Originally Posted by JeffC
And if anyone really wants to look for hidden motives, the new NIE rather neatly takes Iran's nuke program out of play.
Some people might find that a clever diplomatic move on our part.
And if anyone really wants to look for hidden motives, the new NIE rather neatly takes Iran's nuke program out of play.
Some people might find that a clever diplomatic move on our part.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
This just in
Newsmax, Thursday, December 13, 2007: Kissinger: NIE Report Misread
This tosses a monkey wrench into the fray!Former presidential adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that the much-publicized report on the Iranian nuclear weapons program issued last week by the National Intelligence Estimate has been widely misread.
And he asserts that it does not indicate that Iran has abandoned efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
The key passage in the report reads: “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."
In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post, Kissinger states that the passage “was, in fact, qualified by a footnote whose complex phraseology obfuscated that the suspension really applied to only one aspect of the Iranian nuclear weapons program (and not even the most significant one): the construction of warheads. That qualification was not restated in the rest of the document, which continued to refer to the "halt of the weapons program" repeatedly and without qualification.
“The reality is that the concern about Iranian nuclear weapons has had three components: the production of fissile material, the development of missiles and the building of warheads.....
Last edited by Jedburgh; 12-14-2007 at 02:04 PM. Reason: Added link, edited content.
Wasn't Paul Bremer one of Kissinger's boys?
Pat Lang on Kissinger's editorial.
In this piece Kissinger insists that he (and his friends) know best what is important (and dangerous) in Iran's nuclear program. He insists that the mere enrichment of uranium is the most dangerous part of such a program. He denigrates the focus of the NIE on actual weapon and warhead research and production, claiming that such prodigies of engineering could be achieved with relative ease once the all-important store of enriched uranium is obtained.
In this process of reasoning, Kissinger ignores the fact that uranium enrichment is also necessary to produce fuel needed to have a large number of atomic electric plants. The difference in the two kinds of enrichment is that weapons production requires a much higher percentage of enrichment. The difference is detectable and so far the IAEA has not detected any efforts to produce weapons grade enriched fuel.
Been "Watching" to see the spin-offs...
...of the 2007 NIE. Just a few minor "pol" observations.
First (from a pol standpoint), this isn't a "game changer" as much as it is a "playing field changer". It was sort of like trying to play soccer on an ice hockey rink, and now that's been changed to a basketball court. But, now it's not a major priority like it was before, so nobody wants to really play PERIOD.
Second, it's been an early Christmas present for all the political "Body and Fender" shops out there. The 2007 NIE conclusions weren't expected, so all the political punditry had to scramble around and had to acquire all the "expertise" they could get on the QT. Nice little unexpected bonus there, some people made out really well. The spin resulting from all of this has run the full spectrum, with some of it being nothing short of spectacular (from a "spin appreciation" standpoint).
Third, most of the major political candidates are silently counting their blessings. Took an item off the boards that nobody had a really good answer on, and nobody wanted to really run with.
Conclusions (political) I'm hearing: Iran is no longer a front burner International issue, for the domestic political front. And from the looks of it, the pols like it that way.
Thoughts?
I wonder how much support towards Iran's nuclear ambitions Kissinger provided when he was Nixon's National Security Advisor, and if he's having any second thoughts, particularly as regards the loopholes in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty? Here's a bit of Iran's nuclear history back in the 60's and 70's:
Although Iran began developing its nuclear program in the 1950s, it was slow to progress until late in the 1960s, when the U.S.-supplied 5MW thermal research reactor (TRR) went online at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). In 1973, spurred by an influx of oil revenues, the Shah of Iran embarked on an ambitious goal of modernizing the country and building its image abroad. He did this by shifting the country's budgets toward the military and the newly established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The Shah set his goal high: "...get, as soon as possible, 23,000MWe from nuclear power stations."[1] In 1968, Iran signed the NPT in an effort to speed up its negotiations for nuclear agreements, particularly with the United States. In 1970, the government ratified the NPT and its obligations went into force.
