Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[Jedburgh]

The Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close that thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat:

DNI, 3 Dec 07: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities

Since its release, there has been a tremendous amount of analysis and debate over its content. Some of it is linked below:

ISN Security Watch, 7 Dec 07: Iran Report's Impact Overstated

CNS-MIIS, 6 Dec 07: Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. NIE

CSIS, 6 Dec 07: Understanding the Key Judgments in the New NIE on Iranian Nuclear Weapons and 4 Dec 07: Critical Questions: Iran and the New NIE

CEIP, 4 Dec 07: Assessing the NIE

WINEP, 4 Dec 07: How Much Does Weaponization Matter? Judging Iran's Nuclear Program

[Ron Humphrey]

The Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close that thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat:

DNI, 3 Dec 07: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities

Since its release, there has been a tremendous amount of analysis and debate over its content. Some of it is linked below:

ISN Security Watch, 7 Dec 07: Iran Report's Impact Overstated

CNS-MIIS, 6 Dec 07: Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. NIE

CSIS, 6 Dec 07: Understanding the Key Judgments in the New NIE on Iranian Nuclear Weapons and 4 Dec 07: Critical Questions: Iran and the New NIE

CEIP, 4 Dec 07: Assessing the NIE

WINEP, 4 Dec 07: How Much Does Weaponization Matter? Judging Iran's Nuclear Program

If the internatinal and national media and government kickbacks keep up like they are now the intel community is gonna be afraid to release any products unless they simply state we think, but don't know.

Somebody probably should have thought this one through more carefully, then again ?????

[Sean Osborne]

If the internatinal and national media and government kickbacks keep up like they are now the intel community is gonna be afraid to release any products unless they simply state we think, but don't know.

Somebody probably should have thought this one through more carefully, then again ?????

I think you are correct. This NIE, as all NIEs, are comprised of one or more key judgements and assessments.

The problem with this NIE seems to revolve around the fact that its primary composers have a significant political bias against the Bush Administration which was reflected in the document on the whole. As reported by the Wall Street Journal (Opinion Journal) and The Weekly Standard, one of those writers (Tom Fingar) stated exactly the opposite regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in July 2007.

The MSM keyed on the aspect they desire to hype in their reporting on this NIE - again, for political reasons.

What the NIE says elsewhere has not been reported on by the MSM, particularly that found in Assessment B.

[Rex Brynen]

As reported by the Wall Street Journal (Opinion Journal) and The Weekly Standard, one of those writers (Tom Fingar) stated exactly the opposite regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in July 2007.

Although I've only had the opportunity to interact with him on relatively rare occasions, at workshops and conferences, I have to say that I've always been enormously impressed with Tom Fingar--he is one very, very bright guy, and an enormous asset to the US IC.

[Jedburgh]

The problem with this NIE seems to revolve around the fact that its primary composers have a significant political bias against the Bush Administration which was reflected in the document on the whole. As reported by the Wall Street Journal (Opinion Journal) and The Weekly Standard, one of those writers (Tom Fingar) stated exactly the opposite regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program in July 2007.

And right up front the NIE states, "Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously. Translation: we've been wrong in our assessments of intentions for at least two years..

Tom Fingar is an old Army MI guy, and a fellow linguist. I doubt that he permitted his personal political beliefs to contaminate his analysis - especially when that would be reflected in a high-profile national-level product. I'm not saying that there isn't any political twist to the NIE - but it isn't an anti-Bush conspiracy either.

[slapout9]

Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.[/I] Translation: we've been wrong in our assessments of intentions for at least two years..

Hi Jed I think that is crucial, we have been thinking he is threatening us when he has really been negotiating. He probably thinks America is abunch of Gangsters like we think Iran is all Terrorist. plenty of time to start a war, why not try talking first??

[Sean Osborne]

And right up front the NIE states, "Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously. Translation: we've been wrong in our assessments of intentions for at least two years..

"Probably" is an estimate. It's not a certainty. We know what we know, and we don't know what we don't know. We estimate and arrive at key judgements on the rest.

Still I think Assessment B is very much overlooked. Particularly with respect to North Korean activities through October 2006:

As stated in this NIE Scope Note:

This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.

The above speaks direct to the 3000 centrifuges producing HEU.

And in Assessment B we read:

We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.

The above speaks directly to either or both North Korea and the AQ Khan network of nuclear weapons technology proliferation.

