“’Dishonest Doctrine:’ Or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Coin Doctrine”

[SteveMetz]

I say this respectfully to you, Steve; but I believe that you are wrong. As soon as we develop theories and arguments to show that a "counterinsurgency war" like Iraq is not war that it is something else then that is what causes us to loose and not the other way around as you say. Would, say for example, Cavguy, or RTK, or former operator Tom Odom agree that counterinsurgency is not war, or even except your premise that even if it is then we need to adjust our thinking in how we view it and change it into something else so that we can mire ourselves in places like Iraq for generations?

And I don’t think you can parse things so neatly as to say well at the tactical level for the lieutenant or captain it is war but at the higher strategic and political level it is not. That sort of thinking is wrongheaded and attempts to place war into a neatly compartmentalized analytical box with no true meaning as to the inter-connected relationship of millions of variables that defines war in all of its levels and conditions.

gian

War entails organized violence but not all phenomena that involve organized violence are war. War is a political conflict that can be resolved by organized violence. There are other types of political conflict that involve organized violence but cannot be resolved by it alone.

As brilliant as Clausewitz was (and with a bow to my friends who are Clausewitzeans like Chris Bassford and Colin Gray), I don't consider him an astute grand strategist.

I believe Americans elect to treat political conflicts that are not amenable to resolution solely or primarily by armed force as if they are simply because we are good at warfighting, not because that reflects reality or is the most effective option. To slightly revise the old canard, when the best tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat everything like a nail. In counterinsurgency, we attempt to do carpentry by relying on a hammer. You need a hammer to do carpentry but if you rely on it, you're going to be a pretty lousy carpenter.

[selil]

I'd say that stating that all conflict using the military is war is a slippery slope. War other than war, insurgency, law enforcement and border protection all bring up specters of military action short of "war". Layered onto that is the rampant political aspect of "constitutional declaration of war". The methodical spectrum of conflict as war being just an extension of diplomacy suggested by Clausewitz is elegant. In reality though it seems that border protection, drug interdiction, disaster relief (and security), and finally COIN can all be at different levels. In Iraq (I'm guessing) the conventional conflict switched towards COIN when we didn't remove troops immediately.

I'm struggling with the ideas of a ladder of force (old cop talk coming out). COIN seems to be much a part of the ladder of force within conventional non-nuclear conflict. I'm aware of the types of war (conventional, catastrophic, attrition, etc.), but within that conventional formulation it seems that there different types or levels. On the law enforcement ladder of force you start out with presence, work yourself through batons, to tasers, to lethal force. COIN would seem to be analogous to tasers (sometimes lethal, but usually it just hurts to bejesuz).

When I was a LEO working court room services the ASP expandable baton had just come out. It was the bees-knees of non-lethal force. Where we might have used goose neck holds, or even choke holds to take somebody down the baton became the tool of choice. My reasoning on the explosion of baton use (night sticks never had the same popularity) is that the ASP was new, it was effective, and as such it sucked up situations above and below it on the ladder of force for quite awhile. I see COIN as the military equivalent by analogy.

All that being said COIN is not bad it is not new, but it does have a place. COIN is however very effective and politically palatable for some kinds of conflict. As an LEO we never threw away shot guns or duty side arms to use the baton. The Army should not throw away armor or heavy infantry when developing new doctrine either. All good analogies fall apart quickly but after the expandable baton came along pepper spray (Capiscium Oleo Resin) and when that happened everybody started getting sprayed. The same will happen with the army and its force du jour.

Doctrine to me seems to be the capture of lessons learned and methods that are acceptable in accomplishing missions as a framework for future conflict. The soldier may stay within the framework and also leave it when the need arises (but do so knowingly). It would be a bad thing to see doctrine devolved into simply the newest thing on the block as the only way to fight a war.

[Global Scout]

Webster's definition, War:
1a: a state of usu. open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations.
2a: a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism b: a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end

Warfare: 1. Military operations between enemies. 2: Struggle between competing enities.

Interesting enough I couldn't find a definition for war or warfare in the DoD Dictionary? I guess it is one of those words that is assumed to be common knowledge, yet that obviously isn't the case.