In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several contracts for the construction of nuclear plants and the supply of nuclear fuel: with the United States in 1974; Germany in 1976; and France in 1977. In 1976, Iran also purchased a stake in Eurodif's (the European consortium) Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and purchased a stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia. Also in 1976, the government signed a $700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa and sent Iranian technicians abroad for training in nuclear sciences.
(source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html)
I'm very far from a Kissinger fan, and as has been apparent on this board I've been critical of (bellicose) Administration handling of Iran (nuclear and other issues).
His editorial does point out an important issue, however.
The enrichment issue is an absolutely key aspect of a weapons programme, and also relates directly to future Iranian strategic power. It is also the hardest part to crash-start, and the hardest part to do covertly.
The unclassified portions of the NIE seems to suggest that it is the weapons design/weaponization portion of the programme has been stopped. Whether the enrichment programme is meant to have civilian, military (immediate weapons production), or strategic-scientific-technical (future weapons potential) goals is still unclear. I suspect the third is at least as important as the first.
But no one has denied that there's still an enrichment issue. It is the single greatest fault that the IAEA has with Iran's other-wise more or less acceptable compliance, and it's still being negotiated as far as I know. Neverthelessr, I don't know of any credible experts who claim that Iran has anything other than ancient centerfuges which might be able to generate enough HEU in 18 months to produce one nuclear warhead - and that's a big "if".
"unaccounted for" and "unknown" are all that anyone has on this issue. That being the case, the most reasonable action is to let the designated international body, the IAEA, do its work and to act in collaboration with other nations to encourage Iran to comply with the IAEA. Every nation involved is willing to do that, including, for a change, ours (a vocal minority who still want to bomb Iran notwithstanding). The only exception is Israel who already possesses a developed nuclear capability.
Let me ask you, Sean. If you discovered that your neighbors were Satanists, and that they held rituals in their backyard to glorify Satan and blaspheme Jesus, how would you feel (this is a purely rhetorical question - please don't answer and convert this thread into a religious discussion). My point is that nuclear proliferation is not a simple black and white issue because nobody wants their neighbor who they don't get along with to possess a weapon that they have no defense against. They'll only feel safe if they can have that same weapon to offset their neighbor's possession of one.
That being the case, threats issued by the world's preeminent superpower, not to mention the nation which has more nuclear weapons by a factor of 10 then any other nation except Russia, are counter-productive to say the least.
US, Israel, and the Iranian nuclear program
"U.S. puts brakes on Israeli plan for attack on Iran nuclear facilities," Haaretz, 13 August 2008.
The American administration has rejected an Israeli request for military equipment and support that would improve Israel's ability to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
A report published last week by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) states that military strikes are unlikely to destroy Iran's centrifuge program for enriching uranium.
The Americans viewed the request, which was transmitted (and rejected) at the highest level, as a sign that Israel is in the advanced stages of preparations to attack Iran. They therefore warned Israel against attacking, saying such a strike would undermine American interests. They also demanded that Israel give them prior notice if it nevertheless decided to strike Iran.
As compensation for the requests it rejected, Washington offered to improve Israel's defenses against surface-to-surface missiles.
The report mentioned is David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, "Can military strikes destroy Iran’s gas centrifuge program? Probably not" ISIS, 7 August 2008:
(Apologies to anyone also on MESHnet, since I've made the same post there.)From the time that Iran halted the suspension of its centrifuge manufacturing efforts and its adherence to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing complex has degraded dramatically. U.S. and other intelligence agencies appear to have only partial information about Iran’s centrifuge complex and its ability to reconstitute its program following an attack. Iran’s decision to disperse and keep secret several of its key sites further hinders the development of a full picture of its centrifuge complex. Considering the modular, replicable nature of centrifuge plants, we conclude that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program is unlikely to significantly degrade Iran’s ability to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program.
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