Tom Fingar is an old Army MI guy, and a fellow linguist. I doubt that he permitted his personal political beliefs to contaminate his analysis -

Someone will have to take the WSJ and WeeklyStandard to task on thier reporting. Nevertheless Tom Fingar's statement (assessment?) on July 11, 2007 on Iranian nuclear weapons was:

"Iran and North Korea are the states of most concern to us. The United States’ concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, including many of Iran’s neighbors. Iran is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and has shown more interest in protracting negotiations and working to delay and diminish the impact of UNSC sanctions than in reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution. We assess that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons--despite its international obligations and international pressure. This is a grave concern to the other countries in the region whose security would be threatened should Iranacquire nuclear weapons."

The man said what he said just five months prior to this NIE.

[Rex Brynen]

The man said what he said just five months prior to this NIE.

As Ted has pointed out, the predominate view in the IC has changed on this issue (although the internal debate was older than five months).

I would much rather the IC shift assessments when new data and/or analysis suggests a correction is necessary, than that they dogmatically stick to a fixed conceptzia.

[JeffC]

The above speaks direct to the 3000 centrifuges producing HEU.

Iran hasn't yet revealed an accurate report of it's capabilities to produce HEU. It has old, unreliable centerfuges. If you read the AFCEA Intelligence newsletter NightWatch, the author, John McCreary writes:

Another paragraph of the Key Judgments merits special attention. “We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.” At last this is a judgment that is consistent with what the world knows about Pakistani P-1 centrifuges which is the type they proliferated to Iran and North Korea, according to multiple technical sources – they are engineering nightmares. The rotors break and the centrifuge cascade cannot be stabilized, which explains why the Pakistanis developed and use P-2 centrifuges in their cascades.

The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead. And since that's unlikely, their only other use is to be a negotiating tool for Tehran to bargain with.

[selil]

If the internatinal and national media and government kickbacks keep up like they are now the intel community is gonna be afraid to release any products unless they simply state we think, but don't know.

Somebody probably should have thought this one through more carefully, then again ?????

According to Steven Aftergood: LINK

By challenging the prejudices of the Administration rather than reinforcing them, the NIE on Iran does what earlier estimates on Iraq notoriously failed to do.

It also departs from the judgments of the 2005 NIE on Iran, which is why it has now been publicly disclosed, according to Deputy DNI Donald Kerr.

"Since our understanding of Iran's capabilities has changed, we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available," he said (pdf).

In fact, however, Congress directed the DNI in the FY 2007 defense authorization act to prepare an unclassified summary of the Estimate.

"Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted." (House Report 109-702, section 1213, Intelligence on Iran).

It looks to me like the were required to release the NIE as it was attached to a funding bill that had already been signed and such. In other words it was not because anybody was being patriotic, and it was a requirement.

[Sean Osborne]

The Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour thread has become so long and rambling, I am going to use the excuse of release and debate over the new NIE to close that thread and open a new one, using the NIE as the start point for new discussion on the potential Iranian nuclear threat:

DNI, 3 Dec 07: Iran: Nuclear Prospects and Capabilities

Since its release, there has been a tremendous amount of analysis and debate over its content.

Rasmussen conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).

Toplines - Iran Nuclear Program - December 5-6, 2007
National Survey of 800 Likely Voters

1* How closely have you followed recent news stories about Iran’s nuclear program?

43% Very closely

40% Somewhat closely

2* A U.S intelligence report found that Iran stopped their nuclear weapons program in 2003. Do you believe that Iran has stopped their nuclear weapons program?

66% No

3* Is Iran still a threat to the national security of the United States?

67% Yes

4* Should the United States continue to impose economic sanctions on Iran?

59% Yes

5* How likely is it that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon in the future?

47% Very likely

34% Somewhat likely

Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with respect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

[Rex Brynen]

Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with repect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

The target of the NIE was not, however, the American voting public, and its "failure" can therefore hardly be assessed in those terms.

[Sean Osborne]

The target of the NIE was not, however, the American voting public, and its "failure" can therefore hardly be assessed in those terms.

Au contraire, the unclassified version of the NIE was most assuredly intended for public consumption. With this National Survey of the public reaction to it the purpose of the unclassified NIE most assuredly can be assessed as a failure. We'll see come November '08 just how much of a failure.

[Rex Brynen]

Au contraire, the unclassified version of the NIE was most assuredly intended for public consumption. With this National Survey of the public reaction to it the purpose of the unclassified NIE most assuredly can be assessed as a failure. We'll see come November '08 just how much of a failure.

The unclassified portion of the NIE is presumably precisely that--the key judgements of the NIE that could be unclassified with prejudice to means/sources/techniques, or to key US interests.

Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.

[Sean Osborne]

The unclassified portion of the NIE is presumably precisely that--the key judgements of the NIE that could be unclassified with prejudice to means/sources/techniques, or to key US interests.

