Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[Sean Osborne]

The unclassified portion of the NIE is presumably precisely that--the key judgements of the NIE that could be unclassified with prejudice to means/sources/techniques, or to key US interests.

As I noted above, the unclassified NIE notes within its text that it contains estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions.

Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.

This one is assuming nothing but has noted above and will note now that in the text of the unclassified version of the NIE were the objections of the DOE and the NIC to some of the estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions made in the document.

[Sean Osborne]

... in the text of the unclassified version of the NIE were the objections of the DOE and the NIC to some of the estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions made in the document.

One of our main allies in the Middle East also had objections to the current NIE. Those objections resulted in an "unusual visit" to Israel by C-JCS Admiral Mike Mullen on Monday, 10 December.

According to a report published the next day by the New York Times:

Israeli intelligence estimates say Iran stopped all its nuclear weapons activities for a time in 2003, nervous after the American invasion of Iraq, but then resumed those activities in 2005, accelerating enrichment and ballistic missile development and constructing a 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor in Arak that could produce plutonium.

The LA Times also reported on that day what Admiral Mullen told his Israeli hosts:

Mullen said after the meetings that both Barak and Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, the new head of the Israeli defense staff, expressed a desire to work with the U.S. on analyzing American intelligence on the Iranian program.

Mullen said he expressed similar U.S. concerns about the enrichment program, calling it the "center of gravity" of the Iranian program that needs to be stopped with the help of international pressure.

He also reiterated American views that Iran continues to mislead nuclear regulators about the extent and intentions of its program.

"I wanted to reassure them that I still consider Iran a threat," Mullen said in an interview with The Times aboard his aircraft.

"Their hegemonic views, their regime's rhetoric, still speaking to the elimination of Israel, is all very disturbing to me. I intended to leave the impression with them that I wasn't taking my eye off the mark."

The Jerusalem Post also published a report that included a significant detail from the Israeli perspective:

During their meetings, Mullen and Ashkenazi discussed the Iranian threat. Israel believes Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon and will be ready to manufacture such a device as early as the end of 2009.

Question: If the US NIE is accurate and Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and had not re-started it as of mid-2007, how can Iran be capable of manufacturing a weapon in about two years time?

The unclassified NIE states on its last page the basis of the US and Israeli differences:

We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

The details regarding these differences would appear to exist in the classified version of the NIE.

[Stan]

Question: If the US NIE is accurate and Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and had not re-started it as of mid-2007, how can Iran be capable of manufacturing a weapon in about two years time?

The unclassified NIE states on its last page the basis of the US and Israeli differences:

The details regarding these differences would appear to exist in the classified version of the NIE.

Sean, the unclas version here is slightly different from your quote.

• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

Condensing quotes is misleading and should be avoided.

My fix is tied to the necessity of getting well-placed HUMINT to determine the real status of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and go from there.

Bottom line: The enfranchised American public will elect the next chief executive decisionmaker and those who control the funding of the national policy the IC attempts to guide through their product.

Thanks for the quick fix !
Correct me if wrong herein, but covert intel from in-country would be performed by whom ? As I opined in my previous post, I doubt we have intel types with degrees in nuclear physics, and now is certainly not the time for more sneaky Sierra. They already don't trust us, and now we slip a few rocket scientists..wanna be..spies in with beards speaking arabic ?

[Sean Osborne]

Sean, the unclas version here is slightly different from your quote.

Stan,

I was being specific with respect to the 2009 date ("about two years time") and how the US and Israeli estimates currently judge/assign confidences to the Iranian nuke weapons capability or lack thereof.

Thanks for the quick fix !

I apologize for misunderstanding what you had asked.

Correct me if wrong herein, but covert intel from in-country would be performed by whom ?

A guess - someone of similar insider access as Iran's former deputy defense minister and most recent defector Gen. Ali Reza Asghari? I was just engaged in some wishful thinking recently that with his defection he might have given the US or a closely allied intel agency someone else inside the Iranian nuke program as a potential POC/HUMINT source to pursue/exploit? Hope so.

[Stan]

Stan,

I was being specific with respect to the 2009 date ("about two years time") and how the US and Israeli estimates currently judge/assign confidences to the Iranian nuke weapons capability or lack thereof.

I've now read the pdf three times and cannot understand why the 2009 date is even remotely significant. I can see and appreciate why Israel would have a differing view, as they sit on the border. I have no doubt they have some serious concerns, but that should not influence hard intel.