We had the Cold War, the War on Drugs, the War on Terrorism, the Long War, the Civil War, etc., and many of these don't necessarily fit the state versus state model.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was definitely a war by the classical definition, but did the war end in phase III? If it did, what is it now?

Steve you have made numerous brilliant points throughout, and I think you are on to something here, but your leaving us hanging. If it is war, then what type of conflict is it? If the military is charge is it war, and if the State Department is in charge it is something else? There are at least categories of conflict, state versus state, state versus a non-state actor, and non-state actor versus non-state actor. All them can involve aspects of what some call total war where we target each other with kinetic strikes, information, diplomacy, economic actions, and the list goes on and on. It is basically any action or combination of actions used to persuade the competitor to behave acceptably (or destroy him completely). When is it normaly statecraft and when is it war?

Let's say your right, and what we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere to support the Long War is not war, what is it? If we give it another name, what advantage does that give us?

[SteveMetz]

Webster's definition, War:
1a: a state of usu. open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations.
2a: a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism b: a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end

Warfare: 1. Military operations between enemies. 2: Struggle between competing enities.

Interesting enough I couldn't find a definition for war or warfare in the DoD Dictionary? I guess it is one of those words that is assumed to be common knowledge, yet that obviously isn't the case.

We had the Cold War, the War on Drugs, the War on Terrorism, the Long War, the Civil War, etc., and many of these don't necessarily fit the state versus state model.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was definitely a war by the classical definition, but did the war end in phase III? If it did, what is it now?

Steve you have made numerous brilliant points throughout, and I think you are on to something here, but your leaving us hanging. If it is war, then what type of conflict is it? If the military is charge is it war, and if the State Department is in charge it is something else? There are at least categories of conflict, state versus state, state versus a non-state actor, and non-state actor versus non-state actor. All them can involve aspects of what some call total war where we target each other with kinetic strikes, information, diplomacy, economic actions, and the list goes on and on. It is basically any action or combination of actions used to persuade the competitor to behave acceptably (or destroy him completely). When is it normaly statecraft and when is it war?

Let's say your right, and what we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere to support the Long War is not war, what is it? If we give it another name, what advantage does that give us?

I think euphemistic uses of the word "war" to connote anything we take seriously is a mistake (drugs, terrorism, poverty, etc). As someone at the RAND conferences as I at last week points out (it may have been Bruce Hoffman), the phrase "war on terror" is particularly absurd since our opponent is an emotion. At least with the "war on terrorism" our opponent is a tactic or operational method (which is slightly less absurd).

I'll admit that what I'm suggesting is consummately American conceptualization. But to me, the defining factor is whether a political conflict is predominantly or solely resolvable by armed force. That means that that the military plays a greater role in strategy formulation than during a period of "not war." Wars have a discernible beginning and end (although the participants may define those differently). A state of war is differently than a state of "not war" even though armed force may be used during "not war."

[Rob Thornton]

I think we've reached a point to agree to disagree - that is not only OK, but maybe healthy in some ways as it keeps us looking from different perspectives - this may not be one of those things that requires "unity" - conflicting views within the broader community might not be disingenuous from progress on problems and conditions.

I tend to fall more on the Clausewitzian side - no real surprise there, but I'm not totally out of sync with what Steve has put forward either - perhaps that is part of the value of being a SWC member is exposure to various perspectives, and the synthesis of good ideas. I think war is unique within a broader spectrum of "conflict", and I also believe that we are at war in Iraq. I think this has to do with the use of military forces or military like organizations using violence in pursuit of a political objective(s) - defined broadly as those of an organized body politic. We have a political end to which we've applied military forces and the majority of those forces (certainly at the tactical level) are in keeping with traditional roles and missions normally assigned to the military.

I also agree that the use of the word "War" has been used inaccurately to garner political support for a broad range of causes, often because no other word existed which communicated effectively the level of importance the user wished to import upon the object.

I heard Dave Kilcullen use the term "counter-war" within his Charlie Rose interview. I thought this pretty thoughtful, in terms of considering how to direct resources (time, people, $$$, military means, etc.), however, it still puts multiple entities employing large scale (relative - maybe scaled, tailored or estimated is better?), organized violence to achieve a political objective - which I believe is war. Throughout OIF (and within the context of many other larger wars) we've seen some groups with more means and refined purpose then some of the others - the smaller groups have often taken advantage of the greater instability to pursue more limited political objectives. There have also been regional players using the conditions created by OIF to pursue their political objectives.