As I noted above, the unclassified NIE notes within its text that it contains estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions.

Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.

This one is assuming nothing but has noted above and will note now that in the text of the unclassified version of the NIE were the objections of the DOE and the NIC to some of the estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions made in the document.

[Sean Osborne]

A more salient point would be to note what GlobalSecurity.org has to say, with the acknowledgement that this NIE confirmed the existence of Iranian WMD of the nuclear variety.

The success of strikes against Iran's WMD facilities requires both tactical and strategic surprise, so there will not be the sort of public rhetorical buildup in the weeks preceeding hostilities, of the sort that preceeded the invasion of Iraq. To the contrary, the Bush Administration will do everything within its power to deceive Iran's leaders into believing that military action is not imminent.

With respect to the role of the upcoming election, and the barometer of public perception of the Iranian nuclear threat, I submit the poll posted above is most germane to this issue. To quote one of my favorite columnists:

I think the election results will turn as much on perceptions as reality, and political campaigns are all about creating perceptions, so the campaigning will be highly relevant. Don't get me wrong, there is not always a major disconnect between perception and reality. The electorate will often perceive things as they objectively exist.

From the same link as above:

4 November 2008
The US presidential election of 2008 is scheduled to occur on November 4, 2008. If the White House judges that military strikes would rally the country around the President and his party, it would argue for timing strikes as little as a week before the election, a pre-planned October Surprise.

This might be the bottom line if the current NIE was in fact politically motivated.

[Stan]

I just plain give up herein

My Intelligence Estimate

Dang... there goes my coveted HUMINT. POOF!

Rasmussen conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).

Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with respect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

A more salient point would be to note what GlobalSecurity.org has to say, with the acknowledgement that this NIE confirmed the existence of Iranian WMD of the nuclear variety.

Are we to conclude that your HUMINT is based on a 800-Joe-Delta-Everyday-Civilian's opinion and top that with Global Security ?

How 'bout addressing the issue. What's your fix, Sean ?

[Ken White]

The target of the NIE was not, however, the American voting public, and its "failure" can therefore hardly be assessed in those terms.

In totality, I mean. The Intel community both has leanings and likes synergies...

[Steve Blair]

Rasmussen conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).



Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with repect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

And I'm not a big fan of trusting an 800 person survey as reflecting much other than the mindset of those 800 people. Sorry, but most polling organizations shroud their methods and certain key points of information (like response rate, refusal rate, polling locations, times called, and so on) in so much secrecy that it's impossible to tell what they really reflect.

Polls can be an interesting general indicator, but at the end of the day they reflect little more than the opinion of the people who actually answered the phone and stuck with the survey all the way through.

[wm]

Rasmussen conducted "National Survey of 800 Likely Voters" on 5/6 December 2007. Here is the report on the results of that poll (emphasis added) which reflects the mindset of the American citizen with a high degree of confidence (95%).



Sounds to me like the most recent NIE accomplished zip with respect to the voting American public (i.e.: was a big time failure).

I'm not sure what the relelvance of this post is. The NIE is not targeted at the GAP (great American public). Its purpose, like any intelligence product, is to answer questions asked by deicsionmakers in order to help inform the decisions that they make.

I earlier tried to make a post about the problem of getting any kind of consensus about the NIE's meaning/truth. However, it was eaten by etherspace. I'll try again now.

Statements are not true in a vacuum. They are true in a complex of a question and an answer. The question itself is framed against a backdrop of presuppostion held by the questioner. If the NIE does not provide an answer to the question asked by the decisionmaker in the context of those presuppostions, then it is neither true nor fals. It is simply irrelevant.

Here's an example. I see a paper on a bulletin board. I ask myself, "Why did someone post that paper on the bulletin board?" I am seeking an answer that provides me with someone'as motivation for putting the paper on the board and have presupposed that it was indeed posted on the board by someone. Now if the answer I get is that the paper lists the hours of operation of the local pizza shop or that no one posted the paper, it just appeared mysteriously by an act of divine providence, I will not have an answer that I accept as true. Neither response answers my question in the context of my presuppostions.

I suspect that this may be why the poll results are so negative. The GAP idn't get its questions answered in a way that accorded with their presupposition, built up since 1978 by the US MSM, that the Iranians are deceitful scoundrels. But, of course, they were not the customer.

As a further point, I think the above analysis (for which I cannot take credit--it comes from R.G Collingwood in his Essay on Philosophical Method and his Essay on Metaphysics) probably explains most of our so-called "intelligence failures." Decisionmakers dismissed the intel they received because it didn't answer their question or did not fit their presuppositions. Then they acted on instinct rather than with reason.