F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

[Sean Osborne]

I've now read the pdf three times and cannot understand why the 2009 date is even remotely significant.

Stan,

It has to do with what our unclassifed NIE specifically states about that year and what the Israeli intel assessment says about that year regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Maybe I should also bring to this 'table' what the French, British and Italian intel folks have to say on the matter of this NIE.

(Hmmmm, that sounds like a great idea to me at this point... broaden the scope of this thread to include other foreign intelligence assessments on the same Iranian nuclear weapons program as referenced in this current NIE!)

I can see and appreciate why Israel would have a differing view, as they sit on the border.

Actually Israel lies a significant number of miles west-southwest of the Iranian border with Iraq, and come to think of it, west of Jordan and southwest of Syria. The distance is nothing a theater ballistic missile like the Shahab-3/4, BM-25 or Kh-55 cruise missile can't handle though.

I have no doubt they have some serious concerns, but that should not influence hard intel.

There is NOTHING relating to "hard intel" with respect to the unclassified NIE. Sources and methods are thoroughly protected/sageguarded through the declassification process of the estimate by DNI, et al. More to the point, there's nothing about the words "estimate" or "assessment" or "judgement" or "assumption" even remotely related to "hard intelligence". Hard intelligence is what vetted, viable HUMINT is supposed to provide.

Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.

[JeffC]

There is NOTHING relating to "hard intel" with respect to the unclassified NIE. Sources and methods are thoroughly protected/sageguarded through the declassification process of the estimate by DNI, et al. More to the point, there's nothing about the words "estimate" or "assessment" or "judgement" or "assumption" even remotely related to "hard intelligence". Hard intelligence is what vetted, viable HUMINT is supposed to provide.

Do I understand you to say that no HUMINT intelligence contributes to any of the sources used to write an NIE, Sean? That really isn't what you mean't to say, is it?

[Ken White]

. . .
Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.

Why do that-- it's broadly irrelevant in any case. Sure. the Unclas version of NIE was tailored for a purpose; so what? It's been released, the good and bad intended has been done and isn't going to be undone and all that's being accomplished here, it seems to me is the flaying of a dead Jackass for no good reason.

I don't think it's near big enough to rise to Horse status.

We've been playing silly games with Iran since 1979 and are likely to continue to do so for a good many years. They don't mean us well (some of them, not all) and they do odd things on occasion but they aren't stupid.

Much ado about nothing.

[Stan]

Stan,

It has to do with what our unclassifed NIE specifically states about that year and what the Israeli intel assessment says about that year regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Maybe I should also bring to this 'table' what the French, British and Italian intel folks have to say on the matter of this NIE.

(Hmmmm, that sounds like a great idea to me at this point... broaden the scope of this thread to include other foreign intelligence assessments on the same Iranian nuclear weapons program as referenced in this current NIE!)

Sean,
While I understand that the NIE utilizes many sources when developing their products, I didn't draw the same conclusion (that Israel's contribution was the overall impetus). I'll assume you're going to invite these fine folks to join the SWC and participate.

Actually Israel lies a significant number of miles west-southwest of the Iranian border with Iraq, and come to think of it, west of Jordan and southwest of Syria...

Thanks for the geography lesson. I think you know what I was saying

Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.

We already have many distinguised SWC members from every corner of the world (including NATO members), and some have in fact posted on this very thread.

[Sean Osborne]

Roy Gutman's OpEd in yesterdays Post-Bulletin (Rochester, Minnesota) had a rather unique conclusion regarding the NIE, Iran and HUMINT.

U.S. intelligence can be spectacularly right -- or wrong

This brings us to Iran. The Bush administration could have deduced months ago that Iran had no active nuclear weapons program. The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency reached that conclusion by talking with Iranian officials, sending in inspectors and verifying the facts.

Under the mullahs, Iran is a notoriously difficult country for recruiting top-level spies. True, there are phone intercepts, satellite images and walk-in defectors. But human, on-the-ground contact is best facilitated by having an embassy, full diplomatic relations and a program of exchanges and visits. The IAEA did that. While an IAEA inspection regime is not infallible, it is, when supplemented by intelligence (and journalism), the most plausible way to monitor any threat from Iran.

Reporters and the public ought to view intelligence findings and National Intelligence Estimates as a starting point for an investigation rather than the conclusion to it. Until we can examine the sources and methods on which such findings are based and understand the context in which those sources are operating, we should treat such pronouncements with caution.