To me, all of these are in keeping with what Clausewitz describes as the rationale and political context for war - and while we may describe the exact reasons for going to war in 2003, the greater political context which gave rise to employing military means to achieve that object i.e. our own long term health and security (be it sustained global access to the strategic energy resources of the Persian Gulf, or be it promotion of political philosophies which potentially promote more stability) are enduring.

To divorce COIN from war to me is a greater danger then only keeping one tool in the tool box. I think the former is a political danger, while the latter is a military one. What I mean is that while we've been able to adapt our military to conduct COIN (and I do believe 3-24 is both a recognition and a part of that adaptation), we've had to do so because of our initial constrained thinking at the policy level in terms of what the outcome of employing military force to achieve a political objective would be. I think we've overcome some of that now.

Its a kind of dichotomy, but the "short term" business investment philosophy proffered by the then SECDEF and others that predicted sunshine on the back-end of the invasion was out of step with the objective nature of war as described by Clausewitz (and some other military theorists and philosophers who've pondered war). Again it goes back to the consequences and non-linearity that run rampant within war (they exist wherever there is complexity and interaction - but are perhaps at their highest in war due to the stakes in the outcome, and the degree of finality to which it is pursued).

I believe there is a significant political danger in calling it something other then war. It denies the possibilities which come into being within war (doesn't matter what we call it if the conditions mimic war), and can create an atmosphere in which politicians make decisions to employ military forces without respect for the consequences. I realize that by calling it war we might create the conditions where the hammer is reached for - but I prefer to live with that only because I want no (maybe less is more realistic) misunderstanding between those who decide to use military force to pursue said objective and the increasing range of risk and possibilities subject to chance by doing so; and also because I think we can adapt our hammer in relatively short order - as long as we invest in good leaders. The former calls for adaptation, the latter for commitment.

Finally, I'd say that there is room for debate here, in fact I think its healthy - we're never going to reach absolute consensus, and in maybe we shouldn't. I'd also say that if political decision makers insulated by the "Beltway" (to varying philosophical and physical degrees) are not going to have military service, then we owe them the very best objectivity about the consequences of using military forces (itself a hammer among the elements of national power) to achieve a political objective, they owe it to those who elect them to listen, and it would behoove them to study and think about war as something more then a distraction or domestic political tool.

Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Steve - that last paragraph has brought me back to a theme that has interested me with regard to how we use history.

From Steve:

I'll admit that what I'm suggesting is consummately American conceptualization. But to me, the defining factor is whether a political conflict is predominantly or solely resolvable by armed force. That means that that the military plays a greater role in strategy formulation than during a period of "not war." Wars have a discernible beginning and end (although the participants may define those differently). A state of war is differently than a state of "not war" even though armed force may be used during "not war."

When do you know how the enemy(ies) discern the beginning and the end? I think its easier to do so when we consider when looking backwards (this was also what interested me in MG (ret) Scales' bit on culmination). However, I believe whenever we do so there is the risk of simplifying it to a very linear view. Consider the view of the Vietnam War - we have an entry date and exit date that largely biases our view of that war. However, would the Vietnamese see it the same way? Would they see their rationale for commitment of military force as broader, and inclusive of the need to resist the Japanese, fight the French and then fight us? Would they also include their border wars with China? When we entered in pursuit of a political objective and then decided to withdraw from pursuit of that political objective - how does that mesh with their own political objectives?

With regard to what might have been in any historical consideration of war - I think there are some questions which just cannot be answered because the conditions that might have provided them answers, never came into being - as such they are to hard to gauge what the opponents reaction might have been, or the various possibilities that might have occurred as a result.

British involvement on the European continent during the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries also bring up an interesting point with regard to how rivals with opposing interests view themselves and each other. How did those powers view the state of their relations - what decisions were made as a result of their own perspectives?

With regard to the Ancient world - I think Athens and Sparta in deciding who was to dominate the Greek world, and the smaller political/military rivals which that contest gave rise to, also offer a relative perspective - and interesting one to boot since the exhaustion which occurred to both principal antagonists offered up a new possibilities, and a future strategic situation that might never have come into being if those two city-states had seen things differently.

