed when I think of my time there. It really is like Disneyworld for military history.

Cheers,
Jill

[Gian P Gentile]

Jill:

I will be involved in it; but not the day-to-day running of it like when you were here. Yeah, that was a great experience; I especially liked the staff ride to Saratoga when we made Simon Frasier's line "Oh Fatal Ambition" as our motto. That was my favorite tee-shirt too until my son absconded with it.

thanks for your thoughts.

gian

[Eden]

It's hard to disagree that we should train for the next war, not the last, but I have very little faith that we (and by that I mean TRADOC) will be able to divine just where and when we will fight the next war. Maybe I just traveled in the wrong crowd, but I don't remember anybody in 2000 suggesting it was time to start training for counterinsurgency in Iraq. In fact, do a little thought experiment.

Starting in 1900, imagine how likely it was that we would properly envision the next war, or set of wars, as we planned out the next two decades of training for the Army.

1900 - Next US War after the recent unpleasentness in the Philippines will be a major conventional war on the continent of Europe.
1920 - Next US War will be a virtual repeat of the recent major conventional war, with the Pacific thrown in for good measure. Oh, and the Army will need to become expert at amphibious operations.
1940 - OK, this one is an exception - or is it? Who would have forseen after WWII that our next war would be a limited one on the Asian continent?
1960 - 500,000 men need to be trained on semi-conventional counterinsurgent warfare.
1980 - Our next opponents will be the Sov...oh, several insignificant Latin American countries.
1990 - Coming up, we get a chance to employ all those wonderful tanks after all!

"Prepare for the next war, not the last" is one of those true but useless aphorisms. Unless our prognostication skills radically improve, preparing for the last war will be just as useful as preparing for what we imagine the next might look like.

By the way, I have "major conventional war in Europe" in the office pool.

[selil]

By the way, I have "major conventional war in Europe" in the office pool.

I have sino russian conflict with whimsical money on russian canadian

[Norfolk]

I have sino russian conflict with whimsical money on russian canadian

They're itching for a re-match of '72.