Within those centuries and decades you could consider there was broader periods of "not war" punctuated by periods of "war" which sometime decided nothing, other then the possibility (maybe probability) of returning to war with each other.

I think this important to understand that different sides may not agree on where a war begins or ends, or the even the proximate and long term causes of why they waged war. I think when we do so we risk a kind of historical bias - however it may be the best we can do given our predisposition to look for final answers - its just who we are.

Anyway sorry to digress a bit - but I wanted to explore it.

Best, Rob

[SteveMetz]

Hey Steve - that last paragraph has brought me back to a theme that has interested me with regard to how we use history.

From Steve:



When do you know how the enemy(ies) discern the beginning and the end? I think its easier to do so when we consider when looking backwards (this was also what interested me in MG (ret) Scales' bit on culmination). However, I believe whenever we do so there is the risk of simplifying it to a very linear view. Consider the view of the Vietnam War - we have an entry date and exit date that largely biases our view of that war. However, would the Vietnamese see it the same way? Would they see their rationale for commitment of military force as broader, and inclusive of the need to resist the Japanese, fight the French and then fight us? Would they also include their border wars with China? When we entered in pursuit of a political objective and then decided to withdraw from pursuit of that political objective - how does that mesh with their own political objectives?

With regard to what might have been in any historical consideration of war - I think there are some questions which just cannot be answered because the conditions that might have provided them answers, never came into being - as such they are to hard to gauge what the opponents reaction might have been, or the various possibilities that might have occurred as a result.

British involvement on the European continent during the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries also bring up an interesting point with regard to how rivals with opposing interests view themselves and each other. How did those powers view the state of their relations - what decisions were made as a result of their own perspectives?

With regard to the Ancient world - I think Athens and Sparta in deciding who was to dominate the Greek world, and the smaller political/military rivals which that contest gave rise to, also offer a relative perspective - and interesting one to boot since the exhaustion which occurred to both principal antagonists offered up a new possibilities, and a future strategic situation that might never have come into being if those two city-states had seen things differently.

Within those centuries and decades you could consider there was broader periods of "not war" punctuated by periods of "war" which sometime decided nothing, other then the possibility (maybe probability) of returning to war with each other.

I think this important to understand that different sides may not agree on where a war begins or ends, or the even the proximate and long term causes of why they waged war. I think when we do so we risk a kind of historical bias - however it may be the best we can do given our predisposition to look for final answers - its just who we are.

Anyway sorry to digress a bit - but I wanted to explore it.

Best, Rob

The fact that participants in a war define its beginning and end different does not, in itself, change my point. The important feature, in my opinion, is that the participants do see it as "abnormal. Whether they agree on when it began and when it ends is important in terms of crafting effective strategy, but not in terms of deciding whether something was or was not a war.

Vietnam is actually a difficult case. Using the conceptualization I've proposed, it WAS a war for the North Vietnamese since they could attain their strategic objectives solely or predominantly through military means. But was it for the United States? Harry Summers, of course, argues that we could have won militarily. Others believe we could not because of strategic constraints. Is it possible, then, to have a half war where one combatant is at war and the other is not?

My instincts tell me yes. Our conflict with AQ may be an example.

[Bill Moore]

My head hurts when I read and think about this. So why doesn't the DoD dictionary have a definition for war? I would assume that war carries with it some legal authorities, so you would think we could define it.

We have fought declared and undeclared wars, so if the President and Congress declare war what does that mean?

I don't believe the Cold War was ever declared, it was just assumed, and we conducted a variety of offensive and defensive diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities to ultimately prevail. Framing the ideological challenge as a war proved useful, because it forced our nation to strategize and use all our elements of National power to prevail. If we called it a "Not War" (waiting on the new term), I doubt we would have had as much synergy as we did.

While I also think the phrases, "War on Terror", and the “Long War” are misleading, the reality is we still have a global movement motivated by ideology to destroy our way of life. I think that qualifies as a significant threat to our nation; and the appropriate response is something similar to what we call war, even if we can’t define it. To me, that doesn’t mean the military is always the primary tool, as a matter of fact I think we are waging this war globally primarily diplomatically and politically and economically, but of course the hot spots make the news, so the other good work our government is conducting is largely invisible. I doubt that the State Department wants to describe what they’re doing as waging war, but if we change the common perception of war to include all the elements of DIME to counter serious threats to our national security, then why isn’t it?

Iraq confuses the issue, so for sake of this discussion let's assume that OIF didn't happen.

Would our activities against the Islamists in Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Philippines, South Asia, SE Asia, the Pan Sahel, South America, and throughout the world diplomatically, informationally, and economically be better defined as conflict than war?

I agree that winning is hard to define in this conflict, and that the military definitely can't win a war of ideology, at best we may can hope to mitigate the serious military threats, and perhaps set conditions for a diplomatic or informational victory of sorts, but does that mean because the military can’t win it, that it isn't a war?

[Rob Thornton]

Steve,

I see what you are saying. It interests me when wars extend beyond the life of the authors within the body politic who might have provided the original rationale for it (could be out of power or it could be by death - just plain outlasts them). How does that happen - trans-generational struggles? Is the substance of the threat so obvious that its undeniable; is it the inability to distinguish current objectives from previous ones; is it the greater context created by the original rationale that gave birth to more reason to continue, vs. discontinue - kind of a sunk cost argument? Maybe its some or all depending on the nature of the war?

Anyway, its got me thinking.

Ken - You are the only guy I know who has the combined experience, the institutional knowledge to have lived it, thought about it, read about and wrote about it. What do you think?

Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

. . .
Ken - You are the only guy I know who has experience, the institutional knowledge to have lived it, thought about it, read about and wrote about it. What do you think?
Best Regards, Rob

LINK.

An aside; I think the thread is getting wrapped around semantics; an issue on which there'll be many different approaches or answers -- and there probably is not a 'correct' answer...

Only slightly more concisely than my previous comment ; what I think is that 'war' implies conflict or combat. When you're in one you know it but aren't concerned about the esoteric arguments of what 'it' is. One does not engage in (as opposed to provide aid or efforts in support of) COIN unless one is at war; COIN entails killing and dying at base or tactical level and political finesse at that and higher levels (not, BTW, one of the US' strong points...). A COIN campaign IS the operational level of war for the Nations involved, no more and no less. The strategy put us in the Nation wherein the campaign takes place, the operational level is the COIN effort and it and the Tactical level operations and all the TTP must be tailored to achieve the political ends of that particular National effort -- and each COIN campaign is different (thus we have to be careful not to draw too many 'lessons' from a specific campaign).

Most insurgencies end up being wars of attrition with the insurgents simply trying to outlast their opponents (see American Revolution; Malaya,Viet Nam; AQIZ and many others).

Given the above generic strategy by insurgents, our political ineptitude, the national trait of impatience, todays communications capability, our unwillingness to train properly and completely and a few other factors, I believe we should avoid COIN efforts unless there is no other option and we should try to shape conditions to use our strengths in breaking things and people, fixing things, cobbling solutions together and doing all that rapidly.

To do that we need far better intel than we have had before -- thus my request for Global Scout (the missing capability, not the specific poster here ).

Regardless of my belief that we should avoid COIN if possible, it may not always be possible and we must acknowledge that and be prepared. Our first effort should be to send in the specialists at as low key as is possible. We may have to commit the GPF / MPF and they must have some COIN training but they MUST remain a full spectrum force and while COIN is demanding, HIC is even more so thus our doctrinal and training focus must reflect that.

We are capable of doing that and doing it well. Whether we do it or not remains to be seen...

[slapout9]

To me, that doesn’t mean the military is always the primary tool, as a matter of fact I think we are waging this war globally primarily diplomatically and politically and economically, but of course the hot spots make the news, so the other good work our government is conducting is largely invisible. I doubt that the State Department wants to describe what they’re doing as waging war, but if we change the common perception of war to include all the elements of DIME to counter serious threats to our national security, then why isn’t it?

Hi Bill, nice to see you back. I think you hit it on the head. Our concept of use of force is to narrow. Changing a system by injecting positive energy is just as much a use of force as using negative energy to change it, and positive energy is usually longer lasting because you don't have to worry about the revenge factor.

[SteveMetz]

LINK.

An aside; I think the thread is getting wrapped around semantics; .

You're not anti-semantic, are you?

[Ken White]

are or were Semen. er, Seman. Semants? Sem -- them...

[Gian P Gentile]

You're not anti-semantic, are you?

No, but he might be an anti-dentite.

[Ken White]

A board of biting wit...

[Bill Moore]

Slapout you slay me. The Army put out that the terms kinetic and non-kinetic are non-doctrinal, and we're now supposed to use lethal and non-lethal. I see a whole bunch of problems with these, and as flawed as kinetic and non-kinetic were, they seem better than lethal and non-lethal (I'm either going to kill ya, or I'm not), especially for COIN and IW.

I like your use of positive and negative force instead of lethal and non-lethal. However, if you conduct a lethal activity against a real bad a..wipe, is that positive or negative force? Of course I'm joking, but you can see where this could lead....

I'm getting out of the anti-semantic debates for a while, there just isn't enough aspirin to quiet my headaches when I really start thinking hard about this, and for me any degree of thinking is hard.

It's good to be back from a short sabatical downrange and to see that the SWJ is still the best site on the web.

[slapout9]

I like your use of positive and negative force instead of lethal and non-lethal. However, if you conduct a lethal activity against a real bad a..wipe, is that positive or negative force? Of course I'm joking, but you can see where this could lead....

Hi Bill, it's a good point..so good I asked that question myself. It depends on the target. Positive energy produces something,negative energy consumes something. So killing a bad guy is negative energy all around but it was necessary to protect your system, but you still consumed ammunition maybe had casualties,used up equipment,etc. Everything has a cost the trick is to keep it balanced in your favor. That is why positive energy is so good because it can produce a profit or benefit to both systems. Remember your Coke executive example and Cuba we talked about a while back on another thread. Put positive energy into a bad system and it can become good over time. But once in a while there is always some jerk who just will not get with the program so you have to put the 100% Alabama Whoop Ass on him (negative energy)to make things work out.

It's like that yingy yangy stuff from Kung Fu...You know Grasshopper talking to his master who flung dung and stuff.

[selil]

Hi Bill, it's a good point..so good I asked that question myself. It depends on the target. Positive energy produces something,negative energy consumes something. So killing a bad guy is negative energy all around but it was necessary to protect your system, but you still consumed ammunition maybe had casualties,used up equipment,etc. ......It's like that yingy yangy stuff from Kung Fu...You know Grasshopper talking to his master who flung dung and stuff.

If'n y'all start swinging crystals around and chanting ommmmmm. I'm going to puke in your tofu.

Maybe the laws of thermodynamics as a model I've seen it used for security before why not the army?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_thermodynamics

changed for here (it's likely been done before)

The zeroth law

When two entities come into contact with each other energy will be exchanged.

First law

Energy can not be created or destroyed it can only be transferred.

Second law

Systems have a tendency to become more chaotic or seek entropy.

Third law

As things get really cold systems become quiescent.

You can move them around but as to their relative simplicity they've been applied all over the place. Basically because they're so dang simple. Even I understand them.

[SteveMetz]

If'n y'all start swinging crystals around and chanting ommmmmm. I'm going to puke in your tofu.

Maybe the laws of thermodynamics as a model I've seen it used for security before why not the army?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_thermodynamics

changed for here (it's likely been done before)

The zeroth law

When two entities come into contact with each other energy will be exchanged.

First law

Energy can not be created or destroyed it can only be transferred.

Second law

Systems have a tendency to become more chaotic or seek entropy.

Third law

As things get really cold systems become quiescent.

You can move them around but as to their relative simplicity they've been applied all over the place. Basically because they're so dang simple. Even I understand them.

I heard that Alberto Gonzales decided that the laws of thermodynamics were, umm, "negotiable."

[Ron Humphrey]

I heard that Alberto Gonzales decided that the laws of thermodynamics were, umm, "negotiable."

I have been keeping up with this thread but you guys are so on top of it I'm not sure I can keep up so I will just bring up the one major concern I have.

As the military has always done we look wherever we can to get better ways of accomplishing the mission. In current operations there has been a big movement towards academization in just about every facet of our forces. While this is not a bad thing I do wonder if perhaps we have moved too much towards fighting wars academically vs using knowledge and academic lessons to better fight wars.

I think this is probably along the lines of what you have been saying but for myself placing it in this context might be easier in understanding the future of our defense forces.